Legal Document: HASIM MOHAMMED vs FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation

On October 18, 2021 a 66257Defen002028 was filed involving a dispute between Mohammed, Hasim A., and Does 1 Through 50 Inclusive, Federal Express Corporation, A Delaware Corporation, Fedex Corporate Services, Inc., A Delaware Corporation, Fedex Corporation, A Delaware Corporation, Fedex Freight, Inc., An Arkansas Corporation, Fedex Trade Networks Trade Services, Inc, A Delaware Limited Liability Company, Fedex Trade Networks Trade Services, Llc, Fedex Trade Networks Transport & Brokerage, Inc., A New York Corporation, for Complex Civil Unlimited Class Action in the District Court of San Mateo County.

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1 MICHAEL S. FREY (SBN 216100)
michael.frey@fedex.com
2 FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION
2601 Main Street, Suite 340
3 Irvine, California 92614
Telephone: (949) 862-4638
4
Attorney for Defendant
5 FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION
6 Additional counsel listed on signature pages
7

8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

9 FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO – CENTRAL COURT

11 HASIM A. MOHAMMED, on behalf of Case No.: 21-CIV-05619
himself and all others similarly situated,
12 ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO: Hon.
Plaintiff, Danny Y. Chou, Dept. 22, Complex Civil
13
v.
14 DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, a BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF
15 Delaware corporation; FEDEX DEMURRER PURSUANT TO ORDER OF
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; THE COURT
16 FEDEX FREIGHT, INC., an Arkansas
corporation; FEDEX CORPORATE
17 SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation; DATE: (No Hearing Scheduled)
FEDEX TRADE NETWORKS DEPT: 22
18 TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE, INC., a
New York corporation; FEDEX TRADE
19 NETWORKS TRADE SERVICES, LLC, a Complaint Filed: October 18, 2021
Delaware limited liability company; and Trial Date: None Set
20 DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

21 Defendants.

23 TO PLAINTIFF AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
24 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants Federal Express Corporation, FedEx
25 Corporation, FedEx Freight, Inc., FedEx Trade Networks Transport & Brokerage, Inc., FedEx
26 Trade Networks Trade Services, LLC, and FedEx Freight, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”)
27 hereby jointly file the following supplemental brief regarding the recently published Limon v.
28 Circle K (2022)(F082929) pursuant to the Court’s November 3, 2022 Order for Reconsideration

(265887) i
DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 of Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint.
2

5 DATE: November 10, 2022 By: _____________________________________
MICHAEL S. FREY
6 Attorneys for Defendant FEDERAL EXPRESS
CORPORATION
7

8 DATE: November __, 2022 By: _____________________________________
CHRISTOPHER M. AHEARN
9 Attorney for Defendants FEDEX
CORPORATION and FEDEX CORPORATE
10 SERVICES, INC.
11

12 DATE: November 10, 2022 By: ___________________________________ for
13 KEITH A. JACOBY
Attorney for Defendant FEDEX FREIGHT,
14 INC.

16
DATE: November 10, 2022 By: ___________________________________ for
17 SANDRA C. ISOM
Attorney for Defendant FEDEX FREIGHT,
18 INC.

20
DATE: November 10, 2022 BALLARD ROSENBERG GOLPER &
21 SAVITT, LLP
22

23 By: ___________________________________ for
MATTHEW B. GOLPER
24 Attorneys for Defendants FEDEX TRADE
NETWORKS TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE,
25 INC. and FEDEX TRADE NETWORKS
TRADE SERVICES, LLC
26

(265887) ii
DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 of Defendants' Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint.

