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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
Document Scanning Lead Sheet
Jul-19-2017 11:32 am
i
Case Number: CPF-16-514994
Filing Date: Jul-19-2017 11:29
: Filed by: RONNIE OTERO
Image: 05951291
MOTION (CIVIL GENERIC)
DAVID FAZIO VS. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
001005951291
Instructions:
Please place this sheet on top of the document to be scanned.R=
Ce NADH Bw
David Fazio
PO Box 31641
San Francisco, CA, 94131
(510) 590-7363
DAVID FAZIO, IN PRO PER
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
DAVID FAZIO, an individual, CASE NO: CPF-16-514994
RESERVATION No: 05050620-07
Petitioner,
NOTICE OF HEARING OF MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD ON APPEAL (DOR
SELF-EMPLOYMENT TRAINING
MANUAL, APRIL 06, 2015 EMAIL,
PETITIONER’S PROPOSED BUSINESS
PLAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
vs.
CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARINGS,
emma
Respondents. GENERAL DECEMBER 10, 2015 AUDIT
REPORT)
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ) Date: August 01, 2017
REHABILITATION, ) Time: 9:30 AM
) Department: 302
Real Party in Interest. } Action Filed: May 9, 2016
)
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the above-captioned date, time, or as soon thereafter as the matter
may be heard, in the above-captioned department of the above-named Court, located at 400
McAllister Street, San Francisco, California, 94102 Petitioner David Fazio will move this Court TO
AUGMENT RECORD ON APPEAL (DOR SELF-EMPLOYMENT TRAINING MANUAL,
APRIL 06, 2015 EMAIL, PETITIONER’S PROPOSED BUSINESS PLAN, USS.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL DECEMBER 10,
2015 AUDIT REPORT)”
This motion is made on the grounds that:
NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCc 3
Exhibits were erroneously omitted from the record on appeal. Those exhibits are:
C. OAH Decision No. 2015060661.
D. Petitioner's April 06, 2015 email where he submitted his proposed business plan to the
Department of Rehabilitation, as they requested.
E. Petitioner's proposed business plan.
F. California Department of Rehabilitation's Self-Employment Training Manual.
G. United States Department of Education Office of Inspector General December 10, 2015
Audit Report Control Number ED-OIG/A0900008.
The Petitioner asserts the following necessity to include the aforementioned items:
C. OAH Decision No. 2015060661: This exhibit was introduced during the February 19, 2016
Fair Hearing, as cited on the Hearing Transcript’s page 28 line 11 — page 29 line 6. The
respondent denied petitioner a fair trial, and due process by not admitting this
exhibit/evidence into the administrative record.
D. Petitioner's April 06, 2015 email where he submitted his proposed business plan to
the DOR, as they requested: This exhibit was introduced during the 38 minutes of cut off audio
recording on pg 135 line 21 of the Hearing Transcript.
E. Petitioner's proposed business plan: This exhibit was introduced during the 38 minutes of
cut off audio recording on pg 135 line 21 of the Hearing Transcript.
F. DOR's Self-Employment Training Manual: This exhibit was introduced during the February
19, 2016 Fair Hearing as cited on the Hearing Transcript's page 48 line 3, and pg 50 line 22-
pg 51 line 3. The respondent denied petitioner a fair trial, and due process, by not admitting
this exhibit/evidence into the administrative record;
Pursuant to California Civil Procedure 1094.5, I, David Fazio, request augmentation of the
record on appeal, OAH No 2016010162, to include extra-record evidence (Western States
Petroleum Assn., 9 Cal.4th at 575, n 5.). That evidence is:
G. United States Department of Education Office of Inspector General December 10, 2015 Audit
Report Control Number ED-O1G/A0900008.
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NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSUk w NY =
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The Petitioner asserts the following necessity to include the United States Department of
Education Office of Inspector General December 10, 2015 Audit Report Control Number ED-
OIG/A0900008:
This exhibit is relevant evidence which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have
been produced at the hearing before respondent.
This motion is based on this notice, the verified petition, the administrative record previously
lodged with this Court, the briefs filed with the court, the declarations and exhibits, and any and all
other evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this motion.
"Pursuant to Local Rule 8.3, the Court will make a tentative ruling on the merits of this matter by
3:00 p.m, the court day before the hearing. You may obtain the tentative ruling issued by
telephoning (415) 551-4000 or visiting the court’s website at www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/ and clicking
the online services link, or arrange to obtain the tentative ruling from the clerk of Department 302.
You must give notice to the Petitioner and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required, if you wish to
appear at the Hearing. You may contest the tentative ruling by sending an email to the court to
contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s)
of the tentative ruling that you wish to contest. You may not argue at the hearing if the Petitioner is
not so notified and he does not appear.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed at San Francisco, California this 7th day of May, 2017.
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NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSDATE: July 7, 2017
Petition , David Fazi
In Pro Per
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NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCo 3
David Fazio
PO Box 31641
San Francisco, CA, 94131
(510) 590-7363
DAVID FAZIO, IN PRO PER
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
DAVID FAZIO, an individual, ) CASE NO: CPF-16-514994
_ ) RESERVATION No: 05050620-08
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION
) FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ) MANDAMUS
HEARINGS, )
) Date: August 01, 2017
) Time: 9:30 AM
Respondents. ) Department: 302
Action Filed: May 9, 2016
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
REHABILITATION,
Real Party in Interest.
eee
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the above-captioned date, time, or as soon thereafter as
the matter may be heard, in the above-captioned department of the above-named Court, located at
400 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California, 94102, petitioner David Fazio will move this
Court for a writ of administrative mandamus, under Code of Civil Procedure §1094.5 commanding
respondent California Office of Administrative Hearings to set aside, and vacate, its decision of
FEBRUARY 19, 2016, in the administrative proceedings titled OAH DECISION NO 2016010162.
