Exhibit,Appendix: BRYANT FU ET AL VS. TINA YAN ET AL

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28

Farlla Bran +Matel ip
235 Montgomery Steet, 17° Floor
‘San Fencisco, Cafomia 94104
(415) 64-4400

Gary M. Kaplan (State Bar No. 155530)
an@fbm.com

Farella Braun +Martel LLP

235 Montgoi Street, 17" Floor

San Francisco, Califomia 94104

Telephone: (415) 954-4400

Facsimile: (415) 954-4480

Attomeys for Plaintiffs
CRYSTAL LEI and BRYANT FU

ELECTRONICALLY
FILED

Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco

07/05/2022
Clerk of the Court
BY: SANDRA SCHIRO
Deputy Clerk

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

CRYSTAL LEI, an individual, and
BRYANT FU, an individual,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

TINA YAN, individually and as personal
representative of the estate of CHEUK TIN
YAN, deceased; THAI MING CHIU, an
individual; KAMAN LIU, an individual; and
DOES 1-20 inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. CGC-17-556769

EXHIBITS K THROUGH Y TO
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN

ADJUDICATION ON FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION (AVOIDANCE AND
RECOVERY OF FRAUDULENT

TRANSFERS)

Date: July 29, 2022
Time: 9:30am

Dept: 501

The Hon. Charles F. Haines

[HEARING TO BE CONDUCTED VIA.

ZOOM VIDEO CONFERENCE
PURSUANT TO COURT DIRECTION]

41312\14905922.1

EXS K THROUGH Y TO RJNISO PLAINTIFFS’ RENEWED MOTION SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
- Case No. CGC-17-556769Exhibit KMonty

SHUHENTU | «AN A

SAOWN EELOW MAL TAXSTAIGMENTION | SSE San Franeiseo Assessor-Recorder
Carmen Chu, Assessor-Recorder
SHUZHEN TU : ._ DOC- 2019-K720293-00
547 23rd Avenue ” Friday, JAN 11, 2019 11:51:32
San Francisco, Ca. 94124 : Tel Pd = $92.00 Rept # 0005939347
. fog ofa/FT/1-2

‘SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE
Trustee’ s Deed Upon Sale.

Trustee’s Sale Number: _2018-1004 . Assessor Parcel Number; 1586-012

THE UNDERSIGNED GRANTOR DECLARES:

(1) The Grantee named herein [¥] was []-was not the foreclosing Beneficiary.

(2) The amount of the unpaid debt together with cost was S_3,152,462.45 :

(3) The amount paid by the Grantcc at the Trustce’s Salc was S. 3,000,000.00

(4) The Document Eh Taxis$_ @. mT HWqG2€ .

(5) Said property is in 1 unincorporated area: [v] City of, an Francisco and
Vi Dan Tran _. (herein.called Trustee), as the duly appoirited Trustee under the
Deed of Trust hereinafter described or as duly appointed Trustee, docs hereby grant and convey, but without covenant or
‘warranty, express or implied, to :

" SHUZHEN TU, an.unmarried woman,

(herein called Grantee), all of its right, title and interest in and to that certain property situated in the City of
San Francisco . County of San Francisco , State of California, described as follows:

COMMENCING at a point on-the Westerly line of 23rd Avenue, distant thereon 275 feet Southerly from the Southetly li
ne of Anza Street; running thence Southerly along said Westerly line of 23rd Avenue 25 feet; thence at a right angle W
esterly 120 feet; thence at a right angle Northerly 25 feet; and thence at a right angle Easterly 120 feet to the Westerly
line of ‘23rd Avenue and the point of commencement. BEING a portién of Outside Land Block No. 306.

TRUSTEE STATES THAT: .
This conveyance is made pursuant to the powers conferred upon Trustce by the certain Deed of Trust “dated
41/15/2007 | and executed by DEMAS WAI YAN _ Sas
Trustor, and recorded as Instrument No. 2007-1497016-00 » Book : Page (s) ve
of Official Records of SAN FRANCISCO. County, State of California, or as the duly appointed Trustee, and
atter fulfillment of the conditions specified in said Deed of Trust authorizing this conveyance. Default occurred as set
forth in a Notice of Default and Election to Sell which was recorded in the office of the Recorder of said County. All
requirements of law regarding the mailing of copies of notices and the posting and publication of copies of the Notice of
“Sale which was recorded and has been complied with. Said property was sold by said Trustee at publi
11/27/2018 at the place named in the Notice of Sale, in the County of San Francisc
California, in which the property is situated. Grantwe being the 5,006 ,000.0% s00'0, 4 such sale, became the pure!
property and paid therefore to said Trustee the amount Bid s 3,00( . in lawful money of the United
States, or by the satistaction, pro tanto, of the obligations then secured by 8 ea of Trust.Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale

Trustee’ Sale No. 2018-1001
Order No.

In Wimess Whereof, said ViDan Tran _. as Trustee, has this day caused
its name to be hereunto affixed. .

Dated: VL foe 1g /1P Vi Dan Tran

as Trustee aforesaid

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate
verifies only the identity of the individual who signed ‘the
document to which this certificate is attached, and not|
the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA .
COUNTY OF A lawned

on_ Voc 4 20\ . fore me,

K te K N gn ny phe
7 There insel ile df the officer)

,notary public, personally appeared_ | Dar \ T Can

who proved to me on the basis of salisfactory evidence to be the
person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument
and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in
his/hertheir authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their
signature(s) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf
of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.

\ certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the state of
California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and official seal _

(This area tor offizal nozarial seal)

EITH K. NGUYEN
‘COMM. #2174133Exhibit LAPPEALS - Vol. II - April 7, woe |

LE

San Francsce County Soper
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
MAR 15 2017

COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
APPEALS DIVISION BY.
DEPARTMENT NO. 504 HONORABLE , SUZANNE R. BOLANS

A149849

Case No.
CGC-14-537574

CHARLES LI, an individual,

Plaintiff/Respondent,
Court of Appeal

v. Case No. A149849

THAI MING CHIU, et al.,

Volume II
Defendants/Appellants.

wveve ve ve ve vee

Pages 35 - 204

 “Z i
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE GF DECLARANT)
If this memorandum of costs is filed at the same time as an application for a writ of execution, any statutory costs, not exceeding
$100 in aggregate and not already allowed by the court, may be included in the writ of execution. The fees sought under this
included in the writ of execution. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070(e).) A motion to tax costs claimed in this memorandum must be filed
within 10 days after service of the memorandum. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070(c).)

Page 1of2
Sonn Aapled Nanay Use MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AFTER JUDGMENT, sf Bahe 58 dec cab nee pyoleseoss
Mc-012 [Rov Januay 1. 2516] ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CREDIT, AND DECLARATION °°!24971° vw cours ca.gov

OF ACCRUED INTERESTMC-012

Short Title: Crystal Lei, et al. v. Demas Yan, et al. CASE NUMBER:
ee
PROOF OF SERVICE
x | Mail Personal Service

14. Atthe time of service | was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.

2. My residence or business address is:
700 E Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

3 [__] I mailed or personally delivered a copy of the Memorandum of Costs After Judgment, Acknowledgment of Credit, and
Declaration of Accrued Interest as follows (complete either a or b):

a. Mail. | am a resident of or employed in the county where the mail occurred.
(1) | enclosed a copy in an envelope AND
(a) deposited the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid.

(b) [x ] placed the envelope for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown in items below following our
ordinary business practices. | am readily familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing
correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is
deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with
postage fully prepaid.

(2) The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:

(a) Name of person served: Demas Yan aka Dennis Yan Crystal Lei & Bryant Fu
(b) Address on envelope: 100 Pine Street #1250 337 28th Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94111 San Francisco, CA 94121

(©) Date of mailing: January |b, 2018
(d) Place of mailing (city and state): Sacramento, CA

b. Personal delivery. | personally delivered a copy as follows.
(1) Name of person served:
(2) Address where delivered:

(3) Date delivered:
(4) Time delivered:

| declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: January \o 2018

Mor Saetern >
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF DEGLARANT)

* The above-listed document was also served on Demas Yan aka Dennis Yan via
email to anewlaw@gmail.com pursuant to the Court's local rules.

MC-012 (Rev. January 1, 2018] MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AFTER JUDGMENT, Page 2 of 2
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CREDIT, AND DECLARATION
OF ACCRUED INTERESTExhibit QMC-012

ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY STATE BAR NUMBER: FOR COURT USE ONLY
vane. Brian S. Healy SBN 112371
arwnawe: Tierney Watson & Healy
street anoress: 351 California Street, Suite 600

ony. San Francisco state: CA zie cove: 94104

revepuone no: (415) 974-1900 raxno. (415) 974-6433 ELECTRONICALLY
ewaaporess: Drian@tw2law.com FILED
ATTORNEY FOR (name: Judgment Creditor ‘Superior Court of California,
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF San Francisco County of San Francisco
street aporess: 400 McAllister 01/15/2021
MAILING ADDRESS: Clerk of the Court
city ano zip cove San Francisco, CA 94102 BY: ANNIE PASCUAL

sranch name: Limited Jurisdiction Deputy Clerk

PLAINTIFF: Crystal Lei
DEFENDANT: Demas Yan, aka Dennis Yan
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AFTER JUDGMENT, ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF | case numeer
CREDIT, AND DECLARATION OF ACCRUED INTEREST CGC 14 541875

1. {Q] Postjudgment costs
a. ‘I claim the following costs after judgment incurred within the last two years (indicate if there are multiple items in any category):
Dates Incurred Amount

(1) Preparing and issuing abstract of judgment
(2) Recording and indexing abstract of judgment
(3) Filing notice of judgment lien on personal property
(4) Issuing writ of execution, to extent not satisfied by Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 685.050 (specify county):
(5) Levying officers fees, to extent not satisfied by Code Civ. Proc., $
§ 685.050 or wage garnishment
(6) Approved fee on application for order for appearance of judgment Aug 2019 ___ 100.00
debtor, or other approved costs under Code Civ. Proc., § 708.110
et seq.
(7) Attorney fees, if allowed by Code Civ. Proc., § 685.040 Nov 2018 s_~——- 5,882.50
(8) Other: (Statute authorizing cost): _______ to Nov. 2020
(9) Total of claimed costs for current memorandum of costs (add items (1)-(8)) $ 5,982.50
b. All previously allowed postjudgment costs $ 32,406.43
c. Total of all postjudgment costs (add ifems a and b) $ 38,388.93
2. () Credits to interest and principal
a. lacknowledge total payments to date in the amount of: $ _ = 0.00 (including returns on levy process and direct payments).
The payments received are applied first to the amount of accrued interest, and then to the judgment principal (including
postjudgment costs allowed) as follows: credit to accrued interest: $ 0.00 ; credit to judgment principal $
b. Principal remaining due: The amount of judgment principal remaining due is $ ________. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 680.300)
3. w Accrued interest remaining due: | declare interest accruing (at the legal rate) from the date of entry or renewal and on
balances from the date of any partial satisfactions (or other credits reducing the principal) remaining due in the amount
of $ ¢
4. lam the: CC) judgment creditor (C2) agent for the judgment creditor [K) attorney for the judgment creditor.
| have knowledge of the facts concerning the costs claimed above. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the costs claimed are
correct, reasonable, and necessary, and have not been satisfied.
| declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregding is tru