2
3

4
5 DATE: November_, 2022 By:
MICHAEL S. FREY
6 Attorneys for Defendant FEDERAL EXPRESS
CORPORATION

~
7

8 DATE: November _/!!_, 2022 By:
9 Attorney for Defendants FEDEX
CORPORATION and FEDEX CORPORATE
10 SERVICES, INC.
11

12
DATE: November_, 2022 By:
13 KEITH A. JACOBY
Attorney for Defendant FEDEX FREIGHT,
14 INC.

16
DATE: November_, 2022 By:
17 SANDRA C. ISOM
Attorney for Defendant FEDEX FREIGHT,
18 INC.

20
DATE: November_, 2022 BALLARD ROSENBERG GOLPER &
21 SAVITT, LLP

22
23 By:
MATTHEWB. GOLPER
24 Attorneys for Defendants FEDEX TRADE
NETWORKS TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE,
25 INC. and FEDEX TRADE NETWORKS
TRADE SERVICES, LLC
26

(265887) ii
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 A key argument in Defendants’ Demurrer was that standing requirements and the plain
3 language of the FCRA enforcement provision require an allegation of actual damages for any
4 case to proceed, even if statutory damages are what is sought and awarded. (Defendants’
5 Demurrer at pp. 12-13). The Court concluded that “the FCRA does not require that Plaintiff
6 allege an actual compensable injury in order to recover statutory damages for a willful violation.”
7 (Court’s 6/06/22 Ruling p. 4). The recently published Court of Appeal case of Limon v. Circle K
8 has provided new guidance holding “[w]e conclude, under California law, that an informational
9 injury that causes no adverse effect is insufficient to confer standing upon a private litigant to sue
10 under the FCRA.” Limon v. Circle K (2022)(F082929) at pp. 36-37.
11 Limon held: (1) California applies an injury-in-fact requirement to Fair Credit Reporting
12 Act (“FCRA”) claims; (2) FCRA’s statutory language requires actual damages; and (3)
13 “Informational injuries” do not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. Defendants now
14 respectfully request that the Court reconsider its ruling in light of Limon and dismiss Plaintiff’s
15 case for lack of standing.
16 A. Summary of Limon Case
17 In Limon, the plaintiff brought a putative class action alleging “the consent form utilized
18 by Circle K violates the FCRA ‘by including a liability release’ and ‘state disclosures’ which
19 Limon alleges violate the ‘‘standalone’ disclosure and ‘clear and conspicuous’ requirements’ of
20 section 1681b, subdivision (b)(2)(A)(i).” Limon at p. 6. Limon also alleged he “was confused
21 regarding the nature of his rights under the FCRA and did not give valid authorization for [Circle
22 K] to procure a consumer report in violation of section 1681b, subdivision (b)(2)(A)(ii).” Id.
23 From these allegations Limon “contends he and all proposed class members are entitled to
24 “statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 for every willful violation of
25 the FCRA, as well as punitive damages, and an award of costs and attorney fees.” Id. at p. 7.
26 The trial court sustained a demurrer based on standing and the plaintiff appealed.
27 The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal holding:
28 Limon has failed to allege any concrete injury in connection with his claim of

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DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 informational injury. Thus, his alleged informational injury is insufficient
under California law to confer upon him standing to pursue his claim in state
2 court. We conclude, under California law, that an informational injury that
3 causes no adverse effect is insufficient to confer standing upon a private litigant
to sue under the FCRA. Id. at pp. 36-37.
4

5 The Court of Appeal reached this conclusion by holding California requires an “injury-in-fact”

6 in order to have standing: “we conclude, as a general matter, to have standing to pursue a claim

7 for damages in the courts of California, a plaintiff must be beneficially interested in the claims

8 he is pursuing.” Id. at p. 28. The Court analyzed the FCRA statute stating “the statutory damages

9 provision is intended to compensate a plaintiff for injury…[i]t is designed to provide redress

10 where damages are ‘difficult or impossible to quantify or prove.’” Id. at p. 31. Thus, “[t]o have

11 standing to pursue his claims, Limon must allege a concrete injury.” Id. at p. 32. The Court of

12 Appeal noted that Limon did not allege he failed to receive a disclosure, that it was inaccurate,

13 or defamatory information, only that it was an “informational injury.” Limon at p. 34. The Court

14 of Appeal upheld the dismissal of Limon’s case rejecting it as an “informational injury”:

