Motion-Secondary: ROBERT ROSS et al VS. C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS

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                                BRAYTON®PURCELL LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
222 RUSH LANDING ROAD

PO BOX 6169
NOVATO, CALIFORNIA 94948-6169

(415) 898-1555

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GILBERT L. PURCELL, ESQ., S.B. #113603
JAMES P. NEVIN, ESQ,, S.B. #220816

ingvin@bravionlaw.com

BRAYTON*®PURCELL LLP . ELECTRONICALLY
Attorneys at Law FILED

222 Rush Landing Road Superior Court of California,
P.O. Box 6169 County of San Francisco
Novato, California 94948 08/11/2015

Clerk of the Court
BY:RONNIE OTERO.

Deputy Clerk

(415) 898-1555

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

ASBESTOS
No. CGC-10-275731

Plaintiffs
° PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF REGARDING

ROBERT ROSS and JEAN ROSS,
)
vs. } EXPERT WITNESSES’
)
)
)
)

ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIABILITY OF
C.C. MOORE & CO. ENGINEERS; ARTICLE AND CALIFORNIA
Defendants as Reflected on Exhibit 1

EVIDENCE CODE § 721(b)(3)
attached to the Summary Complaint herein;

and DOES 1-8500.
Trial Date: August 10, 2015

Dept.: 613

I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

California Evidence Code section 721(b)(3) (“CEC”) means exactly what it says, and this
Court should apply it accordingly. In past cases, defense counsel has cited Kennemur v. State
(1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 907, in an attempt to prevent plaintiffs’ counsel from asking their own
expert to establish literature as a reliable authority under CEC section 721. Kennemur says
nothing to prevent this foundational use of any witness. Defendant’s objection is misplaced and
contravenes the legislative intent behind CEC 721 (b)(3). Plaintiffs’ counsel should be able to
use any witness or expert to establish the article as reliable and authoritative for the purpose of
laying the evidentiary foundation for later use during the cross-examination of defendant’s
expert.
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Moreover, Kennemur does not stand for the proposition that an expert cannot testify
about opinions not disclosed during his/her deposition. Rather, the overarching principle in
Kennemur and its progeny is that an expert should be precluded from testifying differently at trial]
only if the opposing party has no notice that the expert will offer new opinions, or if notice of the
new opinions comes at a time when re-deposing the expert is unreasonably difficult. (Easterby v|
Clark (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 772, 781, emphasis original.) In order to exclude an expert’s
“new” opinion, the opposing party has the burden to prove: (1) what opinions the expert gave at
deposition; (2) that the expert was “closed out”; (3) that the subject area is a new opinion; and
(4) that the new opinion was not disclosed sufficiently in advance of trial. (Kelly v. New West
Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659 at pp. 670-671.) Kennemur simply does not, and
cannot, apply to exclude a particular item of literature that is encompassed within the general
opinion that was expressed at deposition.

IL. ARGUMENT
A. PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH
THE RELIABILITY AND AUTHORITATIVENESS OF AN ARTICLE
FOR USE IN CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERT

PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE § 721(b)(3)
BECAUSE IT IS THE LAW

1. Plaintiffs’ Expert Should Be Allowed to Establish the Reliability and
Authoritativeness of an Article

a. Plaintiffs’ Counsel Should Not Be Precluded From Having an
Expert Establish the Reliability and Authoritativeness of an Article

Although defendant objects to plaintiffs’ use of the expert to establish an article as
reliable and authoritative because it was not specifically mentioned in the expert’s deposition,
plaintiffs’ counsel should not be precluded from using the expert to establish the reliability of the
article because this action would not fall under Kennemur, supra, or the line of cases decided
subsequent to the Kennemur decision. (See, Jones v. Moore (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 557; Bonds
v. Roy (1999) 20 Cal.4th 140.) In the cases of Kennemur and Jones, it was held that when an

expert offers opinions at trial that are different from those held at the time of deposition, such

opinions may be excluded. That has nothing to do with laying a CEC 721(b)(3) foundation foroem NY DW BR wWwN

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use of an article during cross-examination. (See, Jones, 80 Cal.App.4th at 565; see generally
Kennemur, 133 Cal.App.3d 907.)

