Order: BEACON RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION VS. CATELLUS THIRD AND KING LLC et al

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Coltins Collins
Muir + Stewart LLP.
1100 E! Cente Steet

Sp, Pasadena, CA $1030
Phone (626) 243-4200
Fax (626) 244014

Samuel J. Muir, Esq. (State Bar No. 89883)
Erin R. Dunkerly, Esq. (State Bar No. 260220)

COLLINS COLLINS MUIR + STEWART LLP ELECTRONICALLY
1100 El Centro Street
South Pasadena, CA 91030 Sy FILED |
(626) 243-1100 — FAX (626) 243-1111 County of San Francisco

OCT 02 2013
Attorneys for Defendant Clerk of the Court
WEBCOR CONSTRUCTION, INC. dba WEBCOR BUILDERS BY: VANESSA WU

Deputy Clerk

Steven H. Schwartz, Esq. (State Bar No. 94637)

Noel Macaulay, Esq, (State Bar No, 121695)

SCHWARTZ & JANZEN, LLP

12100 Wilshire Bivd., Suite 1125

Los Angeles, CA 90025

(310) 979-4090 — FAX: (310) 207-3344

Attorneys for Cross-Defendant, HKS, INC., individually and dba HKS ARCHITECTS, INC.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

BEACON RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION,

CASE NO, CGC-08-478453

[Assigned to Judge Curtis EA. Karnow, Dept 304]
Plaintiff, REPLY TO MISSION PLACE’S OPPOSITION
TO MOTION OF HKS, INC., WEBCOR
CONSTRUCTION, INC. AND WEBCOR
BUILDERS, INC, FOR CLARIFICATION
AND/OR AMENDMENT AND/OR
RECONSIDERATION OF FORM/CONTENT
OF ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

VS.

CATELLUS THIRD AND KING, LLC, et
al.,

Defendants.

DATE: October 9, 2013
TIME: 9:30 a.m.
PLACE: 303 with Judge Kramer

AND ALL RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS.

Complaint Filed: 08/08/08

Trial Date: None

Ne ee ee ee

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Coltins Collins
Muir + Stewart LLP.
1100 E! Cente Steet

Sp, Pasadena, CA $1030
Phone (626) 243-4200
Fax (626) 244014

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1
INTRODUCTION

In its opposition, MISSION PLACE misstates the issue presented by asserting that this
motion is nothing more than an attempt to reargue the underlying motion for summary adjudication.
That is false. The Court ruled as it did on August 24, 2012, and HKS and WEBCOR respect that
ruling. If the order submitted by MISSION PLACE nearly a year later and thereafter executed by
this Court accurately reflected that ruling, this motion would not have been brought. However, the
order does not conform to what the Court stated on the record its ruling to be and goes far beyond
it. That is the fundamental problem with MISSION PLACE’s order that this motion secks to rectify,

The parties spent hundreds of hours voluminously briefing the issues relating to this motion
for summary adjudication. The Court spent vast amounts of time reviewing and considering the
same. The process culminated on August 24, 2012, with hours of oral argument and judicial
colloquy. At that time, the Court clearly delineated the scope of its ruling and the limitations on the
same. In doing so, it made it very clear that it was not determining what, if anything was covered by
any defense obligation.

What did MISSION PLACE submit for the Court’s consideration, approximately one year
later? An order which states, amongst other things, that HKS and WEBCOR must defend all claims
asserted against MISSION PLACE. An order which contains in its findings statements that are
demonstrably and undeniably false (e.g., “HKS agreed to indemnify CUDG for all claims
regarding acts of the architect”). These statements are not what this Court ruled at the time, and the
fact that a year has passed, and memories diminished, provides no excuse for MISSION PLACE’s
attempt to secure indirectly what it was unable to obtain through reasoned argument from the Court
earlier.