15 Informational injury that causes no adverse effects”—e.g., where required
information is provided but is provided in the wrong format as in the present
16 case—has been held insufficient to satisfy Article III standing. (TransUnion,
17 supra, 2021 WL 2599472, *15 [141 S.Ct. 2190, 2214.) California case law has
held similarly. Id. at p. 36 (cites omitted).
18
B. Summary of Applicability of Limon the Instant Matter
19
Limon applies here for three reasons. First, California has an injury-in-fact standing
20
requirement for FCRA claims and it is undisputed Plaintiff has not plead any actual injury.
21
(Court’s 6/06/22 Ruling, p. 2 “Plaintiff did not allege that he suffered any actual damages.”
22
Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 35). Like Limon, Defendants brought a Demurrer based on standing
23
arguing Plaintiff was – at best – alleging an “informational injury” in violation of California’s
24
requirement of an injury-in-fact. (Defendants’ Demurrer at pp. 7-13). The Court’s June 6, 2022
25
ruling disagreed with Defendants’ injury-in-fact argument holding “[b]ut Transunion only
26
addressed standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. There is no such standing
27
requirement under California law.” (Court’s 6/06/22 Ruling p.3). Limon found such an injury-
28
in-fact requirement under California law for FCRA claims stating “we conclude, as a general
(265887) 2
DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 matter, to have standing to pursue a claim for damages in the courts of California, a plaintiff must
2 be beneficially interested in the claims he is pursuing.” Limon at p. 28.
3 Second, FCRA requires an actual injury. Defendants’ Demurrer argued the statutory text
4 also requires an actual injury. (Defendants’ Demurrer pp. 12-13). The Court disagreed in its June
5 6, 2022 ruling stating “the Court concludes that the FCRA does not require that Plaintiff allege
6 an actual compensable injury in order to recover statutory damages for a willful violation.”
7 (Court’s 6/06/22 Ruling p. 4). The ruling was based on the language that FCRA allowed for
8 statutory damages “the language of the FCRA strongly suggests that Plaintiff need not allege an
9 actual compensable injury in order to sue for willful violation.” Id. Limon found otherwise,
10 stating the statutory damages require an injury-in-fact since they are designed to compensate for
11 an actual injury: “the term damages connotes compensation for an injury and the term penalty
12 connotes punishment for wrongdoing… we conclude the statutory damages provision is intended
13 to compensate a plaintiff for injury.” Id. at p. 30.
14 Third, an alleged “informational injury” fails to meet the standing requirements under the
15 California law and the statute. Defendants argued under Price v. Starbucks Corp. (2011) 192
16 Cal.App.4th 113, there is no injury-in-fact for alleged “informational injury” claims.
17 (Defendants’ Demurrer at pp 12-16). This Court disagreed holding Plaintiff has standing to
18 “protect consumer privacy.” (Court’s 6/06/22 Ruling p.3) Limon held otherwise, stating a
19 plaintiff must suffer “an injury—i.e. an “‘invasion of [his or her] legally protected interests” to
20 fulfill FCRA’s privacy interests and there “there was no injury to Limon’s protected interest in
21 ensuring fair and accurate credit (or background) reporting” and thus “his alleged informational
22 injury is insufficient under California law to confer upon him standing to pursue his claim in state
23 court.” Id. at pp. 33, 36.
24 Limon has provided new guidance for California courts on the interpretation of FCRA
25 claims and standing for claims that do not allege actual damages. Based on this new guidance,
26 Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant Defendants’ Demurrer based on standing
27 and dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice under Limon.
28 ///

