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ROBERT M. PETERSON (Bar No.: 100084)
COLIN C. MUNRO (Bar No.: 195520)
CHRISTOPHER J. WEBER (Bar No.: 233998)
CARLSON, CALLADINE & PETERSON LLP ELECTRONICALLY
353 Sacramento Street, 16th Floor FILED
San Francisco, CA 94111 Superior Court of California,
Telephone: (415) 391-3911 County of San Francisco
Facsimile: (415) 391-3898 MAR 04 2015
Clerk of the Court
Attorneys for Defendants ,
TAXI EQUIPMENT LEASING LLC and eeaeaene eputy Clerk
YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUA, CASE NO.: CGC-11-515542
Plaintiff, Consolidated with CGC-12-519794 and CGC-13-
529705
v.
DEFENDANTS TAXI EQUIPMENT
JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ, and LEASING , LLC AND YELLOW CAB
individual, CAROLINE MILLER, an COOPERATIVE, INC.’S MOTION IN
individual; TAXI EQUIPMENT LEASING LIMINE NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE
LLC, a Limited Liability Company; SAN PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S
FRANCISCO INDEPENDENT TAXI TESTIMONY
ASSOCIATION, a Corporation; YELLOW
CAB COOPERATIVE, INC., a Corporation;
and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive, Date: March 9, 2015
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Defendants. Dept: 206
Defendants TAXI EQUIPMENT LEASING LLC and YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE,
INC. hereby move this Court, in limine, to exclude at trial any reference by, or testimony of, Lan
Lievense as to the cost of Plaintiff's alleged past or future medical costs.
This motion is based upon the grounds that in the interest of justice and fairness, such
evidence must be excluded under Evid. Code § 352, because such evidence creates a substantial
danger of undue prejudice to Defendants, confusing the issues, and/or misleading the jury.
Additionally, such proffered testimony is not admissible in California Courts pursuant to the
holding in Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1324-32, which held that
1 Case No... CGC-11-515542
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evidence of gross medical charges are not admissible at trial as evidence of past medical damages
nor may they be used as evidence of future medical expenses. In the alternative, if there is any
issue as to what evidence proffered by Plaintiff's expert Lan Lievense should be excluded from
trial concerning medical damages, Defendants request an evidentiary hearing under Evid. Code §
402, outside the presence of the jury, to determine whether evidence sought to be presented is
admissible to the jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS MOTION
This case arises from a traffic collision involving a taxi driven by Defendant Joel Sanchez.
Plaintiff was a passenger in Mr. Sanchez’s taxi and claims personal injuries resulting from Mr.
Sanchez rear-ending a vehicle. The taxi bore a Yellow Cab taxi color scheme and was using a taxi
cab medallion leased to Alan Da Silva. Mr. Da Silva employed Mr. Sanchez as an independent
contractor to operate the taxi from time to time. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Sanchez was an
employee of Yellow Cab and that Yellow Cab is vicariously liable for his negligence. Yellow Cab
denies that Mr. Sanchez was its employee.
Plaintiff intends to offer the expert testimony of Mr. Lievense to prove her alleged past and
future medical expenses incurred from health care providers Stanford University Medical Center
and Kaiser Permanente, even though Mr. Lievense did not consider either the actual amount of
expense incurred by Plaintiff or the reasonable amount of those expenses.
1. ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiff's Introduction of Expert Evidence Lacking Proper Foundation
Should be Excluded under Evidence Code sections 352 and 801.
If an expert’s opinion is based on a faulty foundation, or on no foundation at all, then it is
not admissible and is properly excluded from being offered. An expert opinion must be “[b]ased
on matter . . . that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an
opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates... .” Evid. Code, § 801. “‘ We construe
this to mean that the matter relied on must provide a reasonable basis for the particular opinion
offered, and that an expert opinion based on speculation or conjecture is inadmissible.’” Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770 (quoting
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Lockheed Litigation Cases (2004) 115 Cal. App.4th 558, 564.) Expert opinion testimony based on
matter that provides no reasonable basis for the opinion. offered is properly excluded under
Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b). Sargon, 55 Cal.4th 747 at 776.
Similarly, Evidence Code section 802 allows the trial court to inquire into the reasons for
an expert’s opinion and to exclude expert opinion testimony if it is “based on reasons unsupported
by the material on which the expert relies.” Jd. at 771. Evidence Code section 802 also requires
courts to consider prior judicial decisions regarding the proper evidentiary foundation for an
expert opinion. /d. If the material on which an expert relies does not support the expert’s
reasoning, the expert’s opinion is properly excluded under Evidence Code section 802. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff will attempt to introduce as evidence at trial through her
retained expert Lan Lievense as to the cost of Plaintiff's past and future medical expenses by
proffering opinions about the reasonable value of such medical services based on the full/gross
amounts billed by Plaintiff's medical treatment providers for services rendered as a result of the
subject accident. Such evidence must be completely excluded from trial because: 1) such
evidence has been declared inadmissible by the Court of Appeal in Corenbaum v. Lampkin, and 2)
Mr. Lievense’s entire opinion rests on irrelevant material that is based on a faulty foundation
unsupported by the materials on which he relies. Hither way, his opinions must be excluded.
B. Lan Lievense’s Testimony Should Be Excluded In Its Entirety Because His
Opinions Regarding Past Medical Costs Are Based On a Faulty Foundation Of
Irrelevant Materials.
In the controlling decision of Corenbaum v Lampkin, the court held that “evidence of the
full amount billed for a plaintiff's medical care is not relevant to the determination of a plaintiff's
damages for past medical expenses, and therefore is inadmissible for that purpose if the plaintiff's
medical providers, by prior agreement, had contracted to accept a lesser amount as full payment
for the services provided.” Corenbaum, 215 Cal.App.4th at 1328; see also State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Huff (2013) 216 Cal-App.4th 1463, 1471 (recognizing that “the full amount
billed by medical providers is not an accurate measure of the value of medical services” because
“many patients . . . pay discounted rates,” and standard rates “for a given service can vary
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tremendously, sometimes by a factor of five or more, from hospital to hospital in California.”)
