Exhibit,Appendix: SATAWHITE, ROBERT v. BARBER, JERALD Et Al

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APPELLATE COURT
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Judicial District of Fairfield
APPELLATE COURT NO. AC. 35658
ROBERT SATAWHITE

V. BRIDGEPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.
a eee Ne St i be se ne aa PN be |

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Plaintiff's Appeal From Superior Court
Hon. Richard Gilardi

Hon. Dale Radcliffe

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff/Appellant toe For Defendant/Appelle

Jerald Barber, Esq. et John Mitola, Esq.
Williams and Barber Bridgeport City AttorneysTABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement of ISSUCS .........cecceccesceseeseeeeeeeereeteenieassaseetennarnasnegteetee esses

Table of Authorities

I. Statement of Facts...............ccccccccee cee eee ree cee eee ceeeee tee nee nee aee nan aneas

Il. Argument...

Ill. Conclusion and Relief RequestedSTATEMENT OF ISSUES

4. Did the trial court err in granting the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies where the Plaintiff
substantially availed himself of his administrative remedy and any further
pursuit of the same would have been futile and inadequate under the

circumstances?TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cahill v. Board of Education, 198 Conn 229 (1985)
Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection,215 Conn 616 (1990)....esesserereressrees

Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling, 204 Conn. 551 (1987)... cscs eeesereereeeneees

Connecticut Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson, 473 Conn, 352 (1977)..--.-
Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn 421 (1 GGG)... csssesssnserenssnnenensnanesnnanensanettes

Labbe v. Pension Commission, 229 Conn. 801 (1994)
© &G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Co! ission, 232 Conn. 419 (1995)........
Simko v. Ervin, 234 Conn. 498 (1995)STATEMENT OF FACTS

This is the appeal of the Plaintiff, Robert Satawhite from dismissal of his breach
of contract lawsuit against the Bridgeport Board of Education on the ground that the
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's claim because for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies.

On September 12, 2011, the Plaintiff, Robert Satawhite, brought action by way of
Writ, Summons and Complaint against defendants City of Bridgeport Board of
Education, Lawrence Osborne, Melvin Wearing and Carole Pannozzo, premised upon a
breach of his employment contract. Plaintiff alleged that he was placed on
administrative suspension in June 2006 without pay and indefinitely suspended which
constituted an illegal and improper employment condition and constituted a breach of

his employment contract with the City. Complaint. Record

In November 2012, the Defendants moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the claims alleged because
the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The matter was scheduled for

a courtside trial on January 16, 2013. On that date, the Honorable Judge Dale
Radcliffe, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice, reasoning that
plaintiff could attempt to prove that pursuing his administrative remedies was futile.
Order, 1/16/13, ___ Record. On April 25, 2013, the Hon. Richard Gilardi reasoned that
“in the long run it might be best for all parties that it - - it goes through the grievance
procedure” and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Order , 4/25/13.___ Record.ARGUMENT

1. The trial court erred in granting the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies because Plaintiff substantially
availed himself of his administrative remedy and any further pursuit of the

same would have been futile and inadequate under the circumstances.
The doctrine of exhaustion is grounded in a policy of fostering an orderly

process of administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a reviewing court will have
the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions. Connecticut Life & Health Ins. Guaranty
Assn, v. Jackson, 173 Conn. 352, 358-59 (1977). The doctrine of exhaustion furthers the
salutary goals of relieving the courts of the burden of deciding questions entrusted to an
agency... in advance of possible judicial review. Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling, 204
Conn. 551, 557 (1987). However, “[dlispite the important public policy considerations underlying
the exhaustion requirement, we have grudgingly carved several exceptions from the exhaustion
doctrine. Cahill v. Board of Education, 198 Conn 229 (1985). One of the limited exceptions to

the exhaustion rule arises when recourse to the administrative remedy would be demonstrably

futile or inadequate. O & G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 232 Conn. 419
(199). Labbe v. Pension Commission,229 Conn. 801 (1994)(Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn 421 (1996). "An administrative remedy is futile or inadequate if the

agency is without the authority to grant the requested relief." Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental
Protection,215 Conn 616 (1990). “It is futile to seek a remedy only when such action could not

result in a favorable decision and invariably would result in further judicial proceedings. Simko v.

Ervin, 234 Conn. 498, 507 (1995).

