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Mark Hooshmand (SBN 194878)
Tyson Redenbarger (SBN 294424)
Jenny Jin, Esq. (SBN 296184)
Hooshmand Law Group
22 Battery Street, Ste. 610
San Francisco, CA 94111
Tel: (415) 318-5709
Fax: (415) 376-5897
Attorneys for Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle
ELECTRONICALLY
FILED
Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco
01/08/2018
Clerk of the Court
BY: VANESSA WU
Deputy Clerk
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO - UNLIMITED CIVIL JURISDICTION
ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TREVOR DENG, and DOES | TO 10,
Defendants.
SSS SH Se SSS SS SY
CASE: CGC-16-555761
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S
MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
Date: February 7, 2018
Time: 3:00 p.m.
Dept.: 504
Judge: Hon. Suzanne R. Bolanos
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF
ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION
FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 1om IN DAH BF WN
10
TABLE OF CONTENTS
L INTRODUCTION .0..oesssesessssesssssssssssesssnsssssessssnecssasecssnecssssecsanscassueccaneccessecsanscsssaveceuarecsuaneeanaseeand 4
TI, STATEMENT OF FACTS .......cccccssesssssserssseesneserencenernvesveonesnssuesssssassnesuesnseansssssnesaracanssacanssevesasanses! 4
Ill. KEY TRIAL TESTIMONY EVIDENCING UNCONTROVERTED MATTERS .......:...sesss000e 5
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION ........ssssssccsssssssecsnsntescennsaneesessnnsecensnaneeenesne
A. Standard for Rendering a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict .............secsssesssssssseeseseesseee 7
B. Defendant Deng Admitted That He Had Ulterior Motives When He Evicted Angelique
Rochelle, Which is a Direct Violation of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance ...........ssecssseseseeeeeee8
C. Defendant Deng Lied Under Penalty of Perjury at His Deposition About Rent at His Previous
Residence Being “Discounted”...........sssssscsssesessessesssessesseseteserssesscsnsenssnecsscescsnsesseneerecsessaceneraeeseeseren 8
D. There Was No Evidence That Defendant Deng’s Mother Was Actually Planning to Move into
the Subject Premises or Live There for 36 Months as Required by the Law ........scsscsesssssssssssesenee 9
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION
FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 2oem ND HW FF WY
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Supreme Court of California
Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co.,
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 877........ceceeesssseeseesseceescesseeseceeceeesecseeseecseeseeceeseeseesteseesseseeead 4
Hauter v. Zogarts,
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 110.0000... ecceccsccceseesereeeaceaseaseeeescescereeeseeseseeseesesceseeseeeseeees se eae 4
California Courts of Appeal
Beavers v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
(1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 310, 323-324......cccssseseeseeeceeteeseeseeseeseeessessersesesseeessaaaaaeea gegen 5
Deil’Qca v. Bank of New York Trust Co.. N.A.,
(2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 531, 5a Cee teceectt Petes stat tenets 5
Hansen v, Simnyside Products, Inc.,
(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1510........csecccsceessssseceeessseeeeeeesseeeeeeessaeeeeceasseseeseeneeeeeeneas 5
Moore v. San Francisco,
(1970) 5 Cal-App.3d 728, 733-734.........scccccccessececeeersceecesenseeseseeseeeecsneceeeesseseeseaaeed 4
Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank,
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 234, 275.......cecccccscsscsecceecceceeeeesseesenseneeeesseeuseneesseesenseeseeeree 4,5
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Code Civ. Proc. § 629.........cccccceessssssneereneeseeeneeeeeeeeseeeseeseeseeteeteeenerteeetessereenannerereed 4
San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, § 37.9.............06+ 2,3,5
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION
FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 3oe IN DH FF WH
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle moves for a full, or in the alternative partial, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict based on the clear, uncontroverted evidence presented at trial that
Defendant Trevor Deng had ulterior motives when he evicted Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle and
that there was no evidence that Defendant Deng or his mother, Yu Yao Tan, planned to have
Mrs. Tan move to Ms. Rochelle’s unit or intended for Mrs. Tan live at the unit for 36 continuous
months, as required under the law. Mrs. Tan even renewed her lease at her apartment when Mr.