Date: i
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) 2 * ASIGNAT
—

AHO

my
‘and correct,

& OF DEZLARANT)

NOTICE TO THE JUDGMENT DEB’
If this memorandum of costs is filed at the same time as an application for a writ of execution, any statutory costs, not exceeding
$100 in aggregate and not already allowed by the court, may be included in the writ of execution. The fees sought under this.
memorandum may be disallowed by the court upon a motion to tax filed by the debtor, notwithstanding the fees having been
included in the writ of execution. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070(e).) A motion to tax costs claimed in this memorandum must be filed

within 10 days after service of the memorandum. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070(c). Page 1 of 2}
7 CL—— MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AFTER JUDGMENT, gots Lei rece,
MeOT2 Rev September? 2 Essential ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CREDIT, AND DECLARATION Be ote cours 2. go¥

2018)
Ge {ejForms” OF ACCRUED INTERESTMC-012

Short Title: CASE NUMBER.

Lei v. Yan, Demas : CGC 14 541875

PROOF OF SERVICE
KY Mail CC) Personal Service

1. Atthe time of service | was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.

2. My residence or business address is:
351 California St #600
San Francisco, CA 94104

3. [QQ | mailed or personally delivered a copy of the Memorandum of Costs After Judgment, Acknowledgment of Credit, and
Declaration of Accrued Interest as follows (complete either a or b):

a. (QQ Mail. 1 ama resident of or employed in the county where the mailing occurred.
(1) | enclosed a copy in an envelope AND

(a) [QQ deposited the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid.

(b) (CQ placed the envelope for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown in items below following our
ordinary business practices. | am readily familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing
correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is
deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with
postage fully prepaid.

(2) The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:

(a) Name of person served: Demas Yan

(b) Address on envelope: 100 Pine St #1250, San Francisco, CA 94111
(c)_ Date of mailing: November 30, 2020

(d) Place of mailing (city and state): Alamo, CA

b. CC) Personal delivery. | personally delivered a copy as follows:
(1) Name of person served:
(2) Address where delivered:
(3) Date delivered:
(4) Time delivered:

' declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: November 30,2020
Brian S. Healy

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)

[MC-012 [Rev. September 1, 2078] MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AFTER JUDGMENT, Page 2 of 2
CEB Essential ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CREDIT, AND DECLARATION
cabcom | 2! Forms:

OF ACCRUED INTERESTExhibit RUnited States District Court
Northern District of California

Oo Om NY DA HW PF WN

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMAS YAN, Case No.11-cv-01814-RS (JSC)
Appellant,
ORDER RE 28 U.S.C. § 1927
v. ATTORNEYS’ FEES
CRYSTAL LEI, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 83, 85
Appellees.

Creditor seeks sanctions of attorneys’ fees from Mr. Yan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
(Dkt. No. 75.)

28 U.S.C. § 1927 states “[a}ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs,
expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” An award under this
section requires a finding of “subjective bad faith,” where counsel “knowingly or recklessly raise a
frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent.”
Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court
may award such fees against Mr. Yan even though he is a pro se litigant. See Wages v. IRS, 915
F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1990). Whether to impose inherent power sanctions is “a determination
that rests in the sound discretion of the district court.” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir.

2001). The Court in its discretion granted Creditor’s request for fees concluding:

Mr. Yan has “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplied the judgment
collection proceedings, most recently when he blatantly violated the Court’s Order
that he produce his tax returns and the other documents reviewed in camera, Over
the last five months the Court has issued three orders and held two hearings on this
matter yet Mr. Yan continually refuses to comply with the Court’s productionUnited States District Court
Northern District of California

oem ND nw FF WN

orders. Accordingly, sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 are warranted.

(Dkt. No. 83 at 4.) The Court then ordered Creditor to file a declaration clarifying the amount of
fees and costs she seeks. (/d.) Creditor’s former counsel, Mr. Mark Serlin, submitted a
declaration and billing records reflecting $11,496.25 in fees, (Dkt. No, 85 at 2.) Given the Court
has already determined 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions are warranted, the Court shall proceed to
evaluate whether Creditor’s requested fees are reasonable.

Reasonable attorneys’ fees are based on a “lodestar” calculation. Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc.,
214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The
lodestar is determined by multiplying (1) “the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation” by (2) “a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 46\ U.S. at 433.

A. Reasonableness of Billing Rate

To determine the lodestar amount, courts must first assess the reasonableness of counsel’s
hourly billing rate. Credit Managers Ass’n of S. Cal. v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins, Co., 25
F.3d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1994). Courts look to the prevailing market rates in the relevant
community for similar work by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.
Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 ¥.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). The relevant community is
the forum where the district court sits; in this case the Northern District of California. Id.