In the instant case, an exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies

requirement applies because the issues in controversy between the plaintiff and the defendants

6are separate and distinct from the issues contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement
between the Gity of Bridgeport and the National Association of Governmental Employees,
plaintiff's bargaining unit. Rather than imposing conditions on plaintiff's employment or
discipline, the defendant's conduct towards plaintiff was improper and constituted a breach of
contract and a constructive discharge of plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff alleged that he was
placed on administrative suspension without pay for a period of twenty days and thereafter
denied the right to return to work. __ Record. The twenty day suspension was subsequently
grieved by the plaintiff and reduced to a five day suspension. __ Record. In so doing, plaintiff
substantially complied with any required administrative procedures. In addition, further pursuit
of plaintiff's administrative remedies, if any, would have been futile or inadequate. By
conditioning plaintiff's return to work on a determination by a doctor that he was fit for duty was
not related to plaintiff's work, but rather further improper employer conduct which had the effect

of imposing new and different terms and conditions of employment.
1. CONCLUSION

For the reasons enumerated above, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to
consider and determine the claims alleged in plaintiff's complaint. Given the facts and

circumstances of this case, plaintiff was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies as

said efforts would have been futile or inadequate.Ex. T

ROBERT SATAWHITE i DN: AAN-CV-14-6017396
SUPERIOR COURT
VS. i JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

ANSONIA/MILFORD AT MILFORD
CITY OF BRIDGEPORT

BOARD OF EDUCATION

NOVEMBER 24, 2015

DEFENDANT BRIDGEPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/MOTION TO DISMISS

1. Introduction and Background

The plaintiff Robert Satawhite alleges in his complaint that he began his employment
with the Defendant on or about August 31, 1989 as security officer with the Bridgeport
School system. He alleges that on or about June 20, 2006 he was placed on
administrative suspension without pay and indefinitely suspended from his employment
with the Board pending confirmation of his ability to perform as a security officer. He
alleges that the suspension was an illegal and improper employment condition imposed
upon him. He claims that he remained on the administrative suspension until August
31, 2013 when his employment was terminated by the defendant Board of Education.

He alleges that as a long-time employee he earned vested employee benefits includingsalary, fringe benefits and retirement benefits all due and payable to him upon the
termination of his employment. In Count I] of his complaint plaintiff re-alleges all of the
Count | allegations and then alleges that he was constructively discharged as a result of
his failure to comply with the defendant's improper directive to obtain confirmation of his
ability to perform as a security officer, He claims he has suffered a loss of employment
and emotional distress.

The Defendant City of Bridgeport Board of Education moves for summary

judgmentdismissal in this case on three grounds:

4. The claims/issues in this case have been adjudicated and are therefore barred
based on the doctrine of res judicata. This is so because in a prior suit alleging
the same type of claims/issues the superior court ruled that the plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies and dismissed the claim on the ground that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Further, in that case the plaintiff filed
an appeal and in a per curiam decision the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed
the trial court’s dismissal of the case. See: Robert Satawhite v. Board of
Education of the City of Bridgeport DN AC 35658 (released May 20, 2014).

2. Even if this court rules that res judicata does not bar the action before this court,
nevertheless, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims alleged in
the complaint because the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies available to him pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement betweenplaintiffs union the National Association of Government Employees (“NAGE”)
and the Defendant City of Bridgeport. Therefore the case should be dismissed.
3. The claim that the plaintiff did not receive certain retirement benefits once he was

“terminated” is not ripe because plaintiff has not filled out the required paperwork

in order for him to receive his pension and any other benefit he may be entitled

to. Therefore there is no issue in dispute and the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over that claim. The claim should be dismissed.

li. Discussion
A. The Claims in Counts One and Two are Barred by the Doctrine of Res
Judicata

The claims alleged in Counts One and Two are barred by the doctrine of res
judicata because the superior court dismissed and entered judgment on a previous
similar case brought by the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Consequently the court ruled that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a complaint dated August
10, 2011 filed by the plaintiff against the Bridgeport Board of Education which alleges
many of the same allegations as the present complaint. In his first complaint and in the
present case plaintiff alleges that on or about June 20, 2006 he was placed on
administrative suspension without pay and indefinitely suspended from his employment
with the Board pending confirmation of his ability to perform as a security officer. (See

Exhibit A paragraph 6 of August 10, 2011 complaint; see paragraph 4 of the current

3complaint). Further, both complaints allege that the suspension was an illegal and
improper employment condition imposed upon the plaintiff. In the August 10, 2011
lawsuit the plaintiff alleged that the City breached his employment contract and sought
damages like loss salary and fringe benefits. In the present case plaintiff claims that the
illegal and improper employment condition placed upon him (the suspension) led to him
being ‘terminated’ from his employment on August 31, 2013 when he received a notice
from the Board of Education and he claims that as a long standing employee he earned
vested employee benefits like salary, fringe benefits and retirement benefits all due and
payable to him upon the termination of his employment. Both cases claim that the
administrative suspension was illegal and improper and in the present case a fair
reading of his complaint is that the administrative suspension resulted in plaintiff losing
his job and associated benefits.

