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PATRICK KELLY ELECTRONICALLY
3790 El Camino Real, #1009 FILED
Palo Alto, CA 94306 Superior Court of California,
(41 5) 769-9524 County of San Francisco
i i 10/25/2017
mailforpatkelly@gmail.com 10/: oe 42 CouE
BY:SANDRA SCHIRO
Plaintiff, In Pro Per Deputy Clerk
SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
(Unlimited Jurisdiction)
PATRICK KELLY, Case No.: CGC-13-535823
Plaintiff, OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS
: MOTION JN LIMINE #6 REGARDING
vs. CHOICE OF LAW AND REQUEST
: FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING FILED
SHANE CLARIDGE KELLEY, AS EXECUTOR| CONCURRENTLY WITH CROSS
etal, MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY
HEARING TO DETERMINE
Defendants. PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT
: STATUS
INTRODUCTION
Defendant’s choice of law arguments are entirely founded and dependent upon the
unsubstantiated assumption that Plaintiff was acting as an independent contractor and not an
employee when he acquired 2™ citizenship for White. Since Cambodian law mirrors US law where
both recognize oral employment contracts, if Plaintiff was acting as White’s employee there is no
basis to move from the forum’s law since the is no conflict between the two states laws. Plaintiff
moves the Court for an Order determining the status of Plaintiff's employment by White.
DEFENDANT’S BURDON OF PROOF
The law of the forum is presumed to apply unless a party demonstrates otherwise.
Washington Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1080 (2001). The burden of proof is on the
proponent of the non-U.S. law to show that it “materially differs” from the forum and that applying
Ce
PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823the non-U.S. law will further the interest of the non-U.S. jurisdiction. Id. The non-U.S. law is
presumed to be the same as the law of the forum absent a showing to the contrary. United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) Absent the non-U.S. law
proponent carrying its burden, the forum law governs. In re Seagate Tech. Sec. Litig., 115 F.R.D.
264, 269 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to meet their burden of proof as set out below
and therefore the Court should deny their motion to apply Cambodian law to the Breach of Contract
claim.
DEFENDANT’S MISSTATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants mislabel as “facts” something they are acutely aware that Plaintiff disputes
(Defendant’s Motion In Limine #6, page 2:9-16):
“Plaintiff claims that over a series of meetings in early and mid-February, Plaintiff and.
White agreed to the terms of the Citizenship Contract. (Evangelist Decl., Ex. B [P. Kelly
Response to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories — General, Set One, No. 50.1] [stating he
entered into the contract in early-February 2005 and that he and White agreed to the terms of
the contract in mid-February 2005]; id. at Ex. L [P. Kelly declaration, § 3, stating “[t]he
decision to approach Cambodia was not made until roughly 2-weeks after we entered into
the Citizenship Contract’); id. at § 29.)”
Plaintiff has never claimed the Citizenship Contract was formed “over a series of meetings”
and there is no mention of Cambodia in the Verified Frist Amended Complaint that details the
contract (VFAC p.7:19 — p.10:19). Plaintiff's claim in the complaint and stated numerous times
elsewhere could not be clearer that the parties agreed to the Citizenship contract during a single
meeting that took place the first week of February 2005. During that meeting there was no decision
or agreement regarding any particular country the parties would or could apply to for citizenship nor
did there need to be in order for the contract to be valid. The only stipulation was that Plaintiff
would acquire 2" citizenship for White with no terms defining which country or countries Plaintiff
could apply to other than White having the right to approve those countries.
-2-
PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823At the time the parties contracted there was no understanding of where the contract would be
performed.' There was no understanding that Plaintiff would be required to travel anywhere in order
to obtain 2nd citizenship for White and certainly no expectation that the majority of Plaintiff's work
in performing the contract would have to be done in another country. Though there was certainly
the idea that travel to a host country would likely become necessary, that does not amount to an
assumption that the majority of work in obtaining 2nd citizenship for someone must be done in
person from within the host country. On the contrary, at the time of contracting Plaintiff assumed
the majority if not all the work done in foreign jurisdictions would be done by agents or attorneys
from those countries. That assumption turned out to be correct.