MISSION PLACE’s other arguments are without merit. While the motion was originally
noticed for the department to which this case is assigned, something which was both necessary and
proper, it has now been referred for hearing to Judge Kramer, so the challenge to the courtroom in

which the motion was filed is not only invalid, but moot. A motion for clarification of an order is

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Coltins Collins
Muir + Stewart LLP.
1100 E! Cente Steet

Sp, Pasadena, CA $1030
Phone (626) 243-4200
Fax (626) 244014

not limited in the fashion described in the opposition. To the extent that this is viewed as a motion
for reconsideration (as distinct from a motion for clarification), and the Court were to decline to
review the matter sua sponte, the new facts, circumstances and law justifying reconsideration are,
first and foremost, an order that radically differs from the Court’s rulings of August 24, 2012, and,
secondly, the very real likelihood (particularly given the timing of the submission and execution of
the order, the differing departments involved and the well-documented confusion concerning the
receipt of prior filings and submissions in this case) that the transcript of proceedings and the cover
letter/Declaration of Noel E. Macaulay regarding the order were not received or considered by
Judge Kramer. As such, this motion ought to be heard on its merits and at this time.
i

MISSION PLACE’S PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS ARE

NEITHER MERITORIOUS NOR APPLICABLE

A. This Motion Has Been Filed With the Proper Court

This matter is now assigned to Judge Karnow in Department 304. As such, Webcor and
HKS were obligated to file this motion in that department. Such requirement certainly does not
mean that clarification or reconsideration of a ruling by the judge who previous sat in this
department can never be sought. The present judge, Judge Karnow, can assign the reconsideration
motion to the judge who originally ruled, Judge Kramer. See In re Alberto, 102 Cal. App. 4th 421,
432 (2002); Ziller Electronics Lab Gmbh v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1222, 1232 (1988).
Indeed, that very assignment occurred at the case management conference held on Friday,
September 27, 2013. Thus, MISSION PLACE’s argument not only lacks merit, but is now moot.

B. Clarification of the August 19, 2013 Order Is Proper and Necessary

As noted in the moving papers, courts have the inherent power to make such orders as are
necessary to render their judgments and decrees effective. Code Civ. Proc., § 128 subd. (a)(8);
Security Trust & Savings Bank vy. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 585, 589 (1935).
This includes the power to do justice between the parties by making an order conform to the true
state of events. See, e.g., Wexler v. Goldstein, 146 Cal. App. 2d 410 (1956). Here, the Court’s order

of August 19, 2013 stated that Webcor and HKS have a present duty to defend the claims against

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Coltins Collins
Muir + Stewart LLP.
1100 E! Cente Steet

Sp, Pasadena, CA $1030
Phone (626) 243-4200
Fax (626) 244014

MISSION PLACE [August 19, 2013 order 3:27 ~ 4:4], but makes no mention of the qualifying
language in the Webcor or HKS contracts; nor does it reference in any way this Court’s prior
exhaustive statement of the limitations on the scope of what was adjudicated. The apparent
disparity between what was ruled upon on August 24, 2012 and the order issued August 19, 2013
makes the ruling on summary adjudication unclear.

Webcor’s contract language limits its very duty to defend to only those matters not “covered
or compensated by insurance.” Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Craig & Rush, Inc., 26 Cal.App.4th 1194,
1197 (1994). Movants’ RJN, Ex. 4, Mission Place’s Compendium of Exhibits in Support of Motion
for Summary Adjudication (“Compendium”) Ex. 2 at MSA0040 - MSA0041. HKS’s contract limits
its indemnity (and thus defense) obligation to matters as to which MISSION PLACE is ultimately
adjudicated not to be “actively, passively or concurrently negligent.” Movants’ RIN, Ex, 2, Motion
for Summary Adjudication at 3:4-10; Ex. 4, Compendium Ex. 4 at MSA0080. A blanket declaration
that the parties have an immediate and present duty to defend MISSION PLACE against the “the
claims” not only ignores the very contract language in question, but must have been submitted in
deliberate disregard of this Court’s own ruling on the record!. Civ. Code § 2778. It is directly
contravened by the very transcript setting forth the ruling the order purports to memorialize
[Macaulay Decl. 10:23 — 11:16]. Clarification is therefore appropriate,