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DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 II. THE LIMON V. CIRCLE K CASE REQUIRES THAT PLAINTIFF’S
2 COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED FOR A LACK OF STANDING
3 Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a FCRA claim against Defendants as a matter of law.
4 Under Limon, California law requires him to have an injury-in-fact to have standing. Plaintiff
5 has failed to plead any injury because there is none. Indeed, he has declined this Court’s
6 invitation to amend his complaint to allege an injury-in-fact. His claims should be dismissed.
7 A. The Limon Case Holds There is an Injury-In-Fact Requirement for FRCA
8 Claims Brought in California Courts
9 Defendants’ Demurrer argued California standing requirements required Plaintiff to have
10 an actual injury to state a claim. (Defendants’ Demurrer at pp. 9-12). The Court disagreed: “the
11 Court concludes that the FCRA does not require that Plaintiff allege an actual compensable injury
12 in order to recover statutory damages for a willful violation.” (Court’s 6/06/22 Ruling p. 4).
13 Limon held, absent some clear exceptions which do not apply here, 1 a plaintiff is required to show
14 they are beneficially interested to maintain standing. Limon calls this test “Suffer An Injury-In-
15 Fact” stating “[t]he FCRA Does Not Eliminate The Requirement Limon Be Beneficially
16 Interested (Suffer An Injury-In-Fact) In Order To Have Standing.” Limon at p. 28.
17 Thus, California authority now unequivocally requires a FCRA plaintiff incur an actual
18 injury to have standing. Limon at p. 32 (“To have standing to pursue his claims, Limon must
19 allege a concrete injury.”) Plaintiff does not meet this standing 2 requirement as a matter of law.
20
1
21 The Limon court stated: “National Paint, Weatherford, and White stand for the proposition that
the Legislature may authorize public interest lawsuits by a plaintiff even if that plaintiff has not
22 been injured by the claimed violation. (White, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 764; National Paint, supra,
58 Cal.App.4th at p. 762.) These cases do not, however, stand for the proposition that a concrete
23 or particularized injury is never required in order for a plaintiff to have standing to sue in
California.” Limon at p. 18.
24
2
25 Plaintiff argued, like the plaintiff in Limon, Article III standing provisions don’t apply in
California. The Court in Limon stated, the beneficial interest test is similar: “Although courts
26 have routinely noted that California is not constrained by the case or controversy provisions of
Article III of the U.S. Constitution (e.g., Weatherford, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1247–1248;
27 Jasmine Networks, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 990; People ex rel. Becerra v. Superior Court
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 486, 497), they have also equated the “beneficially interested” test for
28 standing in California to the injury-in-fact prong of the Article III test for standing in the federal
courts.” Limon at p. 25.
(265887) 4
DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 B. The Limon Case Held the FCRA Statute Also Requires an Actual Injury to
2 Have Standing Because it Specifically Requires Damages
3 Defendants’ Demurrer argued the FCRA text itself requires an actual injury. (Demurrer
4 pp. 9-12). Specifically, Defendants argued the use of the term “damages” in the statute requires
5 Plaintiff have a compensable injury. (Id at pp. 12-13). The prior Court ruling disagreed, holding
6 “the language of the FCRA strongly suggests that Plaintiff need not allege an actual compensable
7 injury in order to sue for willful violation.” (Court’s 6/06/22 Ruling p. 4) The ruling held the
8 FCRA recognized either actual damages or statutory damages — the latter which did not require
9 standing (Id.)
10 The Limon Court held actual damage is required to confer standing and FCRA offers
11 injured plaintiffs a choice between a statutory set range of damages or actual damages, both
12 intended to compensate an injured plaintiff. The Court based its ruling on the fact that FCRA
13 uses the term “damages”:
14 Specifically, section 1681n provides, in part: “Any person who willfully fails to
15 comply with any requirement imposed under the subchapter with respect to any
consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of [¶] (1)(A)
16 any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or
damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 ….” (§ 1681n, subd.
17 (a)(1)(A).) Limon at. p. 29.
18 Other sections of FCRA use the term “penalties”:

19 Section 1681s reads, in part: “Except as otherwise provided …, in the event of a
20 knowing violation, …, the Federal Trade Commission may commence a civil
action to recover a civil penalty” up to “$2,500 per violation.” (§ 1681s, subd.
21 (a)(2)(A).) Id. at 30.