When the Citizenship Contract was made, Plaintiff had only done a cursory search of
potential countries that might grant White citizenship primarily based upon investor citizenship
programs. He did not seek to research that further until after the parties had reached their agreement
since it would have been pointless to put so much time and energy into something without Plaintiff
understanding he stood the chance of being well compensated for that work. Several days after the
contact was agreed to, White asked Plaintiff to research the income tax rates of the various countries
along with things like which countries’ passports permitted the most visa free entry into other
countries. This all happened after the contract was agreed to.
There was nothing in the contract that limited the number of countries Plaintiff could apply
to. Other countries were still under consideration after Cambodia was selected (Exhibit “A”) and.
right up until just before Cambodia granted citizenship (Exhibit “B”). The contract term agreed to
at the time of contracting that Plaintiff would acquire 2" citizenship for White obviously does not
indicate a place of performance.
' CCP §1636. A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the
parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.
Cal
PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823Defendants ignore the 4-complaints in this and the previous case so they can claim that their
highly suspect interpretation of so-called “facts” shows the intent was to perform the contract in
Cambodia and that the contract was made in a series of meetings over a couple of weeks. To
support this claim, Defendants rely heavily upon Evangelist Decl., Ex. D [P. Kelly Response to
Special Interrogatories from Defendant to Plaintiff, Set Three, No. 239(f)]:
“239. For every person listed in your answer to Interrogatory No. 12.1 in Defendant’s First
Set of Form Interrogatories, recite all statements made regarding the oral contract you allege
arose on or about February 2005.”
First, in answering Plaintiff clearly states that he is reciting statements made “during the
month of February 2005” and not just those made by Plaintiff and White at the Contract Formation
Meeting that occurred in early February. Special Interrogatory #239 does not limit answers to
statements made during the Contract Formation Meeting but rather asks for “all statements made
regarding the oral contract you allege arose on or about February 2005.” Yet Defendants appear to
use Plaintiff's answers as if they evidence what was said during the Contract Formation Meeting.
Second, Plaintiff's answers to 12.1 in Defendants’ Form Interrogatories Set One lists 8-
individuals and therefore obviously refers to the period after the Citizenship Contract was already
agreed to since Plaintiff and White were the only two people at the Contract Formation Meeting.
Third, Plaintiff's answers that mentions Cambodia obviously refer to statements made
during unspecified meetings that took place during the whole month of February 2005 and after the
contract was made. Since the question did not require Plaintiff to differentiate between what was
said at the Contract Formation Mecting and what was said in subsequent meetings, for the sake of
expediency Plaintiff simply combined the final understandings that Cambodia would be pursued
within certain answers where that meaning conveyed the final understanding of what was said. It
would have been unnecessarily redundant for example for Plaintiff to answer no. 239 by repeating;
“Plaintiff told White he would acquire citizenship in a country of White’s choosing” and then also
-4-
PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823state; “Plaintiff told White he would acquire citizenship in Cambodia” even though both statements
were made at different times during the month of February. Surely Defendants knew this when
falsely claiming their version of certain facts were “undisputed facts” even though a wealth of other
evidence clearly shows on its face that their purported facts are highly disputed.
The Citizenship Contract Was Not Primarily Performed in Cambodia
Defendants cannot and do not offer any convincing evidence other than their own
conclusions to support their claim that the Citizenship Contract was primarily performed in
Cambodia. What they do acknowledge however is that the contract took a full 15-months to
complete and that during that period Plaintiff went to Cambodia on only 7 occasions to attend
meetings related to acquiring citizenship for White.
Defendants’ analysis of where the contract was preformed conveniently ignores dozens of
meetings Plaintiff had with Dr. Kao over the more than 1-year period it took to have White’s
citizenship approved where only three meetings with Dr. Kao took place in Cambodia. Their
analysis also fails to take into account all the meetings Plaintiff had with Supat and others including
several that took place before it was even decided to pursue Cambodia. A conservative estimate of
all the meetings Plaintiff attended outside of Cambodia in performance of the Citizenship Contract
would easily exceed 30-meetings over the 15-month period it took to acquire White’s citizenship.