Mr. Serlin has practiced law in the State of California for 32 years. (/d.) He hasa B.A. in
economics from the University of California, Berkeley and a law degree from the University of
California, Hastings College of law. (id. at 1.) His hourly rate is $425 per hour. (Jd. at 2.) Given
Mr. Serlin’s many years of experience his hourly rate is reasonable. See, e.g., US Foods, Inc. v.
Lalla Holding Corp, No. 13-CV-02328-BLF, 2014 WL 5281058 (N.D. Cal, Oct. 15,

2014) (finding $450 per hour reasonable for an attorney with seven years of experience).
B. Reasonableness of Hours

“(Al party seeking attorneys’ fees [also] bears the burden to “document{ ] the appropriate
hours expended.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. “To meet that burden, the moving party must submit
detailed records justifying the hours that have been expended.” Forto v. Capital One Bank,

National Association, 2017 WL 6026242, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017) (citing Chalmers v. City

2United States District Court
Northern District of California

nA ns

of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986)). Courts may reduce the hours if they are
duplicative, excessive, or otherwise unnecessary. Id. © .

Mr. Serlin spent 8.3 hours preparing and conducting the debtor’s examination of Mr. Yan.
(Dkt. No. 85 at 3.) These hours were incurred prior to Mr. Yan’s vexatious conduct of refusing to
produce his tax returns despite several hearings and orders requiring him to do so. Therefore, the
hours related to the debtor’s examination are not recoverable.

On July 24, 2017, the Court ordered Mr. Yan to show cause as to why he should not be
held in contempt for failing to produce the subpoenaed documents for his debtor’s examination.
(Dkt. No. 52.) The Court then held a hearing on August 10, 2017 and ordered Mr. Yan to produce
several financial documents including his 2014, 2015, and 2016 tax returns. (Dkt. Nos. 59 & 60.)
Thereafter the Court held one additional hearing and issued four additional orders requiring Mr.
Yan to produce the documents at issue. (Dkt. Nos. 64, 68, 69, 72, 83.) Accordingly, Mr. Serlin’s
remaining | 8.75 hours are reasonable in light of the multiple orders and requests for sanctions.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (concluding there is no precise rule or formula
and “[t}he court necessarily has discretion in making this equitable judgment” to award fees that
are based on “‘the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.”)

For the reasons described above, the Court orders Mr. Yan to pay attorneys’ fees in the

amount of $7,968.75 pursuant to section 1927.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 19, 2018

/ACQUELINE SCOTT COR!

United States Magistrate JudgeExhibit SUnited States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case 3:11-cv-01814-RS Document 83 Filed 02/09/18 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMAS YAN, Case No.11-cv-01814-RS (JSC)
Appellant,
ORDER RE SANCTIONS.
v. AWARD OF FEES AND COSTS,
AND PRODUCTION
CRYSTAL LEI, et al.

Re: Dkt. Nos. 75, 76
Appellees.

The Court is in receipt of two items: (1) Mr. Yan’s request pursuant to Rule 59(e) that the
Court amend its decision ordering Mr. Yan to produce his tax returns and (2) Creditor’s request
for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Rule 11. (Dkt. Nos. 75 and 76.)

On November 3, 2017, Mr. Yan submitted for the Court’s in camera review documents
related to the Fung assignment and sources of income, including: (1) four emails with Mr. Yan’s
client regarding the Fung assignment, including a March 1, 2017 email from Mr. Yan with a
description of the judgment amount and attorneys’ fees, (2) nine copies of client checks ranging
from $300 - $3,900, and (3) four client invoices with attorney fees ranging from $3,630 - $8,730.

After review of Mr. Yan’s documents, the Court ordered Mr. Yan to produce to Creditor
on or before December 5, 2017 his personal tax returns for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016, and all
of the documents submitted to the Court in camera with only the second paragraph of the March 1,
2017 email from Mr. Yan to Florence Fung redacted. (Dkt. No. 72 at 5.) The Court also ordered
Mr. Yan to file with the Court on or before December 5, 2017 a declaration under oath stating
whether he produced to Creditor all documents in his possession responsive to Creditor’s requests.
(id)

On December 5, 2017 Mr. Yan filed a declaration stating (1) he intended to file a Rule 59United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case 3:11-cv-01814-RS Document 83 Filed 02/09/18 Page 2 of 6

motion to request that the Court amend its Order regarding the production of Mr. Yan’s tax
returns, (2) he would produce to Creditor the documents reviewed in camera, and (3) he had
produced all of the documents in his possession that are responsive to Creditor’s requests. (Dkt.
No. 74.)

Thereafter, Creditor reapplied for an order of contempt arguing Mr. Yan produced “a
number of documents containing wholesale redactions of critical information, namely the
identities of the payors of monies that he recently received based on accounts receivable such that
there is no way for Lei to levy any further amounts due.” (Dkt. No. 75 at 1:23-28.) Creditor also
argues the Ninth Circuit has held that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies not only to attorneys but to
litigants appearing in pro per. See Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1990). (/d. at 2.)
Creditor seeks contempt sanctions as well as sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 arguing Mr. Yan
has “willfully and repeatedly failed and refused to comply with orders of this Court in complete
bad faith.” Creditor requests $7,682.50 plus $500.00 per day for each day after August 31, 2017
(the original production date ordered by this Court) until full compliance with court orders. (/d.)

Mr. Yan then filed a Rule 59(e) motion requesting the Court amend its order directing Mr.
Yan to produce his tax returns, arguing the Court “misconstrued” the holding in Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) and that the returns are in fact covered by Mr. Yan’s Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (Dkt. No. 76.) Yan requests the Court amend its
order or alternatively hold an in-camera hearing. (/d. at 4:10-11.) .