Deng served the relative eviction notice on Ms. Rochelle. Neither Mrs. Tan nor Defendant Deng
have provided any evidence that Mrs. Tan truly intended to move in or live at the subject unit.
These uncontroverted facts prove violations of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance; yet the jury
did not find for Plaintiff under her Rent Ordinance causes of action.
Therefore, where there was substantial evidence supporting Defendant’s violations of the
Rent Ordinance, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Il. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle is a former tenant of a rental unit located at 778 25th Avenue,
San Francisco, California (“Subject Premises”). Plaintiff Rochelle moved into the Subject
Premises in November 2003, and resided there with her three children, until she was evicted in
July 2014. Defendant Trevor Deng and his wife, May Deng, purchased the building in or around
July 2013, and moved into the upstairs unit at 776 25th Avenue in April 2014.
On June 13, 2014, Defendant served Plaintiff with a relative move-in (“RMI”) eviction
notice, which indicated that Defendant Deng’s mother. Mrs. Tan, was going to moving into the
Subject Premises. (Declaration of Mark Hooshmand (“Hooshmand Decl.”), Exhibit B (Trial
Exhibit No. 8).) Defendant separately represented to Plaintiff that Mrs. Tan would be moving into
the Subject Premises to help take care of Defendant's children. Relying on Defendant's
representation that his mother was moving in, Ms. Rochelle found a new apartment in Oakland.
On June 25, 2014, Ms. Rochelle agreed to a move out date, and confirmed this through a one-page
document that Defendant had prepared, which included penalty clauses and waivers of rights
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION
FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 4om IY DAH BF WwW DY
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under the Rent Ordinance, which are void. (Hooshmand Decl., Exhibit C (Trial Exhibit No. 9).)
Plaintiff thereafter moved out in July 2014.
Following Ms. Rochelle’s move out, Ms. Rochelle continued to believe that Mrs. Tan had
moved into her former unit. She even happened to drive by the Subject Premises, but did not see
any signs that Mrs. Tan had not moved in, or any signs of construction or remodeling. Ms.
Rochelle had no reason to suspect that Defendant Tan had in fact, not moved into the Subject
Premises, since Defendant had been so adamant as to the importance of having Mrs. Tan live in
the same building as Defendant, to help Defendant take care of his children.
The jury trial in this case began on November 21, 2017. The jury returned a special verdict
in favor of Defendant on December 4, 2017, and notice of entry of judgment was entered on
December 14, 2017. (Declaration of Mark Hooshmand (“Hooshmand Decl.”) { 3, Exhibit A.)
Ill. KEY TRIAL TESTIMONY EVIDENCING UNCONTROVERTED MATTERS
Defendant Deng evicted Plaintiff under the Rent Ordinance section 37.9(a)(8), which
states:
(8) The landlord seeks to recover possession in good faith, without ulterior
reasons and with honest intent;
(ii) For the use or occupancy of the landlords grandparents, grandchildren,
parents, children, brother or sister, or the landlords spouse or the spouses of such
relations, as their principal place of residency for a period of at least 36
months, in the same building in which the landlord resides as his or her principal
place of residency, or in a building in which the landlord is simultaneously seeking
possession of a rental unit under 37.9(a)(8)(i).
(emphasis added.)
Defendant served a 60-Day Notice pursuant to section 37.9(a)(8) above, and made the
following representation within that notice:
“The owners of the aforesaid premises, Chu Hua Deng and May Deng, seek to
recover possession in good faith, without ulterior reasons and with honest intent for
use as the principle place of residence of Chu Hua Deng's mother, Yu Yao Tan, for
a period of at least 36 continuous months. Yu Yao Tan, who is over the age of 60,
intends in good faith, without ulterior motives and with honest intent, to make the
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION
FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 5Ce YN DH PF WN =
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premises her principal place of residence for a period of at least 36 continuous
months.”