Pursuant to Section 801 of the California Evidence Code, opinion testimony of the
witness is that which “would assist the trier of fact... .” (Cal. Evid. Code § 801 (West 2012).)
Plaintiffs’ expert’s establishment of the reliability and authoritativeness of the article cannot be
considered opinion testimony as under Section 801 of the California Evidence Code because the
expert’s establishment of the reliability of the article is not for the purpose of assisting the trier of
fact.' Rather, plaintiffs’ counsel is merely establishing the reliability and authoritativeness of the
article for the purpose of being able to cross-examine the defendant’s expert under section

721(b)(3) of the California Evidence Code. (Cal. Evid. Code § 721(b)(3) (West 2012); see also,

infra, section B.)

Because the purpose of the expert establishing the reliability of the text is to cross-
examine the defendant’s expert and not to provide opinion testimony to assist the trier of fact, the}
expert’s stated establishment of the reliability of the article does not fall under the Kennemur line
of cases dealing with opinion testimony, meaning that plaintiffs’ counsel should not be precluded
from asking the expert if the article is reliable and authoritative just because it was not

specifically mentioned in his deposition.

2. Plaintiffs’ Counsel Should Not Be Precluded From Allowing the Expert to
Establish the Reliability and Authoritativeness of the Article
Because This Action Will Not Touch upon any Substantive Matter and
Will Not Present any Unfair Surprise to Defendant's Counsel

Furthermore, this Court should exercise its broad discretion to allow the expert’s mere
establishment of the reliability and authoritativeness of the article because, in doing so, the exper
will not go beyond the general substance of the deposition, and the expert will not be discussing

any substantive matter within the text. Although the court in Bonds held that “[w]hen an expert

is permitted to testify at trial on a wholly undisclosed subject area, opposing parties . . . lack a

fair opportunity to prepare for cross-examination or rebuttal,” this determination is not

' To best make this point self-evident, the Court could ask plaintiffs’ counsel to ask their CEC 721(b)(3)
foundational question of the expert witness outside the presence of the jury during a short break.

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applicable, and is entirely beside the point, because the expert’s establishment of the reliability o:
the article does not probe into any subject area or substance that defendant's counsel would have
the need to prepare for cross-examination or rebuttal. (Easterby v. Clark (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
772, 780; see also, DePalma v. Rodriguez (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 159, 164-65.) Defendant’s
counsel would have no need to gather sufficient evidence for cross-examination or rebuttal, as
plaintiffs’ counsel is merely using the expert to establish the reliability of the article, without
detailing its substance, so that plaintiffs’ counsel can subsequently use the article to cross-
examine the defendant’s expert, a right of theirs under section 721(b)(3) of the California
Evidence Code. (See, infra, section B.)

The purpose of discovery simply is not disregarded by allowing an expert to establish the
reliability of the article even though it was not specifically mentioned in a prior discovery
proceeding. “One of the principle purposes of discovery was to do away ‘with . . . surprise at
trial’... The overall intent of the Discovery Act, said the Court, was to: ‘(MJake a trial .. . a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed... .” (Williams v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1244, 1254.) Allowing the expert to establish the
reliability and authoritativeness of the article, even though it was not specifically mentioned in
the deposition, would not present an unfair surprise to defendant’s counsel. Merely establishing
that an article as reliable is not beyond the expectation of defendant’s counsel, as no unexpected
facts or opinions will be asserted by the expert that would necessitate any unfair surprise or
potential burden upon defendant’s counsel.

