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  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
						
                                

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CO OD WH AH BW HY om ee wR BN oO P OBOX 6169 NOVATO, CALIFORNIA 94948-6169 (415) 898-1555 ATTORNEYS AT LAW - MARUSH LANDING ROAD n a BRAYTON@PURCELL LLP 2 RoR Ny NR MY NN NY NY = & e232 FA ROHS = SE & ALAN R, BRAYTON, ESQ., $.B, #73685 DAVID R. DONADIG, ESO., 8.B. #15443 OREN P. NOAH, ESQ., $.B. #136310 ELECTRONICALLY ASHLEY J. BENSON, ESQ., S.B. #276326 FILED BRAYTON@PURCELL LLP Superior Court of California, orneys at Law County of San-Francisco POBox 610) APR 24 2013 Novato, California 94948-6169 Clerk of the Court (415) 898-1555 BY: VANESSA WU Tentative Ruling Contest Email: contestasbestosTR@braytonlaw.com Deputy Clerk Attorneys for Plaintiffs SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO ASBESTOS No. CGC-10-275731 PLAINTIFFS! MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN ROBERT ROSS and JEAN ROSS, } OPPOSITION. TO DEFENDANT HAROLD Plaintiffs, VS. . C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS; Defendants as Reflected on Exhibit 1 attached to the Summary Complaint herein; and DOES 1-8500. BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Date: May 8, 2013 Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept: 503, Hon. Teri L. Jackson Trial Date: June 10, 2013 Action Filed: December 17, 2010 Enniudu 9347p ldtopp- BEASLY -si-s2.wpd. ASB PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC."S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONCO NR WH BR WN RN YN NN RN RD a ka oar A A BW NY KF OD oO we NY RH A RB YW NR & oO TABLE OF CONTENTS L INTRODUCTION... etree teenies 1 Tl STATEMENT OF FACTS 2.0.0.0. occ ne nee ence e nee eee 2 UL LEGAL ARGUMENT «2.2.0.6. e eee eee eee eee ee ence eee eee 5 A. THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION IS LIMITED TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN ITS SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ... 20.2.0 0 cece eee eee ee eer ee rece ees 5 B. DEFENDANT BEASLEY OWES A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF TO EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE IN HANDLING AND DISTURBING ASBESTOS- CONTAINING MATERIALS .. 26.002 eee eee ee 6 c. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET IT’S BURDEN THAT THE SOPHISTICATED USER DEFENSE PRONOUNCED IN JOHNSON v. AMERICAN STANDARD, INC. 43 Cal.4th 56 (2008) APPLIES TO THE CASE AT BAR oo. cece een tenet tenet et en eee 9 D. THE UNION HAS NO EXPRESS DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR SAFETY IN * THE WORKPLACE «2.0.0.0 occ n tee teete ee ee il E. THE SOPHISTICATED USER DEFENSE IS NOT A COMPLETE DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION ..............- 12 F. DEFENDANT’S ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION SHOULD BE DENIED ..... 2.6... e cece cee eee 14 CONCLUSION oo. ee ee eee 14 KAlnjured O249ipld.opp- BG ASLY mss. i PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONCo wm IY ARH & wWHK 10 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co, (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49 200. 7 Conn. v. National Can Corp. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 630, 638.......0.0. 2.0.00. c eda eee 5 Fleet v. CBS, Inc. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1916 00.0... 0. ee 3 Inemational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler (1987) 481 U.S,.851, 0 Johnson v.American Standard, Inc, 43 Cal.4th 56 (2008) .. 2.0.00... e eee eee 9-13 Juge vy. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal _App.4th 59, 66 200.0... 6 cece 5 ir ited Airli (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 253 ...0..0000.0.022004 eee 6 North Coast Business Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 22, 31 ...... 6 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 131 6 Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 C.2d 108 2.02.0... eee ee eee eet eee 7 San Diego Watercrafts. Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, (2002) 102 Cal. App.4th 308, 316... 5 Scott v. Chevron U.S.A. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 510, 515 60.0... eee cee eee eee ee eee 6-7 Steelworkers v, Rawson (1990) 495 U.S. 362, 372-373 2.0.02. ec cee eee 11 Warner v, Santa Catalina Island Co. (1955) 44 C. 2d 310,317 ©... eee eee 8 Vaca v, Sipes (1967) 386 U.S. 171, 190 2.2... cece eee eee 12 Statutes Code of Civil Procedure § 437¢ . 0.00.0... cece eee eee wo ceccueceuecseeeeuveliueas 5-6 Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(a) o...c c cence een een nner enees 5 Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(b)(1) . 5 Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(p)(2) 9 Code of Civil Procedure § 1714(a) 00.060. ccc cece cece ene ieeees 7 KNslured1934 ~SEASLY et. ii - PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONCm YN A UW BF WN RNR YM RY RN RRQ om mm met Ba IHD Ww BW NY =~ DD DA DAH BP WH KF Oo L INTRODUCTION Defendant HAROLD BEASLEY HEATING & PLUMBING INC, (“BEASLEY”) asserts two (2) arguments in its Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication: (1) that as a smaller contractor, BEASLEY did not have and shouldn’t have known about the hazards of asbestos and therefore cannot be liable to plaintiff, and (2) the affirmative defense that Mr. ROSS was a sophisticated user and thus BEASLEY had no duty to warn Mr. ROSS of the hazards of which he was already aware. As to its first argument BEASLEY ignores the state of the art available at the time it exposed Mr, ROSS to asbestos. Plaintiffs’ discovery