In the August 10, 2011 case, the Defendants moved to dismiss the case based
on the claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff was a
member of a union and he had at his disposal a grievance process/procedure available
to him though collective bargaining and state law which he was required to use-to
adjudicate the types of job related complaints alleged in the lawsuit, and plaintiff failed
to use that administrative process. (See Exhibit B Defendants Motion to Dismiss dated

March 18, 2013 in the matter Robert Satawhite v. City of Bridgeport Board of Educationet_al DN FBT-cv-11-602198-S docket entry 114.00"). The plaintiff objected to the
motion to dismiss but nevertheless the superior court dismissed the matter holding that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. The court agreed that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the case because the plaintiff had an administrative process available through his
collective bargaining agreement to adjudicate disputes related to his employment and
work conditions, and that plaintiff failed to utilize that administrative remedy, (See
Exhibit C attached hereto Court post card granting motion to dismiss). The plaintiff then
appealed the court's dismissal to the Appellate Court. (Satawhite v. Board of Education

City of Bridgeport Board of Education, et, al AC 35658). The parties fully briefed the

issues (See Exhibit D appellate legal briefs of both parties); and after oral argument the
Appellate Court, in a per curiam decision, affirmed the judgment of the superior court.

(See Exhibit E per curiam decision Satawhite vy. Board of Education City of Bridgeport

DN AC 35858 release May 20, 2014).

In the present case, the doctrine of res judicata bars the plaintiff from pursuing
the claims that he raises because those claims are similar to and raise the same type of
claims plaintiff asserted in his August 10, 2011 case, a case that was dismissed by the
superior court on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because

the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies available to him under a

' At times in this brief the Defendant will cite to exhibits attached to Exhibit B, which is the Defendants’ March 18,
2013 Motion to Dismiss. Those citations will be italicized to differentiate between exhibits attached to this brief and
exhibits attached to the March 18, 2013 Motion to Dismiss,

5collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The superior court agreed that the claims
alleged in the prior lawsuit (just like the claims alleged in the present suit) dealt with
matters and disputes relating to the conditions of plaintiff's employment and that those
types of claims needed to be adjudicated through the grievance procedure outlined in
the applicable CBA. The Connecticut Appellate Court agreed and affirmed the superior
court’s decision. (See Exhibit C attached hereto Court post card granting motion to

dismiss and See Exhibit E Satawhite v. Board of Education City of Bridgeport Board of

Education, et, al AC 35658). The doctrine of res judicata holds that a valid, final
judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar
to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand.
Moreover, res judicata prevents the pursuit of any claims relating to the cause of action
which were actually made or might have been made in the prior action. The essential
concept of the modern rule of claim preclusion is that a judgment against the plaintiff is
preclusive not simply when it is ‘on the merits' but when the procedure in the first action
afforded plaintiff a fair opportunity to get to the merits. Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446,
459 (2010). The doctrine is but a manifestation of the recognition that endless litigation
leads to confusion or chaos. To prevent multiplicity of actions equity will enjoin further
litigation of a cause of action which has already been adjudicated. Local 1279 v.

Connecticut Labor Relations Board, 171 Conn. 342, 355 (1976). If the same cause of

action is again sued on, the judgment is a bar with respect to any claims relating to the

cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. Bridgeport

6Hydraulic Co. v. Pearson, 139 Conn. 186, 196 (1952); Wade's Dairy, Inc. v. Town of
Fairfield,181 Conn. 556, 559-60 (1980).

As stated above, the claim and issues alleged in this matter are identical in many
respects and very similar in nature to the claims alleged in the past case that was
dismissed. The plaintiff is alleging in the present lawsuit that his suspension was an
illegal and improper employment condition placed on his employment. That is the exact
same claim that he alleged in the August 10, 2011 suit and the superior court ruled (and
affirmed by the Appellate Court) that if plaintiff believed that his suspension was illegal
and improper he was required to adjudicate that claim through the procedures of a
collective bargaining agreement between his union and the City of Bridgeport, and
because he failed to do that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (See
Exhibit B Defendants Motion to Dismiss dated March 18, 2013 in the matter Robert

Satawhite v. City of Bridgeport Board of Education et, al DN FBT-cv-11-602198-S

docket entry 114.00; See Exhibit C attached hereto Court post card granting motion to

dismiss; See Exhibit D legal briefs of both parties in Satawhite v. Board of Education

City of Bridgeport Board of Education, et, al AC 35658; See Exhibit E per curiam

decision Satawhite v. Board of Education City of Bridgeport DN AC 35658 release May

20, 2014). Further in the present suit plaintiff is alleging that the illegal and improper
suspension led to his termination and that he did not receive vested benefits like salary,
fringe benefits and retirement benefits due and payable to him when he was terminated.

