Motion,Ex Parte: ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

						
                                
Preview
                                PATRICIA G, ROSENBERG, SBN 154820 : we Deeg : .
2. |/ HAAS. & NAJARIAN, LLP. : oe a ELECTRONICALLY

58 Maiden Lane, Second Floor - 5 ee

2/||'San Francisco, CA 94108. Se ee PP LED
Telephone: 415.788.6330 a Lass Se : “Superior Couit of Calor

3 se 2 SAN 52802 a SODAS oe “County of San-Frandise

- || JAMES N. SINUNU, ve Sr, .

4-|} JUNIPER BACON, SBN 256687 : ce belt 2043 3 3

-, || SINUNU BRUNI LLP ce : : oo BY: VANESSA WU [

5. || 333 Pine Street, Suite 400 : - : ~ : : : Dep y Clerk

~ |! San Francisco, CA 94104-3311.
6 || Telephone: 415.362.9700 -

Facsimile: 415.362.9707

~7-|| jsinunu@sinunubruni.com ~~

..{jbacon@sinunubruni.com -

‘Attomeys for Defendant...
9:1) MCCLURE ELECTRIC, INC...

10
a : . eS :
-22|] SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
“3 ||. COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO - UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

- ROBERT ROSS and JEAN ROSS, Case No CGC-10-275731

. : Paint, :

ae | DEFENDANT MCCL IRE ELECTRIC,
- |, || GC: MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS; TL

: Defendants as Reflected on Exhibit 1°
g0..|| Attached to the Summary Complaint
os Herein, and DOES 1- 18500. Lo

PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES [MIL NO. 1
“Com aint Filed: December 17, 2010

ORAL NAS

Teal date: June 3, 2013.
“39 : Defendants. :
a as
.
2 se
a6 || INTRODUCTION : ee ee
ay fo ‘Defendant MCCLURE ELECTRIC, INC. (Defendant) hereby moves this Cou for

gg. |fan order i in limine Himiting the admission of evidenee, trons documents, sexpert testimony, or

“DEFENDANT MCCLURE ELECTRIC, INC. 8. MOT ION IN LIMINE TO CMT THE ‘ADMISSIBILITY OF THE FULL
SEES _ AMOUNTS BILLED FOR PLAINTIFF'S PAST. MEDICAL | EXPENSES man NO: a ils: ‘Adopting the approach taken by: the Court of Appeal i in Hanif: v. Housing Auth, of. Yolo: County

|) past medical. services cannot support an expert opinion regarding the reasonable. value of future
_|| medical services, and that the trial court, in its role as the gatekeeper of admissible exper

: treatment for tortuously-causéd i injuries suffers a compensable economic Joss, and i is therefore :

: Sierra Railway Co. 1907) 151 Cal, 133, 115.) However, when the costs of the medical

otherwise, of the ful amounts billed for Plains past medical expenses.

" ‘The California Supreme Court, i in its opinion in Howell y. Hamilton Meats & Provision, »
Inc. 201 1) 52 Cal. 4th 541, resolved a long-standing split of authority over the proper measure :
of: damages for past medical expenses ‘that were incurred by or on behalf of an injured plaintiff.

(1988): 200 Cal. App. 3d 635 and Nishihama y, City and County of’ ‘San Francisco (2001) 93°
Cal. App: Ath 298, 306-307, the Supreme Court (by a6- 1 vote) agreed. that the proper: recovery
fora plaintifs medical expenses must be limited to the amounts actually, ‘paid by or on
plaintiff's behalf, as opposed to the amounts that may have been billed byt their medical care
providers. . : : oe
Furthermore, the C Court of Appeal, in its recent opinion in Corenbaum v, Lampkin 2013 1
Cal.App.. LEXIS 342, interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in ‘Howell, and not only held.

that evidence of the fall amount billed is not relevant to. the amount of past medical expenses, oS
but that itis also not. relevant to the determination of future medical damages or non-economic
damages. In addition, the Corenbawn Court held ‘that evidence of the full amount billed for

opinion, must exclude any. opinion based on such evidence.

"Accordingly, ‘Defendant requests that this Court i issue an order i in n imine that evidence
of the full amount billed for Plaintiff's medical care is not admissible for the purposes of
determining Plaintiff's damages for his past medical expenses, the reasonable value of his

future medical expenses, or his non-economic damages. -
I. ARGUMENT.