responses include facts, references to extensive documents, and expert testimony supporting plaintiffs’ claims that a contractor such as BEASLEY should have know asbestos was hazardous. Defendant’s second argument that it is shielded from liability on account of a purported affirmative defense of sophisticated user fails on two grounds. First, defendant fails to establish that plaintiff was a sophisticated user under applicable California law. Second, even if plaintiff were considered to be a sophisticated user, the sophisticated user defense does not 2 amount to a complete defense and contrary to the defendant's erroneous assertion does not absolve defendant of a duty to exercise due care. As to its showing of plaintiff's supposed sophistication, defendant presented no evidence regarding what plaintiff knew about hazards of asbestos at any time. Defendant has merely suggested there are articles and there were meetings that would have informed plaintiff of the hazards of asbestos. Defendant made no showing that plaintiff had read the articles or attended any meetings , that there was any requirement or expectation that plaintiff had read the articles or attend any meetings, or even that plaintiff had the opportunity to read the articles. The defendant’s effort to stack inference upon inference fails to demonstrate that plaintiff knew or ought to have known of asbestos hazards at the time defendant’s employees negligently exposed him to asbestos. Wt KAlnjusodLihdtipllope RE ASL Yeo casa 1 PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONEven had defendant successfully demonstrated plaintiff to have been sophisticated, the sophisticated user defense, when it applies at ail, applies ONLY to the duty to warn. It does not. relieve the defendant from its duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring others by other means. It provides no immunity for the negligence of its employees in exposing plaintiff to asbestos. Plaintiff produces herewith competent evidence demonstrating that a disputed issue of material fact exists regarding what defendant ought to have known about the presence of asbestos in the materials disturbed by its employees and the hazards posed thereby: Specifically Richard Cohen, M.D.’s declaration articulates that there was a longstanding general understanding of workplace dusts as posing a hazard decades before the events at issue in the *: instant matter, creating a concurrent obligation on the part of an employer to determine if hazardous materials are present. Dr. Cohen also articulates additional specific reasons why, by: the mid1970's, regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency and OSHA, should have further alerted contractors in industrial settings to the potential hazards posed by thermal insulation materials and spray-on fireproofing. From the facts presented by Dr. Cohen’s declaration, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that BEASLEY ought to have known of the presence of asbestos, or at the very least dust in general, the hazard posed thereby and should therefore have conducted itself in a manner so as not to expose Mr. ROSS. BEASLEY has neither shown that plaintiffs’ evidence is deficient nor proffered sufficient evidence to establish the affirmative defense of sophisticated user as a complete defense. Thus, BEASLEY’s arguments fail. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS Robert Ross, a career insulator, suffers from colon cancer, asbestosis and asbestos- related pleural disease. (Complaint, Ex. A.) He and his wife brought this personal injury and joss of consortium action on December 17, 2010 against various defendants responsible for his exposure to asbestos, including BEASLEY. Mt KlnjusodLtRhaMpopp BE ASL sip PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING’. AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONin this Motion, BEASLEY acknowledges that the claims herein arise from Beasley's plumbers exposing Mr. ROSS to asbestos at three sites: McKinleyville High School, St. Patrick High School, and Fairfield Hospital. (BEASLEY’s Separate Statement No. 6.) Defendant BEASLEY acknowledges that the evidence shows that: ’ Mr. ROSS worked in the presence of a BEASLEY plumber named “Brownie” on a new construction project at McKinleyville High School in McKinleyville, California between 1961 and 1965 and that Mr. ROSS observed "Brownie" disturb existing fireproofing when "Brownie" installed new plumbing lines. (BEASLEY’s Separate Statements Nos. 7 & 8.) . During a roughly one month new construction project at St. Patrick High School in Vallejo, California between 1967 and 1969, Mr. ROSS worked in the presence of Jim Beasley and a Beasley-plumber he knew as "Browning." "Browning's" work included fabricating’Garlock gaskets. (BEASLEY’s Separate Statements Nos. 10 & 11.) . In-1979, Mr. ROSS observed one or two BEASLEY plumbers remove existing insulation and disturb existing fireproofing during a one to two week remodel project on Fairfield Hospital's campus. (BEASLEY’s Separate Statement No. 12.) In this Motion, BEASLEY does not contend that plaintiff cannot prove that the thermal insulation, fireproofing and gaskets disturbed by BEASLEY employees in plaintiff’s presence did not contain asbestos, or that he was not exposed to asbestos. (BEASLEY’s Separate Statement of Facts.) ‘ : With regard to BEASLEY’s contentions that it owed no duty to prevent Mr. ROSS from breathing in the asbestos dust that its employees created, the facts are that: . Extensive literature, dating back a century, recognized the potential hazards posed by toxic substances leaving the work place on the clothing