The only difference in the present case from the former is that plaintiff is alleging that

7the illegal and improper suspension led to his termination. However that type of claim is
barred by res judicata because the superior court already determined that plaintiff was
required to exhaust his available administrative remedies concerning any disputes that
relate to the terms and conditions of his employment. Specifically, as detailed in the
Defendants Brief moving to dismiss the prior case for failing to exhaust administrative
remedies the plaintiff was a member of a union the National Association of Government
Employees ("NAGE") and the terms and conditions of his employment were governed
by the collective bargaining agreement between the City of Bridgeport and NAGE. (See
Exhibit B Defendants Motion to Dismiss dated March 18, 2013 in the matter Robert

Satawhite v. City of Bridgeport Board of Education et_ al DN FBT-cv-11-602198-S

docket entry 114.00 and attached to that motion Exhibit | NAGE Collective Bargaining
Agreement “CBA” and Exhibit C Affidavit of Director of Labor Relations Lawrence
Osborne). |n fact plaintiff admitted in his responses to a set of request for admissions
filed in the previous lawsuit that the terms and conditions of his employment were
governed by the NAGE CBA. (See Exhibit B Defendants Motion to Dismiss dated March

18, 2013 in the matter Robert Satawhite v. City of Bridgeport Board of Education et, al

DN FBT-cv-11-602198-S docket entry 114.00 and see attached to the motion to dismiss
Exhibit B Plaintiff's response to Request for Admissions dated January 22, 2013-
request No. 3; Also see Osborne Affidavit Exhibit C). In the CBA between NAGE and
the City Article 1 entitled “Recognition” states in relevant part that, “The Employer

recognizes the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the purposes of

8establishing salaries, wages, hours and conditions of employment for all of those
employees of the City of Bridgeport as certified by the Connecticut State Board of Labor
Relations. . .” Article 11 provides a “Grievance and Arbitration Procedure” and states
that, “Any grievance or dispute which may arise between the parties concerning the
application, meaning or interpretation of this Agreement, shall be settled only in the
following manner...” Article 11 then sets forth certain steps that the parties must utilize
to resolve grievances/disputes. Step 1-A grievance must be filed in writing and it first is
considered by the department head; Step 2- If the grievance is not resolved in Step 1-it
is presented to the Labor Relations Office and it has 10 days to respond; Step 3- If the
grievance is still unresolved then either party may request arbitration by the State
Board. (State Board of Mediation and Arbitration). Article 11 specifically states that the
decision of the arbitrator(s) shall be final and binding on the parties. (See Exhibit |
relevant contract provisions attached to Defendant’s Exhibit B March 18, 2013 Motion to

Dismiss in Robert Satawhite v. City of Bridgeport Board of Education et, al DN FBT-cv-

11-602198-S docket entry 114.00). In the prior suit what plaintiff alleged is that the
Defendant had no authority to place him on administrative suspension and indefinitely
suspend him pending the confirmation of his ability to perform as a security guard, In
that case the Defendants argued that such an issue needed to be adjudicated through
the grievance provisions of the CBA and plaintiff had no authority to bypass that
process and sue in court. As stated above, the superior court agreed (affirmed by the

Appellate Court) and dismissed the case for failure to exhaust his administrativeremedies. The court ruled that when a dispute involves terms and conditions of
employment which are governed by the NAGE CBA, the administrative process set forth
in the CBA must be utilized to resolve that dispute and plaintiff failed to exhaust that
administrative process. That holding is dispositive on the present case and bars the
plaintiff from pursuing this present case based on the doctrine of res judicata. Clearly
the claims alleged in the present case deal with the “terms and conditions” of his
employment and in the prior suit the superior court held that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction (affirmed by the Appellate Court) because any dispute regarding those
“terms and conditions” needs to be adjudicated through the NAGE CBA grievance
procedures,

B. In the alternative this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this

case because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

The plaintiff may argue that the present case is different from the former case
because in the first case he did not allege that he was “terminated” from his position on
or about August 31, 2011. Even if the Court determines that the claims in the prior suit
and the present suit are different it is submitted that the result is the same: that the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. This is so because the plaintiff never challenged or contested his
“termination” and his claim that because of it he lost certain benefits through the
grievance procedures outlined in the NAGE CBA. Clearly, the allegations of the present

complaint relate to the terms and conditions of his employment and any dispute on

10those terms and conditions need to be adjudicated through the grievance process
outlined in the CBA. It is clear that he never did that. (See Affidavit of Director of Labor
Relations Lawerence Osborne attached hereto as Exhibit F). On the failure to exhaust
argument the Defendant incorporates herein the text and law of its March 18, 2013
Motion to Dismiss. (See Exhibit B Defendants Motion to Dismiss dated March 18, 2013
in the matter Robert Satawhite v. City of Bridgeport Board of Education et_al DN FBT-
cv-11-602198-S docket entry 114.00). It is a well-settled principle of administrative taw
that a party may not bring a matter to the Superior Court without first exhausting
available administrative remedies. Lopiano v. City of Stamford, et al 22 Conn. App. 591,
594 (1990) citing Silverman v. New Haven, 19 Conn. App. 360, 364 cert, denied 212
Conn. 812 (1989). The exhaustion of remedies doctrine implicates subject matter
jurisdiction; a case must be dismissed if an administrative avenue of redress remains

untried. Lopiano v. City of Stamford, et af 22 Conn. App. at 595 (1990). In the present

case this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff filed to utilize and
exhaust the administrative grievance procedure available to him as outlined in the
NAGE CBA. If he believed that the City did not have the authority to place him on paid
administrative leave and/or that he was in some fashion wrongly ‘terminated’ from his
position he was required to adjudicate those claims under the grievance procedure
found in the NAGE CBA. Therefore the case should be dismissed.