1, Howell vA Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc, oo

~ California Jaw. has long recognized that an injured party who received medical

ent tled to ‘an award of damages for: -any reasonable charges for that treatment. (See Melone v. :

treatment were erat in whole or in part bya a third el party, ‘such asa medical insurer, the : :

DEFENDANT: MCCLURE BLECTRIG INC.’S MOTION IN .LIMINE TO. TMiT THE ADMISSIBILITY OFTHE FULL. “foes
. : "AMOUNTS BILLED FOR PLAINTIFF” 'S PAST: MEDICAL, EXPENSES [MIEN NO. a S“collateral source rule” is implicated; under that rule, “Sf.an n injured party receives some :
compensation for his i injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment
should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintif? would otherwise collect from the
tortfeasor. ” (Helfend ¥. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal. 341, 6).

The California Supreme Court’s opinion in Howell answered a question ‘debated | by: the

Court of Appeal: for at least twenty years - “namely, the proper. scope of an injured party’ S-.

: economic damages for their past medical treatment. In deciding that only the amounts actually :

“e: paid. by oron behalf of the injured party was the proper measure of those damages, instead of |
the amount billed by the medical providers, the Howell Court confirmed that the collateral -

source rule “has no. bearing on. amounts that were included i ina provider" Ss bill but for which the

plaintiff never inewmred liability because the: provider, by Prior agreement, accepted a lesser
: amount as full payment, ” * (Howell, supra, 52.Cal. 4 at p. 548. ) The Court added:
“Such sums are not damages the: plaintiff: ‘would otherwise have collected from the >

. defendant. They are neither paid to the providers on the plaintiff's behalf nor paid e ope

the plaintiff in indemnity of his or her expenses. Because they do not represent an
-economic loss for the plaintiff; they are not recoverable in-the first instance. The -.-
-collateral source rule. precludes. certain deductions against otherwise recoverable
damages, but does not expand the seope of ec economic * damages to include e-expenses f the.
plaintiff never incurred.

da. at pp. 548-549 [emphasis added)

~The Howell Court adopted a bright line” ‘tule applicable to all civil tigation: ‘that an pee
award of. past medical expenses must not exceed the amounts is actually “paid by. or on behalf of” :

the injured plaintiff:

“When atortuously injured p person receives medical care for his or her solo ae :

with the injured person’s health i insurer’, an amount Jess than that stated/in the: -
~provider’s bill. -In that circumstance, may the injured person recover from the
—\ tortfeasor, as economic damages for past medical expenses, the undiscounted sum ~:.
°- »stated in the provider’s bill but never paid by or on behalf of the injured | person? We

: suffer any economic loss in that amount,

2-The Howell opinion noted that if the court in in Hanif had been correct when i it ruled that a@tort * plaintit :
could only recover what was “paid or incurred” for the plaintiff's medical care, it was still necessary to.

decide whether Hanif properly could be extended to a plaintiff covered by private health insurance (the
Hainf plaintiff had been a Medi- Cal | recipient), “The Howell Court ultimately found that Hanif was right
and should be extended to cover private health i insurers, (See Howell, supra, 52 Cal a at at p

3.

- provider of that care often accepts as full payment, pursuant toa preexisting contract - oo

hold no.such recovery is allowed, Jor the simple reason that the injured Plain did not).

56-559.) a

AMOUNTS BILLED FORP! AINTIFF” 8 PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES. [MIL NO. a

DEFENDANT MCCLURE ELECTRIC INC: s MOTION IN TIMINE TO LIMIT THE ‘ADMISSIBILITY OF THE FULLa Ad. at p. 548 [emphasis added].). :
2 : ~ Tn so ruling, the. Howell Court adopted the approach advocated by a series of appellate
: 3 decisions starting with Hanif, which limited recovery for a plaintiff's or decedent's Past
a medical expenses to.the amounts actually paid, as opposed to the amounts billed (Hanif,
5 supra, 200 Cal.App. 3d 635: at p. 640; see also, Cabrera’ v. E. Rojas Properties, Ine. (201 1) 192, “fe
6 | Cal. App. ath 1319, 1328; Greer v, . Buzgheia' (2006) 141 Cal. -App. 4th 1150, 1157; and:
: 7 Nishihama v. City and County of: ‘San Francisco, supra, 93.Cal, APP. 4th at Pp. 306-307, )