or person of workers. (Declaration of Richard Cohen, M.D., M.P.H.) Mt PLAINTIFFS‘ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION0 Oo YW AHA PF WN eK BNR YN RN NR ND Dm we aS Oo WD wh FW MY KF FB Be BDH BF BH HK SG Mie Literature dating back as early as1898 recognized the hazards posed by asbestos and by the late 1940s, it came to be understood that asbestos could cause cancer. (id) Extensive studies and literature indicate that well recognized practices were available to reduce or eliminate the exposure to asbestos in the workplace. (Id.) By the 1960s a company working in construction and on jobsites where contractors and laborers were working alike should have been aware of potential health hazards associated with exposure to certain occupational dusts generally. In view of this, to the extent that any contractor was unaware of the composition of dust which might be created or encountered, it ought to have sought out such information. (Id.) Likewise, by the 1960s a company, working in construction and on jobsites » where contractors and laborers were working alike, should have been aware of health hazards associated with exposure to asbestos dust. Information was readily available prior to the 1960s concerning the health hazards of not only exposure to certain occupational non-asbestos dusts, but also to asbestos dust and the associated increased risk of developing an asbestos-related disease. Information regarding the substantial health risks associated with exposure to airborne asbestos was readily available by the 1960s, and only became more readily available over the course of time. (Id.) Equally available was information about measures to reduce the creation of dust and eliminate or reduce the exposure to dust that was created. By the 1960s, contractors, including defendant, located in California and subject to California General Industry Safety Orders, had ready access to information regarding methods for mitigating exposures and could have implemented them. (Id.) Contractors such as defendant should have been educating their employees and implementing procedures to mitigating dust in at least the 1960s. (Id.) 4 _KiddnjucediOdShpldboppatilia ss PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONCo Oe YN DAH PF WH RN NY RNR NR RD DQ me mee SCI KDA BF OWS &§ So MAY DA Bw YD SK Oo i LEGAL ARGUMENT A. THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION IS LIMITED TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN ITS SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c imposes “on the moving party both a pleading requirement and a substantive burden in order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 66.) “[T]he initial duty - to define the issues presented by the complaint and to challenge them factually is on the defendant who seeks a summary judgment.” (Conn. v. National Can Corp, (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 630, 638.) This duty requires a defendant seeking summary judgment to set forth in its moving papers “with specificity (1) the issues tendered by the complaint or answer which are pertinent to the summary judgment motion and (2) each of the grounds of law upon which the moving party is relying in asserting that the action has no merit or there is no defense to the action.” (Juge, 12 Cal.App.4th at 67.) Specifically, “[t]he Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in support of a motion must separately identify each cause of action, claim, issue of duty or affirmative defense, and each supporting material fact claimed to be without dispute with respect to the cause of action, claim, issue of duty, or affirmative defense. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.3150(d), emphasis added.) “The due process aspect of the separate statement requirement is self-evident, to inform the opposing party of the evidence to be disputed to defeat the motion.” (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 316.) “Failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may in the court’s discretion constitute a sufficient ground for denial of the motion.” (C.C.P. § 437c(b)(1)) “Facts stated elsewhere [other than in the separate statement] need not be considered by the court.” (Fleet v. CBS, Inc, (1996) 50 Cal_App.4th 1911, 1916.) Due process further requires the Court to exclude any evidence which was not timely served in accordance with C.C.P. § 437c(a). (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc., 102 Cal.App.4th at 316.) “Thus, when the ‘fact’ is not mentioned in the separate statement, it is irrelevant that such fact might be buried in the mound of paperwork xa 5. seeDLOAADipL oss ALAS asst PLAINTIFFS‘ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONoO FR tA RB WN oN RP NY NN RN Re eB c era aA A ROSH 2S SH UAE RE BAH ES filed with the court, because the statutory purposes are not furthered by unhighlighted facts.” (North Coast Business Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 22, 31.) Further, defendant cannot expand the scope of its argument or offer new evidence in response to either plaintiff's response to defendant's Separate Statement or to plaintiffs own Separate Statement if one was necessary. There is no provision in either C.C.P. § 437c or California Rules of Court 3.1350 authorizing or allowing a response to the opposing party’s Separate Statement. (See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal. App.4th 243, 253.) Therefore, any supplemental declarations, documents, or additional evidence presented by defendant in its reply brief or at the hearing on this motion must be disregarded. Here, defendant makes two arguments, both erroneous: (1) that defendant was so small a contractor that they didn’t know and shouldn’t have known asbestos dust was hazardous; and (2) even if they had known about the hazards of asbestos dust, defendant owed no duty to plaintiff because Mr. ROSS was a sophisticated user. < Defendant does not dispute that its employees disturbed and handled fireproofing, gaskets, and thermal insulation. They merely, erroneously, claim that they owed Mr. ROSS no duty to exercise reasonable care. Nor does defendant argue any failure of evidence of exposure or medical causation.’ B. DEFENDANT BEASLEY OWES A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF TO EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE IN HANDLING AND DISTURBING ASBESTOS- CONTAINING MATERIALS “According to the familiar California formula, the allegations requisite to a cause of action for negligence are (1) facts showing a duty of care in the defendant, (2) negligence constituting a breach of the duty, and (3) injury to the plaintiff as a proximate result.” (Peter W. y. San Francisco Unified School District (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 131.) Defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiff in this matter, which it breached. As a result, plaintiff suffered injury. The foreseability of the harm, though not determinative, has become the chief factor in duty analysis." (Scott v. Chevron U.S.A. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 510, 515.) Our state Supreme } Defendant also seeks summary adjudication of plaintiff’s claims for strict liability, but plaintiff has dismissed this cause of action. AICS pop BERS! Yoeagaape PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONco OD wm TN DA A FB WN Court discussed the foreseeability analysis in Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49. In that case, the plaintiff was inside a telephone booth located in a parking lot 15 feet away from the curb when an intoxicated driver veered off the street and crashed into the booth, injuring plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the entities that installed and maintained the telephone booth, alleging that the booth was negligently located too close to the street. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court reversed. Regarding the issue of foreseeability, the court explained: "In pursuing this inquiry, it is well to remember that 'foresceability is not to be measured by what is more probable than not, but includes whatever is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] wouid take account of it in guiding practical conduct.' [Citation.] One may be held accountable for creating even "the risk of a slight possibility of injury if a reasonably prudent [person] would not do so.” [Citations.] (Id. at pp. 57-58.) As the Scott court explained, in analyzing duty, the court's task: 2 is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party." [Citation.] Viewed in this light, the question of foreseeability in a "duty" context is a limited one for the court, and readily contrasted with the fact-specific foreseeability questions bearing on negligence (breach of duty) and proximate causation posed to the jury or trier of fact. [Citation.] (Scott, supra, at p. 516.) California Civil Code § 1714(a), derived from the common law and unchanged in our law since 1872, reads in part as follows: “Every one is responsible, not only for the results of his or her wrongful acts, but also for an injury occasioned by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself." (Witkin, supra, § 833.) In Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 C.2d 108, the court reexamined negligence liability and concluded that this general section is the foundation of California negligence law. Rephrased, it establishes the general principle that "(a)ll persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as the result of their conduct." And, “in the absence of KAtajucadndtillbappeBs 2 arjerasind. PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONCo we YA HW & WN statutory provision declaring an exception to the fundamental principle..., no such exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy.” (1d, at 112.) "The standard of care required of the reasonable person when dealing with ... dangerous articles is so great that a slight deviation therefrom will constitute negligence." (Warner v. Santa Catalina island Co. (1955) 44 C. 2d 310, 317.) Here, defendant first argues that it owed and breached no duty to plaintiff as plaintiffs lack evidence of what BEASLEY knew or should have known concerning the presence of asbestos in the fireproofing and thermal insulation materials it disturbed. Naturally, plaintiffs are not in a position to demonstrate what BEASLEY actually knew more than 30 years ago, but they are not required to do so. What plaintiffs can do, and have done, is to produce evidence that BEASLEY ought to have known whether asbestos was present in the materials it was disturbing and exposing plaintiff to. Dr. Cohen, in paragraphs 12-15 of his declaration, articulates how there was a widespread understanding, dating from the 1930's and 1940's and even earlier, that there was a general hazard posed by dusts in industrial settings and a further recognition that “[t]he only safe way for an employer is to regard all dusts in industry as a hazard” absent a determination otherwise. In view of this, to the extent that any contractor was -unaware of the composition of dust which might be created or encountered, it ought to have sought out such information. Additionally, regardless of the kind of dust, BEASLEY should have protected its own employees and in the process would also have protected Mr. ROSS. Dr. Cohen explains, in paragraphs 15, 21 and 22 of his declaration, that the information regarding the hazards associated with dust exposure was readily available to companies working in the construction trades, including BEASLEY by at least by the mid-1930s. As a California employer, BEASLEY was subject to the California General Industry Safety Orders and therefore should have educated its employees about the precautions to be taken around workplace dust, by the early 1960s at the latest. A disputed issue of material fact has been. demonstrated as to BEASLEY’s duty of care and its breach. “ 8 PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONew wm ND hw RB WwW NY PR YP NY YN RD Dee eka SC WA A BO VY em SCM WA A BBW = S Cc. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET IT’S BURDEN THAT THE SOPHISTICATED USER DEFENSE PRONOUNCED IN JOHNSON v. AMERICAN STANDARD, INC. 43 Cal.4th 56 (2008) APPLIES TO THE CASE AT BAR When asserting an affirmative defense as defendant does here, defendant bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to establish all elements of the affirmative defense. (C.C-P. § 437c(p)(2).) BEASLEY failed to produce such evidence as demonstrated below. The sophisticated user defense was recognized by the California Supreme Court in the case of Johnson v. Am erican Standard, Inc, (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56. (“Johnson.”) The case involved a plaintiff who was a trained and certified heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) technician. He was injured when heat from a welding torch he was using caused “R- 22"--a refrigerant gas in the air conditioning system he was working on-- to decompose into phosgene gas, a hazardous toxic substance. Plaintiff sued American Standard, the manufacturer of the air conditioning system, alleging both strict liability and negligence, with each cause of action grounded in a claim that the manufacturer failed to provide adequate warning of the hazard posed by the heating of the R-22 gas. The Johnson court upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on a factual determination that plaintiff had been a sophisticated user with respect to the refrigerant gas and a legal holding that “[a]. manufacturer is not liable to a sophisticated user of its product for failure to warn of a risk harm or danger if the sophisticated user Anew or should have known of that risk harm or danger”. (Id., at 71, emphasis added.) Here, defendant has produced no evidence whatsoever that Mr. ROSS had actual knowledge of any risk associated with asbestos at any relevant time. Jobnson of course recognized an alternate means of establishing status as a sophisticated user-- the “should have known standard”. (id.) But defendant likewise failed to produce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiff “should have known” that there were health hazards associated with asbestos generally or, more particularly, that plaintiff “should have known” that the fireproofing defendant handled and disturbed was hazardous. The facts of Johnson provide useful illustrations of how it can be demonstrated that a product user should have known of the hazards of a product. The evidence in Johnson revealed PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADIUDICATIONCem WOH hm BB WN yoR RP NR NR RN Re ee Be ee ee ee ont DA MH FYB NY KF CS DOD OM HD A BR wD NY —& OC that the plaintiff was required to have been certified by the EPA and that the EPA required certified HVAC technicians to understand the decomposition products of refrigerants under high temperatures. In addition the court noted that the study guide that comprised-part of an HVAC technician’s training contained specific information that refrigerant in contact with high heat can form dangerous substances. Moreover, there was evidence that the Material Safety Data Sheets (“MSDS”) for R-22 gas—which plaintiff acknowledged having received.and read-contained explicit warnings that heating the material could lead to the release of phosgene gas. Finally, the court noted expert testimony, apparently undisputed, that there was wide knowledge among HVAC technicians that when R-22 is heated it can release phosgene gas. Defendant here failed to make an evidentiary showing commensurate with any of the foregoing examples. There was no showing that plaintiff was required by any agency or entity to have any understanding of the hazards associated with the materials with which he worked. Defendant, in its examination of plaintiff regarding his training declined to explore what, if anything, he was taught about asbestos hazards. Although defendant argues the publication, The Asbestos Worker, contained information about asbestos, it ignores the fact that plaintiff testified he did not read any of the issues . There was no evidence that MSDS sheets were ever provided to plaintiff at any relevant time nor any evidence that plaintiff ever received any information by any other means advising him of health hazards associated with asbestos. Nor did defendant offer other evidence, as was presented in Johnson, that hazards concerning the product in question were well known among members of plaintiff's class. In Johnson, in addition to evidence regarding training, testing, certification and distribution of warnings via Material Safety Data Sheets, there was express testimony via declaration of a defense expert that “it was ‘widely known among HVAC technicians’ that when R-22 is heated it can decompose into toxic substances including phosgene gas.” (1d., at 74.) Here however, . defendant, rather than making a showing