This motion is made on the grounds that:
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NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS.Ceo ND
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a Respondent’s findings are not supported by the evidence because it finds, without any
evidence, that:
1) “As part of the IPE process, appellant participated in a self-employment assessment with a small
business consultant, who determined the self-employment plan was not feasible, as presented.
Appellant had several fair hearing appeals before OAH related to his self-employment plan, which
were all denied. On February 21, 2014, appellant’s case was closed, for reasons that included his
failure to cooperate with DOR.”
2) “Appellant refused to use DOR’s small business consultant, Kramer, Blum and Associates, to
assess his proposed business plan and he did not provide a copy of his plan to his rehabilitation
counselor within the time frame the parties had agreed.”
3) “On May 4, 2015, appellant and DOR agreed to extend the time to complete the IPE until May
15, 2015. However, the dispute regarding the use of Kramer, Blum and Associates for plan review
continued, and even after additional time extensions were granted for appellant to complete the
business plan, appellant did not submit a plan. On June 19, 2015, appellant’s case was again closed
for failure to cooperate in developing a suitable IPE that would result in a successful employment
outcome.”
4) “DOR contended that the IPE was not completed because of appellant’s lack of cooperation and
refusal to participate in appropriate assessments. Appellant’s vocational rehabilitation counselor,
Julie Ford, testified that in order to prepare an IPE, the following steps are required: (1) a vocational
evaluation to determine a consumer’s skills and interests, and a functional capacity evaluation; (2)
determining an employment goal; (3) conducting a labor market evaluation; (4) determining any
entry level requirements and whether necessary training is required given a consumer’s present
skills; and (5) the self-employment plan must be evaluated by a third party vendor as part of the
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assessment to determine the nature and scope of services. Ford also stated that this case was
different from appellant’s previous case, because he already had an IPE in place that was changed to
a self-employment setting and an IPE amendment was created. The ALJ determined that these
required steps had not been completed for a number of reasons, and that both DOR and appellant
shared responsibility for the delay.”
5) “The ALJ’s order required the parties to continue to prepare an IPE consistent with DOR’s and
appellant’s obligations as set forth in Findings 2(b), 2(c) and 2(d).”
6) “Appellant asserts, based on the provisions of Section 7129, subdivision (a)(1) that he can
prepare his own IPE, and further, once having prepared it, no further approval by DOR is required.
Appellant’s assertion that he has the right to direct and control the IPE process, and that DOR is
obligated to accept his terms and IPE language, is the foundation for appellant’s appeal.”
7) “IPE Language. Appellant asserts that the regulations give him an independent right to include
any language he feels is necessary, and to reject language with which he disagrees, in the IPE. (§
7029.) (§ 7129.) (§ 7135.5 subd. (c).)”
8) “Self-Employment Setting. Appellant asserts that the self-employment setting is consistent with
his strengths, and accordingly a self-employment plan has been or must be approved by DOR. (§
7136.5.) (§ 7136.9.)”
9) “Training. Appellant asserts that the training he believes is needed should begin immediately,
before the small business plan is approved, and that he can, without DOR’s review and approval,
attend any training he deems necessary, at DOR’s expense. In this regard he would like to travel to
conferences or training opportunities anywhere in the country, without prior approval for any
particular training opportunity. (§ 7154.)”
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10) “Transportation. Appellant seeks reimbursement for: (1) the cost of transportation in connection
with assessment services, (2) to meet with his DOR counselor, and (3) to any and all training
opportunities, regardless of their location. Separately, appellant also requested a regular monthly
travel allotment to cover these and similar costs, but he did not specify the amount. (§ 7162.)”
11) “DOR has a different understanding of how its regulations apply to the development and
implementation of appellant’s IPE, and to what the ALJ’s Decision and Order require it and
appellant to do with respect to the completion of an IPE.”
12) “DOR maintains that Section 7137, requires it first to determine, through a series of evaluations,
whether the self-employment setting is feasible for the consumer. The first portion of this “two-step
equation” includes assessing the proposed small business plan. Once this is complete and the project
is determined to be feasible, the second step is for DOR to determine, with the consumer, the
appropriate scope of services necessary to implement the business plan.”
13) “DOR is willing to pay for Gabriella Sapp to serve as a small business consultant to assess the
plan, and for Consumer Credit Counselors of San Francisco to perform appellant’s credit review.
However, in addition DOR wishes to employ others of its choosing to separately review the
appellant’s business plan and assess his credit worthiness.”
14) “DOR asserts that its obligation to pay for training is limited by Section 7154, and that it must
approve any training it pays for; it further asserts appellant does not have an independent right to
choose any training he wishes, and then require DOR to pay for it. In addition, it is DOR’s position
that payment for any training is contingent upon it first completing the assessment and approving
the self-employment setting, including approval of the business plan. The ongoing disputes between
DOR and appellant have for years prevented the completion of the IPE.”
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15) “DOR’s position regarding the provision of transportation is similar to that relating to training;
for example, it will pay the cost of transportation to training, if the training is approved pursuant to
Section 7154. It will also pay for the transportation costs associated with meeting with those who
provide the assessment of the business plan, and similar costs incurred in the process of developing
the IPE. In the event the IPE is approved, subsequent transportation costs would be evaluated on an
ongoing basis. It does not believe, however, there is presently a basis to establish a specific monthly
budget or stipend.”
16) “Appellant has the burden of introducing evidence at hearing sufficient to demonstrate that he is
entitled to the relief sought by a preponderance of the evidence.(§ 7356, subd. (e).).”