“In Hovell, like i in the present case, the defendants sought an in limine order to exclude.
the admission i into evidence. of any medical bills that neither plaintiff nor ‘her health insurer. had
paid, arguing, pursuant to the HaniffNishihama line of cases, that because only, the amounts
-|| paid by plaintiff and her i insurer could be recovered, the evidence regarding the large amounts: :
that had been billed | by. the providers was imelevant and should be excluded. Gowell, supra,

: 52 Cal. ae at p. 549.) The trial court denied the motion, ruling that plaintiff would be allowed.
to present her full medical bills to the j jury. ‘and any reduction to reflect peyment of reduced : :
amounts would be. handled through “ ‘a posttrial Hanif: motion, ” (id) : : :
> After a verdict i in favor. of, plaintiff, which included a an award of $189, 978. 63 in past :
medical expenses (an amount equaling the amounts billed on Plaintiff's medical bills submitted

into evidence during trial), the defendant filed a “Hanif motion” to reduce the past medical.”
specials award to $59, 691. R, ‘the ‘amount actually paid by plaintiff or her i insurers, after
|| various write-offs had been deducted from the billed treatment charges. (ld. at p. 550.) The
: trial court granted: the defendant’ s motion, but the ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeal, :
: which held. that the reduction order violated the collateral ‘source rule. : (Ud) :

a The. Howell Court upheld. the trial court's decision to reduce the om bill

award. The Supreme Court first noted that none of the competing appellate court opinions.
dealt specifically with. the “central” questions of. whether “restricting recovery to. amounts _
ae actually paid by plaintiff oron his or her. behalf contravenes the collateral source rule. ” dd. at :
‘I[p. 554-55.) In ruling that the damage award had properly been subjected t to reduction by the |
: trial cout, the Howell Court followed Hanif in finding that “a pl ir i ry FEC oe

: economic damages no. imore re than the reasonable aly of the medical services 5s received and S

ES 4: : : :
‘DEFENDANT MCCLURE HECTIC NC: °S MOTION IN. LIMINE TO. LIMIT THE ‘ADMISSIBILITY OF THE FOL :
2 “AMOUNTS BILLED | FOR, PLAINTIFF 'S PAST. MEDICAL EXPENSES {MIL NO. 9 eenot entitled to recover the reasonable value if his or her actual loss was s less: ” a. at P 555,

: citing Hanif, supra, 200 Cal. App. 3d at p. Al )

: Addressing the situation where a plaintiff had private medical insurance, ‘the Court
further acknowledged | that write-off negotiated bya Plaintiff's in insurers that resulted in a
reduction of the billed amount effectively reduced the potential economic loss to the insured
plaintiff (Howell, supra, $2 Cal. a at p. 556-: “557. ). The Court noted that since the insured’s
prospective liability pursuant to. the negotiated terms of a health i insurance ‘policy would be
limited solely to the amounts the i insurer agreed to pay the providers for the: services they were.”
to render, an insured party “cannot mesningfilly be said ever to have incurred the full
charges. (ld. at p. 557.) sone :

The Howell Court also rejected the notion that its ruling would result in windfalls? t to
tortfeasors because damages awards. would be reduced due to the favorable rates of payment

{| that were negotiated by the injured person s medical provider. After reviewing the:

“complexities of contemporary pricing and reimbursement patterns for medical providers” i in. -
modern health i insurance policies, the Howell Court noted that looking to the negotiated prices.
providers accepted from i insurers to establish the “reasonable value” of those services “makes,

at least as much sense, and arguably more” than looking merely at the. amounts that were

billed. Ua at p. 562.) The Court added:

pti is not possible to say ‘generally that providers’ ‘full bills represent the real value of
their services, nor that the discounted payment they accept from private insurers are.
“Mere arbitrary reductions. Accordingly, a tortfeasor who pays only ihe discounted
~-amount as damages does not generally receive a windfall and itis not generally.”
undeterred from engaging in risky conduct. : :
Gd) Co SS
Finally the Howell Court ‘ruled that any differential between the amounts billed and the

: amounts actually paid with regard to the charges for medical treatment was not recoverable as |

