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  • CHARLES TOBEY VS. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B*P) AS REFLECTED ON EXHIBITS et al ASBESTOS document preview
  • CHARLES TOBEY VS. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B*P) AS REFLECTED ON EXHIBITS et al ASBESTOS document preview
  • CHARLES TOBEY VS. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B*P) AS REFLECTED ON EXHIBITS et al ASBESTOS document preview
  • CHARLES TOBEY VS. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B*P) AS REFLECTED ON EXHIBITS et al ASBESTOS document preview
  • CHARLES TOBEY VS. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B*P) AS REFLECTED ON EXHIBITS et al ASBESTOS document preview
  • CHARLES TOBEY VS. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B*P) AS REFLECTED ON EXHIBITS et al ASBESTOS document preview
  • CHARLES TOBEY VS. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B*P) AS REFLECTED ON EXHIBITS et al ASBESTOS document preview
  • CHARLES TOBEY VS. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B*P) AS REFLECTED ON EXHIBITS et al ASBESTOS document preview
						
                                

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BRYDON HUGO & PARKER 135 Mah S¥Reet 20" Foon Sun Francisco, CA 94503 John R. Brydon [Bar No. 083365] Brian H. Buddell [Bar No. 166103] George A, Otstott [Bar No.184671] ELECTRONICALLY BRYDON HUGO & PARKER CTRONIC 135 Main Street, 20% Floor FILED San Francisco, CA 94105 Superior Court of California, Telephone: (415) 808-0300 County of San Francisco Facsimile: (415)-808-0333 MAY 05 2010 Clerk of the Court Attorneys for Defendant BY: RAYMOND K. WONG BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC., successor to Deputy Clerk AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC. SUPERIOR COURT ~ STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO ~ UNLIMITED JURISDICTION CHARLES TOBEY,. ~ (ASBESTOS) Case No, CGC-07-274226 Plaintiff, vs, DEFENDANT BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC/S MOTION IN LIMINE TO ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B*P), PRECLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING : DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN Defendants. TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, OR RECEIPT OF TRADE ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS, OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES {06} Date: May 10, 2010 Dept: 206 Judge: Hon. James J. McBride Defendant BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC. (‘Defendant’) hereby moves in limine for entry of an order to preclude Plaintiff.from attempting to present at trial evidence of Defendant's constitutionally protected activities, specifically, Delendant’s membership in trade associations, receipt of trade association publications, or other conduct protected by the United States and California Constitutions, such as governmental lobbying. In addition, documents related to this Defendant's membership.in trade associations, as well as the publications related to the activities of those associations, must be excluded. In the alternative, Defendant moves the Court for an order instructing the parties, 1 DEFENDANT BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC.'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, OR RECEIPT OF TRADE ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS, OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES [06]ec . ew WOW RR he RO BRyDON Huco & PARKER 138 Mani Stat San Praneieco, CA 94105 their represeritatives and witnesses to refrain from making any direct or indirect mention whatsoever before the jury.of the matters hereinafter set forth without first having obtained permission from the Court outside the presence and hearing of the jury. £ INTRODUCTION Defendant anticipates that Plaintiff will attempt to introduce evidence regarding Defendant's participation in and association with various trade groups. Defendant's membership in any such organizations, receiving the publications of such groups, and participation in the lobbying efforts and public presentations of those organizations are protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as under the California Constitution. The only issues to be resolved in this case are whether Plaintiff's injuries were caused by asbestos, whether Defendant was a substantial factor in causing those injuries, and, if so, whether Defendant is now Hable to Plaintiff. Whether or not Defendant joined trade groups, or participated in lobbying efforts, are entirely irrelevant to any of these questions, It would be a violation of Defendant's constitutional rights for this Court to permit Plaintiff to introduce evidence relating to these activities, particularly in a proceeding where punitive damages.may be at issue. Accordingly, to avoid such a result, Defendant asks the Court to preclude Plaintiff from introducing any such evidence. A. Plaintiff’s Attempt To Introduce Evidence Of Constitutionally Protected Activity Is Inconsistent With The First Amendment, And Is Prejudicial In Any Event, The First Amendment to the United States Constitution articulates the fundamental “right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Similarly, the California Constitution states, “The people have the right to instruct their representatives, petition government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the common good,” (Cal. Const., Art. I, Sec. IIL Para, (a).) Under these principles, the right to petition.the government is considered “fundamental to the very idea of a republican form of governance.” (Stern v. Linited States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 2 DEPENDANT BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, OR RECEIPT OF TRADE ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS, OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES [06]CO OO SM DBR HW BR WN em Bee BRR RP BSB ES S&S SFR RGR GRE S 28 Brybon HuGo & Parker 2S MAIN STREET AO P.0OH San Francioco, CA 84105 1342 (7 Cir, 1977).) Accordingly, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the