17) “This appeal deals principally with whether DOR has complied with the terms of the Decision
and Order in OAH No. 2015060661. The Decision requires DOR to pursue appellant’s request to
develop an IPE in a self-employment setting, but in so doing, it also acknowledges DOR’s
obligation to follow the directions and apply the limitations required by the regulations governing
such IPEs. (Findings 1(e), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d) and 2(e).) This is a process into which appellant is
entitled to significant input, but it is not one in which he is the sole decision maker; appellant cannot
unilaterally require DOR to adopt his version of the IPE. DOR retains the ultimate approval of any
IPE and of the specific services that will be provided pursuant to the IPE. DOR can only approve an
IPE for self-employment after it finds the criteria contained in Section 7136.6 have been satisfied,
and in this case, that has not yet occurred. Section 7130, subdivision (a)(3)(B), expressly reserves
approval of an IPE to DOR, and Section 7133, subdivision (a), requires such IPEs to be reviewed
annually by a DOR counselor.”
18) “In order for an appellant’s IPE to be approved, the incremental steps described in Findings
1(f), 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d) must first be completed. As part of this process, DOR has agreed to use
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NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSC 3
appellant’s choice of consultants, Gabriella Sapp and the Consumer Credit Counselors of San
Francisco, at DOR’s expense. DOR may employ additional consultants if it wishes to do so, and
then consider all of the information available to it in making a decision about either the
appropriateness of the self-employment setting in the IPE or supplemental services that may be
offered in the event the self-employment IPE is approved. (§ 7136.5, subd. (c).).”
19) “Appellant is entitled to reimbursement for certain transportation costs, once the requirements
of Section 7162, subdivision (b), are satisfied. Appellant provided an undated letter from a nurse
practitioner asserting his use of public transportation would create an undue hardship, but no
evidence was received on the other criteria. This is a matter for appellant and DOR to discuss and
consider further. Until such time as an IPE for self-employment is approved, DOR is not required to
provide transportation to attend out of area training conferences. In the event a self-employment IPE
is approved, DOR has the discretion, but not the obligation to approve payment for transportation
based on necessity.”
b. Respondent’s decision is not supported by the findings because there were no findings that
the contents of the IPE developed by the petitioner were outside the scope of applicable services of
an IPE in a self-employment setting (CCR § 7136.5), nor were there any findings that the contents
of the IPE developed by the petitioner were not consistent with his unique strengths, resources,
priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, and interests. The ALJ did not find that the petitioner did
not have the right to develop all, or part, of his IPE, and have it approved by DOR (9 CCR §
7029.7). Furthermore, no findings were cited that would impose any limitations on the scope of
authority, decision making, and control of the petitioner to determine the contents and/or language
of his IPE. Respondent’s findings on behalf of DOR were substantially vague. Respondent’s
findings on behalf of DOR consisted entirely of hearsay in which he weighed as evidence, which is
expressly prohibited by law (WIC § 19705(d)(2). Finally, respondent also enlarged statutes beyond
fair meaning of their language.
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c. Respondent’s decision is in error of the law because he misapplied the standard of review,
disregarded significant evidence, and applied the wrong substantive standard to determine whether
DOR violated Title 9 of the California Code of Regulations, and other applicable law, when it
denied the petitioners request to sign and authorize the November 20, 2015 IPE that he developed.
In the statement of decision, the Administrative Law Judge explained that “Appellant has the
burden of introducing evidence at hearing sufficient to demonstrate that he is entitled to the relief
sought by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 7356, subd. (e).)” This is not an accurate statement of
the appropriate standard that the Administrative Law Judge was legally obligated to apply. The
appropriate standard set forth by 9 CCR § 7356, subd. (e). reads “The appellant shall have the
burden of introducing evidence at the hearing sufficient to demonstrate his or her case by a
preponderance of the evidence.” The petitioner’s burden was to introduce evidence that
demonstrates DOR’s action/inaction was not in accordance with Title 9 of the California Code of
Regulations, and other applicable law. The petitioner does not have to demonstrate, by any
substantive standard, that he is entitled to the relief sought. The preponderance of evidence, in
introducing sufficient evidence to demonstrate petitioner’s case, is met if the petitioner’s
proposition is more likely to be true than not true. The standard is satisfied if there is greater than a
fifty percent chance that the proposition is true. Petitioner’s case only needs to be "more probable
than not.” Respondent applied a more stringent substantive standard than allowed by the law in this
case, in that the respondent’s placed burden on the petitioner of introducing evidence sufficient to
demonstrate his entitlement to the relief sought is the substantive standard applied in Civil Law
cases, where the plaintiff must prove each element of the claim, or cause of action, in order to
recover. This is not the substantive standard set forth by § 7356, subd.(e).
In the petitioner’s case, his burden of introducing evidence sufficient to demonstrate his case by a
preponderance of the evidence simply means that he has to produce more evidence in his favor than
DOR, even by the smallest degree.
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NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCo 2
d Respondent’s decision is contrary to the law because Title 9 CCR § 7130(a)(3)(A),
(a)(3)(B)(1)(a), and (a)(3)(B)(1)(b) Mandatory Procedures for Development of the Individualized
Plan for Employment (IPE); Review; Amendment, as well as 9 CCR § 7129(a)(1), and (a)(2)(A)
Options for Developing an Individualized Plan for Employment (IPE), as well as 9 CCR §
7029.7(b)(5) Rights of Individuals with Disabilities; Applicants; Eligible Individuals, impose a legal
obligation, impervious to judicial discretion, on DOR to allow the petitioner to develop all, or part
of his IPE, without their assistance. Furthermore, DOR has a legal obligation, impervious to judicial
discretion, under 9 CCR § 7130 to authorize the petitioner’s IPE as he has developed it so long as it
is appropriate, and necessary, in consideration of his unique strengths, resources, priorities,
concerns, abilities, capabilities, and interests; and the scope of applicable laws and regulations
specified in 9 CCR 7029.6(c). Respondent applied a series of invalid regulations in deciding this
case:
1) 7135.5, (§ 7136.5, subd. (c).) are not valid regulations in determining whether or not petitioner’s
IPE can/will be approved, criteria contained in Section 7136.6 is not valid in determining whether
or not DOR can approve an IPE for self-employment. Section 7133, subdivision (a), requiring such
IPEs to be reviewed annually by a DOR counselor, is not relevant to this issue.