2 The Howell Court noted that medical providers “who agreed. to “accept discounted payments by -
managed care organizations or other health insurers as full payment fora patient’s care do so not asa

-|| gift to the patient or insurer, but for commercial reasons.and as a result of negotiations. As plaintiff.

herself ‘explains, hospitals and medical groups obtain commercial benefits from their agreements with
health insurance organizations, the agreements guarantee the providers prompt payment of the agreed
rates and often have financial incentives for nen members to choose the Providers’ services. ” {See

4 Howell, supra, 52. Cal.4" at pp. 556+ £559.)

ges

DEFENDANT MCCLURE ELECTRIC, inc. “8 MOTION TN LIMINE TO TiMiT THE “ADMISSIBILITY OF: THE FULL
: ‘AMOUNTS BILLED FOR PLAINTIFF'S PAST. MEDICAL EXPENSES SMI NO. 4a benefit provided tos an 1 insured by. having ‘medical i insurance. ‘As an insured plaintiff did not >

|}incur liability for the providers’ full bills (because the providers had already. agreed to accept.

the insurer's price schedule as ‘Payment in full for any services rendered under that policy), a

: plaintiff could not recover that differential as damages because they. “never incurred the full:

bill” in the first place. (id. at p. 563. ) :
“In sum, the Howell Court agreed that because an ingared plant did not “incur liability .
in the amount of the negotiated rate differential, which also i is not paid tooron behalf of the. :

“3. plaintiff to cover expenses of the: plaintif’s i injuries, it simply does not come” ‘within the:
: collateral source tule. (id. at p. 563. ) As a a result, the Howell court adopted this “brightine”

rule: ~

We hold.. “that an injured plaintiff whose medical expenses are © paid through private

insurance may recover as economic damages no more than the amounts paid by the}
: aaa or his or her i insurer for the medical services. received or still owing at the time -

~of trial, - ade

daa atp. 566.)
he ‘Corenbaum ¥. Lampkin,

~ A. Evidence of the Full Amount Billed Is Not Relevant to the Amount of Past
~ Medical Expenses. .

~ Although the Howell Court didn not ainely SO hold the Court of Appes held i in”

: Corenbaum ve Lampkin, after performing a thorough review.of Howell, that “evidence of the.
Po full amount billed fora plaintiff's medical care is not relevant to. the determination ofa: a

: plaintiff's damages for) past medical expenses, 5s, and therefore i is inadmissible for that purpose if

the laintift S medical providers, by prior. agreement, had contracted to accept a lesser amount
as full payment for the services rendered, (Corenbaum, supra, 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS at p

25, ) ‘lt also held that, “fin contrast, evidence of the amount accepted by. medical providers as.
: fall payment d does. not. violate the collateral source rule and i is admissible provide that the :

{P The. Howell Court noted that i in situations where ajury was provided e evidence of the amounts -
accepted a as full payment by an. injured plaintiff or decedent’s medical providers, but nevertheless

~- |] awarded a greater sum ‘as damages for past medical expenses, the defendant - instead of ‘bringing a

| “Hanif motion” — may move for a new trial on grounds of excessive damages See Howell, era | 52 S

Cal.4’ ‘at P. 567; see also, Code Civ, Proc., § 657(5))

QS :
DEFENDANT ‘MCCLURE ELECTRIC, NC 3 MOTION: IN. TIMINE 70 TIMIT: THE ADMISSTBIATY OF THE FULL: MS
~ AMOUNTS BILLED. FOR PLAINTIFF'S PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES In. NO. teoe.

he DEFENDANT MCCLURE ELECTRIC, INC’S: MOTION. IN LIMINE TO. LIMIT: THE ‘ADMISSIBILITY OF! THE FULL ”

source of the payment is is not disclosed to the jury and the evidence satisfies the. other rules of.