Cc The Cases Cited by Mission Place Do Not Limit Reconsideration in the Manner

Stated in the Opposition

To the extent that this is viewed as a motion for reconsideration (as distinct from a motion

for clarification), and the Court were to decline to review the matter sua sponte, the new facts,

' MISSION PLACE’s actions in this regard cannot be dismissed as simple oversight or innocent
mistake. For example, under “Findings Specific to HKS”, it recites that “HKS agreed to indemnify
CUDG for all claims regarding acts of the architect’ (emphasis added). However, as the Court
itself acknowledged. during oral argument, the scope of any duty to indemnify/defend for HKS was
quite limited (it must “arise or result from” “misconduct, failure to comply with any provision of
this Agreement or negligent act, error or omission of Architect...” and did not apply to the extent
caused by the “active, passive, or concurrent negligence or willful misconduct on the part of any
indemnified party”. The Court itself noted that any recital of such duty would have to incorporate
those limitations. [See e.g. discussion and comments by the Court to that effect in RIN No. ILA
(Transcript), pgs. 66 (20) — 69 (18)], A misstatement of this magnitude speaks volumes.

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Coltins Collins
Muir + Stewart LLP.
1100 E! Cente Steet

Sp, Pasadena, CA $1030
Phone (626) 243-4200
Fax (626) 244014

circumstances and law giving rise to reconsideration are, first and foremost, an order which
radically differs from the Court’s rulings of August 24, 2012, and, secondarily, the very real
possibility (given the timing of the submission and execution of the order, the differing departments
involved and the well-documented confusion concerning the receipt of prior filings and
submissions in this case) that the transcript of proceedings and the cover letter/Declaration of Noel
E. Macaulay re the order were not received or considered by Judge Kramer. In that regard,
MISSION PLACE offers no authority for the proposition that if Judge Kramer did not see the
transcript and the supporting Declaration submitted by the parties opposing Mission Place’s order,
such cannot be a new fact or circumstance. It is certainly possible—perhaps even probable—that
the Court did not know that HKS and Webcor had submitted their own proposed order, a copy of
the transcript and a supporting declaration, or that the Court did not receive or consider the same
prior to executing the order. Knowledge and review of this material might very well have affected
the outcome of the summary adjudication ruling. See Macaulay Decl. { 15. Thus, the failure to
review points and authorities, for example (referenced by Mission Place — See Opp. 6:3-5) is only
one example of “new circumstances” justifying reconsideration, but is certainly not the universe of
all such grounds. As such, HKS and Webcor respectfully request the Court address the motion and
on its merits.
iW
THE ORDER SUBMITTED BY MISSION PLACE
MISSTATES THE RULING OF THIS COURT

As noted in the Introduction, the parties spent hundreds of hours in voluminously briefing
the issues relating to this motion for summary adjudication. The Court then spent vast amounts of
time reviewing and considering the same. The process culminated on August 24, 2012, with hours
of oral argument and judicial colloquy. At that time, the Court clearly delineated the scope of its
ruling and the limitations on the same. In doing so, it made it very clear that it was not determining
what, if anything was covered by any defense obligation. This is wot what is reflected in the Order
submitted by Mission Place.
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Coltins Collins
Muir + Stewart LLP.
1100 E! Cente Steet

Sp, Pasadena, CA $1030
Phone (626) 243-4200
Fax (626) 244014

A. The Ruling
MISSION PLACE has cited to various portions of the transcript, placing carefully selected

and isolated excerpts in the body of its opposition. However, there is no question as to what the
Court ruled. The transcript of the August 24, 2012 hearing states:

THE COURT: But I don’t know why I couldn’t say I declare that there is
a duty for the architects -- I'll pick on you guys -- to provide defense
costs to the extent the moving party incurs obligations caused by, and
then quote the section in 7.8 of your contract.

MR, MACAULAY: Including the exception, Your Honor,
correct?

THE COURT: Well, yeah, / would probably have to do it right,
huh? Yeah.

MR. HANSON: And, likewise, with our, you know, “contractor shall,”
it’s up to the extent covered or compensated by insurance.

So to have a ruling that we have a duty to defend, I can tell you ahead
of time that if | after being in court today in a week sit down with Mr.
Cvitanovic, that’s going to be our position. We have no duty to pay you a
dime.