State of California, as articulated below, have installed protections for a party exercising its First Amendment right to petition the government. Certain documents pertaining to trade association activities that Plaintiff may seek to introduce during this trial relate to constitutionally-protected activities, and are absolutely privileged under the First Amendment and the California State Constitution, Case law confirms that Defendant's participation in various trade or informational organizations, and the activities of those organizations, are protected by the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of association and freedom of speech. In addition, Plaintiff may attempt to introduce documents into evidence which purport to show what asbestos-related trade groups may have known, However, these documents are irrelevant to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant, and, absent foundational evidence that Defendant ever saw or had possession of trade group documents, are irrelevant with regard to this Defendant. In any event, even if such documents are marginally relevant, their probative value would be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Defendant and confusion of the jury. In the class action case of In re Asbestos School Litigation, 46 F.3d 1284 (3 Cir,1994), a former manufacturer of asbestos-containing insulation, Pfizer, Inc., sought partial summary’ judgment on the Plaintiff's conspiracy and concert of action claims. The complaint in that case was founded on claims surrounding Pfizer's association with the Safe Buildings Alliance, a Defendants’ lobbying and. public education organization, and the activities of that organization. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals granted Pfizer an extraordinary writ and ordered the district court to grant summary judgment on the conspiracy counts: The district court’s (denial of summary judgment] was clearly wrong. Worse, it has implications that broadly threaten First Amendment rights... Joining organizations that participate in public debate, making contributions to them, and attending 3 DEPENDANT BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC.’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, OR RECEIPT OF TRADE ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS, OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES [06]So ow eo NM DO He BB WN BRYDON Hugo & PARKER, 125 Main StREET 20" p.ooR ‘Sia Fenacieay, CA 95195 their-meetings are activities that enjoy substantial First Amendment protection, (43. F.3d at 1294 (citation omitted).) The Third Circuit's decision held that a manufacturer may properly join a trade association that petitions the government, or publishes its views, without having those activities used against individual members in subsequent litigation. Making these constitutionally protected activities “risky ... would undoubtedly have an unwarranted inhibiting effect upon them.” ([d.) The fact that Pfizer was, apparently, no longer associated with the SBA as of the time of the summary judgment hearing did not diminish the chilling effects potentially caused by the trial court's decision. (Id. at 1287.) Permitting Plaintiff to present evidence regarding Defendant's past or-present trade association activities would inhibit this and other.companies’ right to associate, to speak and to petition the government, now and in.the future. The Third Circuit relied heavily on N.A.A-C.P. 0. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982) 458 US. 886, where the activity at issue was a boycott by African-Americans of allegedly discriminatory business owners in Claiborne County, Mississippi. The boycott was not completely non-violent. In deciding, unanimously, that the non-violent elements of the boycott were entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court held that “[t]here isa “profound national commitment’ to the principle that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” (458 U.S, at 913 (citation omitted).) Admittedly, “the constitutionally protected conduct in Claiborne Hardware was of much greater societal importance” than the trade association membership in question in the Pfizer case, (Claiborne Hardware, supra, 43 F.3d at 1291.) Nevertheless, the Third Circuit found “nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion ... that lends support to the suggestion, that the standard it enunciated was not meant to have general applicability.” (Ikid.) Hence, Defendant's participation in trade associations should not be inhibited by the concern that documents reflecting these activities could be introduced by an opposing litigant decades later. 4 DEPENDANT BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, OR RECEIPT OF TRADE ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS, OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES [06]The Supreme Court has consistently held that the right of association and petitioning na the government extends to so-called “commercial speech.” (Virginia State-Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1976) 425 U.S. 748, 760-61.) As the Court noted in the case of United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n (1967) 389 U'S. 217, 222 (citations omitted): We start with the premise that the rights to assemble peaceably and to petition for a redress. of grievances are among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. These tights, moreover, are intimately connected both in origin and purpose, with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and free press ..... The First Amendment would, however, bea hollow promise if it left government free to destroy or erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law is passed that 12 prohibits free speech, press, petition, or assembly as such. oO Dp oe NU HR HW B Ww | | ‘Thus, to allow Plaintiff the opportunity here to base his claims, even in part, on Defendant's attempt to seek redress from the goverrunent is precisely the “indirect 15 | restraint” prohibited by United Mine Workers. 