2) Section 7137 is invalid in its application to this case in that it does not require DOR first to
determine, through a series of evaluations, whether the self-employment setting is feasible for the
petitioner. It does not address a “two-step equation” that includes assessing the proposed small
business plan, determining feasibility, then determining the appropriate scope of services necessary
to implement the business plan.
3) (§ 7136.5.) (§ 7136.9.) are not valid in their application to this case in that petitioner asserted that
9 CCR 7130 imposed a legal obligation impervious to judicial discretion on DOR to approve the
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NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCm ty DH RF BH NY =
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IPE he developed because they were in agreement that it was consistent with his strengths,
attributes, priorities, concerns, capabilities, resources, and informed choice.
4) Respondent applied invalid regulations (§ 7029.) (§ 7135.5 subd. (c).) to petitioner’s assertion
that the regulations give him an independent right to include any language he feels is necessary, and
to reject language with which he disagrees, in the IPE.
5) Respondent applied invalid regulation 9 CCR Section 7129 subdivision (a)(1) to the petitioner’s
assertion that he can prepare his own IPE, and that he has the right to direct and control the IPE
process, and that DOR is obligated to accept his terms and IPE language, as the foundation for
appeal.
e. Petitioner was denied a fair trial, resulting in arbitrary and capricious administration of the
agency program, in that:
1.) The Respondent’s use of irrebuttable presumptions in labeling and weighing DOR’s entire oral
argument as “evidence” rather than “argument” interfered with petitioner's right to a fair trial.
2.) The hearing was not conducted by an impartial hearing officer knowledgeable regarding the
federal and state laws and regulations applicable to the department, by the Respondent’s own
admission (WIC § 19705(d) (1)).
3.) Respondent relied on hearsay evidence that was not used for the purpose of supplementing or
explaining other evidence. Respondent also relied on hearsay evidence prohibited from supporting
findings in of themselves, because it would not be admissible over objection in a civil action (WIC
§ 19705(d)(2).
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4.) Respondent enlarged statutes beyond fair meaning of their language.
5.) Respondent did not allow the full issue at appeal to be heard, nor was it adjudicated in its
entirety. The petitioner’s original claim at issue in appeal was:
pe gi pp
(A) The California Department of Rehabilitation denied the changes I requested to the IPE that
DOR drafted on December 1, 2015, in accordance with my right to develop all, or part of my IPE
with, or without the assistance of DOR, pursuant to 9 CCR § 7129 Options for developing an
Individualized Plan for Employment (IPE). Those changes include, and should be addressed
individually:
1.) Revision of DOR’s answer to section la
2.) Revision of DOR’s answer to section b.
3.) Revision of the 2nd step in section 2, to sign consent forms to release prior employment
information (lines 9 and 10 on Appellant’s draft).
4.) Revision of the 3rd step proposed by DOR in section 2, to have Appellant’s business plan
reviewed.
5.) Removal of the 4th step in section 2, related to behavior
6.) Revision of the 5th step in Section 2, to provide necessary resources.
7.) Revision of the 6th step in section 2, to submit tax returns and credit history to determine
viability of obtaining a small business loan
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NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSC)
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8.) Removal of the 8th step in section 2 to provide transportation assistance and inserting it in
section 3.
9.) Revising Transportation assistance, and changing it from “provided at a public rate” to a
specified monthly payment, while removing the additional, unnecessary wording.
10.) Revision of the 9th step in section 2
11.) Removal of additional text inserted after the 9th step in section 2 before section 3 begins.
12.) Revision of the Business/self-employment Plan analysis service
13.) Addition of Conference expenses as a service provided in section 3
14.) Addition of DOR assistance in applying for the loans referenced in this plan, including, but not
limited to, loan guarantees, as a service provided in section 3
15.) Addition of credit record review by qualified consumer credit counselor, Dan Parrish, as a
service provided in section 3
16.) Addition of DOR assistance in applying for a PASS plan, including but not limited to writing a
letter of support to the PASS Cadre, as a service provided in section 3
17.) Addition of training as a service in section 3
18.) Addition of technical assistance in revising self-employment plan as a service in section 3
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NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS19.) Addition of self-employment plan third party reviewer, Neuropsychologist Dr. John Fahy, as a
service provided in section 3
20.) Revision to DOR’s answer in section 4
21.) Revision to DOR’s answer to section 5a
22.) Revision to DOR’s answer to section 5b
23.) Revision to DOR’s answer to section 6
24.) Revision to DOR’s answer to section 7.”
This motion is based on this notice, the verified petition, the administrative record previously
lodged with this Court, the briefs filed with the court, the declarations and exhibits, and any and all
other evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this motion.
"Pursuant to Local Rule 8.3, the Court will make a tentative ruling on the merits of this matter by
3:00 p.m, the court day before the hearing. You may obtain the tentative ruling issued by
telephoning (415) 551-4000 or visiting the court’s website at www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/ and clicking
the online services link, or arrange to obtain the tentative ruling from the clerk of Department 302.