MR. CVITANOVIC: Your Honor, you obviously considered that
argument in reading the paperwork, and now he is saying that, oh, he can
have a duty to defend, but we have this exculpatory clause.

There’s a duty to defend is what you've ruled, and now for them to
come back and say, okay, there could be a duty to defend, but we stand
on our exculpatory clause doesn’t make sense.

THE COURT: /t’s not exculpatory clause. It’s a clause that defends the
scope of their duty to defend.

I think I can properly resolve the defenses that you raised that this
wasn’t an assignment so whatever if says, it doesn’t matter, And we
didn’t consent to it so whatever it says, it doesn’t matter. And that there’s
a fact question as to whether anybody in their right mind would have
agreed to this in the first place, so it doesn’t matter what this thing says.

I can resolve all of those questions. They’re important questions.
They will have to be resolved perhaps sometime.

[Emphasis added]

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Coltins Collins
Muir + Stewart LLP.
1100 E! Cente Steet

Sp, Pasadena, CA $1030
Phone (626) 243-4200
Fax (626) 244014

[Transcript of August 24, 2012, pgs. 68 (17) — 70 (3)]

MR. MACAULAY: .. . Obviously, we stand on our position, but I was
curious as to was Your Honor suggesting that the Court might determine
that there was a valid contract and a valid assignment and a valid
consent, but that any duty created was limited to the scope of the
indemnity clause and subject to all other legal or equitable defenses that
might be applicable?

THE COURT: If you were to put that on the Bar exam question that that
will result from this, you would get a very high grade. I wish I could
have said it better than that. I probably did.

Yes. The clause is good and it applies to the moving party. And
whatever it says doesn’t get changed by it being assigned and now
enforceable. You have the same duty you had to the transferor. Now you
have it to the moving party/transferee, but it didn’t expand the coverage
of the indemnity at all.

[Emphasis Added]

[Transcript at pages 73 (10) — 74 (2)]

THE COURT: .. . Motion for summary adjudication declaring that there
is a duty owed by the architects and the general contractor to the moving
party, as set forth in the twe agreements that we’ve dealt with, 1 will
declare that using the proper words which need to be worked out.

I like counsel’s idea that you have a month or two or whatever you
want to work out those words.

And there is no issue of fact. The order has to get written, but there
is no issue of material fact regarding the existence of that duty or that
the words of the agreement govern it.

There will be fact issues as to how that applies to what happens in
this case for another day.

And there’s no fact issue as to whether the tenders were made in the
timing and the form set forth in your statement of undisputed facts. And
that’s it.

[Emphasis Added]
[Transcript at pg. 80 (10 — 25]

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Coltins Collins
Muir + Stewart LLP.
1100 E! Cente Steet

Sp, Pasadena, CA $1030
Phone (626) 243-4200
Fax (626) 244014

Finally, the transcript at pages 82 (21) — 84 (1) reads:

THE COURT: J’m adjudicating that there were contracts for each of you
that did provide for a duty to defend. Those contracts were effectively
assigned to the moving party. They were effectively consented to, and
there is no ambiguity regarding the existence of the duty or the scope of

the duty.

There will be plenty of difficult ways of applying that to what
happens in this case. I] understand that. But these things were written in
an enforceable matter and were transferred to a transferee who has the
right to enforce them.

MR, HANSON: Your Honor, you just said there’s no question as to the
scope of the duty. There’s a lot of questions as to the scope of the duty.

THE COURT: No. There’s the words -- as to what is covered is written
clearly, How that applies to the real world is not clear.

i mean, give the easiest one. If the architects were negligent and all
the other stuff that’s in there, they have to indemnify, including defend
and including reimbursing attorneys’ fees.

But whether they were negligent or not remains to be seen before
anything. There’s enough in the complaint to suggest that if they were,
the homeowners are trying to get the owner, the subsequent owner, to pay
for it.

The scope is clear. The words are good.
MR. HANSON: Meaning, the scope is defined hy the contract, correct?