Add to that all the meetings at the jails where Plaintiff updated White on the progress of the project
and received his instructions on how to proceed that all occurred outside of Cambodia and
Defendants’ claim the contract was primarily performed in Cambodia is obviously baseless. And
none of this includes the countless hours Plaintiff spent on the phone or in front of his computer
working on the project where none of that work was done while he was in Cambodia.
But this has all been argued before.
-5-
PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE IS LITTLE MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT TO
RELITIGATE THEIR FAILED SUMMARY ADJUDICATION ARGUMENTS
Defendant’s Motion Jn Limine #6 is little more than an improper second attempt to gain a
more favorable ruling on a Summary Adjudication Motion that has already been ruled on.? The
Court provided a very comprehensive 3-page ruling (Exhibit “C”) on the same choice of law
arguments Defendants now bring before this Court in the form of a Motion Jn Limine. Plaintiff
relies on his MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY
ADJUDICATION submitted to this Court for the hearing heard on September 20, 2017 (Exhibit
“D”). Defendant’s arguments in this motion that the Court already found unpersuasive are:
1. The intent at the time of contracting was to perform the contract in Cambodia (Plaintiff
disputes this.);
2. The Citizenship contract was primarily performed in Cambodia (Plaintiff disputes this.);
3. Both parties agree that if there was a contract it would have been entered into in Thailand;
4. Since the contract was primarily performed in Cambodia, the governmental interest test
governs the choice of law (Plaintiff agrees this would be correct if #1 and #2 were true but
disputes the contract was primarily performed in Cambodia or that the intent at the time of
contracting was to perform the contract in any particular state.);
5. Under the governmental interest test, the court first determines if the applicable rules of law
differ between the two states (Plaintiff agrees this would be the proper step in determining
choice of law if #1 and #2 were true but disputes they are true.);
? A motion in limine to, in effect, assert a late-filed motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication is improper. (Clemens v. American Warranty Corp. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 444, 451;
Los Angeles County Superior Court rule 3.57(b).)
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PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-5358236. Cambodian Decree Law 38 Part 2 Article 4 states that all contract over $1.25US have to be
in writing and since Plaintiff's contract was for $350,000 it violates Article 4 (Plaintiff
disputes this and argues that if Cambodian law applied, the applicable laws would be
Cambodia’s Labor Law promulgated by the Royal Kram No. NS/RKM/0397/01 dated
March 13, 1997 that recognizes oral employment contracts.);
7. The two states laws differ meaning Cambodian law applies (Plaintiff disputes this because if
Cambodian law apples there is not difference between US law and Cambodian law since
both recognize oral employment contracts.);
8. Since the contract violates Article 4 because it was not put in writing it is void under
Cambodian law (Plaintiff disputes this since it is obvious that Article 4 could not apply to
Cambodian Labor Law Article 65 that states employment contracts can be written or verbal
because Defendant’s Article 4 is clearly not intended to apply to any type of employment
contract since no employment contract could be for a sum less than $1.25US.);
9. There is no valid contract before this Court and the Breach of Contract claim should be
dismissed (Plaintiff disagrees and argues that Defendants have failed to show Cambodian
law applies and therefore the forum’s law applies.)
CAMBODIAN LAW RECOGNIZES ORAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
In anticipation of this motion Plaintiff retained a Cambodian attorney to provide an opinion
on Cambodian law that confirms oral employment contracts are valid under Cambodian law and
that Plaintiff would be considered an employee under Cambodian law (Exhibit “E”).
CONCLUSION
Defendants have failed to show the intent was to perform the contract in Cambodia when the
contract was formed and have misused a motion in limine as a second chance for a more favorable
ruling on a previously filed summary adjudication/judgement motion. Plaintiff submits concurrent
Cael
PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823Co mo NIN a
with this Opposition to Defendant’s /n Limine Motion #6 a Cross Motion for an Evidentiary
Hearing to Determine Plaintiff's Employment Status to help resolve any choice of law issues and to
help prevent confusion by the jury over Plaintiff's working relationship with White where the jury
seeing that relationship as an independent contractor relationship greatly distorts the true nature of
the relationship between the parties. For the above stated reasons, Plaintiff requests the Court deny
Defendant’s Jn Limine Motion #6.