22
The Limon court reasoned the statute purposefully used different words, which means
23
there is a difference in meaning: “[w]e usually ‘presume differences in language … convey
24
differences in meaning.” Id. The Limon court held “damages” mean “[m]oney claimed by, or
25
ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury” and penalties mean
26
“[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer, usu[ally] in the form of imprisonment or fine;
27
esp[ecially], a sum of money exacted as punishment for either a wrong to the state or a civil
28

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DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 wrong (as distinguished from compensation for the injured party’s loss.)” Id. at pp. 29-30. The
2 Court held the “term damages connotes compensation for an injury and the term penalty connotes
3 punishment for wrongdoing.” Id. at 30. Accordingly, the Limon court ruled: “[b]ased on the
4 above, we conclude the statutory damages provision is intended to compensate a plaintiff for
5 injury…[i]t is designed to provide redress where damages are ‘difficult or impossible to quantify
6 or prove.’” (Gambles, supra, 234 F.Supp.3d at p. 523.)” Id. at 31. Statutory damages are “not
7 intended to penalize a company for violation of the FCRA.” Id.
8 Thus, under Limon, the statute requires an injury exist in order to recover any damages
9 and Plaintiff cannot equate statutory damages as a free-standing “penalty.” Yet these are the only
10 “damages” plead. The Complaint should be dismissed.
11 C. Plaintiff Has Failed to Plead Any Actual Damages or Injury Which
12 Forecloses on His Claim as a Matter of Law
13 It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to plead that he suffered any injury. 3
14 (Court’s 6/06/22 Ruling, p. 2 “Plaintiff did not allege that he suffered any actual damages.”
15 Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 35). As noted above, California law and FCRA both require an injury-
16 in-fact. On this basis alone, he fails to meet standing requirements. The court noted:
17 Here, Limon does not allege he did not receive a copy of the consumer report that
18 Circle K obtained. Limon does not allege the consumer report obtained by Circle
K contains any defamatory content or other per se injurious content. He does not
19 allege the consumer report contained false or inaccurate information. Similarly,
there are no allegations of any exposure to a material risk of future harm,
20 imminent or substantial. Limon at p. 34.
21 Without such allegations, there is no injury:
22 Thus, there was no injury to Limon’s protected interest in ensuring fair and
accurate credit (or background) reporting. Similarly, there was no injury
23
associated with any adverse employment decision based on false or inaccurate
24 reporting. Id.

25 The Limon court manifestly held without an injury there is no standing: “we conclude

26 Limon has not alleged a concrete or particularized injury to his privacy interests sufficient to

27 3
Plaintiff cannot obtain punitive damages without an actual injury as a matter of law as well.
28 Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 212, 238 (“An award of actual
damages, even if nominal, is required to recover punitive damages.”)
(265887) 6
DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 afford him an interest in pursuing his claims vigorously.” Id. at p. 35. As is the case here, it is
2 undisputed Plaintiff failed to plead any injury whatsoever; rather, he plead only insufficient
3 statutory damages. Plaintiff’s lack of injury mandates dismissal.
4 Limon foreclosed argument that an “informational” injury 4 from an alleged FCRA
5 violation based on mere formatting or extra language can established standing. Defendants’ brief
6 and oral argument asserted “informational injuries” cannot convey standing in California under
7 Price v. Starbucks Corp. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 113. (See Defendants’ Demurrer pp. 7-13, Oral
8 Argument pp. 34-44). Limon agreed holding:
9 Informational injury that causes no adverse effects —e.g., where required
10 information is provided but is provided in the wrong format as in the present
case—has been held insufficient to satisfy Article III standing. (TransUnion,
11 supra, 2021 WL 2599472, *15 [141 S.Ct. 2190, 2214.) California case law
has held similarly. (Boorstein, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 472–473 [noting
12 a lack of California case law recognizing “informational injury” and holding
“informational injury” is not cognizable under Civil Code, section 1798.83 et
13 seq.];5 Price v. Starbucks Corp. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1142–1143
14 [deprivation of information, by itself, is not a cognizable injury under former
Labor Code section 226].) Id. at p. 36.
15

16 Here, Plaintiff failed to plead any injury, let alone an information injury. Like in Limon, Plaintiff

17 fails, as a matter of law, to establish standing and his claim should be dismissed:

18 Limon has failed to allege any concrete injury in connection with his claim of
informational injury. Thus, his alleged informational injury is insufficient under
19 California law to confer upon him standing to pursue his claim in state court.
20 We conclude, under California law, that an informational injury that causes no
adverse effect is insufficient to confer standing upon a private litigant to sue
21 under the FCRA. Limon at pp. 36-37.