: evidence.” "id. citing Howell, supra, 52 Cal. 4° at P. 567, ). :
In so holding, the Court disagreed with the argument that any € evidence of the amount val
| accepted bya medical provider as full payment for the services provided, including testimony

given in court, constitutes evidence ofa statement as to the terms of the agreement between the
medical provider and the Plaintiff's health i insurer and j is therefore inadmissible hearsay, . :
instead finding that, although the amount accepted as full payment might have been determined

by agreement, evidence that.a medical provider accepted a certain amount as full payment does ©

not constitute evidence ofa statement as to the terms of the ‘agreement 2 and is not offered to.
prove the terms of. agreement. (Corenbaum, supra, 2013. Cal. “App. LEXIS at Pp. 425, ) The |
Court also found that it is not the terms of the agreement that are. in issue, but rather, iti is the
amount that has been accepted as full payment by the medical provider. (Id. at P. "21, -
~ Farther, the | Court rejected the argument ‘that a plaintift secking damages for. past a
medical expenses should be able to present evidence of not only. the amounts accepted as fl

: payment for. past medical services provided, but also the reasonable value of those services,

finding that, since an injured plaintiff can recover as damages for past medical expenses no

more than the amount incurred for those past medical services, evidence that the reasonable

value of such: services exceeded the amount paid is irrelevant and inadmissible on the i issue of

the amount of damages for; Past m medical services. a at Ppp. 727-428, ) The Court also stated =

Tithat:

Jae Moreover, for. the j jury to o consider both evidence of the amount at accepted by: medical. :
“providers as full payment and evidence of a potentially greater reasonable value would

- very likely cause jury confusion and suggest the existence of a collateral source
payment, contrary to-the evidentiary aspect of the collateral source rule. Likewise, the

presentation in each case of evidence as to the reasonable value of a plaintiff's medical »

: : care apart from the amount accepted by medical providers as full payment would, as
“Howell stated, “routinely in involve ¢ violations of f the evidentiary aspect ofthe. collateral.
“source rule. . : : : :

[eae at p. 428.)

1

oe “AMOUNTS BILLED FOR PLAINT! TFF'S. PAS’ MEDICAL EXPENSES IMILN NO. al

| However the Court conceded that “pie the j Jury ‘were ee to decide whether the : Te :|| price actually paid for medical care was lower than reasonable, the defense could not in

fairness be precluded from showing the circumstances by which that Price was determined,
including that it was negotiated and paid by the | plaintf?s health i insurer.. fin contrast, our :
conclusion that the plaintiff may recover no more than the medical providers accepted i in full

payment for their services, allows for proof of the amount paid without admitting evidence of

: the payment’s. source. ” dd. at P. *29.). The Court then concluded that evidence of the full

amount billed for plaints medical c care was not. admissible for the purpose of. determining

plaintiffs’ damages for their past medical expenses. (id. at p. #29. )

B. Evidence of the Full. Amount Billed For Past Medical Services Is: Not
~-Relevant to the Determination of. Damages for Future Medical Expenses.

~ Similarly, the Corenbaum Court found that Howell precludes the. argument that the fall

: amount billed for past medical : services is relevant to the reasonable value of future medical

services that the plaintif is reasonably. certain to require and negates the assumption at the :

basis of such an. argument that the fall amount billed for past medical services is relevant to the

value of those past medical servic . (Ud. at p.*31 > The Court ‘was compelled to reach this =

conclusion on the ‘same grounds that it found that the full amount billed by medical providers i is
not relevant to the value of past medical services, in that Howell stated that the full amount
billed i is ‘not an ‘accurate measure of the value of medical services, there can be significant ede
disparities between the amount. charged by: medical providers and the costs of providing
services, the price of a particular service. can ‘vary tremendously. -from hospital to. hospital in.
California,” and “a medical provider” s billed j price for particular services is not necessarily :
representative of either the cost of ‘providing these services or thei market value. 7 a at PB

31, citing Howell, supra, 52 Cal. at pp. 560- 562, 564, )
Furthermore, the Court again found that to allow ajury to consider both evidence of the 4

: amount accepted. as full | payment for the purpose of: determining the amount of past economic.

damages and the full: amount billed for: some other purpose would “most certainly cause jury”

confusion and suggest th the existence of a collateral source 7 payment contrary to the collateral : :

“DEFENDANT MCCLURE ELECTRIC TNC. "Ss MOTION IN LIMINE- TO: Mir THE ADMISSBILTTY OF THE FULL
: : AMOUNTS I BILLED FOR PLAINTIFE'S FAST MEDICAL EXPENSES *§ [MI NO. q.source cule. ” (Corenbaum, ‘Supra, 2013 Cal, | App. LEXIS at pp. “31 -*32.) ‘The Court then