that there was widespread knowledge of hazards on the part of other workers like plaintiff, defendant instead presented evidence purporting to show knowledge on the part of third parties, the union with which plaintiff was affiliated and one higher up individual within the union. PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC."S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONeo Oe YN DH HW RB BN Even accepting defendant’s premise that plaintiff’s union had knowledge conceming asbestos hazards as of at least 1957, defendant failed to demonstrate that the union’s knowledge was conveyed to its rank-and-file in an effective way. Defendant did not demonstrate that the union undertook to train, test, or certify its members regarding asbestos hazards. Defendant did not show that plaintiffs union promulgated work rules addressing asbestos hazards or negotiated contracts with plaintiff's employers mandating enforcement of safe asbestos handling practices. The only evidence offered by defendant as to why plaintiff should be deemed “sophisticated” is that the union produced a few issues of its monthly magazine--a magazine plaintiff stated in swom testimony that he did not read-- and meetings which defendant does not even attempt to prove plaintiff attended, that spoke to the issue of health tisks associated with asbestos insulation. Defendant failed to demonstrate how plaintiff, or others situated similarly to him, was to have come to learn of information in articles he never had an opportunity to read and meetings he never attended. . : D. ..THE UNION HAS NO EXPRESS DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE in Johnson, the Supreme Court emphasized that pursuant to various California Code Regulations that employers are required to train and educate their employees about the. chemicals and dangers to which they may be exposed on the job. (Id, at 62.) The dangers and risks associated with R--22 are noted on Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS's). (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8. § 5194, subd. (g)(1), (2).) The purpose of MSD8's is to inform those who may come into contact with potentially hazardous chemicals about their dangers. (See Cal.Code Regs.. tit, 8, § 5194, subd. (g).) Employers are required to use the MSDS to train and educate their employees about the chemicals and dangers to which they may be exposed on the job. (See Cal.Code Regs., tit, 8, § 519, subd. (h).) Among other things, employers are required to tell employees where they can find the MSDS's, how to read them, how to detect the presence of dangerous materials, and how to protect against possible heaith hazards from those materials. (Cal.Code Regs.. tit. 8. § 5194, subd. (H)2)(0), (D), (E), ).) But a union has no such obligation or duty. There is no express duty of care a union owes to its members under a negligence cause of action. (Steelworkers v, Rawson (1990) 495 U.S. 362, 372-373.) While unions do have a PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC,'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONoD me NY KD A BR WN duty of fair representation (Vaca v. Sipes (1967) 386 U.S. 171, 190), this duty does not encompass an implied duty of care to furnish a safe workplace. . At most, a union may acquire such a duty if it expressly assumes responsibility for it under a contractual arrangement with an employer. Only then do claims of negligence have any possible merit: (International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler (1987) 481 U.S. 851, 861.) Additionally, the employee must have relied on that duty. (Rawson, 495 U.S. at 363.) In the absence of an express assumption and reliance, a negligence claim will not lie. In International Brotherhood, a union. member claimed her union breached a duty of care to provide her with a safe workplace. The Supreme Court stated that the key inquiry for ascertaining if a cause of action existed was to look at the contract and determine what duties were taken on by each of the parties, and the scope of these duties. (International Brotherhood, 481 U.S. 851 at 862.) In as much as defendant has failed to show that plaintiff knew the hazards of asbestos, or that he. ought to have known because he received training in the subject, defendant’s argument appears to be that plaintiff ought to have known because the union ought to have trained him. Defendant offers no evidence that the union by its charter or contract with plaintiff or by any other means was required to assure that plaintiff became sophisticated about the hazards of asbestos. Plaintiff cannot be charged with constructive knowledge based merely upon a judgment regarding what his union, in a perfect world, ought to have done. : E. THE SOPHISTICATED USER DEFENSE 1S NOT A COMPLETE DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION Even if Mr. ROSS were considered a sophisticated user, such circumstance provides no defense other than to a cause of action based upon an alleged failure to warn. A plaintiff's sophistication does not relieve a defendant from any duty to exercise reasonable care otherwise. The California Supreme Court, in describing the scope of the sophisticated user defense in Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56. (“Johnson”), could not have been more succinct or clear: “A manufacturer is zot liable to a sophisticated user of its product for Kcdlajuced AG3SiplbopaLEa SL Yaad 12 PLAINTIFES' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONCm ny DA MW eR WN 10 failure to warn of a risk harm or danger if the sophisticated user knew or should have known of that risk harm or danger.” (Johnson, supra, at 