B. UNDER CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 721(b)(3), PLAINTIFFS

MAY ESTABLISH A PUBLICATION AS “RELIABLE AUTHORITY” BY
OPPOSING PARTY'S EXPERT IN REGARD TO “THE CONTENT OR.
TENOR” OF AN ARTICLE

In 1997, the California Legislature specifically amended California Evidence Code
section 721(b) to add the language in subsection (b)(3), which provides:

If a witness testifying as an expert in the form of an opinion, he or she may not be

cross-examined in regard to the content or tenor of any scientific, technical, or

professional text, treatise, journal, or similar publication unless any of the
following occurs:

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(3) The publication has been established as a reliable authority by the testimony or
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice.

(Cal. Evid. Code § 721 (b)(3).)

The Law Revision Comment to section 721(b) states that subsection (3) clarifies the
matter of cross-examination of an expert witness using a publication, which has been the subject
of “considerable confusion in the California decisions” for over a century. (Cal. Law Revision
Com. com., West’s Ann. Cal. Evid. Code (West 2012) foll. section 721 (Cal. Law Revision
Com.”).) Since the addition of the new subsection to the statute, the few applicable cases
addressing the new exception requirement under subsection 721(b)(3) offer some instructive
guidance on its application. Despite the murky history of the case law and the dearth of
authoritative cases addressing 721(b)(3), the statute and its legislative history provide clear
guidance for establishing the article as a reliable authority by “other expert testimony” for use in
the cross-examination of an expert. (Section 721(b)(3).)

Admission of the article for the purpose of cross-examination would not result in unfair
surprise or prejudice to the defendant under this provision because section 721(b) specifically
provides procedural safeguards, i.e. reading the text into evidence and limiting instructions,
designed to promote the underlying evidentiary policies of reliability and fairness in search of
truth. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 73 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended
May 13, 1997, p. 5. (“Sen. Com. on Judiciary”); see, section 721(b) (“If admitted, relevant
portions of the publication may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.”).
Therefore, under section 721(b)(3), plaintiff's expert should be permitted to establish the article
as a reliable authority for use in cross-examining defendant’s expert “in regard to the content or
tenor.” (See, section 721(b)(3).)

1. By Permitting Plaintiffs’ Expert to Establish the Article as
a “Reliable Authority” Under Section 721(b)(3), the Court Would
of hudioal Resouroes as Conlemploted by the Evidence Code
of Judicial Resources as Contemp! y le

Provision
This Court would promote the policy objectives of subsection (b)(3) by allowing

plaintiffs’ expert to efficiently establish the article as a reliable authority under section 721(b)(3).

(See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, p.5.) First, section 721(b)(3) is meant to ensure the appropriate use

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of reliable publications for cross-examination because “it may be precisely those reliable
authorities the expert has not considered that will provide the best cross-examination of that
expert.” (Id., emphasis in original.) Furthermore, subsection (b)(3) “ensures that outdated or
otherwise unreliable treatises will not be used inappropriately to discredit an expert’s opinion,”
thus, increasing the reliability of such publications and experts during the trial. (Id. at 6.)

Second, section 721(b)(3) discourages the type of gamesmanship that was resulting under
the narrowly proscribed requirements preceding the amendment. (See, id., at 5.) Subsection
(b)(3) was enacted, in part, to discourage the practice of experts relying only upon favorable
sources that allowed for “pseudo experts to testify as to a matter and avoid questioning on how
his view differs from reliable treatises simply by ignoring the existence of the more learned but
contrary treatise.” (See, Id. at 5-6.)

Third, allowing “other expert testimony” to establish reliability reduces litigation costs by
avoiding a battle of the experts. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen.
Bill No 73 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 25, 1997, p. 6.) Permitting publications to
be used to “counter opposing expert opinions through cross-examination” reduces “the time and
expense of having to call another expert to battle the opposing expert to establish a position
which is consistent with established thought.” (Id.) Therefore, by allowing plaintiffs’ expert to
establish the article as a reliable authority the Court would (1) ensure the reliability of the article
and the expert witness by allowing the best possible cross-examination, (2) ensure expert
credibility by discouraging “pseudo experts” who rely only on favorable sources, and (3) reduce
litigation cost and time.