: concluded that the full amount billed for past medical expenses is not relevant fo the amount of

future medical expenses ¢ and i is. therefore inadmissible for that purpose. da. at p. *32 yo

~ ©. Evidence of the Full Amount Billed For Past Medical Services Cannot
Support an Expert Opinion on the Reasonable Value of Future Medical
Services. Ses

: In addition, the Corenbaum Court found that, because i it is not relevant to the value 0 of.
those services, the full amount billed for, past medical s services can provide no easonable basis
for’ an expert opinion on the value of future medical services, and therefore cannot support an.
expert opinion regarding the reasonable medical value: of: future medical services. Ud. at Pe
*32-933, citing Evid, Code §§ 801(b): and 802. ) Citing the recent Court of. Appeal decision i in :

~ Sargon Enterprises, Inc. ¥ University of Southern California 2012) 55 Cal. an 747 (which

addresses the trial court’s role as the gatekeeper of: admissible expert opinion under Evidence :
Code sections 801(b) ‘and 802),. the Court concluded. that “any expert who testifies on remand
with respect to the reasonable value of. the future medical services that (plaints) are :

: reasonably likely to require may not rely. on the full amounts billed: for plaintifis’ past medical :
expenses,’ "as such material would not support the experts: reasoning as required by Evidence wey
Code section 802, (Corenbaum, supra, 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS at PP. “33: #35, citing Sargon, qe

supra, 55 Cal.4" at Pp. 716, TN). : :
~The Court also concluded that, for an expert to base a an opinion as.to the reasonable =

value of future medical services, in whole orin Part, on the fall amount billed for | past medical S as o

services would lead to the introduction of. evidence concerning the circumstances by which, a.

lower price was negotiated with that plaints health insurer, and would thus bein violation of | ~
: the evidentiary aspect of the collateral source rule. (Corenbaum, supra, 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS pe

at p. * 34, citing Howell, supra, 52 Cal: qe atp. 563 >:

2D. “Evidence of the Full ‘Amount Billed Is Not Relevant to the Amount of Non- :

: - Economic Damages. : Sones :
Finally, the Corenbaum ‘Court found that evidence of the full amount billed i is not

go.

DEFENDANT MCCLURE ELECTRIC, INC.’ Ss MOTION IN LIMINE TO LIMIT THE ADMISSIBILITY. OF FTE POLL

foe AMOUNTS BILLED. FOR -PLAINTIFE’S. PAST. MEDICAL: EXPENSES [IL NO.9]relevant to the amount of non-economic damages, including pain and. suffering. (Corenbaum,
supra, 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS at PP. *31-*32.) In so doing, the Court acknowledged that.
plaintiffs? counsel i in the past have used the amount of economic damages as a point, of

reference i in n their argument to a jury. as a means.to help determine the amount of non-economic

‘|| damages, (Corenbaum, supra, 2013 Cal. “App. LEXIS at p. *37.) ‘Nevertheless, the Court .

stated that sucha practice does not Justify the admission of evidence that i is otherwise
inadmissible and that i is not relevant to the amount ofe economic damages. a. ) The. Court: :
concluded that “evidence of the fall amount billed i is not admissible for the purpose of S
providing plaintif? Ss counsel an argumentative construct to assist a juryi in its difficult task of
determining the amount of noneconomic damages: and i is inadmissible for the Purpose of
proving non-economic damages.” ” (id: at PP. *37-*38. ) :

3. The Full Amounts Billed for Plaintiffs Past Medical Care Is Not Relevant,
under. Evidence Code section 350 and Is Therefore Inadmissible. : oe

Under Bvidence Code section 350, only relevant evidence i is admissible. Evidence

Code section 2 Q defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence. vhaving any tendency i in Teason to

provide or 1 Tove any. disputed fact that i is of consequence to the: determination of the

action. ” "Evidence i is relevant ifi it “tends ‘logically, naturally and by reasonable inference to.
establish material facts. ” ‘(People vy. . Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 90, citing People v. :
Garceau (2993) 6 Cal: 4th 140, 177. ) “Although atrial court has broad discretion i in determining
the relevance: of evidence, i it has no. discretion to admit ielevant evidence. a, citing People :
v. Critenden (1994) 9 Calth 83, 132) oe

AS the Howell Court itself: noted, the “bright line” rule on past medical expenses set out.

in its opinion narrowed thes scope of the evidence that would be relevant and admissible to.

prove the damage allowed under that rule:

oS it follows from « our. holding that when a. . medical ¢ care ¢ provider has, by. agreement. with =|
-the plaintiff's private health insurer, accepted as full payment for the plaintiff's care an.

