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  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
  • ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS ASBESTOS document preview
						
                                

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BRYDON HuGO & PARKER 138 MAIN STREET 20" FLOOR San Francisco, CA 94105. Edward R. Huge [Bar No. 124839] P.M. Bessette [Bar No. 127588] Josette D. Johnson [Bar No. 135977] BRYDON HUGO & PARKER ELECTRONICALLY 135 Main Street, 20th Floor San Francisco, CA 94105 Sup JE I - E De ja, Telephone: (415) 808-0300 County of San Francisco Facsimile: (415) 808-0333 Email: service@bhplaw.com MAY 03 2013 Clerk of the Court Attorneys for Defendant BY: CAROL BALISTRERI SWINERTON BUILDERS Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT - STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO - UNLIMITED JURISDICTION ROBERT ROSS and JEAN ROSS, (ASBESTOS) Case No. CGC-09-275731 Plaintiffs, vs. REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO SWINERTON BUILDERS’ MOTION FOR C.C, MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS, et al, | SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY Defendants. ADJUDICATION Date: May 9, 2013 Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept: 503 Judge: Hon. Teri L, Jackson Complaint Filed: | December 17, 2010 Trial Date: June 10, 2013 Swinerton Builders (’Swinerton”) hereby submits its reply to plaintiffs’ opposition to Swinerton’s motion for summary judgment. In opposition to Swinerton’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff claims that Johnson v. American Standard (2008) 43 Cal,4* 56, does not apply to a negligence cause of action, but even if it did, Swinerton has not shown plaintiff's individual sophistication regarding asbestos, such that Johnson should not apply, Neither argument is correct. Under Johnson, Swinerton is not required to show plaintiff's individual, subjective level of sophistication, Rather, Swinerton need only show the subjective sophistication of the 1 REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO SWINERTON BUILDERS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONBRYDON Huco & PARKER, 135 MAIN STREET 20" FLooR San Francisoo, CA 94108 members of plaintiff's trade - asbestos workers. Moreover, Johnson explicitly states that it applies to negligence causes of action. A. As A Sophisticated User of Asbestos, Swinerton Did Not Owe Duty Of Care To Robert Ross. Plaintiffs argue that Swinerton has failed to show that Robert Ross was a sophisticated user of asbestos. This argument ignores the testimony of Robert Ross wherein he admitted to being a member of Asbestos Workers Local 16, to attending union meetings, to receiving the Asbestos Workers magazine, and to wearing a mask throughout his career. Regardless, it is beyond dispute that in Johnson, the Supreme Court adopted an objective standard in determining whether the plaintiff possessed sufficient knowledge to qualify as a “sophisticated user.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Ine. (2008) 43 Cal.4* 56, 71.) Thus, it is not the knowledge of the individual that matters, but rather the knowledge of the trade or group to which the individual belongs that determines the application of the sophisticated user defense. The focus of inquiry is “whether the danger in question was so generally known within the trade or profession that a manufacturer should not have been expected to provide a warning specific to the group to which [the plaintiff] belonged.” (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4" at 74.) Here, there is no doubt that Robert Ross himself, and the union to which he belonged, Local 16, were sophisticated users of asbestos who were fully aware of the dangers of exposure to asbestos. B. As.A Sophisticated User of Asbestos, Swinerton Did Not Owe Duty Of Care To Robert Ross. Plaintiffs contend that even if the sophisticated user defense applies, it is limited to the strict liability/failure to warn cause of action, which they have agreed to dismissed. Put another way, they argue that Johnson should apply only to manufacturers of products, and not contractors. Plaintiffs are wrong. A fundamental element of any cause of action for negligence is the existence of a legal duty of care running from the defendant to the plaintiff. The existence and scope of any such legal 2 REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO SWINERTON BUILDERS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONBRYDON Huo & PARKER, 135 MAIN STREEY Sea Francisco, CA 94305 duty are legal questions for the court. “[D]uty’ is not an immutable fact of nature but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’” (Campbell v. Ford Motor Company (2012) 206 Cal.App.4 15, 26 [emphasis in original].) The Johnson court explained that it is the policy of California that, "[I|ndividuals who represent that they are trained or are members of a sophisticated group of users are saying to the world that they possess the level of knowledge and skill associated with that class." (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4* at 71.) Thus, anyone in the "world" should be absolved from providing a warning to a member of the sophisticated group. Otherwise, under plaintiff's