(Hooshmand Decl., Exhibit B)
The relevant portions of the trial transcript are attached as Exhibit F to the Declaration of
Mark Hooshmand. Testimony at trial established that Defendant Deng had ulterior motives in
evicting Plaintiff, in violation of 37.9(a)(8). Mr. Deng testified that he wanted Plaintiff's unit so he
could gain full access to the garage,.have additional space for storage and parking, and have
available space at the Subject Premises for out of town friends and family be able stay in, when
they visit San Francisco. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 642:17-643:16) These constitute ulterior reasons for
recovering possession of the Subject Premises. These reasons or motives are not simply “a
residence for Yu Yao Tan, for a period of at least 36 continuous months”, which was what
Defendant Deng had represented was his only motive in recovering possession of the Subject
Premises.
Therefore, where Defendant Deng himself admitted he had ulterior reasons for evicting
Plaintiff from the Subject Premises, and where the law prevents a relative move-in eviction for
ulterior reasons or motives, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should issue. Mr. Deng
violated the Rent Ordinance, and the evidence introduced at trial clearly supported that. The jury’s
verdict was therefore erroneous.
Additionally, there was no testimony given at trial that Mrs. Tan actually planned to move
into or live at the Subject Premises for a period of at least 36 continuous months. Defendant Deng
testified he asked his mother if she would consider moving in downstairs and she said “okay.”
Defendant Deng also testified that this conversation lasted mere minutes. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 614:20-
615:3) There was no discussions between Mr. Deng and Mrs. Tan as to when she would move in,
when she would move out of her current apartment, or any of the other logistics of moving into the
Subject Premises. (Tr. Tx. Vol. V, 393:14-21, 394:15-25) At no point did Defendant Deng and
his mother discuss the requirements for when Mrs. Tan would have to move in, or how long she
would have to live in the Subject Premises for.
Mrs. Tan corroborated Defendant Deng’s testimony where she testified that the only
conversation she had with Defendant Deng was limited to her agreement to a cursory plan where
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION
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she might move into the Subject Premises. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 698:24-699:17) Mrs. Tan also
renewed her lease at her apartment during the critical time period in June 2014, when Defendant
represented to Ms. Rochelle that his mother would be moving in. The evidence also established
that Ms. Tan told no one that she planned to move. Mrs. Tan did not actually move into the
Subject Premises, and Defendant Deng renovated and re-rented the unit to new tenants, for
$4,500/month in rent starting in January 2015. (Hooshmand Deecl., Exhibit D (Trial Exhibit No.
18; Tr. Tx. Vol. V, 413: 21-26; Vol. VI, 648:27-28) Indeed, there was no evidence presented at
trial to show that Defendant Deng intended to comply with the Rent Ordinance and move his
mother into the Subject Premises. The jury’s verdict was therefore unsupported by any substantial
evidence.
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
A. Standard for Rendering a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
Code of Civil Procedure section 629 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “[t]he court,
before the expiration of its power to rule on a motion for a new trial, either of its own motion,
after five days’ notice, or on motion of a party against whom a verdict has’ been rendered, shall
render judgment in favor of the aggrieved party notwithstanding the verdict whenever a motion
for a directed verdict for the aggrieved party should have been granted had a previous motion
been made.”
“The cardinal requirement for a directed verdict is that there be no substantial conflict in
the evidence." (Osborn v, Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 234, 275, quoting
Cal. Judges' Benchbook - Civil Trials (CJER 1981) § 9.87, p. 317 and authorities cited.) “If the
evidence is conflicting or if several reasonable inferences may be drawn, the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied." (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d
104, 110.) A motion for judgment “notwithstanding the verdict” challenges the legal sufficiency
of the opposing party’s evidence. (See Jd; Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865,
877; Moore v. San Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 733-734.)
Since a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper whenever a motion for
directed yerdict should have been granted and a directed verdict may be granted as to some but
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION
FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 7Co mRNA HR YW DY =
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not all issues decided at trial, it follows that trial courts may likewise grant judgment
notwithstanding the verdict as to less than all issues. This is also known as a “partial NOV.”
(Beavers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 310, 323-324; Deil’Qca v. Bank of New
York Trust Co.. N.A. (2008) 159 Cal-App.4th 531, 553; Hansen v. Simnyside Products, Inc.
(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1510.)
Granting of a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict involves a determination that
the moving party is entitled to judgment in its favor on some, but not all issues in dispute.
Beavers vy. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 225 Cal. App. 3d 310.