“..* amount less than the provider's full bill, evidence of that amount is relevant to prove

othe plaintiff's damages for past medical. expenses and, assuming it satisfies other rules SS

: of evident is s admissible at t trial, oe :

10.

DEFENDANT FMOCLURE ELECTRIC. INC, § MOTION.IN TIMINE TO OMT THE, ‘ADMISSIBILITY: OF THE FULL :
: : _ AMOUNTS BILLED. FOR PLAINTIFF’ ‘S PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES. Mt NO. a ao(Howell, supra, 52 Cal. ae atp. 567)

However, the Howell Court emphasized that evidence of the full billed amount. of a
plaintifr Ss medical treatment, in situations where his or her health care provider accepted less.
than : a billed amount as full | payment, i is not relevant on the issue of ‘past medical expenses, and.
is thus inadmissible. (a). If, after being presented with evidence only of the amount t accepted
as full payment by a plaintiff's 1 medical providers, a jury. should nevertheless award a greater
sum_as damages for past medical expenses, | the defendant’ Ss remedy i is to ‘move for anew trial.
“on grounds of excessive damages.” “Uid) The Howell Court noted that ‘its ruling maintained :
the evidentiary. aspects of the collateral source rule, stating t that while. the amounts paid ona”

: plaintiff's behalf may | be put before the j jury to prove the plaintiff's damages ‘for ‘past medical

expenses, “{elvidence that such payments were made i in whole or in part by an insurer
remains. -generally inadmissible... dd. at P. 567. ) :

"Similarly, the Corenbaum ‘Court concluded that evidence of the full amounts billed for :

plaints medical care was not relevant to. the amount of their damages for Past medical

expenses, future medical expenses or non-economic damages, and that the admission of such

- evidence was error. (Corenbaum, supra, 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS atp. 438, citing Evid. Code § -
: 350, ) The Court found that this error was prejudicial because the: amounts awarded as damages.

were based on the full amount billed rather than the lesser amounts accepted by medical

providers as full payment. (Corenbaum, supra, 2013 Cal. “App. LEXIS at P. $38, ) The Court:
: therefore reversed the judgments i in favor. of the plaintiffs as to the awards of compensatory
damages against. ihe defendant, and remanded the matter with direction to conduct a new trial S

to determine the. amount of compensatory damages, liability having been established. Ud)

: Pursuant to the Supreme Court’ 's Tuling in Howell, then, any evidence of the amounts a
: billed that exceed the amounts paid would be irrelevant to Plaintiff s claims here for past ae

medical expenses. Furthermore, pursuant ‘to the Court of ' Appeal’s ruling i in Corenbaum, o os

evidence of the full amounts billed for Plaintiff's past medical services would be. imelevant to”

the amount of his damages { for past medical expenses, future medical expenses or non--

: economic damages. AS a result, that evidence i is inadmissible for those purposes in this ¢ case,

and i itis Properly subject t to exclusion by anin limine order. :
“ |

“DEFENDANT MCCLURE HECTIC INC.’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO. LIMIT THE “ADMISSIBILITY OF THE! FULL ~

AMOUNTS BILLED FOR PLAINTIFF'S PAST. MEDICAL EXPENSES mil ‘NO. aii. CONCL Si DN
Based on the foregoing, Defendant requests that this Court issue an order in limine that

evidence of the full amounts billed for Plaintiff's medical care is not admissible for the :

purposes of determining his damages for past medical expenses, the reasonable ‘value. of future

medical expenses, or non-economic damages.

DATED: meen 2 SINUNU BRUNILLP

B :

(JAMES N. SINUNU
"JUNIPER BACON

-- Attomeys for Defendant

“MCCLURE ELECTRIC, INC.”

a

DEFENDANT MCCLURE ELECTRIC, INC "S MOTION TN.LIMINE TO. LMT THE ADMISSIBILITY OF. THE FULL, S

~ : AMOUNTS. BILLED FOR PLAINTIFE’S PAST ‘MEDICAL EXPENSES. MIL NO. >.