(citing Corenbuam and Howell v, Hamilton Meats & Provisions (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541).
In the case here, Plaintiff's insurance carrier was Kaiser Permanente (“Kaiser”), who
insured Plaintiff with respect to treatment she received from Stanford University Medical Center
(“Stanford”). (Decl. of Christopher J. Weber Ex. A at 9:18-10:3; 12:16-18). Although Kaiser was
billed a certain amount by Stanford for medical services provided to Plaintiff, Kaiser actually paid
for those services at a lesser rate established by contract between Stanford and Kaiser, which is not
reflected in the billings submitted by Stanford to Kaiser. (/d. at 13:16-15:9; 23:21-24:9: 29:14-22;
38:3-8). Accordingly, the amounts billed by Stanford to Kaiser in no way reflect the actual cost
incurred by Kaiser on behalf of Plaintiff with respect to Plaintiff's medical costs.
1. Opinion on Past Medical Expenses should be excluded because Mr.
Lievense’s analysis was based solely on the full amounts charged by
Plaintiff's health care providers.
Mr. Lievense testified at his deposition on March 4, 2015 that he does not know the total
amount actually paid for Plaintiff's medical services, nor did the amounts paid contribute to his
opinions at all. (Jd. at §§ 2-3). Instead, Mr. Lievense stated the only way to do an accurate
valuation of medical services is to examine the total retail billing charges. (/d. at {| 3). He asserted
that he was not interested in the actual amount paid by Kaiser to Stanford when forming his
opinion. (Ud. ) He explained that the way to determine the usual customary, reasonable value of
medical services is to look at the billed amount, rather than the amount actually incurred, and that
in his opinion the billed amount represents the reasonable amount of expense for the medical
services offered. (/d.)
This method of valuation is in complete contradiction to the Court’s holding in Corenbaum
and is not relevant to determine medical damages. With Lievense’s opinion solely based on
evaluating the gross retail charges reflected in Stanford’s billing statements to Kaiser, his method
is clearly contrary to the holding in Corenbaum and is therefore inadmissible under Evidence
Code section 801. Lievense’s entire “valuation” of past medical costs and any opinions, reports,
or evidence referencing or relying upon such, must be excluded.
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DEFENDANTS’ MIL NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S TESTIMONY2. Opinion on Future Medical Costs by Mr. Lievense should be excluded because
full amounts billed for services provide no reasonable basis for future medical
costs.
The Court of Appeal in Corenbaum made it clear that “the full amount billed for those past
medical services can provide no reasonable basis for an expert opinion on the value of future
medical services.” Corenbaum, 215 Cal.App.4th at 1331. Clearly, by nature of Mr. Lievense’s
methods of valuation, explicitly described in his deposition as based only on the total retail billing
charges, which is neither relevant nor admissible according to Cerenbaum, any future valuation
made by Lievense would be founded on the same faulty method as his past medical costs opinion
and would only be conducive to further irrelevant or inadmissible opinion. Any opinions on
future costs should therefore be properly excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 802.
CONCLUSION
Based on Plaintiff's retained expert’s own testimony and controlling guidelines offered in
Corenbaum, any testimony offered from Lan Lievense must be excluded. If it is not excluded, the
jury will be misled by being asked to consider medical billing amounts that are not relevant and
inadmissible, which will cause confusion about the medical damages issues and result in severe
prejudice to the Defendants. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, any testimony or evidence produced
by Plaintiff through Lan Lievense on past_or future medical costs must be excluded from trial
under Evidence Code sections 352, 801, and 802.
Dated: March 4, 2015 CARLSON, CALLADINE & PETERSON LLP
By:
ROBERT M. PETERSON
COLIN C. MUNRO
CHRISTOPHER J. WEBER
Attomeys for Defendants
TAXI EQUIPMENT LEASING LLC and
YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC.
5 Case No.:_ CGC-11-515542
DEFENDANTS’ MIL NO, 7 TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S TESTIMONYDECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER J. WEBER
I, Christopher J. Weber, declare as follows:
lam an attorney licensed to practice before all courts of the State of California and am an
attorney with the law firm of Carlson, Calladine & Peterson, attorneys of record for defendants
Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc. and Taxi Equipment Leasing, LLC. Except as otherwise indicated,
I know the following facts from personal knowledge and if called upon as a witness, I could and
would competently testify thereto under oath.
1. Attached hereto as Exhibit “A” is a true and correct copy of selected excerpts from
the March 25, 2014 deposition of Larue Perkins, person most knowledgeable for Stanford
University Medical Center.
2. On March 4, 2015, I took the deposition of Lan Lievense in this case. The
transcript from this deposition was not available as of the filing of Defendants’ motion in limine,
and Defendants will supplement their filing with the relevant portion of Mr. Lievense’s deposition
testimony as soon as it is available.
3. In his deposition, Mr. Lievense testified that he does not know the total amount
actually paid for Plaintiff's medical services, nor did the amounts paid contribute to his opinions at
all. Instead, Mr. Lievense stated the only way to do an accurate valuation of medical services is to
examine the total retail billing charges. He asserted that he was not interested in the actual amount
paid by Kaiser to Stanford when forming his opinion. He explained that the way to determine the
usual customary, reasonable value of medical services is to look at the billed amount, rather than
the amount actually incurred, and that in his opinion the billed amount represents the reasonable
amount of expense for the medical services offered.
I declare under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct and that this
declaration was executed on this 4th day of March 2015, at San Francisco, California.