Unless a jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence, it may not be upheld.
Where, as here, there is no substantial evidence and no reasonable inferences can be drawn to
support the jury's verdict, the trial court should enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict in
favor of Plaintiffs. (See Hauter, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 110.)
B. Defendant Deng Admitted That He Had Ulterior Motives When He Evicted
Angelique Rochelle, Which is a Direct Violation of the San Francisco Rent
Ordinance.
Testimony at trial established that Trevor Deng had ulterior motives in violation of
37.9(a)(8). Mr. Deng stated that he wanted Plaintiffs unit, so he could regain access to the garage,
storage, and have guests stay in Plaintiffs former unit. Those are ulterior motives. Those motives
are not simply “a residence for Yu Yao Tan, for a period of at least 36 continuous months”, which
is what Mr. Deng represented was his only motive. The evidence of Mr. Deng’s “ulterior
motives” was not in conflict. (See Osborn, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at 275.)
Therefore, where Mr. Deng himself admitted he had ulterior motives, and the law prevents
evictions for ulterior motives, the judgment must be changed. Mr. Deng violated the Rent
Ordinance, and the only evidence introduced at trial supported this fact. A judgment
notwithstanding the verdict should issue.
C. Defendant Deng Lied Under Penalty of Perjury at His Deposition About Rent At
His Previous Residence Being “Discounted”
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION
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In further support of Defendant’s dishonest intent and lack of good faith, Plaintiff's
counsel played a video clip from Defendant Deng’s July 12, 2017 deposition in this case, in which
Defendant had taken an oath to testify truthfully under penalty of perjury. When asked how much
rent Defendant had paid at his previous residence in San Francisco, prior to purchasing the subject
property, Defendant stated that he could not recall the exact amount but that it was “discounted” to
something less than $1,400.00. (Tr. Tx. Vol. V, 371:18-372:24.) During Defendant’s testimony at
trial however, where he was also under penalty of perjury to tell the truth, Defendant Deng
testified that he had in fact paid no rent at this previous residence, and that he was simply
embarrassed to say so during his deposition. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 654:21-655:25.)
Such an excuse by Defendant is not a justification for lying, under penalty of perjury, at his
deposition. Defendant Deng was clearly dishonest about paying rent because he wanted to give
the impression that he had a financial need for moving into the subject building, since he had
allegedly paid some amount of “rent” at his previous residence. Likewise, in his answers to
Special Interrogatories read at trial, Defendant had claimed that due to the $25,000 he had to pay
to Plaintiff to move out, “getting some rental income seemed like a good idea.” (Hooshmand
Decl., Exhibit E (Trial Exhibit No. 42A).) In both instances, Defendant attempted to falsely claim
financial difficulties to justify the actions that he took when he in fact, had a plan from the
beginning to move into the subject building and to displace Ms. Rochelle from her rent-controlled
unit. This is not an honest or permitted reason to evict Ms. Rochelle.
D. There Was No Evidence That Defendant Deng’s Mother Was Actually Planning
to Move into the Subject Premises or Live There for 36 Months as Required by the
Law
There was no testimony or evidence at trial showing that Yu Yao Tan actually intended
to move into the Subject Premises, or live at the Subject Premises for a period of at least 36
continuous months, in accordance to the 60-Day Notice. Mr. Deng only testified that he had a
conversation with Mrs. Tan which lasted a few minutes where he asked her if she would move
and she replied “okay.” (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 614:20-615:3) No other discussions took place as to
when or how she would move in, or when she would need to notify her apartment management
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION
FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 9Oo eo IN DA HW BW HY
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of moving out. And at no point did Mr. Deng and his mother discuss the requirement that Mrs.
Tan had to live at the Subject Premises for any length of time.