You must give notice to the Petitioner and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the day
before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required, if you wish to
appear at the Hearing. You may contest the tentative ruling by sending an email to the court to
contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s)
of the tentative ruling that you wish to contest. You may not argue at the hearing if the Petitioner is
not so notified and he does not appear.
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NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCoe ND HM BF WN
DATE: July 7, 2017
'etitioner, David Fazio
In Pro Per
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NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO Document Scanning Lead Sheet Jul-19-2017 11:32 am i Case Number: CPF-16-514994 Filing Date: Jul-19-2017 11:29 : Filed by: RONNIE OTERO Image: 05951291 MOTION (CIVIL GENERIC) DAVID FAZIO VS. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 001005951291 Instructions: Please place this sheet on top of the document to be scanned.R= Ce NADH Bw David Fazio PO Box 31641 San Francisco, CA, 94131 (510) 590-7363 DAVID FAZIO, IN PRO PER SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO DAVID FAZIO, an individual, CASE NO: CPF-16-514994 RESERVATION No: 05050620-07 Petitioner, NOTICE OF HEARING OF MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD ON APPEAL (DOR SELF-EMPLOYMENT TRAINING MANUAL, APRIL 06, 2015 EMAIL, PETITIONER’S PROPOSED BUSINESS PLAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE OF INSPECTOR vs. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, emma Respondents. GENERAL DECEMBER 10, 2015 AUDIT REPORT) CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ) Date: August 01, 2017 REHABILITATION, ) Time: 9:30 AM ) Department: 302 Real Party in Interest. } Action Filed: May 9, 2016 ) PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the above-captioned date, time, or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in the above-captioned department of the above-named Court, located at 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California, 94102 Petitioner David Fazio will move this Court TO AUGMENT RECORD ON APPEAL (DOR SELF-EMPLOYMENT TRAINING MANUAL, APRIL 06, 2015 EMAIL, PETITIONER’S PROPOSED BUSINESS PLAN, USS. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL DECEMBER 10, 2015 AUDIT REPORT)” This motion is made on the grounds that: NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCc 3 Exhibits were erroneously omitted from the record on appeal. Those exhibits are: C. OAH Decision No. 2015060661. D. Petitioner's April 06, 2015 email where he submitted his proposed business plan to the Department of Rehabilitation, as they requested. E. Petitioner's proposed business plan. F. California Department of Rehabilitation's Self-Employment Training Manual. G. United States Department of Education Office of Inspector General December 10, 2015 Audit Report Control Number ED-OIG/A0900008. The Petitioner asserts the following necessity to include the aforementioned items: C. OAH Decision No. 2015060661: This exhibit was introduced during the February 19, 2016 Fair Hearing, as cited on the Hearing Transcript’s page 28 line 11 — page 29 line 6. The respondent denied petitioner a fair trial, and due process by not admitting this exhibit/evidence into the administrative record. D. Petitioner's April 06, 2015 email where he submitted his proposed business plan to the DOR, as they requested: This exhibit was introduced during the 38 minutes of cut off audio recording on pg 135 line 21 of the Hearing Transcript. E. Petitioner's proposed business plan: This exhibit was introduced during the 38 minutes of cut off audio recording on pg 135 line 21 of the Hearing Transcript. F. DOR's Self-Employment Training Manual: This exhibit was introduced during the February 19, 2016 Fair Hearing as cited on the Hearing Transcript's page 48 line 3, and pg 50 line 22- pg 51 line 3. The respondent denied petitioner a fair trial, and due process, by not admitting this exhibit/evidence into the administrative record; Pursuant to California Civil Procedure 1094.5, I, David Fazio, request augmentation of the record on appeal, OAH No 2016010162, to include extra-record evidence (Western States Petroleum Assn., 9 Cal.4th at 575, n 5.). That evidence is: G. United States Department of Education Office of Inspector General December 10, 2015 Audit Report Control Number ED-O1G/A0900008. -2- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSUk w NY = coe NO a ue 3 The Petitioner asserts the following necessity to include the United States Department of Education Office of Inspector General December 10, 2015 Audit Report Control Number ED- OIG/A0900008: This exhibit is relevant evidence which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been produced at the hearing before respondent. This motion is based on this notice, the verified petition, the administrative record previously lodged with this Court, the briefs filed with the court, the declarations and exhibits, and any and all other evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this motion. "Pursuant to Local Rule 8.3, the Court will make a tentative ruling on the merits of this matter by 3:00 p.m, the court day before the hearing. You may obtain the tentative ruling issued by telephoning (415) 551-4000 or visiting the court’s website at www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/ and clicking the online services link, or arrange to obtain the tentative ruling from the clerk of Department 302. You must give notice to the Petitioner and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required, if you wish to appear at the Hearing. You may contest the tentative ruling by sending an email to the court to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that you wish to contest. You may not argue at the hearing if the Petitioner is not so notified and he does not appear. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at San Francisco, California this 7th day of May, 2017. -3- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSDATE: July 7, 2017 Petition , David Fazi In Pro Per -4- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCo 3 David Fazio PO Box 31641 San Francisco, CA, 94131 (510) 590-7363 DAVID FAZIO, IN PRO PER SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO DAVID FAZIO, an individual, ) CASE NO: CPF-16-514994 _ ) RESERVATION No: 05050620-08 Petitioner, ) ) vs. ) NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION ) FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ) MANDAMUS HEARINGS, ) ) Date: August 01, 2017 ) Time: 9:30 AM Respondents. ) Department: 302 Action Filed: May 9, 2016 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION, Real Party in Interest. eee PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the above-captioned date, time, or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in the above-captioned department of the above-named Court, located at 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California, 