The following day, Creditor replied to Yan’s request, arguing the required records
exception applies to the production privilege under the Amendment. (Dkt. No. 77.) That same
day Creditor filed a memorandum of costs in the amount of $27,265.10 in total costs and $147.54
in accrued interest. (Dkt. No. 78.)

I. Rule 59(e) Motion

Mr. Yan’s Rule 59(e) motion requesting the Court amend its decision ordering the

production of tax returns is denied. The Court has already addressed the Fifth Amendment

privilege in the context of Mr. Yan’s tax returns. His motion adds nothing new.United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case 3:11-cv-01814-RS Document 83 Filed 02/09/18 Page 3 of 6

IL. Mr. Yan’s Lack of Compliance

A. Tax Returns

As there are no grounds for Mr. Yan’s refusal to produce his tax returns, he shall produce
them to Creditor on or before February 20, 2018. As Creditor is no longer represented by counsel,
Mr. Yan shall provide them directly to creditor Lei.

B. Documents Reviewed in Camera

Creditor insists that in response to the Court’s in camera review and order to produce
documents to Creditor, Mr. Yan produced “a number of documents containing wholesale
redactions of critical information, namely the identities of the payors of monies that he recently
received based on accounts receivable such that there is no way for Lei to levy any further
amounts due.” (Dkt. No. 75 at 1:23-28.) Mr. Yan does not respond.

Mr. Yan is ordered to reproduce to Creditor all of the documents submitted to the Court in
camera as ordered on November 28, 2017. (Dkt. No. 72.) He shall do so by February 20, 2017.
Mr. Yan may not redact any contents with the exception of the second paragraph of the March 1,
2017 email from Mr. Yan to Florence Fung. His redaction of other materials violated this Court’s
Order. As Creditor is no longer represented by counsel, Mr. Yan shall provide the documents
directly to creditor Lei.

Il. Sanctions, Costs, and Fees

Creditor seeks sanctions of attorneys’ fees and costs from Mr. Yan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1927. The Court may award such fees against Mr. Yan even though he is a pro se litigant. See
Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1990). In Wages, a pro se litigant attempted to file
“an amended complaint that did not materially differ from one which the district court had already
concluded did not state a claim,” and continually moved for “alterations in the district court’s
original judgment despite that court’s clear unwillingness to change its mind.” Jd. at 1235. The
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to sanction Wages pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927
and Rule 11 because Wages evidenced bad faith in multiplying the proceedings in the case
“unreasonably and vexatiously.” Jd. at 1236.

Mr. Yan is a former an attorney who is not eligible to practice law in California, and
3United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case 3:11-cv-01814-RS Document 83 Filed 02/09/18 Page 4 of 6

therefore has been representing himself in these proceedings pro se. Mr. Yan has “unreasonably
and vexatiously” multiplied the judgment collection proceedings, most recently when he blatantly
violated the Court’s Order that he produce his tax returns and the other documents reviewed in
camera. Over the last five months the Court has issued three orders and held two hearings on this
matter yet Mr. Yan continually refuses to comply with the Court’s production orders.
Accordingly, sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 are warranted.

Creditor is ordered to file a declaration clarifying the fees and costs she seeks under 28
U.S.C. § 1927, including: (1) a statement of the services rendered by each person for whose
services fees are claimed together with a summary of the time spent by each person, (2) a
statement describing the manner in which time records were maintained, and (3) a brief
description of relevant qualifications and experience and a statement of the customary hourly
charges of each such person or of comparable prevailing hourly rates or other indication of value
of the services. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 37-4(b)(3), 54-5(b).
If Creditor is still seeking such fees, the declaration shall be filed on or before February 28, 2018.

In addition, given Mr. Yan’s repeated refusals to comply with this Court’s orders of
production, he shall be sanctioned $500 per day for each day after February 20, 2018 that he does
not produce to Creditor the ordered documents. See Grimes v. CCSF, 951 F.2d 236, 239-41 (9th
Cir. 2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Yan is ordered to produce to Creditor on or before February 20, 2018:

1. His personal tax returns for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016.

2. All of the documents submitted to the Court in camera with no redactions except
for the second paragraph of the March 1, 2017 email from Mr. Yan to Florence Fung.

3. Mr. Yan shall be sanctioned $500 for every day after February 20, 2018 that he
does not comply with this Order and produce the documents.

4. On or before February 28, 2018 Creditor shall file a declaration from counsel
detailing the costs and fees incurred as a result of Mr. Yan’s vexatious conduct as described above.

This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 75 and 76.
4United States District Court

Northern District of California

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Case 3:11-cv-01814-RS Document 83 Filed 02/09/18 Page 5 of 6

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 9, 2018

United States Magistrate JudgeUnited States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case 3:11-cv-01814-RS Document 83 Filed 02/09/18 Page 6 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

YAN,
Case No. 11-cv-01814-RS (JSC)

Plaintiff,
v. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

FU,
Defendant.

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S.
District Court, Northern District of California.

That on February 9, 2018, ISERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by
placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by
depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery
receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Crystal Lei

337 28th Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94121

Demas W Yan
100 Pine St #1250
San Francisco, CA 94111

Dated: February 9, 2018
Susan Y. Soong
Clerk, United States District Court

By:
Ada Means, Deputy Clerk to the
Honorable JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

6Exhibit TUnited States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case 3:11-cv-01814-RS Document 143 Filed 01/15/20 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMAS YAN,
Case No. 11-cv-01814-RS
Appellant,
v. ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
CRYSTAL LEI, et al.
Appellees.