Though the defendant might attempt to argue that an expert witness must have relied
upon the publication in order to be cross-examined using the article, this contention relies upon a
line of cases applying the muddled approach that pre-dates the enactment of section 721(b)(3).
(See, Fisher v. So. Pac. R. Co. (1891) 89 Cal.399, 407 [acknowledging it may be proper to cross-
examine an expert witness with medical texts he generally or specifically relies upon, and
holding that, though admission of the texts was error, the “legal proposition be admitted”

(dicta)]; see also, Gluckstein v. Lipsett (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 391, 404-03 [finding error without

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prejudice in permitting the reading of extracts from text on cross-examination where defendant’s
expert did not generally or specifically base his opinion on such medical books]; Griffith v. Los
Angeles Pac. Co. (1910) 14 Cal.App. 145 [acknowledging permissibility of “the contents of the
books of standard authors skilled in that particular profession,” though limited by expert’s
reliance.]

In Salgo v. Stanford (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 560, 579, where the court of appeal upheld
the rule requiring an expert’s reliance upon similar works, the court articulated that: “This rule
has been in nowise changed.” That line of cases did not have the benefit of subsection (3) to
clarify the rule on admissibility of learned publications. The present case is distinguishable from

Fisher, Gluckstein, and Griffith because, unlike in those cases, here the Court has the benefit of

applying the section 721(b)(3) provision to efficiently establish the article as a reliable authority
by plaintiffs’ expert testimony. Thus, reliance upon the article should not be required here, as in
that line of cases, but rather, section 721(b)(3) governs the matter—in no uncertain terms.

The rule has now been changed, though not completely disturbed. (Cf. Salgo,
154 Cal.App.2d at 579, with section 721(b)(3).) The California Legislature relaxed the rigidity
of the old hearsay restriction under the preceding law. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, p. 5.) The
narrow hearsay exception approach California took prior to the 1997 amendment prevented
reliable publications from use for cross-examination of an expert. (Id.) This prompted the
legislature to adopt the new provision in addition to the old rule and requirements. (Id.) (“Under|
current law, an expert witness may not be cross-examined on the contents of a learned treatise
unless the witness has referred to, considered, or relied upon the treatise in forming his or her
opinion, or the treatise has already been admitted into evidence;” but, it may be those authorities

the expert failed to consider that “provide the best cross-examination.”) By adding subsection

(b)(3) to the statute, the Legislature expressly broadened the hearsay restriction in order to allow
publications, such as the article in the present case, to be easily established as reliable authority
for use in cross-examining an expert. (Id.)

The Legislature intentionally adopted the more liberal federal approach to the hearsay

exception by adding the federal rule’s language in subsection (b)(3). (Id.) The new provision,

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sponsored by the State Bar, “substantially adopts Rules 802(18) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
to permit the use of published treatises and other similar publications which are established as
reliable authority” by “other expert testimony” “whether or not the expert himself or herself
referred to it.” (Id. at 6; see also, Ad. Com. com., foll. Fed. R. Evid. 803(18) [adopting the
reasoning in Reilly v. Pinkus (1949) 338 U.S. 269 where the United States Supreme Court
“pointed out that testing of professional knowledge was incomplete without exploration of the
witness’s knowledge of and attitude toward established treatises in the field. The process works
equally well in reverse and furnishes the basis of the rule.”].) The Committee further
acknowledged that this new approach “has been used in federal courts for years and that it has
operated to save resources and shorten trials.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, p. 6.) By finding that

the article may be efficiently established through plaintiff's expert testimony, under section

721(b)(3), this Court would uphold the objectives contemplated in the section by ensuring
reliability, credibility, and trustworthiness of the expert evidence while maintaining conservation
of litigation costs and judicial resources.