THE COURT: You know, sometimes I’m a wise guy and | want to say,
“No,” just to watch everybady’s face drop. But, yes, that’s what I’ve said.
There’s a contract.

B. Mission Place’s Order

Did the order submitted by Mission Place nearly a year later, and subsequently executed by
the Court reflect the ruling? It did not. Instead, it blandly ignored what the Court stated on the
record, and ran roughshod over the careful analysis employed by the Court, as exhaustively
delineated in the transcript. The order commences with gross mischaracterizations of the record in

the factual findings (¢.g., that “HKS agreed to indemnify CUDG for all claims regarding acts of the

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Collins Collins
Muir + Stewart ite

Fax (620) 2407119

architect”) and culminates in assertions that. the motion was granted as prayed for (e.g. “the
Plaintiff's claims are encompassed by. the indenmity and diuty-to-defend. clause,” “owe an

wag

immediate defense,” “immediate duty to. provide a defense”), This is not what the Court ordered at
the time, and in light of the vast discrepancies between the transcript setting forth the ruling and
what was submitted and executed a year later, HKS and WEBCOR can only assume that the
transcript and supporting Declaration was ¢ither not received or reviewed prior to.the execution of
the order. As such, and because as currently formulated the order would do grave. injustice to both
the Court and the moving parties, FICS and WEBCOR respecttully request the Court to clarity, via
amendment or otherwise, the proper contours of the order.
oe WV
CONCLUSION
Webcor and Mission place respectfully request that this Court clarify or reconsider its
previous ruling that, Webcor and Mission Place have a present duty to. defend Mission Place,
without qualification. Such a ruling was never contemplated by the Court and does not comport
with the evidence presented at the briefing of Mission Place’s motion for summary adjudication.

DATED: October 2, 2013 COLLINS COLLINS MUIR + STEWART LLP

ERIN. R.DUNKERLY
SAMUEL J. MUIR
Attorneys for Defendant
WEBCOR CONSTRUCTION, INC, dba
WEBCOR BUILDERS

DATED: October 2, 2013 SCHWARTZ & JANZEN, LLP

By: h Dal il
STEVEN EH. SCHWARTZ L 1
NOEL MACAULAY
Attorneys for Crogs-Defendant

HES, INC., individually and dba HKS
ARCHITECTS, INC.

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REPLY TO OPPOSITION RE: MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION /RECONSIDERATION

1815328

Coltins Collins

Muir + Stewart LLP.
1100 E! Cente Steet

Sp, Pasadena, CA $1030
Phone (626) 243-4200
Fax (626) 244014

PROOF OF SERVICE
(CCP §§ 1013(a) and 2015.5; FRCP 5)
State of California, }
8s.
County of Los Angeles )

Tam employed in the County of Los Angeles. 1 am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is
1100 El Centro Street, South Pasadena, California 91030.

On this date, I served the foregoing document described as REPLY TO MISSION PLACE’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION
OF HKS, INC., WEBCOR CONSTRUCTION, INC. AND WEBCOR BUILDERS, INC. FOR CLARIFICATION AND/OR
AMENDMENT AND/OR RECONSIDERATION OF FORM/CONTENT OF ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY ADJUDICATION on the interested parties in this action by placing same in a scaled envelope, addressed as follows:

[5 (BY MAHL) - I caused such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in the United States mail ia South Pasadena,

Califomia to be served on the parties as indicated on the attached service list. 1 am “readily familiar” with the firm's practice of
collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that
same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at South Pasadena, California in the ordinary course of business. [ am aware that on motion
of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of
deposit for mailing in affidavit.

(BY CERTIFIED MAIL) ~ I cansed such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid via Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested
to be placed in the United States Mail in South Pasadena, California.

—-] BY EXPRESS MAIL OR ANOTHER METHOD OF DELIVERY PROVIDING FOR OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

[x] (BY ELECTRONIC FILING AND/OR. SERVICE) — I served a true copy, with all exhibits, electronically through LexisNexis File
and Serve on designated recipients listed on the attached Service List on: October 2, 2013. (Date)

FEDERAL EXPRESS - I caused the envelope to be delivered to an authorized courier or driver authorized to receive documents with
delivery fees provided for.