22
D. A Standing Requirement Does Not Violate Policy Goals of the FCRA Statute
23
and Plaintiff Suffered No Harm to Any Protected Interest
24

25
4
In fact, Plaintiff alleges an even lesser informational injury in his complaint than Limon – he
26 does not even allege any confusion – just “extraneous information”: The purported disclosures
do not meet the requirements under the law, because they are embedded with extraneous
27 information and are not clear and conspicuous disclosures in a stand-alone document. (Plaintiff’s
28 Complaint ¶ 35).

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DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 The interests protected under FCRA are served by a standing requirement. The Court’s
2 prior ruling held there was no standing requirement and “the purpose behind FCRA supports this
3 construction” and that “Congress enacted the FCRA to ‘protect consumer privacy.’” (Court’s
4 6/06/22 Ruling p. p.4) But to show a violation of FCRA, one must have an injury to the already
5 defined protected interests which are: (1) the right to privacy; and the (2) right to information.
6 Syed v. M-I, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 853 F.3d 492, 499.
7 The Court in Limon noted the protective interests advanced by FCRA:
8 In that regard, Congress sought to “ensure fair and accurate credit reporting” and
9 “protect consumer privacy.” (Safeco, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 52; § 1681, subd.
(a)(1) & (4), (b).) In addition, Congress sought to provide job applicants with
10 (1) the knowledge their prospective employer “may obtain the applicant’s
consumer report for employment purposes”; (2) the knowledge they can
11 withhold their authorization; and (3) “an opportunity to warn a prospective
employer of errors” in the consumer report before an adverse hiring decision is
12 made based on incorrect information. (Syed, supra, 853 F.3d at pp. 496–497; §
13 1681b, subd. (b)(2)(A).) Limon at. pp. 34-34.

14
The statute requires an actual injury to one of these interests:
15
Here, Limon does not allege he did not receive a copy of the consumer report
16 that Circle K obtained. Limon does not allege the consumer report obtained by
Circle K contains any defamatory content or other per se injurious content. He
17 does not allege the consumer report contained false or inaccurate information.
Similarly, there are no allegations of any exposure to a material risk of future
18
harm, imminent or substantial. (See TransUnion LLC. v. Ramirez (2021) 2021
19 WL 2599472, *2, *13 [141 S. Ct 2190, 210 L.Ed.2d 568 (TransUnion).) Thus,
there was no injury to Limon’s protected interest in ensuring fair and accurate
20 credit (or background) reporting. Id. at p. 34 (emphasis added).
21
Here, plaintiff alleges no injury to any of these interests. With none of his rights invaded
22
by an injury, he has no standing. If Congress wanted to deputize non-damaged plaintiffs to
23
enforce technical penalties for FCRA violations in state or federal court, it could. 6 It has not.
24
Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed.
25
///
26
///
27
6
28 Indeed, the statute provides for penalties for the Consumer Reporting Agency to enforce, not
plaintiffs who suffered no injury. 15 U.S.C.§ 1681(s)(a)(2).
(265887) 8
DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 III. CONCLUSION
2 The Limon case is directly on point. Plaintiff must have an injury-in-fact to have
3 standing in California courts for FCRA claims. Plaintiff has not, cannot, and will not plead such
4 an injury because he has not sustained one. Indeed, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to
5 amend in light of the Limon case (after having a week to review it) at the October 28, 2022
6 status conference. He declined. Defendants’ demurrer should be sustained without leave to
7 amend. See. Limon p. 35. (“Limon was provided an opportunity to supplement the record in
8 connection with the federal district court’s reconsideration…Limon filed a response to the
9 court’s invitation which read: ‘[Limon] does not believe that it will be possible to supplement
10 the record with evidence sufficient to establish Article III standing under the standard that the
11 Court has adopted.’”)
12