The California Court of Appeal has addressed the use of the new subsection (b)(3)
provision in unpublished, though instructive, cases. (See, Stoll v. Bush, No. B159275, 2003 WL
227923, 2003 Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 11115 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003); Lopez v. Rashidi,
No. E030977, 2004 WL 161795, 2004 Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 849 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 28,
2004).) In Stoll, a medical malpractice case, the Court of Appeal held that a publication was
properly established under section 721(b)(3) when the expert witness admitted the authority of
the publication. (Stoll, 2003 WL 22792314 at 4.) The court left open the possibility, that under
the same provision, a journal may be established by testimony of another expert if the proper
foundation is laid under section 721(b)(3). (Id.) However, the court found nothing in the record
of that case to indicate proper foundation was laid, but did not find prejudicial error because
“there was no miscarriage of justice based on the question of these two publications.” (Id.)

In Lopez, the Court of Appeal held that the “trial court erred by precluding [plaintiff's]
counsel from using treatises in the cross-examination of Dr. Boone (defendant’s expert witness).”]

(Lopez, 2004 WL 161795 at 13 (explanatory phrases added).) The court remanded the case on a

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finding of prejudicial error, in part based upon the trial court refusing plaintiff's counsel to use
the publications in the cross-examination of the defendant’s expert, as provided for by section
721(b)(3). (Id. at 1.) As in both Stoll and Lopez, this case falls under section 721(b)(3), and
plaintiffs’ counsel should not be precluded from establishing the article as a reliable authority.
Respectfully requested, this Court should follow the express rationales in the above appellate
court decisions and allow plaintiffs’ expert testimony to establish the reliability of the article.
2. Regardless of Whether the Article’s Establishment is Governed By
California Evidence Code Section 403 or Section 405, the Court of

Appeal has Found That a Publication May Be “Established as Reliable
Authority” Under Both Sections

In Lopez, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that “[i]t is not clear whether the
requirements that the treatise be established as reliable authority is governed by Evidence Code
section 403 or Evidence Code section 405.” (Id.) Nevertheless, the court found that under
either section the disputed publications “were all established as reliable authority” under the
appropriate standard. (Id. at 12; see, Cal. Evid. Code sections 403, 405 (West 2012).)

These code sections apply when “the admissibility of proffered evidence turns on the
existence of a preliminary fact.” (Lopez, 2004 WL 161795 at 12.) Under section 403, “it is up t
the jury to decide whether it exists,” and the trial court must admit the evidence upon
determination of whether “there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the existence of the
preliminary fact.” (Id.; see, section 403.)

Under section 405, “it is up to the trial court to determine whether it exists, ” and if so,
admit the evidence. (Lopez, 2004 WL 161795 at 12; see, section 405.) Based on the testimony
of experts other than the defendant's, the court held there was sufficient evidence under section
403 that the publications were reliable authority, and that the trial court should have allowed
them to be used in cross-examination. (Lopez, 2004 WL 161795 at 12.) The court also held that
under section 405 “the trial court erred by applying a standard of reliability that was unduly high,
in two respects.” (Id.) First, by requiring “no doubt” that a treatise was authoritative, the trial
court allowed the defendant’s expert “to avoid being cross-examined” by any authoritative

treatise. (Id.) The court found this to run “counter to the very purpose of Evidence Code section

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721, subdivision (b)(3).” (Id.) Second, the court found that section 721(b)(3) “merely requires”
a publication to be “established as a reliable authority” and the trial court “should not have
categorically precluded any reference to an entire treatise on this ground.” (Id.) The court furthey
found that the publications had “substantial probative value” and they should not have been
precluded from further use during cross examination of the defendant’s expert. (Id. at 13.)