LJ (BY FACSIMILE) - | caused the above-described document(s) fo be transmitted to the offices of the interested parties at the facsimile

number(s) indicated on the attached Service List and the activity report(s) generated by facsimile number (626) 243-1100 indicated alll
pages were transmitted.

5 GY PERSONAL SERVICE) - [ caused such envelope(s) to be delivered by hand to the office(s) of the addressee(s).

Executed on October 2, 2013 at: South Pasadena, California.

EJ

(STATE) - 1 declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

f] (FEDERAL) - I declare that 1 am employed in the office ofa member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.

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Coltins Collins

Muir + Stewart LLP.
1100 E! Cente Steet

Sp, Pasadena, CA $1030
Phone (626) 243-4200
Fax (626) 244014

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BEACON RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION v. CATELLUS THIRD AND KING, LLC

SAN FRANCISCO SUPERIOR COURT — CASE NO. CGC 08-478453
OUR FILE NO, 18153

SERVICE LIST

Ann Rankin, Esq.

Terry Wilkens, Esq.

LAW OFFICES OF ANN RANKIN

3911 Harrison St,

Oakland, CA 94611-4536

(510) 653-8886 — FAX(510) 653-8889
kin@annrankin.com

twilkens@anprankin.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF BEACON

RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION

John A. Koeppel, Esq.
Todd J. Wenzel, Esq.

ROPERS, MAJESKI, JOHN & BENTLEY PC

100 Marshall Street, Suite 500

Redwood City, CA 94063-2052

(650) 364-8200 — FAX (650) 780-170
swenzel@rmkb.com

smartinez@rmkb.com

ikoeppel@rmkb.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PROLOGIS;
THIRD AND KING INVESTORS LLC; CATELLUS
URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION;
CATELLUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION;
CATELLUS THIRD AND KING INVESTORS LLC;
CATELLUS COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; CATELLUS OPERATING
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

8. Mitchell Kaplan
Gregory Hanson, Esq.

GORDON & REES LLP

275 Battery $t., Suite 2000

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 986-5900 — FAX: (415) 986-8054
skaplan@gordonrees.com

ATTORNEYS FOR WEBCOR BUILDERS, INC. ;
WEBCOR CONSTRUCTION, INC., individually and
dba WEBCOR BUILDERS; WEBCOR
CONSTRUCTION LP, individually and dba WEBCOR
BUILDERS

Steven M. Cvitanovie, Esq.
HAIGHT BROWN & BONESTEEL LLP

Three Embarcadero Center, Suite 200

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 546-7500 — FAX: (415) 546-7505

Scvitanovicw@bbbl. mn

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS MISSION PLACE
LLC; CENTURION REAL ESTATE PARTNERS,
LLC; MISSION PLACE MEZZ HOLDINGS, LLC
erroneously named as MISSION PLACE HOLDINGS
LLC; MISSION PLACE MEZZANINE, LLC and
MISSION PLACE PARTNERS, LLC

1]

Kenneth Katzoff, Esq.

KATZOFF & RIGGS

1500 Park Ave., Suite 300

Emeryville, CA 94608

(510) 597-1990 — FAX: (510) 397-0295

kkatzofi@ katzofiriges.com
sshim@ckatzoftriges.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF BEACON
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION

David S, Webster, Esq.
Mark J. D’Argenio, Esq.

WOOD, SMITH, HENNING & BERMAN LLP

1401 Willow Pass Rd,, Suite 700

Concord, CA 94520-7982

(925) 356-8200 — FAX: (925) 356-8250
dwebsterdiwshblaw.com

mdargenio@wshblaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PROLOGIS; THIRD
AND KING INVESTORS LLC; CATELLUS URBAN
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; CATELLUS.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; CATELLUS THIRD
AND KING INVESTORS LLC; CATELLUS
COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION;
CATELLUS OPERATING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

James L. Shea, Esq.
Carol Hastings, Esq.