CHRISTOPHER J. WEBER
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DEFENDANTS’ MIL NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S TESTIMONYExhibit A24
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LARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014
FUA vs. SANCHEZ 1
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO - UNLIMITED CIVIL JURISDICTION
IDA CHRISTINA CRUZ FUA,
Plaintiff,
vs. No. CGC-11-515542
JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ,
and individual; CAROLINE
MILLER, an individual; TAXI
EQUIPMENT LEASING LLC, a
Limited Liability Company; SAN
FRANCISCO INDEPENDENT TAXI
ASSOCIATION, a Corporation;
TAXI ASSOCIATION, a
Corporation; YELLOW CAB
COOPERATIVE, INC., a
Corporation; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive,
Defendants.
DEPOSITION OF
LARUE PERKINS
TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 2014
Reported by: MARK I. BRICKMAN, CSR RPR
License No. 5527
2 ESQUIRE 800.211.DEPO (3376,
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LARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014
FUA vs. SANCHEZ g
persons most qualified or most knowledgeable on some
subjects, and if you would turn to page 3.
A. (Complying) .
Q. On the -- on the bottom there, it says:
"Testimony required."
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So in the Notice, we're requesting that
Stanford produce the person most knowledgeable relating
to any and all claims and/or charges for treatment of Ida
Christine Fua from April 1, 2011 to the present, and
including -- we have subcategories. You see there amount
billed by any subscriber.
AL Yes.
Q. Are you most knowledgeable from Stanford on
that subject?
A. Yes.
Q. "Amounts allowed by Stanford University
Medical Center for a given service by a provider; i.e.
the difference between the amount initially claimed or
billed by the provider, minus any reductions applied by
Blue Cross."
That's obviously a typo and it's my mistake.
But are you the person most knowledgeable from Stanford
in terms of what was billed and then ultimately received
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by Stanford?
A. Yes.
Q. Relating to Miss Fua?
A, Yes. :
Q. Okay. Number 3, "amounts paid by Stanford to
any provider." I don't think that's at issue here.
We'll skip that.
4, "amounts written off" -- it's an
unfortunate term -- "by Stanford Medical Center."
Do you understand what that means?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Are you the person most knowledgeable on that
subject?
A. Yes.
Q. "Amount still owed by Stanford to any medical
provider." I don't think that's the case. We'll skip
that.
And number 6, “amounts for which Ida Christine
Fua is responsible."
Are you the person most knowledgeable
regarding that?
A. Yes.
Q. The Deposition Notice also contains a request
that some documents be produced, and that is on another
section right there. It's on page 2, and the description
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FUA vs. SANCHEZ 12
the insurance has paid, who the insurance company is
that's paying this here and the adjustments that are made
on the accounts, and these are contractor adjustments
made according to our contract.
And also we -- if there were any payments made
by the patient.
MR. WEBER: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Or any -- anything assigned to
collections because it wasn't paid, and then the patient
balances.
This is what's on the physician spreadsheet.
MR. WEBER: Q. When you say "contractual
adjustments" based upon the contract you had, are you
referring to a contract between Stanford and Kaiser?
A. That is correct.
Q. In this case, it's your understanding that the
insurance carrier for Miss Fua is Kaiser?
A. That is correct.
Q. Okay. If you can --
A. Do you want me to go to the other one?
Because it's a little different.
Q. Sure.
A. And on the hospital side, we show the dates of
service when they were in the hospital. Then you have
the -- their -- there are two different account numbers
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that you see, the hospital account numbers, the total
charges, the amount that was paid by the insurance, the
insurance adjustment and the insurance company and then
the financial assistance, if there was any adjustments
that we did because we did some financial assistance
because they couldn't pay, and then there's collection
amount on here.
Q. Okay. What I'd like to do -- the document you
just testified about, Stanford facility billing record,
I'm going to go ahead and mark that as Exhibit 2 to the
depo.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 was
marked for identification.)
MR. WEBER: What I'd like you to do is take a
look at this document, which would be Exhibit 3.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 3 was
marked for identification.)
MR. WEBER: And if you can tell me if these
are substantially the same things (Indicating). This is
for convenience, because I only have copies of three.
THE WITNESS: So what you have here is you
have two dates of service. They're two documents, so I
pulled them out.
MR, WEBER: Q. You're referring to Exhibit
2?
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A. Yes, I am. Right. So what you have here, you
have April the 4th, 2011 to April the 12th, 2011. .
Q. Right.
A. And that would be that first document that we
were looking at.
MS. KATZORKE: Were these documents the same?
THE WITNESS: Right.
MR. WEBER: Those are the same.
Just to resolve some ambiguity, on the one
that I showed you, Exhibit 3, if you look in the upper
left hand, it provides something called date billed, and
that date is January 17th, 2014.
The one that you produced today, Exhibit 2,
carries a date of March 2014.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. WEBER: Q. Is the reason why the dates
are different just that these documents are printed
different times?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. But otherwise, if you look at Exhibit 3
and Exhibit 2, the service dates are the same, the
amounts are the same, the CPT codes are the same?
A. That is correct.
Q. So let's turn to Exhibit 3 again because we
all have copies of this and it's easier to follow.
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FUA vs. SANCHEZ 15
Do you have that before you?
MS. KATZORKE: Right here.
THE WITNESS: Okay. Yes.
MR. WEBER: It's a document entitled:
"Hospital Statement."
Q. Do you see that?
A. Mm-hmm, yes.
Q. Can you tell me generally what this is?
A. This is our billing statement.
Q. Okay. And is this document regularly kept or
made in the course of Stanford's business?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And do you have personal knowledge as to how
the document is created? Let me go back. Different
question.
Based upon your position as senior manager --
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. -- do you have knowledge as to the process by
which information is inputted, for example, in a computer
system and how this document ultimately comes to
fruition, ultimately comes into being?
A. Yes.
Q Yes or --
A. Yes.
Q Great. Thank you.
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A. We do have coders, but I don't know if they
reviewed the records on this here.
Q. What's -- what's the general practice with
respect to the coders in terms of what they review and
what they don't review, if you know?
A. I don't know their process.
Q. Okay. If this had been reviewed by somebody
trained in medical coding terminology, this particular
statement here, would -- would it be on the statement
itself? For example, reviewed by, checkmarked by?