The lengthy history of these proceedings, involving numerous related case dockets in this
court, is reflected in the record and will not be recounted here. At this point, the issue is the failure
of Demas Yan to pay sanctions in the amount of $35,004.71, awarded by the Ninth Circuit to
Crystal Lei, Wei Suen, Bryant Fu, and Stella Hong Chen for Yan’s filing of a frivolous appeal.
The assigned magistrate judge addressed Crystal Lei’s motion for an order finding Yan in civil
contempt and issuing sanctions for his failure to comply with prior orders and his failure to appear
for a judgment debtor’s examination on September 25, 2019, despite an express order to do so.
Mr. Yan did not oppose the motion or otherwise contact the court.

The magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation stating:

For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that the district
court judge grant Ms. Lei’s application for civil contempt in its
entirety and issue an order:

(1) compelling Mr. Yan to appear at a judgment debtor’s
examination;United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case 3:11-cv-01814-RS Document 143 Filed 01/15/20 Page 2 of 3

(2) directing Mr. Yan to, within 10 days of the order, sign IRS Form
4506 requesting that the IRS send copies of Mr. Yan’s tax returns
for the years 2014-2018 directly to Mr. Healy;

(3) directing Mr. Yan to, within 10 days of the district court’s order,
produce all documents requested pursuant to the subpoena served
concurrently with the Order of Examination;

(4) adopting and expanding the Court’s February 2018 Sanction
Order, (Dkt. No. 83), to monetarily sanction Mr. Yan daily until he
fully complies with the order to produce his official tax

returns for the years 2014-2018;

(5) directing Mr. Yan to pay the reasonable attorney fees incurred in
connection with the instant motion in the amount of $2,500; and

(6) warning Mr. Yan that refusal to comply with the order will result
in further sanctions and possible incarceration.

Despite having not responded to the underlying motion, Yan filed an objection to the
Report and Recommendation. The objection contends Yan in fact previously complied with his
obligation to produce documents. The argument comes too little, too late, and is not persuasive. If
Yan in fact previously produced all the relevant documents, he will have no trouble in complying
with the other provisions of this order.

Yan’s further argument that he cannot appear for a debtor’s examination because he is
subject to a state court restraining order prohibiting contact with certain of the other parties is
frivolous. Yan must appear for the examination before counsel as directed. In the event any other
parties elect to attend, they would not be able to charge Yan with violating the restraining order.

The magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation is adopted in full. Yan shall comply

with each of the six numbered provisions set out above.

CasE No. 11-cv-01814-RSUnited States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case 3:11-cv-01814-RS Document 143 Filed 01/15/20 Page 3 of 3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2020

RICHARD SEEBORG
United States District Judge

CasE No. 11-cv-01814-RSExhibit UCrystal Lei, Bryant Fu

337 28" Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94121
(415) 221 - 0969

Email: crystalleija@yahoo.com

Plaintiffs in Pro Per

San Francisco County Superior Court

OCT:24 2019

Es «Bras COURT
* Deputy Giatk

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Crystal Lei, an individual,
Bryant Fu, an individual,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)
Demas Yan aka Dennis Yan, an individual, )
DBA Epona Investment Realty, )
and DBA Yan Law Offices, }
Cheuk Tin Yan, an individual, )
Tina F. Yan, aka Tina Foon Yu Yan, an )
individual, J
547 Investments LLC, a California limited )
liability company, )
The Remodeling Company, Inc., a California )
corporation, )
Epona Investment Group LLC, a California )
limited liability company, )
Anew Law Corporation, a California )
corporation, )
Defendants. }

)

565831

Case No.: CGC-14-565831

[ ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS CRYSTAL LEI AND
BRYANT FU’S MOTION FOR ORDER
SETTING ATTORNEYS FEES IN FAVOR
OF PLAINTIFFS AGAINST DEFENDANT
DEMAS YAN

Hearing Date: October 24, 2019

Time: 9:30 am
Court Room: 302

Judge: Hon. Ethan P. Schulman

OREDER 1

>|24

25

Plaintiffs Cyrstal Lei and Bryant Fu's Motion For*Order Setting Attorneys Fees In Favor
Of Plaintiffs came on calendar for Thursday, October 24, 2019, Line 5,

Plaintiffs Crystal Lei and Bryant Fu's Motion For an Order Setting Attorneys Fees it
Favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant Demas Yan is granted in the amount of $42,687.69)
Plaintiffs prevailed on Yan's anti-SLAPP special motion to strike, and this Court awarded
attorneys' fees on the ground that the special motion was frivolous. (See Code Civ. Proc. §
425.16(c).) The Court of Appeal affirmed that order in its entirety, finding that Yan's anti+

SLAPP motion was a bad faith delay tactic. "A statute authorizing an attorney fee award at the

trial court level includes appellate attorney fees unless the statute specifically provide:
otherwise." (Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1499.) "Section 425.16, was
(c), does not preclude recovery of appellate attorney fees; hence attorney fees recoverable undey
the statute include appellate fees." (Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal-App.4th!
454, 461.) Thus, "[t]he trial court's authority to award fees and costs under section 425.16.
subdivision (c), includes authority to award fees incurred in responding to an appeal of an ordey
granting or denying a special motion to strike, or of an order awarding attorney fees in|
connection with such motion." (Id.; see also, e.g., Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 265, 275 [plaintiff's attorney fees on appeal from order finding anti-SLAPP motion
frivolous are "recoverable under the statute]; Taxpayer and Consumer Rights v. Garamendi
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1395 [same].) Yan shall pay the fees awarded within 10 days o:
entry of the Court's order.
Dated: October 24, 2019 .