BLEDSOE, CATHCART, DIESTEL, PEDERSEN &
TREPPA, LLP

601 California St, 16® Floor

San Francisco, CA 94108

(415) 981-5411 — FAX: (415) 981-0352
jshea@bledsoelaw.com

chastings@bledscelaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/CROSS-

COMPLAINANT SHGOTER & BUTTS, INC.

Steven H. Schwartz, Esq.
Thomas Matteson, Esq.

Noel Macaulay, Esq.

SCHWARTZ & JANZEN

12100 Wilshire Bivd., Suite 1125

Los Angeles, CA 90025

(310) 979-4090 ~ FAX: (310) 207-3344
sschwartz@’sj-law.com

tmatteson@sj-law.com

nmacaulay@jsj-law.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS HKS, INC., HKS
ARCHITECTS, INC., HKS, INC., individually and doing
business as HKS ARCHITECTS, INC.

REPLY TO OPPOSITION RE: MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION /RECONSIDERATION28

Coltins Collins

Muir + Stewart LLP.
1100 E! Cente Steet

Sp, Pasadena, CA $1030
Phone (626) 243-4200
Fax (626) 244014

18183

BEACON RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION v, CATELLUS THIRD AND KING, LLC

SAN FRANCISCO SUPERIOR COURT — CASE NO. CGC 08-478453
OUR FILE NO, 18153

William H. Staples, Esq.

ARCHER NORRIS

2033 North Main St., Suite 800

Walnut Creek, CA 94596

(925) 308 6600 = FAX: (925) 930-6620

SThorys FOR "ANNING- JOHNSON COMPANY

Adam Brezine, Esq.

Julien E, Capers, Esq.

BRYAN CAVE LLP

560 Mission St., 25¢ Floor

San Francisco, CA 94105-2994

{A415} 268. 2000-— PAX: (415) 268-1999

Randell J. Campbell, Esq.

LYNCH, GILARDI & GRUMMER

170 Columbus Ave., 5** Floor,

San Francisco, CA. 94133

(415) 397-2800 — FAX: (415) 397-0937
pbel@lgulaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR ARCHITECTURAL GLASS &

ALUMINIUM CO., INC,

Christopher T, Olsen, Esq.

CLINTON & CLINTON

100 Oceangate, Suite 1400

Long Beach, CA 90802

(562) 216-5078 — FAX: (562) 216-5001
smithy
ATTORNEYS FOR THYSSENKRUPP ELEVATOR
CORPORATION

12

Kevin P. McCarthy, Esq,

Fred Trudeau, sq.

MCCARTHY & MCCARTHY, LLP.

492 Ninth St., Suite 220

Oakland, CA 94607

(510) 839-8 100 ~ FAX: (510) 839-8108
kmecarthy@emecarthylip.com
firudean@mecarthylip.com

ATTORNEYS FOR WINDOW SOLUTIONS

Brent Basilico, Esq.

Christian Lucia, Esq.

Denae M. Olivieri, Esq.
SELLAR HAZARD & LUCIA
1800 Sutter St., Suite 460
Concord, CA 94520

bbasilico@iscllarlaw.com

dolivieri@sellarlaw.com

(925) 938-1430 — FAX: (925) 256-7508,

ATTORNEYS FOR ALLIED FIRE PROTECTION,
BLUE’S ROOFING COMPANY, CAREFREE TOLAND
POOLS, INC., CREATIVE MASONRY, CRITCHFIELD
MECHANICAL, INC., CORPERTINO ELECTRIC, F.
ROGERS CORPORATION, J.W. MCCLENAHAN CO,,
N.V. HEATHORN, INC., VAN-MULDER SHEET
METAL, INC., WEST COAST PROTECTION
COATINGS, INC., and WESTERN ROOFING SERVICE

James P. Castles, Esq.

Richard C. Young, Esq.

ROBLES, CASTLES & MEREDITH

492 Ninth St., Suite 200

Oakland, CA 94607

(415) 632-1586 -- FAX: (415) 743-9305
iimn@ircmlawgroup.com

rick@remlawgroup.com

DEFENDANTS SKIDMORE OWINGS & MERRILL
LLP

REPLY TO OPPOSITION RE: MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION /RECONSIDERATION