A. No.
Q. dust in terms of the overall process again
from the service being provided or rendered and the
statement being generated, have we gone through the
entire -- the entire process or are things missing that I
haven't asked about?
A. No. I think you've gone through the entire
process.
Q. Okay. Still on Exhibit 3, can you turn to
page 12? It's the second to last page.
A. (Complying) .
Q. Just let me know when you're there.
MS. KATZORKE: Tell him you're there. Say
Yokay."
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. You were so soft, I
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A.
pO PRP Oo
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
set up with the different payers, and we negotiate
certain fees, how much we're going to get paid and what
our adjustments are, and that's done by our contracting
department.
in that contract change from year to year?
Kaiser, has contracts with many other health insurance
providers in the State of California, perhaps nationwide;
correct?
I don't know.
You don't. What is the contract for?
Excuse me?
What is the contract for?
It's the contract that our contract department
Who's the head of the contracting, if you
Gary May.
Do you know what Mr. May's job title is?
Vice-president.
Vice-president of Stanford; of the department?
Vice-president of Stanford.
Do you know if the amounts that are set forth
They could be.
Have you ever seen a copy of the contract?
No.
I'm assuming that Stanford, in addition to
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the bill was for four thousand four -- 447,705.
Q. Mm-hmm.
A. That's the total charges. Our payment was
$171,128.14. So that goes on to the patient's account,
and then we take what we call our contractual
adjustments. That's according to the contract, and that
was 277,577. So that's -- and it's according to our
contracts.
So it paid the amount in full, as far as we're
concerned.
Q. Okay. Looking at Exhibit 3, then, for 2011,
was Miss Fua responsible for any amount?
A No.
Q. Is Kaiser responsible for any amount?
A No.
Q. Is any other third party, to your knowledge,
in the world responsible for any amount reflected on
Exhibit 3?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Your account is considered closed, then?
A. > It's paid in full, that particular service
date.
LARUE PERKINS March 25, 201
FUA vs. SANCHEZ 2
Q. Would you tell me how that works?
A. It doesn't adjust any of this here. It is
that the patient -- whatever the payment amount is. So
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FUA vs. SANCHEZ 38
sense "write-off"?
A. Yes.
Q. These amounts that were accepted by Stanford
from Kaiser relative to the treatment of Miss Fua, that's
all pursuant to a negotiated contract that preexisted
Miss Fua's treatment on the dates of service shown on
these documents; right?
A. Yes.
MR. McMILLAN: Can we take a break? I'm
sorry.
MR. WEBER: Off the record.
(Brief recess).
MR. WEBER: Back on the record.
Q. Does Stanford, to your knowledge, take
Medicare and Medi-Cal patients?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you have an understanding as to whether
there's immediate -- Medicare provides certain amounts
relative to service codes?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, do you have an idea of what those
amounts are, generally?
A. No.
Q. Do you know in any way whether or not the
amounts allowed or allotted by Medicare and Medi-Cal are
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EsquireSolutions.comPROOF OF SERVICE
Ida Cristina Cruz Fua v, Joel Enrique Andino Sanchez, et al.
San Francisco Superior Court Case No. CGC-11-515542
1am employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. 1 am over the age of 18
and not a party to the within action. My business address is 353 Sacramento Street, 16th Floor,
San Francisco, California 94111.
On March 4, 2015, I served the following document: DEFENDANTS TAXI
EQUIPMENT LEASING, LLC AND YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC.’S MOTION
IN LIMINE NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S
TESTIMONY in the manner indicated below, on the interested parties in said action at the
following addresses (including fax numbers and email addresses, if applicable) as follows:
Todd P. Emanuel, Esq. Telephone: (650) 369-8900
Mark D. Rosenberg, Esq. Facsimile: (650) 369-8999
Emanuel Law Group Email: todd@TEinjurylaw.com
702 Marshall Street, Suite 400 Email: mark@TEinjurylaw.com
Redwood City, CA 94063 Attorneys for Plaintiff Fua
D. Douglas Shureen, Esq. Telephone: (707) 525-5400
McMillian & Shureen LLP Facsimile: (707) 576-7955
50 Santa Rosa Avenue, Suite 200 Email: doug.shureen@mcmillanshureen.com
Santa Rosa, CA 95404 Attorneys for Defendant Joel Enrique Andino
Sanchez
Gregory H. McCormick, Esq. Telephone: (510) 444-6800
Burnham Brown Facsimile: (510) 835-6666
1901 Harrison Street, 14th Floor Email: gmccormick@burnhambrown.com
Oakland, CA 94612 Attorneys for Defendant Alan DaSilva and
San Francisco Independent Taxi Assn.
Mitchell E. Green, Esq. Telephone: (805) 823-0915
Law Offices of Mitchell E. Green Facsimile: (805) 823-0916
P. O. Box 630550 Email: mitchgreenlaw@aol.com
Simi Valley, CA 93063 Attorneys for Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Co.
Robert S. Aaron, Esq. Telephone: (415) 438-7801
Aaron & Wilson, LLP Facsimile: (415) 438-7808
150 Post Street, Suite 400 Email: rsaaron@aaron-wilson.com
San Francisco, CA 94108 Co-counsel for Defendants Taxi Equipment
and Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc.
BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: Based on a Court Order or an
§] agreement of the parties to accept service by e-mail or electronic transmission, I caused
the documents to be sent to the persons at the email addresses listed. I did not receive,
within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication
that the transmission was unsuccessful.
PROOF OF SERVICEwo er nw
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 4, 2015, at San Francisco, California.