14 DATE: November 10, 2022 By: _____________________________________
MICHAEL S. FREY
15 Attorneys for Defendant FEDERAL EXPRESS
CORPORATION
16

17 DATE: November ___, 2022 By: _____________________________________
CHRISTOPHER M. AHEARN
18 Attorney for Defendants FEDEX
CORPORATION and FEDEX CORPORATE
19 SERVICES, INC.
20

21 DATE: November 10, 2022 By: __________________________________ for
22 KEITH A. JACOBY
Attorney for Defendant FEDEX FREIGHT,
23 INC.

25 ///
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///

(265887) 9
DEFENDANTS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1 III. CONCLUSION
2 The Limon case is directly on point. Plaintiff must have an injury-in-fact to have

3 standing in California courts for FCRA claims. Plaintiff has not, cannot, and will not plead such

4 an injury because he has not sustained one. Indeed, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to

5 amend in light of the Limon case (after having a week to review it) at the October 28, 2022

6 status conference. He declined. Defendants' demurrer should be sustained without leave to

7 amend. See. Limon p. 35. ("Limon was provided an opportunity to supplement the record in

8 connection with the federal district court's reconsideration ... Limon filed a response to the

9 court's invitation which read: '[Limon] does not believe that it will be possible to supplement

10 the record with evidence sufficient to establish Article III standing under the standard that the

11 Court has adopted.'")
12

14 DATE: November_, 2022 By:
MICHAEL S. FREY
15 Attorneys for Defendant FEDERAL EXPRESS
CORPORATION
16

17 DATE: November {() , 2022 By ~ --
18 Attomey for Defendants FEDEX
CORPORATION and FED EX CORPORATE
19 SERVICES, INC.
20

21
DATE: November_, 2022 By:
22 KEITH A. JACOBY
Attorney for Defendant FEDEX FREIGHT,
23 INC.

25 Ill
26 Ill
27 Ill
28 Ill

(265887) 9
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING RE: RECONSIDERATION OF DEMURRER PURSUANT TO
ORDER OF THE COURT
1

2 DATE: November 10, 2022 By: __________________________________ for
SANDRA C. ISOM
3 Attorney for Defendant FEDEX FREIGHT,
INC.
4

5
DATE: November 10, 2022 BALLARD ROSENBERG GOLPER &
6 SAVITT, LLP

Case Info

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Greenberg, Susan Track Judge’s New Case

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Document Filed Date

November 10, 2022

Case Filing Date

October 18, 2021

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Parties

AHEARN, CHRISTOPHER M. Attorney for the Defendant
DOES 1 THROUGH 50 INCLUSIVE Defendant
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation Defendant
FEDEX CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation Defendant
FEDEX CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation Defendant
FEDEX FREIGHT, INC., an Arkansas corporation Defendant
FEDEX TRADE NETWORKS TRADE SERVICES, INC, a Delaware limited liability company Defendant
Fedex Trade Networks Trade Services, LLC Defendant
FEDEX TRADE NETWORKS TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE, INC., a New York corporation Defendant
FREY, MICHAEL S. Attorney for the Defendant
GOLPER, MATTHEW B. Attorney for the Defendant
JACOBY, KEITH A Attorney for the Defendant
MOHAMMED, HASIM A. Plaintiff
SETAREH, CHAIM S. Attorney for the Plaintiff
William Pao Attorneys for Plaintiffs
David Keledjian Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Sandra Isom Attorneys for Defendants
Nolan Dilts Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Garrick Chan Attorneys for Defendants
Shahram Samie Attorneys for Defendants
Maxim Gorbunov Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Document for HASIM MOHAMMED vs FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation

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