16 While Defendant vigorously asserts that its efforts, and that of the trade associations 7 involved, were made in all good faith, motive is not an issue. First Amendment protections 18 apply regardless of motive: 9 Resort to administrative, legislative, political or judicial 20 processes is protected by the first amendment so long as the 21 petition is concerned with obtaining relief afforded by the system .... Even if the seeking of relief is animated by. 22 malevolence or self-interest, the first amendment protects the 23 right to petition of the person whose activities are genuinely 24 aimed at procuring favorable government action, 25 || (LeBlantc-Sternberg v. Fletcher; 781 F.Supp. 261,.266 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citations omitted).) 26 Therefore, courts have consistently applied First Amendment protections regardless 27 \\of the speaker's goals, or even their honesty. (See,.¢.g., Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 5 Brvpon. Hugo: a PARKER DEFENDANT BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC.’ MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE “a Fg REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, OR RECEIPT OF TRADE ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS, OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES [06] 0a San Franciven, CA Gah05so eNO Om OM NON poe eh et N RRR RB PF SS SER RAE BRE S 28 BRYDON Huco & PARKER 435 Maw Sraney 208 ‘Sats Francises, CA W505 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-46 (7th Cir.1977) [the sending of even false complaints to a government employee's superiors protected by First Amendment]; Sawmill Products, Inc. 0. Town of Cicero, 477 F.Supp. 636, 642 (ND. 11.1979) [protesting presence of plaintiff's sawmill which was later shut down by town ordinance protected by First Amendment].) This Court must resolve the tension between Defendant’s First Amendment rights, and the Plaintiff's right to introduce evidence purportedly relating to matters at issue, in favor of Defendant, The standard of review is “strict,” and Claiborne Hardware must be given a broad interpretation. (In re Asbestos School Litigation, supra, at 1291.) To grant Plaintiff the opportunity to introduce trade association documents cannot be squared with the Supreme Court's unequivocal mandate protecting a corporation’s right to associate with others, petition the goverment, and speak out on issues of concern. In addition, admission of documentary evidence concerning the purported knowledge and activities of asbestos-related trade groups would be extremely prejudicial to Defendant, and would only confuse the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.) There would be a grave risk that a jury told that trade groups knew about the hazards of asbestos would be inclined to paint Defendant with the same brush without any factual basis for doing so. ‘This confusion and prejudice is particularly likely to arise where, as here, the “other” asbestos sellers or manufacturers whose documents Plaintiff would offer as evidence are not parties to the trial, because jurors wishing to impose liability on some defendant in order to award Plaintiff damages may be inclined to hold Defendant responsible for what others knew or did. Finally, if Plaintiff is permitted to introduce evidence about such trade groups, Defendant would be forced to rebut the evidence with lengthy testimony disavowing any of the would-be imputed knowledge. This evidentiary sideshow will not only lengthen the trial, but will also distract the jury from the issue at hand—i.e., whether Defendant knew or had reason to know that its products containing small amounts of encapsulated asbestos would emit asbestos fibers when used as intended. 6 DEFENDANT BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, OR RECEIPT OF TRADE ASSOCIATIGN PUBLICATIONS, OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES [06]B. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Also Precludes Plaintiff’sUse Of Trade Association Documents. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes defendants from liability for their efforts to influence legislative, executive, administrative-or judicial action, also leads to the preclusion of the trade association documents. The doctrine shields from certain types of liability an organization’s efforts to influence government action. (See, e.g., Eastern RR. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (1961) 365 U.S, 127; United Mine Workers of America v, Pennington (1965) 381 U.S. 657; In re IEP Confidential Business Documents Litigation (8th Cir. 1985) 755.F.2d 1300, cert. denied, (1987) 479 U.S. 1088.) The doctrine is essentially o Ce we NM A OH FF BL similar to that expressed in Claiborne Hardware, and an atterapt by plaintiff therein to limit 11 ||Claiborne Hardware and distinguish the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was unequivocally 12 [rejected in In re Asbestos School Litigation, supra, at p. 1291, 13 The Noerr-Pennington shield is premised on the need to protect from censure an 14 | entity's exercise of its First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of 15 |igrievances and to avoid any chilling effect on the exercise of this fundamental right. 16 | (Oregon Natural Resources Counsel v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531 (9th Cir.1991).). Although 17 | developed in the context of anti-trust litigation, courts have broadened the application of 18 | the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to shield defendants exercising their First Amendment-rights 19 | from liability in the context of civil rights and negligence cases as well. (Gorman Towers, Inc. 20 |v. Bogoslaveky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) [no liability under U.S.C. section 1983 for 21 ||defendant’s lobbying activities]; Stern v. Untled States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir, 22'|,1977), cert, denied; (1977) 434 U.S. 975 [no liability under U.S.C. section 1985 against a 23 ||corporate defendant which filed a complaint alleging professional misconduct by the IRS},) 24 c First Amendment Protections Extend To The Issue Of Admissibility, 