SHARI L. HHBEL
PROOF OF SERVICE
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oo MN DH PB YBN ROBERT M. PETERSON (Bar No.: 100084) COLIN C. MUNRO (Bar No.: 195520) CHRISTOPHER J. WEBER (Bar No.: 233998) CARLSON, CALLADINE & PETERSON LLP ELECTRONICALLY 353 Sacramento Street, 16th Floor FILED San Francisco, CA 94111 Superior Court of California, Telephone: (415) 391-3911 County of San Francisco Facsimile: (415) 391-3898 MAR 04 2015 Clerk of the Court Attorneys for Defendants , TAXI EQUIPMENT LEASING LLC and eeaeaene eputy Clerk YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO IDA CRISTINA CRUZ FUA, CASE NO.: CGC-11-515542 Plaintiff, Consolidated with CGC-12-519794 and CGC-13- 529705 v. DEFENDANTS TAXI EQUIPMENT JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ, and LEASING , LLC AND YELLOW CAB individual, CAROLINE MILLER, an COOPERATIVE, INC.’S MOTION IN individual; TAXI EQUIPMENT LEASING LIMINE NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE LLC, a Limited Liability Company; SAN PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S FRANCISCO INDEPENDENT TAXI TESTIMONY ASSOCIATION, a Corporation; YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC., a Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive, Date: March 9, 2015 Time: 9:30 a.m. Defendants. Dept: 206 Defendants TAXI EQUIPMENT LEASING LLC and YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC. hereby move this Court, in limine, to exclude at trial any reference by, or testimony of, Lan Lievense as to the cost of Plaintiff's alleged past or future medical costs. This motion is based upon the grounds that in the interest of justice and fairness, such evidence must be excluded under Evid. Code § 352, because such evidence creates a substantial danger of undue prejudice to Defendants, confusing the issues, and/or misleading the jury. Additionally, such proffered testimony is not admissible in California Courts pursuant to the holding in Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1324-32, which held that 1 Case No... CGC-11-515542 DEFENDANTS’ MIL NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S TESTIMONYow RD 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 evidence of gross medical charges are not admissible at trial as evidence of past medical damages nor may they be used as evidence of future medical expenses. In the alternative, if there is any issue as to what evidence proffered by Plaintiff's expert Lan Lievense should be excluded from trial concerning medical damages, Defendants request an evidentiary hearing under Evid. Code § 402, outside the presence of the jury, to determine whether evidence sought to be presented is admissible to the jury. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS MOTION This case arises from a traffic collision involving a taxi driven by Defendant Joel Sanchez. Plaintiff was a passenger in Mr. Sanchez’s taxi and claims personal injuries resulting from Mr. Sanchez rear-ending a vehicle. The taxi bore a Yellow Cab taxi color scheme and was using a taxi cab medallion leased to Alan Da Silva. Mr. Da Silva employed Mr. Sanchez as an independent contractor to operate the taxi from time to time. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Sanchez was an employee of Yellow Cab and that Yellow Cab is vicariously liable for his negligence. Yellow Cab denies that Mr. Sanchez was its employee. Plaintiff intends to offer the expert testimony of Mr. Lievense to prove her alleged past and future medical expenses incurred from health care providers Stanford University Medical Center and Kaiser Permanente, even though Mr. Lievense did not consider either the actual amount of expense incurred by Plaintiff or the reasonable amount of those expenses. 1. ARGUMENT A. Plaintiff's Introduction of Expert Evidence Lacking Proper Foundation Should be Excluded under Evidence Code sections 352 and 801. If an expert’s opinion is based on a faulty foundation, or on no foundation at all, then it is not admissible and is properly excluded from being offered. An expert opinion must be “[b]ased on matter . . . that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates... .” Evid. Code, § 801. “‘ We construe this to mean that the matter relied on must provide a reasonable basis for the particular opinion offered, and that an expert opinion based on speculation or conjecture is inadmissible.’” Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770 (quoting 2 Case No. CGC-11-515542 DEFENDANTS’ MIL NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF*S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S TESTIMONYoc OD we IN DW no Cw Ry DA WA & WB NY yN NN NON NK LY oe 4a RW BF YW YS = S Lockheed Litigation Cases (2004) 115 Cal. App.4th 558, 564.) Expert opinion testimony based on matter that provides no reasonable basis for the opinion. offered is properly excluded under Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b). Sargon, 55 Cal.4th 747 at 776. Similarly, Evidence Code section 802 allows the trial court to inquire into the reasons for an expert’s opinion and to exclude expert opinion testimony if it is “based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies.” Jd. at 771. Evidence Code section 802 also requires courts to consider prior judicial decisions regarding the proper evidentiary foundation for an expert opinion. /d. If the material on which an expert relies does not support the expert’s reasoning, the expert’s opinion is properly excluded under Evidence Code section 802. Id. In the present case, Plaintiff will attempt to introduce as evidence at trial through her retained expert Lan Lievense as to the cost of Plaintiff's past and future medical expenses by proffering opinions about the reasonable value of such medical services based on the full/gross amounts billed by Plaintiff's medical treatment providers for services rendered as a result of the subject accident. Such evidence must be completely excluded from trial because: 1) such evidence has been declared inadmissible by the Court of Appeal in Corenbaum v. Lampkin, and 2) Mr. Lievense’s entire opinion rests on irrelevant material that is based on a faulty foundation unsupported by the materials on which he relies. Hither way, his opinions must be excluded. B. Lan Lievense’s Testimony Should Be Excluded In Its Entirety Because His Opinions Regarding Past Medical Costs Are Based On a Faulty Foundation Of Irrelevant Materials. In the controlling decision of Corenbaum v Lampkin, the court held that “evidence of the full amount billed for a plaintiff's medical care is not relevant to the determination of a plaintiff's damages for past medical expenses, and therefore is inadmissible for that purpose if the plaintiff's medical providers, by prior agreement, had contracted to accept a lesser amount as full payment for the services provided.” Corenbaum, 215 Cal.App.4th at 1328; see also State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Huff (2013) 216 Cal-App.4th 1463, 1471 (recognizing that “the full amount billed by medical providers is not an accurate measure of the value of medical services” because “many patients . . . pay discounted rates,” and standard rates “for a given service can vary 3 Case No.:, CGC-11-515542 DEFENDANTS’ MIL NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFP’S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S TESTIMONYCe RDA AWA BB BY eH nt mm OD oO BD WH BB WN NON NY NR YN NN eo 2a A UW FF YW YN Se S tremendously, sometimes by a factor of five or more, from hospital to hospital in California.”) (citing Corenbuam and Howell v, Hamilton Meats & Provisions (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541). In the case here, Plaintiff's insurance carrier was Kaiser Permanente (“Kaiser”), who insured Plaintiff with respect to treatment she received from Stanford University Medical Center (“Stanford”). (Decl. of Christopher J. Weber Ex. A at 9:18-10:3; 12:16-18). Although Kaiser was billed a certain amount by Stanford for medical services provided to Plaintiff, Kaiser actually paid for those services at a lesser rate established by contract between Stanford and Kaiser, which is not reflected in the billings submitted by Stanford to Kaiser. (/d. at 13:16-15:9; 23:21-24:9: 29:14-22; 38:3-8). Accordingly, the amounts billed by Stanford to Kaiser in no way reflect the actual cost incurred by Kaiser on behalf of Plaintiff with respect to Plaintiff's medical costs. 1. Opinion on Past Medical Expenses should be excluded because Mr. Lievense’s analysis was based solely on the full amounts charged by Plaintiff's health care providers. Mr. Lievense testified at his deposition on March 4, 2015 that he does not know the total amount actually paid for Plaintiff's medical services, nor did the amounts paid contribute to his opinions at all. (Jd. at §§ 2-3). Instead, Mr. Lievense stated the only way to do an accurate valuation of medical services is to examine the total retail billing charges. (/d. at {| 3). He asserted that he was not interested in the actual amount paid by Kaiser to Stanford when forming his opinion. (Ud. ) He explained that the way to determine the usual customary, reasonable value of medical services is to look at the billed amount, rather than the amount actually incurred, and that in his opinion the billed amount represents the reasonable amount of expense for the medical services offered. (/d.) This method of valuation is in complete contradiction to the Court’s holding in Corenbaum and is not relevant to determine medical damages. With Lievense’s opinion solely based on evaluating the gross retail charges reflected in Stanford’s billing statements to Kaiser, his method is clearly contrary to the holding in Corenbaum and is therefore inadmissible under Evidence Code section 801. Lievense’s entire “valuation” of past medical costs and any opinions, reports, or evidence referencing or relying upon such, must be excluded. 4 Case No.:_ CGC-11-515542 DEFENDANTS’ MIL NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S TESTIMONY2. Opinion on Future Medical Costs by Mr. Lievense should be excluded because full amounts billed for services provide no reasonable basis for future medical costs. The Court of Appeal in Corenbaum made it clear that “the full amount billed for those past medical services can provide no reasonable basis for an expert opinion on the value of future medical services.” Corenbaum, 215 Cal.App.4th at 1331. Clearly, by nature of Mr. Lievense’s methods of valuation, explicitly described in his deposition as based only on the total retail billing charges, which is neither relevant nor admissible according to Cerenbaum, any future valuation made by Lievense would be founded on the same faulty method as his past medical costs opinion and would only be conducive to further irrelevant or inadmissible opinion. Any opinions on future costs should therefore be properly excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 802. CONCLUSION Based on Plaintiff's retained expert’s own testimony and controlling guidelines offered in Corenbaum, any testimony offered from Lan Lievense must be excluded. If it is not excluded, the jury will be misled by being asked to consider medical billing amounts that are not relevant and inadmissible, which will cause confusion about the medical damages issues and result in severe prejudice to the Defendants. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, any testimony or evidence produced by Plaintiff through Lan Lievense on past_or future medical costs must be excluded from trial under Evidence Code sections 352, 801, and 802. Dated: March 4, 2015 CARLSON, CALLADINE & PETERSON LLP By: ROBERT M. PETERSON COLIN C. MUNRO CHRISTOPHER J. WEBER Attomeys for Defendants TAXI EQUIPMENT LEASING LLC and YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC. 5 Case No.:_ CGC-11-515542 DEFENDANTS’ MIL NO, 7 TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S TESTIMONYDECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER J. WEBER I, Christopher J. Weber, declare as follows: lam an attorney licensed to practice before all courts of the State of California and am an attorney with the law firm of Carlson, Calladine & Peterson, attorneys of record for defendants Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc. and Taxi Equipment Leasing, LLC. Except as otherwise indicated, I know the following facts from personal knowledge and if called upon as a witness, I could and would competently testify thereto under oath. 1. Attached hereto as Exhibit “A” is a true and correct copy of selected excerpts from the March 25, 2014 deposition of Larue Perkins, person most knowledgeable for Stanford University Medical Center. 2. On March 4, 2015, I took the deposition of Lan Lievense in this case. The transcript from this deposition was not available as of the filing of Defendants’ motion in limine, and Defendants will supplement their filing with the relevant portion of Mr. Lievense’s deposition testimony as soon as it is available. 