94102, petitioner David Fazio will move this Court for a writ of administrative mandamus, under Code of Civil Procedure §1094.5 commanding respondent California Office of Administrative Hearings to set aside, and vacate, its decision of FEBRUARY 19, 2016, in the administrative proceedings titled OAH DECISION NO 2016010162. This motion is made on the grounds that: -1- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS.Ceo ND Co > a Respondent’s findings are not supported by the evidence because it finds, without any evidence, that: 1) “As part of the IPE process, appellant participated in a self-employment assessment with a small business consultant, who determined the self-employment plan was not feasible, as presented. Appellant had several fair hearing appeals before OAH related to his self-employment plan, which were all denied. On February 21, 2014, appellant’s case was closed, for reasons that included his failure to cooperate with DOR.” 2) “Appellant refused to use DOR’s small business consultant, Kramer, Blum and Associates, to assess his proposed business plan and he did not provide a copy of his plan to his rehabilitation counselor within the time frame the parties had agreed.” 3) “On May 4, 2015, appellant and DOR agreed to extend the time to complete the IPE until May 15, 2015. However, the dispute regarding the use of Kramer, Blum and Associates for plan review continued, and even after additional time extensions were granted for appellant to complete the business plan, appellant did not submit a plan. On June 19, 2015, appellant’s case was again closed for failure to cooperate in developing a suitable IPE that would result in a successful employment outcome.” 4) “DOR contended that the IPE was not completed because of appellant’s lack of cooperation and refusal to participate in appropriate assessments. Appellant’s vocational rehabilitation counselor, Julie Ford, testified that in order to prepare an IPE, the following steps are required: (1) a vocational evaluation to determine a consumer’s skills and interests, and a functional capacity evaluation; (2) determining an employment goal; (3) conducting a labor market evaluation; (4) determining any entry level requirements and whether necessary training is required given a consumer’s present skills; and (5) the self-employment plan must be evaluated by a third party vendor as part of the -2- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCo 3 assessment to determine the nature and scope of services. Ford also stated that this case was different from appellant’s previous case, because he already had an IPE in place that was changed to a self-employment setting and an IPE amendment was created. The ALJ determined that these required steps had not been completed for a number of reasons, and that both DOR and appellant shared responsibility for the delay.” 5) “The ALJ’s order required the parties to continue to prepare an IPE consistent with DOR’s and appellant’s obligations as set forth in Findings 2(b), 2(c) and 2(d).” 6) “Appellant asserts, based on the provisions of Section 7129, subdivision (a)(1) that he can prepare his own IPE, and further, once having prepared it, no further approval by DOR is required. Appellant’s assertion that he has the right to direct and control the IPE process, and that DOR is obligated to accept his terms and IPE language, is the foundation for appellant’s appeal.” 7) “IPE Language. Appellant asserts that the regulations give him an independent right to include any language he feels is necessary, and to reject language with which he disagrees, in the IPE. (§ 7029.) (§ 7129.) (§ 7135.5 subd. (c).)” 8) “Self-Employment Setting. Appellant asserts that the self-employment setting is consistent with his strengths, and accordingly a self-employment plan has been or must be approved by DOR. (§ 7136.5.) (§ 7136.9.)” 9) “Training. Appellant asserts that the training he believes is needed should begin immediately, before the small business plan is approved, and that he can, without DOR’s review and approval, attend any training he deems necessary, at DOR’s expense. In this regard he would like to travel to conferences or training opportunities anywhere in the country, without prior approval for any particular training opportunity. (§ 7154.)” -3- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCo 3 10) “Transportation. Appellant seeks reimbursement for: (1) the cost of transportation in connection with assessment services, (2) to meet with his DOR counselor, and (3) to any and all training opportunities, regardless of their location. Separately, appellant also requested a regular monthly travel allotment to cover these and similar costs, but he did not specify the amount. (§ 7162.)” 11) “DOR has a different understanding of how its regulations apply to the development and implementation of appellant’s IPE, and to what the ALJ’s Decision and Order require it and appellant to do with respect to the completion of an IPE.” 12) “DOR maintains that Section 7137, requires it first to determine, through a series of evaluations, whether the self-employment setting is feasible for the consumer. The first portion of this “two-step equation” includes assessing the proposed small business plan. Once this is complete and the project is determined to be feasible, the second step is for DOR to determine, with the consumer, the appropriate scope of services necessary to implement the business plan.” 13) “DOR is willing to pay for Gabriella Sapp to serve as a small business consultant to assess the plan, and for Consumer Credit Counselors of San Francisco to perform appellant’s credit review. However, in addition DOR wishes to employ others of its choosing to separately review the appellant’s business plan and assess his credit worthiness.” 14) “DOR asserts that its obligation to pay for training is limited by Section 7154, and that it must approve any training it pays for; it further asserts appellant does not have an independent right to choose any training he wishes, and then require DOR to pay for it. In addition, it is DOR’s position that payment for any training is contingent upon it first completing the assessment and approving the self-employment setting, including approval of the business plan. The ongoing disputes between DOR and appellant have for years prevented the completion of the IPE.” -4- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSwn eo oe NO Co 9 15) “DOR’s position regarding the provision of transportation is similar to that relating to training; for example, it will pay the cost of transportation to training, if the training is approved pursuant to Section 7154. It will also pay for the transportation costs associated with meeting with those who provide the assessment of the business plan, and similar costs incurred in the process of developing the IPE. In the event the IPE is approved, subsequent transportation costs would be evaluated on an ongoing basis. It does not believe, however, there is presently a basis to establish a specific monthly budget or stipend.” 