theory, the product's designer and manufacturer, which incorporated the asbestos, has no duty to warn, while the law would impose such a duty on a person performing a service by installing controls. Under Johnson, such is not the law. The member of the sophisticated group, i.e., plaintiff - is deemed to have the same knowledge in both situations, whether it be with respect to a product manufacturer or with respect to a company like Swinerton installing piping for plumbing. It is the actual or constructive knowledge of the plaintiff that is determinative, not the relation of the defendant to the plaintiff. Said another way, under Johnson it is the knowledge of the sophisticated user group or trade that extinguishes any duty from a defendant to any member of the sophisticated user group, the rationale being that each member is deemed to have all the knowledge attributable to the group. To wit, whether plaintiff is working with an asbestos-containing product from a manufacturer or working in proximity to work by Swinerton, he is deemed to have the same knowledge in both situations. The effect of that knowledge, i.e., there being no duty to warn, should not be affected by the actions or status of the individual defendant. To say otherwise is to impose different duties on different defendants irrespective of the fact that plaintiff's knowledge is the same in all situations, which would only produce an unjust result, Tn essence, plaintiffs argue that Swinerton employees should not have been doing 3 REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO SWINERTON BUILDERS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONBRYDON HUGO & PARKER 138 MAIN STREET 20°" FL.00R San Prancisoo, CA 94105 the job they were contracted to do, which allegedly included cleaning up the asbestos containing materials brought to and installed at the job site by plaintiff and plaintiff's employer. This argument is absurd on its face. Swinerton was not responsible for bringing any asbestos materials to the job. That was the responsibility of plaintiff's employer. Plaintiff worked with asbestos on a daily basis, exposing himself to asbestos regardless of any action of Swinerton. Nothing that Swinerton could have said or done would have altered the fact that plaintiffs own job put him into daily contact with asbestos on the job sites. Thus, plaintiff assumed the particular inherent risk of working with asbestos in his job as an insulator, a risk of which he was well aware, and Swinerton owed him no duty of care. (See Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4® 296, 314-315 [By virtue of the nature of the activity and the parties’ relationship to the activity, the defendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from the inherent risk of harm that caused the injury.]; Herrle v. Estate of Marshall (1996) 45 Cal.App.4* 1761 [senile patient in hospital owed no duty of care to nurse, who by the very nature of nurse’s chosen profession, assumed the danger of violence by her patients].) Accordingly, this Court should not be persuaded by any contention by plaintiff that Johnson applies only to strict liability causes of action against manufacturers of products. Based on the forgoing, Swinerton requests summary judgment be granted. Dated: May 3, 2013 BRYDON HUGO & PARKER By: _/s/ Josette D. Johnson. Josette D. Johnson Attorneys for Defendant SWINERTON BUILDERS 4 REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO SWINERTON BUILDERS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONRoss, Robert & Jean San Francisco County Superior Court Case No, CGC-10-275731 PROOF OF SERVICE lam a resident of the State of California, over the age of 18 years, and nota party to the within action. My electronic notification address is service@bhplaw.com and my business address is 135 Main Street, 20 Floor, San Francisco, ¢ alifornia 94105. On the date below, I served the following: REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO SWINERTON BUILDERS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION on the following: BRAYTON PURCELL LLP 222 Rush Landing Road Novato, CA 94945 Fax; (415) 898-1247 o” By transmitting electronically the document(s) listed above as set forth on the electronic service list on this date before 5:00 p.m. o By transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax number(s) set forth above on this date before 5:00 p.m. © By placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope and placing the envelope for collection and mailing on the date below following the firm’s ordinary business practices. 1 am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. Postal service on the same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at San Francisco, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. o By placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope designated for Federal Express overnight delivery and depositing same with fees thereupon prepaid, in a facility regularly maintained by Federal Express, addressed as set forth above. o By causing personal delivery of the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth above. I declare under penal of perjury that the above is true and correct. Executed on May 3, 2013, at San Francisco, California. Mabelene Valeros PROOF OF SERVICE