C. Plaintiff's claim that he has not received retirement benefits is not ripe.

11Count One also can be read to allege that plaintiff was entitled to certain benefits
when he was terminated but did not receive them. This court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain this claim because it is not ripe. Justiciability comprises several
related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question
doctrine, that implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to

adjudicate a particular matter._Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry,

271 Conn. 540, 569 (2004), A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, 245 Conn. 88, 91 (1998).
The rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements. /d., at 570. Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial
court “must be satisfied that the case before it does not present a hypothetical injury or
a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire. /d.

Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 86-87 (2008). In the present case any

claim brought by the plaintiff that he has not received certain retirement benefits that he
may be entitled to Is not ripe because, to date, plaintiff has failed to fill out the required
paperwork necessary for him to start collecting a pension and/or any other post
retirement benefits that he may be entitled to. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is an
affidavit from Angela Morton the Retirement/Payroll Administrator for the Bridgeport
Board of Education. She is responsible for assisting those BOE employees who retire

and processing the necessary paperwork to effectuate retirements. In the present case,

12the plaintiff is entitled to a pension through the Connecticut Municipal Employee
Retirement System (“CMERS"”) however before he can collect that pension he needs to
go to Ms. Morton’s office and fill out the required paperwork which then is processed by
Ms. Morton and sent to CMERS. To date the plaintiff has not done that and therefore is
not collecting a pension or any other post retirement benefit that he may be entitled to.
His claim therefore that he has not received retirement benefits upon the termination of
his employment is simply not ripe because he has not filled out the necessary
Paperwork in order for him to commence receiving those benefits.” As this court can see
Ms. Morton attests to the fact that as of today's date, Mr. Satawhite has not come to her
Office to fill out the required paperwork so that he can commence collecting any and ail

retirement benefits that he is entitled to. Simply put, there is no issue in dispute because
Plaintiff has not done what he needs to do to receive his pension and any other
retirement benefits that he may be entitled to. When a plaintiff claims is contingent on
an event which has not occurred, the matter is not ripe for judicial review. Chapman
Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 86-87 (2008). The City has not taken away or
prevented plaintiff from receiving a retirement benefit (like a pension) and the reason he
is not receiving any benefits that he may be entitled to is because he has not completed
the necessary administrative paperwork. Therefore the claim is not ripe and the court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. There is no ripe dispute and plaintiff's

? The undersigned attorney specifically told plaintiff's attorney Jerald Barber that all plaintiff needed to do to
receive earned retirement benefits like a pension was to see Ms, Morton and fill out the required paperwork so that
CMERS could commence paying said benefits, For reasons not comprehended the plaintiff has failed to do this,

13claim is contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire. /d.

Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 86-87 (2008). The claim therefore

should be dismissed.

Ill. Conclusion

For the reasons enumerated above, the Defendant Bridgeport Board of Education
moves that summary judgment be entered on its behalf under the doctrine of res
judicata. In the alternative, the case should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies and/or the claims are not ripe. Therefore, the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
THE DEFENDANT:

BY: /s}
John R. Mitola
Associate City Attorney
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
999 Broad Street - 2" Floor
Bridgeport, CT 06604
Telephone: 203-576-7647
Juris No, 06192

14Ex, V

DOCKET NO AANCV-14-017396S :SUPERIOR COURT
SATAWHITE, ROBERT ‘J.D. OF MIL/ANSONOA
Vv.

BRIDGEPORT BOARD OF EDUATION “AT MILFORD

‘FEBRUARY 12, 2016

REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The plaintiff, Robert Satawhite, by and through his counsel, has elected to waive

his right to file a responsive pleading, waives his right to oral argument on Defendant’s

instant motion and thereby leaves the Defendant to its burden of persuasion.

THE PLAINTIFF, ROBERT SATAWHITE

Jerald S. Barber

Williams and Barber

34 Wright Avenue

New Haven, Connecticut 06515
(203) 787-2236

Juris No. 408909Ex. V

Payroll/Benefits Office

CiTy HALL Christine Walsh Mitchell
45 Lyon Terrace, Room 315 Payroll/Benefits Supervisor
Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 CMitchell@btidgeportedu.net

(203) 275-1054 Fax (203) 337-0118

June 18, 2015

Attorney John Matola

City Attorney

999 Broad Street

Bridgeport, CT 06604

Re: Robert Satawhite - Retirement Benefits
Dear Attorney Matola:

On behalf of Robert Satawhite, enclosed is the estimate for retirement benefits that you requested.