71, emphasis added.) While the court recognized that the sophisticated user defense could be applied to both strict liability and negligence, the basis for so holding was that “there is Little functional difference between the two theories in the failure to warn context.” (Id., emphasis added.) Not only is the scope of the sophisticated user doctrine plainly and repeatedly stated by. the Johnson court, the court’s discussion of the policy rationale underlying the defense is only sensible in the context of failure to warn. The Johnson court describes the defense as an outgrowth from Restatement Second of Torts, section 388 and the obvious danger rule. (Id.,.at -65.) Each of these doctrinal underpinnings share the identical rationale: there is no need to warn about risks or dangers that are already known. (id., at 66.) It does not follow that the sophisticated user defense relieves a defendant of all duty to'- exercise reasonable care outside the context of providing a warning. Plaintiffs’ claim here is not that Mr. ROSS was injured because defendant failed to. warn him of a hazard, but because defendant’s employees engaged affirmatively in negligent work practices that exposed him to asbestos: BEASLEY employees failed to isolate their work as they handled and disturbed asbestos-containing materials either by erecting physical barriers to prevent the movement of - dust or by excluding others from being in proximity and thus exposed plaintiff to the dust they. negligently generated. For defendant’s argument that it is shielded by the “sophisticated user” defense, to be effective beyond the failure to warn context, would require that the ‘affirmative : defense be widened to provide that a “sophisticated user” is owed no duty of care in any + circumstance and that defendant had carte blanche to abandon the exercise of reasonable care and could conduct itself without regard to whether its activities created injurious exposures. Neither Johnson nor any of its progeny have so defined the sophisticated user defense and such a wholesale abandonment of the principle of duty to exercise reasonable care, and is not remotely supported by the policies underlying the limited relief from a duty to warn-- the sole-. immunity contemplated by the sophisticated user doctrine. Wi Maju DUGRASpl Dopp DE ASL Vacate wind PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC,"S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONF. DEFENDANT’S ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION SHOULD BE DENIED 1 Plaintiff has dismissed claims for negligence (products) and products liability against defendant leaving only the premises owner/contractor liability claim.. Defendant’s argument with respect to its negligence as a contractor fails for the same reasons argued above. . Thus, defendant’s failure to shift the burden as to this claim necessitates a denial of the motion for summary adjudication regarding the same. CONCLUSION | For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff respectfully requests this Court deny | BEASLEY's Motion for Summary Judgment or the alternative Motion for Summary - | Adjudication. Dated: April 24, 2013 BRAYTON*#PURCELL LLP By: /s/ Ashley J. Benson Ashley J. Benson Attorneys for Plaintiffs [Te comply with Department 503's rule regarding tentative rulings, you must email he Court notice if you wish to contest the tentative ruling at the following email address: contestasbestostr@sftc.org. A copy of any email notification to Department 503 must also be sent to our firm at contestasbestostr@braytonlaw.com.] PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONBRAYTON@PURCELL LLP ATEORNEYS ATLAW 222 RUSH LANDING ROAD POBOX 6169 NOVATO, CALIFORNIA 94948-6169 (415) 898-1555 oOo wm ID A BR WwW NY 10 PROOF OF SERVICE BY LEXIS-NEXIS E-SERVICE Tam employed in the County of Marin, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 222 Rush Landing Road, P.O. Box 6169, Novato California, 94948-6169. On April 24, 2013, I electronically served (E-Service), pursuant to General Order No. 158, the following documents: PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; DECLARATION OF ASHLEY J. BENSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS; PLAINTIFFS' SEPARATE STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS IN OPPOSITION. TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; PLAINTIFFS’ EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT HAROLD BEASLEY PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; [PROPOSED] ORDER on the interested parties in this action by utilizing Lexis-Nexis E-service program pursuant to General Order No. 158, to transmit a true copy thereof to the following party(ies): SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST The above document(s) were transmitted by Lexis-Nexis E-Service. Executed on April 24, 2013, at Novato, California. I declare under penaity of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. — gS \ ~ / - Diane TI. Davidowski Robert Ross, et al. v. C.C. Moore & Co. Engineers. etal. San Francisco Superior Court Case No. CGC-10-275731 PROOF OF SERVICE BY E-SERVICEBrayton-Purcell Service List Date Created: 4/24/2013-2:01:56 PM (DID) Created by: LitSupport ~ ServiceList - Reporting Matter Number: Adams Nye Becht LLP 222 Kearny Street, Seventh Floor San Francisco, CA 94108 445-982-8955 415- 382. 