IT IS SO ORDERED,

i SERA

565831 ORRDER 2Exhibit VSuperior Gourt
County of San eealorna

AUG 14 2019

CLERK OF THE CQURT
Wy: A
Députy Clerk

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
CRYSTAL LEI AND BRYANT FU, No. CGC-14-565831
PLAINTIFFS, , STATEMENT OF DECISION AND JUDGMENT

vs.

DEMAS YAN aka DENNIS YAN, an
individual, DBA EPONA INVESTMENT
REALTY and DBA YAN LAW OFFICES,
CHEUKTIN YAN, an individual, TINA F.
YAN, aka TINA FOON YU YAN, an
individual, 547 INVESTMENTS LLC, a
California limited liability company, THE
REMODELING COMPANY, INC., a
California corporation, EPONA
INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC, a California
limited liability company, ANEW LAW
CORPORATION, a California corporation, et
al., DEFENDANTS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter came on for a court trial on July 1-3, 2019 as to Case No. CGC-14-565831. This
Court previously bifurcated the instant action from CGC-14-541875 on April 11, 2018 and directed that
the CGC 14-565831 action be filed nunc pro tunc as of September 26, 2014.

Cheryl Rouse appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs Crystal Lei and Bryant Fu. Defendant Demas Yan

4

Statement of Decision and Judgment, CGC-14-565831appeared in pro per. Mark Lapham appeared on behalf of Defendants Tina Yan, Cheuk Tin Yan, and 547
Investments, LLC.

The Court heard testimony from Crystal Lei, Bryant Fu, and Demas Yan. The Court permitted
Demas Yan to present additional written testimony (in lieu of direct examination) subject to cross-
examination on July 3, 2019. The Court admitted into evidence Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-52, 69-71 , 73.
Defendant’s Exhibits. A, B, and D. After giving the parties three weeks to file their respective proposed
orders and having received both sides’ proposed orders, the Court took the case under submission on July
26, 2019. :

After issuing its tentative statement of decision on July 31, 2019, the Court received and reviewed
plaintiffs’ objection to the tentative statement on August 2, 2019. Defendants filed no objections. The °
Court finds that plaintiffs’ subsequent objections of August 12, 2019 are untimely.

Having considered all of the pleadings, evidence, and arguments of counsel and the parties, the

Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Demas Yan and Tony Fu were former business associates. Crystal Lei is Tony Fu’s ex-
wife. Bryant Fu is Tony Fu’s and Crystal Lei’s son.

2. In 2000, Yan and Fu entered into a joint venture agreement concerning real property
located at 663 Chenery Street, San Francisco, California. (Exh. 13.)

3. On August 9, 2010, Demas Yan filed the 2010 Cross-Complaint (San Francisco Superior
Court Case No. CGC-10-501321) against Crystal Lei and Bryant Fu. (Plaintiff's Exh. 2.)

4. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the 2010 Cross-Complaint on February 18, 2011.
(Plaintiffs Exh. 4).

5. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on March 18, 2014. The Court found Yan’s
appeal frivolous and wholly without merit and ordered him to pay $35,004.71 in attorney’s fees.
(Plaintiff's Exh. 9 and 10).

6. On July 20, 2012, Yan filed the 2012 Complaint (San Francisco Superior Court Case No.
CGC-12-522566) against Crystal Lei and Bryant Fu. (Plaintiff's Exh. 11.)

2

Statement of Decision and Judgment, CGC-14-565831oOo IN DH RB WY

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7. The case was removed to Bankruptcy Court, which dismissed the lawsuit on December 13,
2013. (Plaintiff's Exh. 11.) :

8. Yan appealed to the United States District Court, which found the appeal to be without
merit and affirmed the bankruptcy court. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 14.)

9. Yan appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed on April 29, 2016.
The Ninth Circuit found that the “claims were sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past and are
properly included as property of the bankruptcy estate under Section 541.” The Court imposed sanctions
for filing a frivolous appeal. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 15.)

10. As described by Justice Ruvolo in Lei v. Yan, 2018 WL 345768 (1* Dist. Ct. of App.
January 10, 2018): “Yan engaged in a pattern of ongoing, relentless, vexatious, and wholly meritless
litigations against Fu and virtually anyone associated with Fu, including (respondents Crystal Lei and
Bryant Fu). Most of these lawsuits were bad faith attempts to re-litigate issues disposed of by the
bankruptcy court with respect to the various interests in and obligations with respect to the Chenery
Project. In some cases, Yan was sanctioned and in some he was held in contempt. Eventually, the
bankruptcy court determined that Yan was a vexatious litigant. Also, the Ninth Circuit awarded attorney
fees to respondents for having to defend Yan’s frivolous appeal. Yan was not deterred by’ these adverse
outcomes.”

11. Ms. Lei and Mr. Fu incurred approximately $1 18,939.56 to defend against the 2010 and

2012 cross-complaints. Ms. Lei paid these invoices to the Allen Matkins law firm.

12. On September 26, 2014, Crystal Lei and Bryant Fu filed the complaint in this action for
malicious prosecution, constructive fraud, conspiracy to defraud and fraudulent transfers.