As in Lopez, in this case, the article is a publication which may be established as
admissible evidence regardless of whether it falls under section 403 or section 405. Under
Lopez, plaintiff's counsel is allowed to establish the article as a reliable authority when applying
the “appropriate standard. ” Furthermore, this Court may find that the substantial probative a
of the article justifies the establishment of its foundation as provided for under section 721(b)(3).
Without doubt, this Court should apply section 721(b)(3) allowing for the evidence to provide
the “best possible cross-examination” of the defendant’s expert witness.

CONCLUSION

Kennemur is not relevant to this issue. This Court should not preclude plaintiffs’ counsel
from allowing plaintiffs’ expert to establish an article or paper as a reliable authority, regardless
of whether it was mentioned previously, anywhere, or at deposition. Under the express language
of the Evidence Code — and entirely consonant with the very enactment of section 721(b)(3) —
plaintiffs’ counsel should be allowed to use articles to cross-examine defendant’s expert under
California Evidence Code section 721 once there is testing or other showing that the article or
paper is reliable in the field of a witness’s expertise.

Dated: __ AUG 12 2015 BRAYTONSPURCELL LLP
By: _/s/ James P, Nevin

James P. Nevin
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

i tnnotieriaa EI CSC 10 ISHN OOF IPN
PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF REGARD R ESSE ESTAB! (ENT OF RELIAB.
ARTICLE AND ee A IV DENCE COLE NG (b)(3)BRAYTON®PURCELL LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
222 RUSH LANDING ROAD
P.O BOX 6169
NOVATO, CALIFORNIA 94948-6169

(415) 898-1555

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PROOF OF SERVICE BY FILE & SERVEXPRESS .

Iam employed in the County of Marin, State of California. T am over the age of 18 years
and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 222 Rush Landing Road, P.O.
Box 6169, Novato, California, 94948-6169.

On At G.11.2015 _, 1 electronically served (E-Service), pursuant to General Order

No. 158, the following documents:

PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF REGARDING EXPERT WITNESSES’ ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELIABILITY OF ARTICLE AND CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE § 721(b)(3)

on the interested parties in this action by causing File & ee E-service program pursuant
to General Order No. 158, to transmit a true copy thereof to the following party(ies):

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

The above document was transmitted by File & ServeXpress E-Service and the
transmission was reported as complete and without error.

Executed on _AUG 1] 20i5 _ at Novato, California.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.

Robert Ross, et al. v. C.C. Moore & Co. Engineers, et al.
San Francisco County Superior Court Case No. CGC-10-275731

PROOF OF SERVICE BY E-SERVICEDate Created: 8/10/2015-4:41:20 PM

(AAP)

Created by: LitSupport - ServiceList -
19349.004 - Robert Ross

Matter Number:

Adams Nye Becht LLP
222 Kearny Street, Seventh Floor
San Francisco, CA 94108
415-982-8955 415-982-2042 (fax)
Defendants:

Pribuss Engineering, Inc. (PRIBUS)

Berry & Ber
0x 16070
2930 Lakeshore Avenue
Oakland, CA 94610
510-835-8330 510-835-5117 (fax)
Defendants:
Berry & Berry (B&B)

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
50 Fremont Street, 20" Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105-2235
415-591-7500 415-591-7510 (fax)
Defendants:

Pharmacia LLC (PHARCA)

Hugo Parker, LLP,
135 Main Street, 20% a
San Francisco, CA 941
415-808-0300 415- B08: "0333 (fax)
Defendants:
A. Teichert & Son, Inc. (ATEICH)
Cahill Construction Co., Inc. (CAHILC)
Rountree Plumbing & Heating Inc.
(RNTPLU)
Swinerton Builders (SWINBU
Tutor Perini Corporation (fka Perini
Corporation) (PERCOR)

Low Ball & Lynch - SF Office
505 Montgomery Street, 7" Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111-2584
415-981-6630 415-399-1506 (fax)
Defendants:

Giampolini & Co. (GIAMPO)