Respectfully submitted
DATED: October 22 dhs 2017
PATRICK KELLY, Plair ntiff
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PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823
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PATRICK KELLY ELECTRONICALLY 3790 El Camino Real, #1009 FILED Palo Alto, CA 94306 Superior Court of California, (41 5) 769-9524 County of San Francisco i i 10/25/2017 mailforpatkelly@gmail.com 10/: oe 42 CouE BY:SANDRA SCHIRO Plaintiff, In Pro Per Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, (Unlimited Jurisdiction) PATRICK KELLY, Case No.: CGC-13-535823 Plaintiff, OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS : MOTION JN LIMINE #6 REGARDING vs. CHOICE OF LAW AND REQUEST : FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING FILED SHANE CLARIDGE KELLEY, AS EXECUTOR| CONCURRENTLY WITH CROSS etal, MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO DETERMINE Defendants. PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYMENT : STATUS INTRODUCTION Defendant’s choice of law arguments are entirely founded and dependent upon the unsubstantiated assumption that Plaintiff was acting as an independent contractor and not an employee when he acquired 2™ citizenship for White. Since Cambodian law mirrors US law where both recognize oral employment contracts, if Plaintiff was acting as White’s employee there is no basis to move from the forum’s law since the is no conflict between the two states laws. Plaintiff moves the Court for an Order determining the status of Plaintiff's employment by White. DEFENDANT’S BURDON OF PROOF The law of the forum is presumed to apply unless a party demonstrates otherwise. Washington Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1080 (2001). The burden of proof is on the proponent of the non-U.S. law to show that it “materially differs” from the forum and that applying Ce PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823the non-U.S. law will further the interest of the non-U.S. jurisdiction. Id. The non-U.S. law is presumed to be the same as the law of the forum absent a showing to the contrary. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) Absent the non-U.S. law proponent carrying its burden, the forum law governs. In re Seagate Tech. Sec. Litig., 115 F.R.D. 264, 269 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to meet their burden of proof as set out below and therefore the Court should deny their motion to apply Cambodian law to the Breach of Contract claim. DEFENDANT’S MISSTATEMENT OF FACTS Defendants mislabel as “facts” something they are acutely aware that Plaintiff disputes (Defendant’s Motion In Limine #6, page 2:9-16): “Plaintiff claims that over a series of meetings in early and mid-February, Plaintiff and. White agreed to the terms of the Citizenship Contract. (Evangelist Decl., Ex. B [P. Kelly Response to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories — General, Set One, No. 50.1] [stating he entered into the contract in early-February 2005 and that he and White agreed to the terms of the contract in mid-February 2005]; id. at Ex. L [P. Kelly declaration, § 3, stating “[t]he decision to approach Cambodia was not made until roughly 2-weeks after we entered into the Citizenship Contract’); id. at § 29.)” Plaintiff has never claimed the Citizenship Contract was formed “over a series of meetings” and there is no mention of Cambodia in the Verified Frist Amended Complaint that details the contract (VFAC p.7:19 — p.10:19). Plaintiff's claim in the complaint and stated numerous times elsewhere could not be clearer that the parties agreed to the Citizenship contract during a single meeting that took place the first week of February 2005. During that meeting there was no decision or agreement regarding any particular country the parties would or could apply to for citizenship nor did there need to be in order for the contract to be valid. The only stipulation was that Plaintiff would acquire 2" citizenship for White with no terms defining which country or countries Plaintiff could apply to other than White having the right to approve those countries. -2- PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823At the time the parties contracted there was no understanding of where the contract would be performed.' There was no understanding that Plaintiff would be required to travel anywhere in order to obtain 2nd citizenship for White and certainly no expectation that the majority of Plaintiff's work in performing the contract would have to be done in another country. Though there was certainly the idea that travel to a host country would likely become necessary, that does not amount to an assumption that the majority of work in obtaining 2nd citizenship for someone must be done in person from within the host country. On the contrary, at the time of contracting Plaintiff assumed the majority if not all the work done in foreign jurisdictions would be done by agents or attorneys from those countries. That assumption turned out to be correct. When the Citizenship Contract was made, Plaintiff had only done a cursory search of potential countries that