16) “Appellant has the burden of introducing evidence at hearing sufficient to demonstrate that he is entitled to the relief sought by a preponderance of the evidence.(§ 7356, subd. (e).).” 17) “This appeal deals principally with whether DOR has complied with the terms of the Decision and Order in OAH No. 2015060661. The Decision requires DOR to pursue appellant’s request to develop an IPE in a self-employment setting, but in so doing, it also acknowledges DOR’s obligation to follow the directions and apply the limitations required by the regulations governing such IPEs. (Findings 1(e), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d) and 2(e).) This is a process into which appellant is entitled to significant input, but it is not one in which he is the sole decision maker; appellant cannot unilaterally require DOR to adopt his version of the IPE. DOR retains the ultimate approval of any IPE and of the specific services that will be provided pursuant to the IPE. DOR can only approve an IPE for self-employment after it finds the criteria contained in Section 7136.6 have been satisfied, and in this case, that has not yet occurred. Section 7130, subdivision (a)(3)(B), expressly reserves approval of an IPE to DOR, and Section 7133, subdivision (a), requires such IPEs to be reviewed annually by a DOR counselor.” 18) “In order for an appellant’s IPE to be approved, the incremental steps described in Findings 1(f), 2(b), 2(c), and 2(d) must first be completed. As part of this process, DOR has agreed to use -5- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSC 3 appellant’s choice of consultants, Gabriella Sapp and the Consumer Credit Counselors of San Francisco, at DOR’s expense. DOR may employ additional consultants if it wishes to do so, and then consider all of the information available to it in making a decision about either the appropriateness of the self-employment setting in the IPE or supplemental services that may be offered in the event the self-employment IPE is approved. (§ 7136.5, subd. (c).).” 19) “Appellant is entitled to reimbursement for certain transportation costs, once the requirements of Section 7162, subdivision (b), are satisfied. Appellant provided an undated letter from a nurse practitioner asserting his use of public transportation would create an undue hardship, but no evidence was received on the other criteria. This is a matter for appellant and DOR to discuss and consider further. Until such time as an IPE for self-employment is approved, DOR is not required to provide transportation to attend out of area training conferences. In the event a self-employment IPE is approved, DOR has the discretion, but not the obligation to approve payment for transportation based on necessity.” b. Respondent’s decision is not supported by the findings because there were no findings that the contents of the IPE developed by the petitioner were outside the scope of applicable services of an IPE in a self-employment setting (CCR § 7136.5), nor were there any findings that the contents of the IPE developed by the petitioner were not consistent with his unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, and interests. The ALJ did not find that the petitioner did not have the right to develop all, or part, of his IPE, and have it approved by DOR (9 CCR § 7029.7). Furthermore, no findings were cited that would impose any limitations on the scope of authority, decision making, and control of the petitioner to determine the contents and/or language of his IPE. Respondent’s findings on behalf of DOR were substantially vague. Respondent’s findings on behalf of DOR consisted entirely of hearsay in which he weighed as evidence, which is expressly prohibited by law (WIC § 19705(d)(2). Finally, respondent also enlarged statutes beyond fair meaning of their language. -6- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCe ND DW kB Ww N = Ss C! 9 c. Respondent’s decision is in error of the law because he misapplied the standard of review, disregarded significant evidence, and applied the wrong substantive standard to determine whether DOR violated Title 9 of the California Code of Regulations, and other applicable law, when it denied the petitioners request to sign and authorize the November 20, 2015 IPE that he developed. In the statement of decision, the Administrative Law Judge explained that “Appellant has the burden of introducing evidence at hearing sufficient to demonstrate that he is entitled to the relief sought by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 7356, subd. (e).)” This is not an accurate statement of the appropriate standard that the Administrative Law Judge was legally obligated to apply. The appropriate standard set forth by 9 CCR § 7356, subd. (e). reads “The appellant shall have the burden of introducing evidence at the hearing sufficient to demonstrate his or her case by a preponderance of the evidence.” The petitioner’s burden was to introduce evidence that demonstrates DOR’s action/inaction was not in accordance with Title 9 of the California Code of Regulations, and other applicable law. The petitioner does not have to demonstrate, by any substantive standard, that he is entitled to the relief sought. The preponderance of evidence, in introducing sufficient evidence to demonstrate petitioner’s case, is met if the petitioner’s proposition is more likely to be true than not true. The standard is satisfied if there is greater than a fifty percent chance that the proposition is true. Petitioner’s case only needs to be "more probable than not.” Respondent applied a more stringent substantive standard than allowed by the law in this case, in that the respondent’s placed burden on the petitioner of introducing evidence sufficient to demonstrate his entitlement to the relief sought is the substantive standard applied in Civil Law cases, where the plaintiff must prove each element of the claim, or cause of action, in order to recover. This is not the substantive standard set forth by § 7356, subd.(e). In the petitioner’s case, his burden of introducing evidence sufficient to demonstrate his case by a preponderance of the evidence simply means that he has to produce more evidence in his favor than DOR, even by the smallest degree. -7- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCo 2 d Respondent’s decision is contrary to the law because Title 9 CCR § 7130(a)(3)(A), (a)(3)(B)(1)(a), and (a)(3)(B)(1)(b) Mandatory Procedures for Development of the Individualized Plan for Employment (IPE); Review; Amendment, as well as 9 CCR § 7129(a)(1), and (a)(2)(A) Options for Developing an Individualized Plan for Employment (IPE), as well as 9 CCR § 7029.7(b)(5) Rights of Individuals with Disabilities; Applicants; Eligible Individuals, impose a legal obligation, impervious to judicial discretion, on DOR to allow the petitioner to develop all, or part of his IPE, without their assistance. Furthermore, DOR has a legal obligation, impervious to judicial discretion, under 9 CCR § 7130 to authorize the petitioner’s IPE as he has developed it so long as it is appropriate, and necessary, in consideration of his unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, and interests; and the scope of applicable laws and regulations specified in 9 CCR 7029.6(c). Respondent applied a series of invalid regulations in deciding this case: 1) 7135.5, (§ 7136.5, subd. (c).) are not valid regulations in determining whether or not petitioner’s IPE can/will be approved, criteria contained in Section 7136.6 is not valid in determining whether or not DOR can approve an IPE for self-employment. Section 7133, subdivision (a), requiring such IPEs to be reviewed annually by a DOR counselor, is not relevant to this issue. 