Pacific Mechanical Corporation
(PACMCR)

Brayton-Purcell Service List

, BPImport

Archer Norris - Walnut Creek

2033 N. Main St. Suite 800

Walnut Creek, CA 94596

925-930-6600 925-930-6620 (fax)

Defendants:
Albay Construction Company {ALBAY)
Cahill Contractors, Inc. (COPELE)
Cupertino Electric, Inc. (CUPELE)

Burnham Brown
1901 Harrison Street, 14 Floor
Oakland, CA 94612
510-444-6800 510-835-6666 (fax)
Defendants:

California Drywall Co. (CALDRY)

Foley & Mansfield PLLP
300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1900
Oakland, CA 9:
510-590-9500 “$10. 590-9595 (fax)
Defendants:
Acco Engineered Systems, Inc.
(ACCHEA’ A)
D.W. Nicholson Corporation (DWNICH)
Raymond Interior Systems-North
(RAYISN)
Van-Mulder Sheet Metal, Inc. (VANMSM)

Imai, Tadlock, Keeney & Cordery, LLP
100 Bush Street, Suite 1300
San Francisco, CA
415-675-7000 aise as “7008 (fax)
Defendants:
ABM CMS, Inc. (fka Commair Mechanical
Services) (COMMAR)
Clausen-Patten, Inc. (CLSNPT)
Henry C. Beck ‘Company ‘HCBECK)
Webcor Builders, Inc. (WEBCOR)

McDowall Cotter, APC
2070 pee ona
San Mateo, C.
650-572- R33" 650: e512 0834 (fax)
Defendants:

Beta Mechanical Contractors, Limited
(BETAMC)

Run By : Porterfield, Angela

Bassi Edlin Huie & Blum LLP - San
Francisco
500 Washington Street, qt 700
San Francisco, CA 9411
415-397-9006 415-397- 11339 (fax)
Defendants:
Balliet Bros. Construction Corporation
(BALBRO)
J.T. Thorpe & Son, Inc. (THORPE)
Malm Metal Products, inc, (MALMSM)

Dentons US LLP - San Francisco
One Market Plaza
Spear Tower, 24" Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105
415-267-4000 415-267-4198 (fax)
Defendants:

J.T. Thorpe & Son, Inc. (THORPE)

Haas & Najarian, LLP
58 Maiden Lane
Second Floor
San Francisco, C.
415-788-6330 ais: 391 “0555 (fax)
Defendants:
McClure Electric, Inc. (MCCLUR)

Law Offices of Glaspy & Glaspy, Inc.
One Walnut Creek Center
100 Pringle Avenue, Suite 750
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
925-947-1300 925-947-1594 (fax)
Defendants:

Fairmont Hotel Company (FAIRH)

Selman Breitman, LLP - San Francisco
Office
33 New Montgomer 6" Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105
415-979-0400 415-979-2099 (fax)
Defendants:

Rountree Plumbing & Heating Inc.
(RNTPLU)Brayton-Purcell Service List 2

Date Created: 8/10/2015-4:41:20 PM Run By : Porterfield, Angela
(AAP)

Created by: LitSupport - ServiceList - , BPImport

Matter Number: 19349.004 - Robert Ross

Sinunu Bruni LLP Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman &
333 Pine Street, Suite 400 Dicker LLP
San Francisco, CA 94104 525 Market Street, 17" Floor
415-362-9700 415-362-9707 (fax) San Francisco, CA 94105-2725 :
Defendants: 415-433-0990 415-434-1370 (fax)
McClure Electric, Inc. (MCCLUR) Defendants:

Anderson, Rowe & Buckley, Inc. (AR&B)

Bell Products Inc. (BELLPR)

Collins Electrical Company, Inc.
(COLELC)

Emil J. Weber Electric Co. (EMILJW)

Kenles Corporation (fka Advanced
Mechanical Contractors, Inc.) (ADVMEC)