2042 (fax) Defendants: Pribuss Engineering, Inc. (PRIBUS) Becherer, Kannett & Schweitzer Water Tower 1255 Powell Street Emeryville, CA 94608-2604 $10-658-3600 510-658-1151 (fax) Defendants: CSK Auto, Inc. (CSKAUT Johnson Controls, Inc. JOHCON) Bishop, Barry, Drath Watergate Tower IIL 2000 Powell Street, eauite 1425 Emeryville, CA. 510-596-0888 3 io: 1396-0899 (fax) Defendants: Foley Blectric Co. (FOLELE). Buty & Curtiano 555-12" Street, Suite 1280 Oakland, CA 9 510-267-3000 Sto 267-0117 (fax) Defendants: Critchfield Mechanical, Inc. (CRIMEC) Harold Beasley Plumbing and Heating, Inc. (BEASLY) S.J. Amoroso Construction Co., Inc. (AMOCON) Foley & Mansfield PLLP 300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1900 Oakland, CA 9461 510-590-9500 510-590-9595 (fax) Defendants: Acco Engineered Systems, Inc, (ACCESS D.W. Nicholson Compan oration. (DWNICH) Fluor Corporation (FLUOR) Lone Star Industries, Inc. {ENSTR) mond Interior Systems-North 19349.004 ~ Robert Ross Archer Norris P.O. Box 8035 2033 N. Main Street, suite 800 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 925-930-6600 925-930-6620 (fax) Defendants: Albay Construction Con any & LBAY) Cahill Construction Co., ‘AHILC) Ganill Contractors, Inc. ine (CAH iL Cupertino Electric, Inc. ) y Bennett, Samuelsen, Reynolds & Allard 1301 Marina Village Parkway Suite 300 Alameda, CA 94501-1084 510-444-7688 510-444-5849 (fax) Defendants: Slakey Brothers, inc. (SLAKEY) Brydon. Hugo & Parker 135 Main Street, 20" Floor San Francisco, CA 94105 415-808-0300 415-808-0333 (fax) Defendants: A. Teichert & Son, Inc. (ArEic Bayer Cropscience Inc. (BAYCRO) Domco Products Texas, L.P. MCO) Perini Corporation (PERCOR) Rountree Plumbing & Heating Inc. (RNTPLU) Swinerton Builders (SWINBU) Cooley Manien- Jones, LLP 201 Spear Street Suite 1800 San Francisco, CA 941 415-512-4381 415- 315. 6791 (fax) Defendants: Temporary Plant Cleaners, Inc. (TEMPLA) Gordon & Rees LLP Shari Weintraub, Esq. ol West Broadivay, '16" Floor San Diego, CA 1 619-696-6700 io. 696-7124 (fax) Defendants: Marshco Auto Parts, Inc. (MARAPI) (RAYISN) ‘Van-Mulder Sheet Metal, Inc. (VANMSM) Run By : Davidewski, Diane Bassi, Edlin, Huie & Blum LLP 500 Washington Street Suite 700 San Francisco, CA 9411 415-397-9006 415-397- ‘i339 (fax) Defendants: Balliet Bros. Construction Corporation (BALBRO) J.T. Thorpe & Son, Inc. (THORPE) Malm Metal Products, Inc. (€MALMSM) Berry & Berry P.O. Box 16070 2930 Lakeshore Avenue ° Oakland, CA 94610 510-835-8330 510-835-5117 (fax) Defendants: Berry & Berry (B&B) Burnham Brown 1901 Harrison Street, 14" Floor Oakland, CA 9461 510-444-6800 510-835-6666 (fax) Defendants: California Drywall Co. (CALDRY) Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 50 Fremont Street, 20" Floor San Francisco, CA 94105-2235 415-591-7500 415-591-7510 (fax) Defendants: . . . Pharmacia Corporation, which will do business in California as Pharmacia Pharmaceutical Corporation (PHARCA) Gordon & Rees LLP Embarcadero Center West 275 Battery Street, Suite 7000 San Francisco, CA 9411 415-986-5900 415-986-! 1054 (fax) Defendants: Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, The (GOODYR)Date Created: (pip) 4/24/2013-2:01:56 PM Brayton~-Purcell Service List Created by: LitSuppert - ServiceList ~- Reporting Matter Number: Haas & Najarian, LLP 58 Maiden Second Floor San Francisco, CA 9 415-788-6330 41 Saat sss (fax) Defendants: McClure Electric, Inc. (MCCLUR) Law Offices of Glaspy & Glaspy, Inc. One Walnut Creek Center 100 Pringle Avenue, Suite 750 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 925-947-1300 Shs. 947-1594 (fax) Defendants: Fairmont Hotel Company (FAIRH) McInerney & Dillon, P.C. : 1999 Harrison Street,’ Suite 1700 Oakland, CA 94612 510-465-7100 510-465-8556 (fax) Defendants: Allied Fire Protection (ALLFIR) Seiman Breitman LLP 33 New Montgomery 6" Floor San Francisco, CA 94105 415-979-0400 415-979-2099 (fax) Defendants: Rountree Plumbing & Heating Inc. (RNTPLU) Syalsworth, Franklin, Bevins & McCall, 601 Mont; Strset, ° Floor San Francisco, CA 9411 415-781-7072 415-391- 15288 (fax) Defendants: D. Zelinsky & Sons, Inc. (ZELINS) Duro Dyne Corporation (DURODN) 19349.004 - Robert Ross Hake Law, A Professional Corporation 655 Montgomery Street Suite 1000 San Francisco, CA 9411 415-926-5800 415-926-' 's801 (fax} Defendants: Advance Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (ADVMEC) Anderson, Rowe & Buckley. Inc, (AR&B) Bell Products Inc, Bragg Investment Company, "ine. (BRAGG) Collins & Electrical Company, Inc. (CO) TO), Emil J. Weber Electric Co. (EMILJW) Low, Ball & Lynch 505 Montgomery Street, 7" Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-2584 415-981-6630 415-399-1506 (fax) Defendants: Giampolini & Co. (GIAMPO) Pacific Mechanical Corporation {PACMCR) Perkins Coie LLP Four Embarcadero Gepter, Suite 2400 San Francisco, CA 94111 415-344-7000 415-344-7050 (fax) Defendants: General Mitls, Inc. (GMILLS) Sinunu Bruni LLP 333 Pine Street, Suite 400 San Francisco, CA 94104 415-362-9700 415-362-9707 (fax) Defendants: McChure Electric, Inc. (MCCLUR) Run By : Davidowski, Diane Imai, Tadlock, Keeney & Cordery, LLP 160 Bush Street, Suite 1300. San Francisco, CA 94104 415-675-7000 415-675-7008 (fax) Defendants: Clausen-Patten, Inc. (CesNed) Commair Mechanical Services oe mycB ck C (CBECK) len eck Compal Webcor Builders, ine. DW EBCaiS McDowall Cotter, A.P.C. 2070 Pioneer Court San Mateo, CA 94403 650-572-7933 650-572-0834 (fax) Defendants: Beta Mechanical Contractors, Limited (BETAMC) Prindle, Amaro, Goetz, Hillyard, Barnes & Reinholtz LLP One California Street, Suite 1910 Francisco, CA 94111 415-788-8354 415-788-3625 (fax) Defendants: JW, McClenahan Company, Inc. Ret Tse lk Co. Ei ille, b lectric Co. Emeryville, Inc. {REDEL! Le) Sweeney, Mason, Wilson & Bosomworth A Professional Law Corporation 983 University Ave., Suite 104C Los Gatos, CA 95032-7637 408-356-3000 408-354-8839 (fax) Defendants: eae ae) Electric Co. Emeryville, Inc.