might grant White citizenship primarily based upon investor citizenship programs. He did not seek to research that further until after the parties had reached their agreement since it would have been pointless to put so much time and energy into something without Plaintiff understanding he stood the chance of being well compensated for that work. Several days after the contact was agreed to, White asked Plaintiff to research the income tax rates of the various countries along with things like which countries’ passports permitted the most visa free entry into other countries. This all happened after the contract was agreed to. There was nothing in the contract that limited the number of countries Plaintiff could apply to. Other countries were still under consideration after Cambodia was selected (Exhibit “A”) and. right up until just before Cambodia granted citizenship (Exhibit “B”). The contract term agreed to at the time of contracting that Plaintiff would acquire 2" citizenship for White obviously does not indicate a place of performance. ' CCP §1636. A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful. Cal PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823Defendants ignore the 4-complaints in this and the previous case so they can claim that their highly suspect interpretation of so-called “facts” shows the intent was to perform the contract in Cambodia and that the contract was made in a series of meetings over a couple of weeks. To support this claim, Defendants rely heavily upon Evangelist Decl., Ex. D [P. Kelly Response to Special Interrogatories from Defendant to Plaintiff, Set Three, No. 239(f)]: “239. For every person listed in your answer to Interrogatory No. 12.1 in Defendant’s First Set of Form Interrogatories, recite all statements made regarding the oral contract you allege arose on or about February 2005.” First, in answering Plaintiff clearly states that he is reciting statements made “during the month of February 2005” and not just those made by Plaintiff and White at the Contract Formation Meeting that occurred in early February. Special Interrogatory #239 does not limit answers to statements made during the Contract Formation Meeting but rather asks for “all statements made regarding the oral contract you allege arose on or about February 2005.” Yet Defendants appear to use Plaintiff's answers as if they evidence what was said during the Contract Formation Meeting. Second, Plaintiff's answers to 12.1 in Defendants’ Form Interrogatories Set One lists 8- individuals and therefore obviously refers to the period after the Citizenship Contract was already agreed to since Plaintiff and White were the only two people at the Contract Formation Meeting. Third, Plaintiff's answers that mentions Cambodia obviously refer to statements made during unspecified meetings that took place during the whole month of February 2005 and after the contract was made. Since the question did not require Plaintiff to differentiate between what was said at the Contract Formation Mecting and what was said in subsequent meetings, for the sake of expediency Plaintiff simply combined the final understandings that Cambodia would be pursued within certain answers where that meaning conveyed the final understanding of what was said. It would have been unnecessarily redundant for example for Plaintiff to answer no. 239 by repeating; “Plaintiff told White he would acquire citizenship in a country of White’s choosing” and then also -4- PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823state; “Plaintiff told White he would acquire citizenship in Cambodia” even though both statements were made at different times during the month of February. Surely Defendants knew this when falsely claiming their version of certain facts were “undisputed facts” even though a wealth of other evidence clearly shows on its face that their purported facts are highly disputed. The Citizenship Contract Was Not Primarily Performed in Cambodia Defendants cannot and do not offer any convincing evidence other than their own conclusions to support their claim that the Citizenship Contract was primarily performed in Cambodia. What they do acknowledge however is that the contract took a full 15-months to complete and that during that period Plaintiff went to Cambodia on only 7 occasions to attend meetings related to acquiring citizenship for White. Defendants’ analysis of where the contract was preformed conveniently ignores dozens of meetings Plaintiff had with Dr. Kao over the more than 1-year period it took to have White’s citizenship approved where only three meetings with Dr. Kao took place in Cambodia. Their analysis also fails to take into account all the meetings Plaintiff had with Supat and others including several that took place before it was even decided to pursue Cambodia. A conservative estimate of all the meetings Plaintiff attended outside of Cambodia in performance of the Citizenship Contract would easily exceed 30-meetings over the 15-month period it took to acquire White’s citizenship. Add to that all the meetings at the jails where Plaintiff updated White on the progress of the project and received his instructions on how to proceed that all occurred outside of Cambodia and Defendants’ claim the contract was primarily performed in Cambodia is obviously baseless. And none of this includes the countless hours Plaintiff spent on the phone or in front of his computer working on the project where none of that work was done while he was in Cambodia. But this has all been argued before. -5- PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE IS LITTLE MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT TO RELITIGATE THEIR FAILED SUMMARY ADJUDICATION ARGUMENTS Defendant’s Motion Jn Limine #6 is little more than an improper second attempt to gain a more favorable ruling on a Summary Adjudication Motion that has already been ruled on.? The Court provided a very comprehensive 3-page ruling (Exhibit “C”) on the same choice of law arguments Defendants now bring before this Court in the form of a Motion Jn Limine. Plaintiff relies on his MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY ADJUDICATION submitted to this Court for the hearing heard on September 20, 2017 (Exhibit “D”). Defendant’s arguments in this motion that the Court already found unpersuasive are: 1. The intent at the time of contracting was to perform the contract in Cambodia (Plaintiff disputes this.); 2. The Citizenship contract was primarily performed in Cambodia (Plaintiff disputes this.); 3. Both parties agree that if there was a contract it would have been entered into in Thailand; 4. Since the contract was primarily performed in Cambodia, the governmental interest test governs the choice of law (Plaintiff agrees this would be correct if #1 and #2 were true but disputes the contract was primarily performed in Cambodia or that the intent at the time of contracting was to perform the contract in any particular state.); 5. Under the governmental interest test, the court first determines if the applicable rules of law differ between the two states (Plaintiff agrees this would be the proper step in determining choice of law if #1 and #2 were true but disputes they are true.); ? A motion in limine to, in effect, assert a late-filed motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is improper. (Clemens v. American Warranty Corp. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 444, 451; Los Angeles County Superior Court rule 3.57(b).) -6- PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-5358236. Cambodian Decree Law 38 Part 2 Article 4 states that all contract over $1.25US have to be in writing and since Plaintiff's contract was for $350,000 it violates Article 4 (Plaintiff disputes this and argues that if Cambodian law applied, the applicable laws would be Cambodia’s Labor Law promulgated by the Royal Kram No. NS/RKM/0397/01 dated March 13, 1997 that recognizes oral employment contracts.); 7. The two states laws differ meaning Cambodian law applies (Plaintiff disputes this because if Cambodian law apples there is not difference between US law and Cambodian law since both recognize oral employment contracts.); 8. Since the contract violates Article 4 because it was not put in writing it is void under Cambodian law (Plaintiff disputes this since it is obvious that Article 4 could not apply to Cambodian Labor Law Article 65 that states employment contracts can be written or verbal because Defendant’s Article 4 is clearly not intended to apply to any type of employment contract since no employment contract could be for a sum less than $1.25US.); 9. There is no valid contract before this Court and the Breach of Contract claim should be dismissed (Plaintiff disagrees and argues that Defendants have failed to show Cambodian law applies and therefore the forum’s law applies.) CAMBODIAN LAW RECOGNIZES ORAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS In anticipation of this motion Plaintiff retained a Cambodian attorney to provide an opinion on Cambodian law that confirms oral employment contracts are valid under Cambodian law and that Plaintiff would be considered an employee under Cambodian law (Exhibit “E”). CONCLUSION Defendants have failed to show the intent was to perform the contract in Cambodia when the contract was formed and have misused a motion in limine as a second chance for a more favorable ruling on a previously filed summary adjudication/judgement motion. Plaintiff submits concurrent Cael PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823Co mo NIN a with this Opposition to Defendant’s /n Limine Motion #6 a Cross Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing to Determine Plaintiff's Employment Status to help resolve any choice of law issues and to help prevent confusion by the jury over Plaintiff's working relationship with White where the jury seeing that relationship as an independent contractor relationship greatly distorts the true nature of the relationship between the parties. For the above stated reasons, Plaintiff requests the Court deny Defendant’s Jn Limine Motion #6. Respectfully submitted DATED: October 22 dhs 2017 PATRICK KELLY, Plair ntiff -8- PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO IN LIMINE MOTION SIX — CGC-13-535823