Our records show that as of April 30, 2007 Mr. Satawhite will have:

Total Service Time Total Pension Credit
18 years and 2 months 17years and 4 months

Mr. Satawhite is NOT eligible for medical benefits after retirement, in accordance with his union contract.

Also be advised that any period he was absent from work and receiving temporary total disability benefits
under workers’ compensation, Mr. Satawhite is responsible to pay his portion of pension due on money
received.

If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact me at 203-275-1058.

Best Regards,

Angela T. Morton
Retirement/Payroll Administrator
Payroll/Benefits Office

Tel: (203) 275-1058

Fax; (203) 337-0118

PC: files/s 12:90 em Part A Worksheet
First Name Last Name PreTax Conts $0.00
Name: Robert Satawhite PostTax Conts $0.00 Plan b
Gender (MF): Interest: $0.00} Town
SS: 000-00-9308 Total:
CL
Retiree Ago Date Retired 4
——————__—___|
Rotired 2007 4 30 Hire Date 1
Birthdate 1959 2 18 service 2
‘Age 48 2 12 [Unpaid Leave 10 2
Subtotal 17 4 27
[Age Reduction Factor 0.67673 Purchases
Total 17 4 27
nage |
0.02 times 17 = 0.34000
(years) “Wages —a=:|
Dates Amount.
0.02 times 4 = 0.00667 2004 $29,881.58
(months) 2001 $26,536.13
2005 $28,510.40
Percentage Total 0.34667 |
Total s 84,920.11
L— Option, eS Three Year Average $ 28,309.37
D Straight Life (#1) D 1.00000 Cit sss 3)
A 50% Spouse (#2) A50 #REF! Optionee
B 50% Contingent B50 #REFI #REF! Name:
100% Contingent —B100 #REF! #REF! Gender (MIF):
c Twenty Yr Certain  €20 0.97857 $543.99 SS:
Ten Year Certain C10 0.99507 $553.17 Date Retired 2007 4 30
Retiree Age 48 Optionee DOB
Option #; 100 Optionee Ay 2007 Optionee Age 2007 4 30
=I
Benefit Calculation
$28,3v9.37 times 0.34667 = 14.04
final average pay service % annual base entitlement
$9,814.01 times 0.67973 = 670.88
base entitlement age factor age adjusted benefit
‘$6,670.85 times: #REF! = #REF!
age adjusted benefit ‘option factor final annual benefit
#REF! M22 #REF! X12= #REF!
final annual benefit Monthly Benefit final annual rato
lees Retro-Payment
41 Days Times #REFI Daily Rate = #REF!
1 Months Times #REF! ~Vionthly Rati = #REF!
Les #REF!
Payroll a
May-08 payroll #REFI Retroactive to: 4/30/07
Jun-08 payroll #REF! Regular Monthly RateEstimated

Option A

Option B

- Option C

Regular Retirement

OPTIONAL PAYMENT FORM

04/30/2007 Rober Satawhite

50% to Spouse
You will receive $0.00 per month for your lifetime,

Surviving spouse receives $0.00 per month for life.

50% or 100% to Contingent Annuitant

50% - You will receive $0.00 per month for your lifetime.
Surviving beneficiary receives $0.00 per month for life.
100% - You will receive $0.00 per month for your lifetime.
Survivii month for life.

Income Certain and Life

10 year Period Certain $553.17 Per month for Retirees Lifetime.
‘0 months guaranteed for date of retirement ==—S\ SS

After 120 months nothing for beneficiary

20 Year Period Certain $543.99 Per month for Retirees Lifetime.

240 months guaranteed from date of retirement.
After 240 months nothing for beneficiary.

Maximum benefit (basic allowance) j yh

You will receive $55.91 per month for your lifetime. No

Once you retire the option you choose can not be changed.

Entitled _to a cost of living increase every July of between 2.5 - 6%
Receiving a Government Pension may affect your Social Security Benefits
Contact Social Security Office for information (866) 331-6399

6/13/2015
svBREAKDOWN OF EARNINGS
Robert Satawhite

April 30, 2007

Estimated as of

YEAR EARNINGS
2005 28,510.40 v
2004 31,006.58
1,125.00
29,881.58
2003 26,346.32
2002 26,384.80
2001 26,536.1 wl
2000 26,246.99
1,652.03
24,594.962006

2007

2006

2005

2004

Robert Satawhite
Estimate as of 04/30/2007

List of Leave without pay
07/1-30, 08/1-31, 9/1-30, 10/1-31, 11/1-30, 12/1-34

1/1-30, 2/1-28, 3/1-31, 4/1-30

302 TOTAL LWP

None

WORKERS COMPENSATION

6/13/2015Ex. W

TEXT MESSAGES REGARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
Robert Satawhite = S
Jerald Barber = B

January 6, 2016 — 6:29 a.m. —

S: Good morning happy new year. Can we change our meeting that was for today to next
Wednesday the 13" around 10:00 a.m.? Thanks in advance.

B: Yes.
S: Ok.

January 13, 2016 — 10:17 a.m.
S: Here at your office

B: Running late today, if you hold I can be there in about a half hour or we can reschedule, let
me know

S: No problem. Ok. Thanks.

S: If you need more time, we can reschedule to next Tuesday, January 19", 2016 around 9:00
a.m. if that is ok with you.

B: Yes. Lets do that thanks.

S: Ok. Providing the weather. I will see you then. Thanks. God Bless.

January 19, 2016 — 9:12 a.m.
S: Here at your office.

B: Sorry but I am in Norwich court this morning and won’t be back in New Haven until 3:00
p.m.

S: We had a scheduled appointment that we agreed to that was 9:00 a.m. this morning. When
will you be available to meet.

B: This afternoon or tomorrow afternoon after three.

S: Ok. Tomorrow at 3:00 p.m. Thanks.January 20, 2016 — 3:03 p.m.

S: Here at your office

B: 34 Wright. I am inside. Come on in.
S: I’m at 900 Chapel.

B:Ican come there. It will take about 10 to 15 minutes or you can come here. Which do you
prefer.

S: Pll be there in fifteen minutes.

B: Ok

January 20, 2016 meeting at 3:20 — 34 Wright Street, New Haven, CT — meeting lasted 30
minutes.

§: Attorney Barber, when are we going to be going to court on this case.

B: We should be having a court date coming up sometime in February, 2016. I will contact you
to let you know the time we are supposed to be in court.

B: You haven’t had your day in court and we feel that the City was wrong and I feel that we
have a good case and I feel that we will prevail in this case.

February 29, 2016 at 8:59 a.m.
§: Good morning. What is the status on our litigation?

B: Just received court notice decision on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The judge
has granted the motion without a written decision.

S: What does that mean?

B: Judge lannotti has decided the case in favor of the city. As you recall the city once again
argued that the Appellate court’s decision is final and all that is left is the city’s obligation to pay
you your retirement benefits. The only argument left now, is how many years of service the city

must compensate you for.

S: Are you available right now? This is not right. Where is my justice? I haven’t been heard.
We need to meet.

February 29, 2016 at 11:37 a.m.

§: I don’t believe this is the last argument. I need to be heard. (due process). Especially when
the City defaulted so many times as you know the City fired me during the proceedings up inHartford which was really wrong so again I don’t believe this is the last argument. We need to
meet. So when are you available to meet?

February 29, 2016 at 7:24 p.m.

S: Very new case different docket number. The city fired me during litigation proceeds up in
Hartford which was totally wrong. Which you did agree. I need you to fight for me. I have a
right to be heard. It is totally unfair for the City to keep defaulting and the courts are allowing it.
Which you also agree. I can only hope that you put in the motions to the court to this affect.
Which you told me that you did. I need you to fight for me.

March 3, 2016 at 6:18 p.m.

S: I finally got a chance to read the City motion for summary judgment. In my understanding of
it is only telling their side of the story concerning me which is not true. On February 12, 2016,
you filed to waive the right to oral argument which this and the court date 12/16/2015 does not
appear on their appearance sheet. I feel that the response should have been what the City was
accusing me of was not true concerning me and my behavior. I was the one that reported being
assaulted and harassed and that is why I left the school to report the matter to my supervisor.
This is what should have been put in a motion to the court on my behalf. This only to my
understanding of the reply you put in the City’s motion for summary judgment on 2/12/2016 and
if so I believe this is the reason why the judge granted judgment in the City’s favor and didn’t
give a written decision. Please respond to this. Thank you.

B: You are incorrect. The city’s motion argued the law rather than the specific facts are against
you.

S: Thanks.

B: The assault and the harassment claims were not rejected. Instead, the court ruled that these
claims could not be presented in Milford due to the prior Appellate court ruling in the city’s
favor.

S: Thanks. Have a good evening and god bless.

March 4, 2016 at 6:39 a.m.

S: Cancelling my insurance and firing me was not during the appellate court proceedings.
Cancelling my insurance and firing me happened during the appellate court proceedings which I
believe was wrong.March 5, 2016 at 7:48 a.m.
S: Good morning. Are you available to meet at 9:00 a.m. Monday morning March 7, 2016.
S: If not, anytime on Monday, March 7, 2016. Thanks.

March 7, 2016 at 6:48 a.m.
S: Good morning. Are you available any time today?
March 7, 2016 at 9:08 a.m.
S: Are you available today?
March 7, 2016 at 4:58 p.m.

S: Are you available tomorrow?