13, At trial, Ms. Lei testified that she suffered emotional distress from incurring these fees
because she needed to borrow money from family and friends to defend against the suits.

14. Ms. Lei further testified that she had to spend most of her time dealing with the sundry
litigation.

15. Mr. Fu testified at trial that as a result of the litigation, he was unable to pursue his
education as an engineer and instead graduated with an undergraduate degree in legal studies in order to
assist with the on-going litigation. :

3

Statement of Decision and Judgment, CGC-14-56583116. Mr. Yan has failed to pay any of the court-ordered sanctions to date. The approximate
total of all outstanding sanctions and statutory interest as of July 1, 2019 exceeds $400,000.

B. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. To establish a cause of action for the malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding, a
plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the
defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in plaintiff's favor; (2) was brought without probable
cause; and (3) was initiated with malice. (Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 50.)

2. The Court finds that both the 2010 Cross-Complaint and the 2012 Complaint were litigated
on the merits, commenced by Demas Yan, and pursued to a legal termination in plaintiff Crystal Lei’s
favor.

3. A litigant will lack probable cause for his action either if he relies upon facts which he has
no reasonable cause to believe to be true, or if he seeks recovery upon a legal theory which is untenable
under the facts known to him. (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4" 260, 292.)

4. The Court finds that both the 2010 Cross-Complaint and the 2012 Complaint were brought
without probable cause. Despite ample orders suggesting that his claims were meritless, Yan proceeded
to bring and pursue the two actions. (Exh. 5, Order of Thomas Carlson, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, February
18, 2011; Plaintiff's Exh. 13.)

5. As an element of the tort of malicious prosecution, malice at its core refers to an improper
motive for bringing the prior action. As an element of liability it reflects the core function of the tort,
which is to secure compensation for harm inflicted by misusing the judicial system, i.e., using it for
something other than to enforce legitimate rights and secure remedies to which the claimant may tenably
claim an entitlement. (Drummond v. Desmarais (2009) 176 Cal.App.4" 439, 451-452.)

6. The Court finds that plaintiffs have proved by the preponderance of the evidence that the
2010 Cross-Complaint and the 2012 Complaint were initiated with malice. (Plaintiff's Exhs. 5, 11, 13.)
The exhibits admitted at trial evince a long pattern of meritless actions initiated by Mr. Yan. (Jd) Yan
could not point to one successful case or decision at the trial, appellate, and bankruptcy courts. As the
First District Court of Appeal noted, “the 2010 cross-complaint was the latest in a series of bad faith cases
that Yan had filed, thus evidencing malice.” (Lei v. Yan, 2018 WL 345768 (January 10, 2018).)

4
Statement of Decision and Judgment, CGC-14-565831co Ome DH PF WwW WY

7. At trial, Mr. Yan testified that he did not review prior pleadings or court orders before
proceeding to file the 2010 Cross-Complaint and the 2012 Complaint. Specifically, Mr. Yan did not
consider the bankruptcy orders and their effect on further litigation. (Yan Trial Testimony, July 3, 2019;
Plaintiffs Exhs. 5, 11, 13.)

8. To the extent Mr. Yan testified to the contrary that he had a good faith basis for pursuing
the 2010 and 2012 actions, the Court finds that his testimony is not credible. Of note is Mr. Yan’s pattern
of ignoring vexatious litigant orders, flouting court orders regarding sanctions, and ignoring orders stating
that his claims lack merit.

9. A fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA), Civ. Code §
3439 is a transfer by the debtor of property to a third person undertaken with the intent to prevent a
creditor from reaching that interest to satisfy its claim. (Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4" 642,
648.)

10. _A transfer or an obligation is voidable as to both existing and future creditors if it is made
or incurred with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor. (Civ. Code § 3439.04(a)(1).) Such
a transfer is voidable as to a creditor of the debtor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred. (Civ. Code § 3439.04, sub. (a).)

11. With regard to the fraudulent transfer claim, the Court finds plaintiffs have not met their
burden of proving that defendants Tina Yan, Cheuk Tin Yan, and 547 Investments LLC transferred Yan’s
real property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors. The Court declines to apply the
doctrine of collateral estoppel because it is unclear that the same parties litigated the same issues
previously litigated. (Exh. 29.) Thus, the Court enters judgment in favor of defendants Tina Yan, Cheuk
Tin Yan, and 547 Investments LLC with regard to the UVTA cause of action.

12. To the extent that plaintiffs relied on collateral estoppel only to establish their case against
Mr. Yan with regard to the UVTA cause of action, the Court grants their motion to dismiss this claim
against Mr. Yan. Plaintiffs’ UVTA claim against Mr. Yan is dismissed without prejudice; and the Court
finds that it was not litigated on the merits for the purposes of collateral estoppel or res judicata purposes.

13. The Court finds the appropriate measure of plaintiffs’ damages to be the attorney’s fees
incurred to defend the 2010 Cross-Complaint and the 2012 Complaint, or $118,939.56.

5

Statement of Decision and Judgment, CGC-14-56583114. The Court also finds that plaintiffs have proved emotional ‘distress damages in the amount
of $219,000 -- $119,000 for Crystal Lei and $100,000 for Bryant Fu.

15. The Court finds that Mr. Yan’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs’ harm
and damages.

16. The Court declines to award punitive damages because plaintiffs have not met the burden.
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Yan pursued his claims with malice, oppression, and
fraud. The Court does find that plaintiffs have proved “malice” as an element of malicious prosecution by

the preponderan