3. In his deposition, Mr. Lievense testified that he does not know the total amount actually paid for Plaintiff's medical services, nor did the amounts paid contribute to his opinions at all. Instead, Mr. Lievense stated the only way to do an accurate valuation of medical services is to examine the total retail billing charges. He asserted that he was not interested in the actual amount paid by Kaiser to Stanford when forming his opinion. He explained that the way to determine the usual customary, reasonable value of medical services is to look at the billed amount, rather than the amount actually incurred, and that in his opinion the billed amount represents the reasonable amount of expense for the medical services offered. I declare under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on this 4th day of March 2015, at San Francisco, California. CHRISTOPHER J. WEBER 6 Case No... CGC-11-515542 DEFENDANTS’ MIL NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S TESTIMONYExhibit A24 25 LARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014 FUA vs. SANCHEZ 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO - UNLIMITED CIVIL JURISDICTION IDA CHRISTINA CRUZ FUA, Plaintiff, vs. No. CGC-11-515542 JOEL ENRIQUE ANDINO SANCHEZ, and individual; CAROLINE MILLER, an individual; TAXI EQUIPMENT LEASING LLC, a Limited Liability Company; SAN FRANCISCO INDEPENDENT TAXI ASSOCIATION, a Corporation; TAXI ASSOCIATION, a Corporation; YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC., a Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants. DEPOSITION OF LARUE PERKINS TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 2014 Reported by: MARK I. BRICKMAN, CSR RPR License No. 5527 2 ESQUIRE 800.211.DEPO (3376, EsquireSolutions.comwo B® WwW oN LARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014 FUA vs. SANCHEZ g persons most qualified or most knowledgeable on some subjects, and if you would turn to page 3. A. (Complying) . Q. On the -- on the bottom there, it says: "Testimony required." Do you see that? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So in the Notice, we're requesting that Stanford produce the person most knowledgeable relating to any and all claims and/or charges for treatment of Ida Christine Fua from April 1, 2011 to the present, and including -- we have subcategories. You see there amount billed by any subscriber. AL Yes. Q. Are you most knowledgeable from Stanford on that subject? A. Yes. Q. "Amounts allowed by Stanford University Medical Center for a given service by a provider; i.e. the difference between the amount initially claimed or billed by the provider, minus any reductions applied by Blue Cross." That's obviously a typo and it's my mistake. But are you the person most knowledgeable from Stanford in terms of what was billed and then ultimately received &) ESQUIRE 800.211. DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions.comLARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014 FUA vs. SANCHEZ 10 by Stanford? A. Yes. Q. Relating to Miss Fua? A, Yes. : Q. Okay. Number 3, "amounts paid by Stanford to any provider." I don't think that's at issue here. We'll skip that. 4, "amounts written off" -- it's an unfortunate term -- "by Stanford Medical Center." Do you understand what that means? A. Yes, I do. Q. Are you the person most knowledgeable on that subject? A. Yes. Q. "Amount still owed by Stanford to any medical provider." I don't think that's the case. We'll skip that. And number 6, “amounts for which Ida Christine Fua is responsible." Are you the person most knowledgeable regarding that? A. Yes. Q. The Deposition Notice also contains a request that some documents be produced, and that is on another section right there. It's on page 2, and the description Q ESQU IRE 800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions.comLARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014 FUA vs. SANCHEZ 12 the insurance has paid, who the insurance company is that's paying this here and the adjustments that are made on the accounts, and these are contractor adjustments made according to our contract. And also we -- if there were any payments made by the patient. MR. WEBER: Okay. THE WITNESS: Or any -- anything assigned to collections because it wasn't paid, and then the patient balances. This is what's on the physician spreadsheet. MR. WEBER: Q. When you say "contractual adjustments" based upon the contract you had, are you referring to a contract between Stanford and Kaiser? A. That is correct. Q. In this case, it's your understanding that the insurance carrier for Miss Fua is Kaiser? A. That is correct. Q. Okay. If you can -- A. Do you want me to go to the other one? Because it's a little different. Q. Sure. A. And on the hospital side, we show the dates of service when they were in the hospital. Then you have the -- their -- there are two different account numbers 2 ES QUIRE 800,211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions.comLARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014 FUA vs, SANCHEZ 13 that you see, the hospital account numbers, the total charges, the amount that was paid by the insurance, the insurance adjustment and the insurance company and then the financial assistance, if there was any adjustments that we did because we did some financial assistance because they couldn't pay, and then there's collection amount on here. Q. Okay. What I'd like to do -- the document you just testified about, Stanford facility billing record, I'm going to go ahead and mark that as Exhibit 2 to the depo. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.) MR. WEBER: What I'd like you to do is take a look at this document, which would be Exhibit 3. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.) MR. WEBER: And if you can tell me if these are substantially the same things (Indicating). This is for convenience, because I only have copies of three. THE WITNESS: So what you have here is you have two dates of service. They're two documents, so I pulled them out. MR, WEBER: Q. You're referring to Exhibit 2? & ESQUIRE 800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions.com10 il 24 25 LARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014 FUA vs. SANCHEZ 14 A. Yes, I am. Right. So what you have here, you have April the 4th, 2011 to April the 12th, 2011. . Q. Right. A. And that would be that first document that we were looking at. MS. KATZORKE: Were these documents the same? THE WITNESS: Right. MR. WEBER: Those are the same. Just to resolve some ambiguity, on the one that I showed you, Exhibit 3, if you look in the upper left hand, it provides something called date billed, and that date is January 17th, 2014. The one that you produced today, Exhibit 2, carries a date of March 2014. THE WITNESS: Yes. MR. WEBER: Q. Is the reason why the dates are different just that these documents are printed different times? A. Yes. Q. Okay. But otherwise, if you look at Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 2, the service dates are the same, the amounts are the same, the CPT codes are the same? A. That is correct. Q. So let's turn to Exhibit 3 again because we all have copies of this and it's easier to follow. 