2) Section 7137 is invalid in its application to this case in that it does not require DOR first to determine, through a series of evaluations, whether the self-employment setting is feasible for the petitioner. It does not address a “two-step equation” that includes assessing the proposed small business plan, determining feasibility, then determining the appropriate scope of services necessary to implement the business plan. 3) (§ 7136.5.) (§ 7136.9.) are not valid in their application to this case in that petitioner asserted that 9 CCR 7130 imposed a legal obligation impervious to judicial discretion on DOR to approve the -8- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCm ty DH RF BH NY = Ss 11 Cc 9 IPE he developed because they were in agreement that it was consistent with his strengths, attributes, priorities, concerns, capabilities, resources, and informed choice. 4) Respondent applied invalid regulations (§ 7029.) (§ 7135.5 subd. (c).) to petitioner’s assertion that the regulations give him an independent right to include any language he feels is necessary, and to reject language with which he disagrees, in the IPE. 5) Respondent applied invalid regulation 9 CCR Section 7129 subdivision (a)(1) to the petitioner’s assertion that he can prepare his own IPE, and that he has the right to direct and control the IPE process, and that DOR is obligated to accept his terms and IPE language, as the foundation for appeal. e. Petitioner was denied a fair trial, resulting in arbitrary and capricious administration of the agency program, in that: 1.) The Respondent’s use of irrebuttable presumptions in labeling and weighing DOR’s entire oral argument as “evidence” rather than “argument” interfered with petitioner's right to a fair trial. 2.) The hearing was not conducted by an impartial hearing officer knowledgeable regarding the federal and state laws and regulations applicable to the department, by the Respondent’s own admission (WIC § 19705(d) (1)). 3.) Respondent relied on hearsay evidence that was not used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence. Respondent also relied on hearsay evidence prohibited from supporting findings in of themselves, because it would not be admissible over objection in a civil action (WIC § 19705(d)(2). -9- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCoe ND HW BRB WN Cc! > 4.) Respondent enlarged statutes beyond fair meaning of their language. 5.) Respondent did not allow the full issue at appeal to be heard, nor was it adjudicated in its entirety. The petitioner’s original claim at issue in appeal was: pe gi pp (A) The California Department of Rehabilitation denied the changes I requested to the IPE that DOR drafted on December 1, 2015, in accordance with my right to develop all, or part of my IPE with, or without the assistance of DOR, pursuant to 9 CCR § 7129 Options for developing an Individualized Plan for Employment (IPE). Those changes include, and should be addressed individually: 1.) Revision of DOR’s answer to section la 2.) Revision of DOR’s answer to section b. 3.) Revision of the 2nd step in section 2, to sign consent forms to release prior employment information (lines 9 and 10 on Appellant’s draft). 4.) Revision of the 3rd step proposed by DOR in section 2, to have Appellant’s business plan reviewed. 5.) Removal of the 4th step in section 2, related to behavior 6.) Revision of the 5th step in Section 2, to provide necessary resources. 7.) Revision of the 6th step in section 2, to submit tax returns and credit history to determine viability of obtaining a small business loan -10- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSC) UO 8.) Removal of the 8th step in section 2 to provide transportation assistance and inserting it in section 3. 9.) Revising Transportation assistance, and changing it from “provided at a public rate” to a specified monthly payment, while removing the additional, unnecessary wording. 10.) Revision of the 9th step in section 2 11.) Removal of additional text inserted after the 9th step in section 2 before section 3 begins. 12.) Revision of the Business/self-employment Plan analysis service 13.) Addition of Conference expenses as a service provided in section 3 14.) Addition of DOR assistance in applying for the loans referenced in this plan, including, but not limited to, loan guarantees, as a service provided in section 3 15.) Addition of credit record review by qualified consumer credit counselor, Dan Parrish, as a service provided in section 3 16.) Addition of DOR assistance in applying for a PASS plan, including but not limited to writing a letter of support to the PASS Cadre, as a service provided in section 3 17.) Addition of training as a service in section 3 18.) Addition of technical assistance in revising self-employment plan as a service in section 3 -l- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS19.) Addition of self-employment plan third party reviewer, Neuropsychologist Dr. John Fahy, as a service provided in section 3 20.) Revision to DOR’s answer in section 4 21.) Revision to DOR’s answer to section 5a 22.) Revision to DOR’s answer to section 5b 23.) Revision to DOR’s answer to section 6 24.) Revision to DOR’s answer to section 7.” This motion is based on this notice, the verified petition, the administrative record previously lodged with this Court, the briefs filed with the court, the declarations and exhibits, and any and all other evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this motion. "Pursuant to Local Rule 8.3, the Court will make a tentative ruling on the merits of this matter by 3:00 p.m, the court day before the hearing. You may obtain the tentative ruling issued by telephoning (415) 551-4000 or visiting the court’s website at www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/ and clicking the online services link, or arrange to obtain the tentative ruling from the clerk of Department 302. You must give notice to the Petitioner and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required, if you wish to appear at the Hearing. You may contest the tentative ruling by sending an email to the court to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that you wish to contest. You may not argue at the hearing if the Petitioner is not so notified and he does not appear. -12- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUSCoe ND HM BF WN DATE: July 7, 2017 'etitioner, David Fazio In Pro Per -13- NOTICE OF HEARING FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS