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  • HAROLD KOEPKE et al VS. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al ASBESTOS document preview
  • HAROLD KOEPKE et al VS. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al ASBESTOS document preview
  • HAROLD KOEPKE et al VS. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al ASBESTOS document preview
  • HAROLD KOEPKE et al VS. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al ASBESTOS document preview
						
                                

Preview

Kazan, McClain, Satterley & Greenwood A Professional Law Corporation + 55 Harsison Stecet, Suite 400 + Oakland, California 94607 (510) 302-1000 + Jack London Mazket + www.kazanlaw.com Fax: (510) 835-4913 oO Oe YN DA BR Ww HH NR RW NY BY YW DR RR RQ meee eo 2a A aA BF BYP fF S BD we BW DAH BY VY | Joseph Satterley, Esq. (C.S.B. # 286890) Ted W. Pelletier, Esq. (C.S.B. # 172938) tpelletier@kazanlaw.com KAZAN, A Professional Law Corporation Jack London Market 55 Harrison Street, Suite 400 Oakland, California 94607 Telephone: (510) 302-1000 Facsimile: (510) 835-4913 Attorneys for Plaintiffs cCLAIN, SATTERLEY & GREENWOOD ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco JUN 24 2014 Clerk of the Court BY: VANESSA WU Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO HAROLD KOEPKE and NANCY KARIDIS- KOEPKE, Plaintiffs, vs. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., Defendants. Case No. CGC-13-276217 STANDARD MIL 2: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE REFERENCE TO ANY ASSERTED ALTERNATIVE ASBESTOS EXPOSURE SOURCES ABSENT FOUNDATIONAL SHOWING Action Filed: December 3, 2013 Trial Date: June 16, 2014 Dept. 12 (Hon. Richard B. Ulmer, Jr.) Plaintiff Harold Koepke is dying of mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos. At trial, he will present significant, specific evidence that for several decades he was exposed almost daily to asbestos released from vehicle brake products — exposures that his experts will properly opine were significant and contributed to causing his disease. Discovery has revealed that a primary defense at trial will be defendants’ claim that Koepke’s disease was caused not by his decades of brake exposures but by any or all of several “alternative” exposure sources, Plaintiffs have addressed three of these asserted sources in Expert MILs seeking preclusion of any expert “opinions” that Koepke was exposed to asbestos in three areas: (1) living in Hamburg, Germany; (2) a brief work stint in Australia; and (3) some early jobs doing sheet-metal work. As those motions show, none of these three asserted “exposure” sources TPELLETIER/}316930.1 1 PLAINTIFFS’ MIL TO EXCLUDE REFERENCE TO UNSUPPORTED ALTERNATIVE EXPOSURE SOURCESKazan, McClain, Satterley & Greenwood A Professional Law Corporation + Oakland, California 94607 www. kazanlaw.com + 55 Hareison Street, Suite 400 (510) 302-1000 + Jack London Market Fax: (510} 835-4913 * 13 14 is supported by any actual exposure evidence. In addition, questions of plaintiffs’ lay witnesses in discovery have repeatedly insinuated asbestos exposure from various other supposed sources, questioning Koepke and his family members about these sources: 1. Wearing a gas mask in World War II. [Koepke Depo. (Exh. A) at 32:18-33:12.] 2. Koepke’s father’s working for a German railroad. [/d. at 23:15-28:16.] 3. Traveling on a ship to Australia. [Jd. at 54:15-55:4.] 4. Being near Australian opal mines. [/d. at 1111:2-25.] 5. Hiking on Mt. Tamalpais in Marin County. [/d. at 1145:12-22; Karidis-Koepke Depo. (Exh, B) at 204:9-211:7; Torode Depo. (Exh. C) at 120:8-23.] None of these insinuations is supported by any evidence of actual exposure. Accordingly, this standard MIL asks this Court to preclude defendants from any reference in front of the jury — in opening statement, witness questioning, closing argument, or otherwise ~ to any supposed asbestos “exposure” from such sources absent a preliminary foundational showing of evidence that Koepke was or could have been exposed by those sources. Absent any such foundational showing, this evidence is (1) irrelevant — not probative of any material issue (Evid. Code § 350); and (2) unduly prejudicial — any possible probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability of prejudice from jury confusion (Evid. Code § 352). DATED: June a 2014 KAZAN, McCLAIN, stbexgtgh & GREENWOOD A Professional haw 7} Ted Ke Attorneys for Plaintiffs TPELLETIER/13 16930.1 2 PLAINTIFFS’ MIL TO EXCLUDE REFERENCE TO UNSUPPORTED ALTERNATIVE EXPOSURE SOURCES