March 8, 2016 at 11:48 a.m.
B: I am free today at between 2 and 4 at my office on Chapel Street.

S: Good morning. Ok. I will be there at 3:00 p.m. this afternoon.

Barber was running late and cancelled to meeting at 3:00 p.m.

March 10, 2016 at 9:08 a.m.

B: Please know that I have to leave my office this morning no later than 9:40. Are you keeping
our 9:00 a.m. appointment or do you need to reschedule?

S: You scheduled our meeting for 10 a.m. this morning I guess it is rescheduled. When?
B: I will free again tomorrow at 9:00 a.m.

S: Ok. Thanks god bless.

March 11, 2016 at 8:09 a.m.

S: Good morning. Can we reschedule for Monday, March 14", 2016 at 9:00 a.m. or anytime
Monday.

B: I am in Middletown Court at 10:00 and can meet you at 12:00 or 1:00 p.m.
S: So Monday, March 14, 2016 at 12:00 p.m. Right?B: Lets make it 12:30,

S: Ok. Monday, March 14, 2016 at 12:30 p.m. Right?
B: Yes. That will be fine. 900 Chapel Street, 10" Floor,
S: Ok. Thanks. God bless.

March 14" meeting: Discussion about case and why the judge ruled in the City’s favor. S:1
went to the court and found out you waived my rights. B: This case has been going on a long
time. Due to the fact that the judge ruled in the City’s favor in the Appellate Court and this case
was a continuation of the Appellate Court case and since we already got a ruling the in the
Appellate Court case that is why I waived your rights. S: No, this ain’t the same case as the
Appellate Court case. The Appellate Court was dealing with who had jurisdiction and that is
what they ruled on, B: Ok. S: So, what are we going to do. B: We will meet again.

April 11, 2016 at 8:09 a.m.

S: Haven’t heard from you since last month. You said you would call me in two weeks. It is
almost a month later,

April 12, 2016 at 10:47 a.m.

S: Haven’t heard from you like you said you would contact me.
B: | am on vacation and will be back on Connecticut on 4/21/16.

S: Can we meet on 4/22/2016 at 9:00 a.m. on Chapel Street?

April 12, 2016 at 6:02 p.m.

S: Haven’t received a response to my last text.

April 29, 2016 at 9:07 a.m,

B: Lam free next Tuesday or next Wednesday at 9:00 a.m. Let me know what works for you.

May 2, 2016 at 2:34 p.m.

S: I met with you on March 14, 2016. You stated then that my Case was over in the courts and
all that was left to do was to find out what the City owes me. I then said to you that you alreadyhave a copy of what the City says they owe me which I do disagree with and I also said that the
argument still would be, why did the City fire me and whatever reason they may have then my
complaint would have to be heard. You then said, that I was right, then you said that you will
contact me in two weeks and this was said to me on March 14, 2016. I texted you almost a
month later to that date to find out about my situation and when you finally responded, you
stated that you were on vacation until April 212016, My response to you was can we meet on
April 22, 2016. I did not receive a response from you so I hired another attorney on April 29",
2016 at 9:07 a.m. I received a text from you saying that you were available on Monday and
Wednesday of this week and if] wanted to meet. I hired an attorney. 1 don’t believe I’m getting
justice (due process).

B: Ok.Ex X

D.N. CV 16 6021915 SUPERIOR COURT

ROBERT SATA WHITE J.D. OF ANSONIA/MILFORD

V. AT MILFORD

JERALD BARBER and

WILLIAMS AND BARBER JANUARY 4, 2018
DAMAGES ANALYSIS

Damages as a result of an initial wrongful unpaid suspension on May 26, 2006 and then
termination on August 31, 2013:

The following numbers are estimates based on a June 18, 2015 Statement regarding Retirement
Benefits by Angela T. Morton (Exhibit ). Each year is an estimate of salary, overtime and

longevity pay combined:

BACK PAY:

2006 $17,431
2007 $31,910
2008 $33,560
2009 $35,190
2010 $37,000

2011 $39,3402012 $41,000
2013 $42,800
2014 $43,900
2015 $44,790
2016 $45,610
2017 $46,180
Total Back:

FUTURE PAY:

2018 $47,180
2019 $48,090
2020 $49,000
2021 $8,333
Total Future:

TOTAL BACK AND FUTURE:

$458,711

*$152.603

$611,314

*Assuming retirement on March 1", 2021THE PLAINTIFF:

By:__/s/
Daniel H. Kryzanski, Esq.
Law Offices of Daniel H. Kryzanski
30 Ferry Blvd., #2
Stratford, CT 06615
Phone: (203) 380-1384
Fax: (203) 380-1598
Juris #: 408785

CERTIFICATION:

Thereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was delivered on the above date to:
Jerald Barber,Esq.

85 Mumford Road

New Haven, CT 06515

Williams and Barber

85 Mumford Road
New Haven, CT 06515

/s/ Daniel H. Kryzanski