25 Having established that Defendant's membership in organizations and the activities 26 {lof those organizations are entitled to protection under the First Amendment and the 27 ||\California state Constitution, the question arises.as to how these rights affect the admission 28 1 BRYDON Hugo & PARKER DEFENDANT BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE 20" P.COR REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, OR RECEIPT OF TRADE Ses Francis, CA 005 ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS, OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES (06}1 of evidence. The First Amendment and the California Constitution prohibit federal or state 2 |laction in contravention of constitutional guarantees, The requisite action would be present 3 | here were the trial court, a governmental agent, to.decide to admit the proffered a documents. Even private litigants can become state actors in civil lawsuits. (See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co, (1991) 500 U.S, 614 [private litigant in civil case becomes a an state actor when exercising peremptory challenges|.) State action has also been found ~ where the deprivation of constitutional rights has been caused by “the exercise of some 8 | right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State... .” 9 || (Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. (1982) 457 U.S, 922,.937.) 10 In re Asbestos School Litigation, Clairborne Hardware and Noerr - Pennington all stand 11 |/for the principle that a party will not be held liable in a civil action for exercising First 12 ||Amendment rights. Yet the protection extends well beyond that axiom. Beginning with 13 | United Mine Workers. v. Pennington, supra, the protection accorded Noerr-type activity. has 14 | been extenced to the issue of admissibility. Lf the activity itself is protected ~such as 15 |ipetitioning the government—the records of a party's preparation for and meetings 16 | regarding such protected conduct are protected.as well, 7 Defendant recognizes that the papers at issue represent events which occurred 18 | decades ago. However, Defendant does not need to demonstrate a specific factual showing 19 | of achilling effect in order to support an exclusionary order in the present case, This 20 || Defendant remains a member of other trade associations, continues to petition the 21 | government, and otherwise deserves to have its Noerr and constitutional rights protected in 22 | futuro. This Court would impose a chilling effect upon all trade association members if 23 | their past Noerr-type activities were to be introduced as evidence of malicious conduct a 24 | generation later. (In re Asbestos School Litigation, 43 F.3d at 1291.) 25 Evidence of constitutionally protected advocacy and petitioning efforts is exactly the 26 |\type of evidence that should be excluded under principles of undue prejudice. (Evid. 27 \\Code., § 352.) This is so because it (1) is unrelated to Plaintiff and his claims; (2) would g BRYDON Huco & Paris DEFENDANT BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE Bo Fine REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, OR RECEIPT OF TRADE San Francisca, 8 83198 ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS, OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES (06)HuGo & PARKER, San Francison, CA 4105. create collateral issues that would confuse and prolong the trial; (3) would risk inflaming the jury, (4) would unduly prejudice Defendant, and (5) would chill constitutionally protected activity. Furthermore, where First Amendment protections such as the right to petition are involved, the evidence is generally considered “presumptively prejudicial” and must be excluded. (Linited States Football League v. National Football League, 634 F.Supp. 1155, 1171 (S.D.N.Y, 1986) [exclusion of lobbying evidence “should be the rule rather than the exception” as being “presumptively prejudicial” ]; Weit v. Cont’L Ill. Nat’l Bank.& Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457, 466 (7 Cir, 1981) [evidence of lobbying would confuse jury and infringe First Amendment interests with “inevitable prejudicial effect”].) Accordingly, even if Defendant's trade memberships or lobbying efforts were tangentially relevant to Plaintiff's claims, such evidence is inadmissible because itis “presumptively prejudicial,” and its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, tT. CONCLUSION This Court should preclude the Plaintiff from introducing evidence of Defendant's constitutionally protected activities. To. do otherwise would violate and chill Defendant’s constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and Defendant's right to petition the government. Accordingly, Defendant asks that any documents which evidence the exercise of such rights be excluded from evidence. Alternatively; Defendant BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC.requests an Order in limine from the Court, instructing the parties, their representatives and witnesses to refrain from i i if i 9 DEFENDANT BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, OR RECEIPT OF TRADE ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS, OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES [06]1 | making any direct or indirect mention whatsoever before the jury of the matters hereinafter 2 |/set forth without first having obtained permission from the Court outside the presence and 3 ||hearing of the jury. 4 |Dated: May.5, 2010 BRYDON HUGO & PARKER 5 . 6 By: /s/ George A. Otstott John RB. Brydon 7 Brian H, Buddell George A. Otstott 8 Attorneys for Defendant BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC,, successor to 9 AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC, 10 iW 12 13 14 15 16 \7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 BRYDON HUGO & PaRKER DEFENDANT BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE 20" Fano REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, OR RECEIPT OF TRADE Sev Fansite, Ca oars ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS, OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES [06]