43 ESQUIRE 800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions.comLARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014 FUA vs. SANCHEZ 15 Do you have that before you? MS. KATZORKE: Right here. THE WITNESS: Okay. Yes. MR. WEBER: It's a document entitled: "Hospital Statement." Q. Do you see that? A. Mm-hmm, yes. Q. Can you tell me generally what this is? A. This is our billing statement. Q. Okay. And is this document regularly kept or made in the course of Stanford's business? A. Yes, it is. Q. And do you have personal knowledge as to how the document is created? Let me go back. Different question. Based upon your position as senior manager -- A. Mm-hmm. Q. -- do you have knowledge as to the process by which information is inputted, for example, in a computer system and how this document ultimately comes to fruition, ultimately comes into being? A. Yes. Q Yes or -- A. Yes. Q Great. Thank you. 2 ESQUIRE 800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions.comLARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014 FUA vs. SANCHEZ 21 A. We do have coders, but I don't know if they reviewed the records on this here. Q. What's -- what's the general practice with respect to the coders in terms of what they review and what they don't review, if you know? A. I don't know their process. Q. Okay. If this had been reviewed by somebody trained in medical coding terminology, this particular statement here, would -- would it be on the statement itself? For example, reviewed by, checkmarked by? A. No. Q. dust in terms of the overall process again from the service being provided or rendered and the statement being generated, have we gone through the entire -- the entire process or are things missing that I haven't asked about? A. No. I think you've gone through the entire process. Q. Okay. Still on Exhibit 3, can you turn to page 12? It's the second to last page. A. (Complying) . Q. Just let me know when you're there. MS. KATZORKE: Tell him you're there. Say Yokay." THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. You were so soft, I 2 ESQUIRE 800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions.comPB W PB LARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014 FUA vs. SANCHEZ 24 A. pO PRP Oo A. Q. A. Q. set up with the different payers, and we negotiate certain fees, how much we're going to get paid and what our adjustments are, and that's done by our contracting department. in that contract change from year to year? Kaiser, has contracts with many other health insurance providers in the State of California, perhaps nationwide; correct? I don't know. You don't. What is the contract for? Excuse me? What is the contract for? It's the contract that our contract department Who's the head of the contracting, if you Gary May. Do you know what Mr. May's job title is? Vice-president. Vice-president of Stanford; of the department? Vice-president of Stanford. Do you know if the amounts that are set forth They could be. Have you ever seen a copy of the contract? No. I'm assuming that Stanford, in addition to Q ESQUIRE 800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions.com24 25 4 9 the bill was for four thousand four -- 447,705. Q. Mm-hmm. A. That's the total charges. Our payment was $171,128.14. So that goes on to the patient's account, and then we take what we call our contractual adjustments. That's according to the contract, and that was 277,577. So that's -- and it's according to our contracts. So it paid the amount in full, as far as we're concerned. Q. Okay. Looking at Exhibit 3, then, for 2011, was Miss Fua responsible for any amount? A No. Q. Is Kaiser responsible for any amount? A No. Q. Is any other third party, to your knowledge, in the world responsible for any amount reflected on Exhibit 3? A. Not to my knowledge. Q. Your account is considered closed, then? A. > It's paid in full, that particular service date. LARUE PERKINS March 25, 201 FUA vs. SANCHEZ 2 Q. Would you tell me how that works? A. It doesn't adjust any of this here. It is that the patient -- whatever the payment amount is. So £9ESQUIRE 800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions.comLARUE PERKINS March 25, 2014 FUA vs. SANCHEZ 38 sense "write-off"? A. Yes. Q. These amounts that were accepted by Stanford from Kaiser relative to the treatment of Miss Fua, that's all pursuant to a negotiated contract that preexisted Miss Fua's treatment on the dates of service shown on these documents; right? A. Yes. MR. McMILLAN: Can we take a break? I'm sorry. MR. WEBER: Off the record. (Brief recess). MR. WEBER: Back on the record. Q. Does Stanford, to your knowledge, take Medicare and Medi-Cal patients? A. Yes. Q. And do you have an understanding as to whether there's immediate -- Medicare provides certain amounts relative to service codes? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Now, do you have an idea of what those amounts are, generally? A. No. Q. Do you know in any way whether or not the amounts allowed or allotted by Medicare and Medi-Cal are 2 ESQUIRE 800.211.DEPO (3376, EsquireSolutions.comPROOF OF SERVICE Ida Cristina Cruz Fua v, Joel Enrique Andino Sanchez, et al. San Francisco Superior Court Case No. CGC-11-515542 1am employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. 1 am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 353 Sacramento Street, 16th Floor, San Francisco, California 94111. On March 4, 2015, I served the following document: DEFENDANTS TAXI EQUIPMENT LEASING, LLC AND YELLOW CAB COOPERATIVE, INC.’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 7 TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT LAN LIEVENSE’S TESTIMONY in the manner indicated below, on the interested parties in said action at the following addresses (including fax numbers and email addresses, if applicable) as follows: Todd P. Emanuel, Esq. Telephone: (650) 369-8900 Mark D. Rosenberg, Esq. Facsimile: (650) 369-8999 Emanuel Law Group Email: todd@TEinjurylaw.com 702 Marshall Street, Suite 400 Email: mark@TEinjurylaw.com Redwood City, CA 94063 Attorneys for Plaintiff Fua D. Douglas Shureen, Esq. Telephone: (707) 525-5400 McMillian & Shureen LLP Facsimile: (707) 576-7955 50 Santa Rosa Avenue, Suite 200 Email: doug.shureen@mcmillanshureen.com Santa Rosa, CA 95404 Attorneys for Defendant Joel Enrique Andino Sanchez Gregory H. McCormick, Esq. Telephone: (510) 444-6800 Burnham Brown Facsimile: (510) 835-6666 1901 Harrison Street, 14th Floor Email: gmccormick@burnhambrown.com Oakland, CA 94612 Attorneys for Defendant Alan DaSilva and San Francisco Independent Taxi Assn. Mitchell E. Green, Esq. Telephone: (805) 823-0915 Law Offices of Mitchell E. Green Facsimile: (805) 823-0916 P. O. Box 630550 Email: mitchgreenlaw@aol.com Simi Valley, CA 93063 Attorneys for Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Co. Robert S. Aaron, Esq. Telephone: (415) 438-7801 Aaron & Wilson, LLP Facsimile: (415) 438-7808 150 Post Street, Suite 400 Email: rsaaron@aaron-wilson.com San Francisco, CA 94108 Co-counsel for Defendants Taxi Equipment and Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc. BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: Based on a Court Order or an §] agreement of the parties to accept service by e-mail or electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the email addresses listed. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. PROOF OF SERVICEwo er nw 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 4, 2015, at San Francisco, California. SHARI L. HHBEL PROOF OF SERVICE