Mrs. Tan also testified that the only conversations she had with Mr. Deng was limited to
her agreeing to a plan where she might move into the Subject Premises, without any discussions
as to a date of move in or otherwise. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 698:24-699:17) Thereafter, Mrs. Tan
took no other actions or steps to move in, but just waited for Mr. Deng to give her further
instructions. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 703:24-704:1) Ms. Tan in fact, renewed her lease terms at her
apartment while the eviction notice was pending in June 2014. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 706:4-707:13)
Even after Plaintiff had vacated the Subject Premises, Mrs. Tan did not ask Mr. Deng whether
she could move in now, or take any steps to begin the process of moving in. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI,
711:17-27)
There is no conflict in the evidence as to these points. (Osborn, supra 5 Cal.App.4th at
275.) Yet under the Rent Ordinance, Ms. Tan made representations and was required to actually
intend to move to the Subject Premises to live in. Defendant produced no evidence that supports
that Ms. Tan did in fact intend or plan to move. In fact, all of the evidence establishes that Ms.
Tan did not intend to move to the subject premises, as she made no plans, she told no one, and
she ultimately stayed at her apartment without even asking her son if the plan had changed. That
fact proves there was no plan, and Ms. Tan never truly intended to move into the Subject
Premises.
There was no evidence presented at trial that Defendant Deng intended to comply or that
he complied with Section 37.9(a)(8) Rent Ordinance. And for the foregoing reasons, there is no
substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict in this case.
Vv. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle asks the Court to grant this
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The jury’s verdict was not supported by
substantial evidence where Defendant Trevor Deng violated the law in planning to or actually
moving his mother into the Subject Premises, pursuant to the relative move-in eviction served.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION
FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 10oOo ND HA BF BW NY
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Date: January 8, 2018 Respectfully submitted,
HOOSHMAND LAW GROUP
Mark Hooshmand, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION
FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 11
Preview
Co Oe NAH RB YW NY NN NYH HY NR NK KY Be eB ew Be Be Be ee eB ec 1N AD PF YUH |= SO we KA A RF YW KH SK DO Mark Hooshmand (SBN 194878) Tyson Redenbarger (SBN 294424) Jenny Jin, Esq. (SBN 296184) Hooshmand Law Group 22 Battery Street, Ste. 610 San Francisco, CA 94111 Tel: (415) 318-5709 Fax: (415) 376-5897 Attorneys for Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco 01/08/2018 Clerk of the Court BY: VANESSA WU Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO - UNLIMITED CIVIL JURISDICTION ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE, Plaintiff, vs. TREVOR DENG, and DOES | TO 10, Defendants. SSS SH Se SSS SS SY CASE: CGC-16-555761 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT Date: February 7, 2018 Time: 3:00 p.m. Dept.: 504 Judge: Hon. Suzanne R. Bolanos MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 1om IN DAH BF WN 10 TABLE OF CONTENTS L INTRODUCTION .0..oesssesessssesssssssssssesssnsssssessssnecssasecssnecssssecsanscassueccaneccessecsanscsssaveceuarecsuaneeanaseeand 4 TI, STATEMENT OF FACTS .......cccccssesssssserssseesneserencenernvesveonesnssuesssssassnesuesnseansssssnesaracanssacanssevesasanses! 4 Ill. KEY TRIAL TESTIMONY EVIDENCING UNCONTROVERTED MATTERS .......:...sesss000e 5 IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION ........ssssssccsssssssecsnsntescennsaneesessnnsecensnaneeenesne A. Standard for Rendering a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict .............secsssesssssssseeseseesseee 7 B. Defendant Deng Admitted That He Had Ulterior Motives When He Evicted Angelique Rochelle, Which is a Direct Violation of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance ...........ssecssseseseeeeeee8 C. Defendant Deng Lied Under Penalty of Perjury at His Deposition About Rent at His Previous Residence Being “Discounted”...........sssssscsssesessessesssessesseseteserssesscsnsenssnecsscescsnsesseneerecsessaceneraeeseeseren 8 D. There Was No Evidence That Defendant Deng’s Mother Was Actually Planning to Move into the Subject Premises or Live There for 36 Months as Required by the Law ........scsscsesssssssssssesenee 9 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 2oem ND HW FF WY RYN MY NY YN NRK KN S| Se Be Be Be eB eB Be SB Be eI AWK ON =F SO wMe A DW BF BH | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Supreme Court of California Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 877........ceceeesssseeseesseceescesseeseceeceeesecseeseecseeseeceeseeseesteseesseseeead 4 Hauter v. Zogarts, (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 110.0000... ecceccsccceseesereeeaceaseaseeeescescereeeseeseseeseesesceseeseeeseeees se eae 4 California Courts of Appeal Beavers v. Allstate Ins. Co., (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 310, 323-324......cccssseseeseeeceeteeseeseeseeseeessessersesesseeessaaaaaeea gegen 5 Deil’Qca v. Bank of New York Trust Co.. N.A., (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 531, 5a Cee teceectt Petes stat tenets 5 Hansen v, Simnyside Products, Inc., (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1510........csecccsceessssseceeessseeeeeeesseeeeeeessaeeeeceasseseeseeneeeeeeneas 5 Moore v. San Francisco, (1970) 5 Cal-App.3d 728, 733-734.........scccccccessececeeersceecesenseeseseeseeeecsneceeeesseseeseaaeed 4 Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 234, 275.......cecccccscsscsecceecceceeeeesseesenseneeeesseeuseneesseesenseeseeeree 4,5 STATUTORY PROVISIONS Code Civ. Proc. § 629.........cccccceessssssneereneeseeeneeeeeeeeseeeseeseeseeteeteeenerteeetessereenannerereed 4 San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, § 37.9.............06+ 2,3,5 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 3oe IN DH FF WH I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle moves for a full, or in the alternative partial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the clear, uncontroverted evidence presented at trial that Defendant Trevor Deng had ulterior motives when he evicted Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle and that there was no evidence that Defendant Deng or his mother, Yu Yao Tan, planned to have Mrs. Tan move to Ms. Rochelle’s unit or intended for Mrs. Tan live at the unit for 36 continuous months, as required under the law. Mrs. Tan even renewed her lease at her apartment when Mr. Deng served the relative eviction notice on Ms. Rochelle. Neither Mrs. Tan nor Defendant Deng have provided any evidence that Mrs. Tan truly intended to move in or live at the subject unit. These uncontroverted facts prove violations of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance; yet the jury did not find for Plaintiff under her Rent Ordinance causes of action. Therefore, where there was substantial evidence supporting Defendant’s violations of the Rent Ordinance, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Il. STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle is a former tenant of a rental unit located at 778 25th Avenue, San Francisco, California (“Subject Premises”). Plaintiff Rochelle moved into the Subject Premises in November 2003, and resided there with her three children, until she was evicted in July 2014. Defendant Trevor Deng and his wife, May Deng, purchased the building in or around July 2013, and moved into the upstairs unit at 776 25th Avenue in April 2014. On June 13, 2014, Defendant served Plaintiff with a relative move-in (“RMI”) eviction notice, which indicated that Defendant Deng’s mother. Mrs. Tan, was going to moving into the Subject Premises. (Declaration of Mark Hooshmand (“Hooshmand Decl.”), Exhibit B (Trial Exhibit No. 8).) Defendant separately represented to Plaintiff that Mrs. Tan would be moving into the Subject Premises to help take care of Defendant's children. Relying on Defendant's representation that his mother was moving in, Ms. Rochelle found a new apartment in Oakland. On June 25, 2014, Ms. Rochelle agreed to a move out date, and confirmed this through a one-page document that Defendant had prepared, which included penalty clauses and waivers of rights MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 4om IY DAH BF WwW DY 10 under the Rent Ordinance, which are void. (Hooshmand Decl., Exhibit C (Trial Exhibit No. 9).) Plaintiff thereafter moved out in July 2014. Following Ms. Rochelle’s move out, Ms. Rochelle continued to believe that Mrs. Tan had moved into her former unit. She even happened to drive by the Subject Premises, but did not see any signs that Mrs. Tan had not moved in, or any signs of construction or remodeling. Ms. Rochelle had no reason to suspect that Defendant Tan had in fact, not moved into the Subject Premises, since Defendant had been so adamant as to the importance of having Mrs. Tan live in the same building as Defendant, to help Defendant take care of his children. The jury trial in this case began on November 21, 2017. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Defendant on December 4, 2017, and notice of entry of judgment was entered on December 14, 2017. (Declaration of Mark Hooshmand (“Hooshmand Decl.”) { 3, Exhibit A.) Ill. KEY TRIAL TESTIMONY EVIDENCING UNCONTROVERTED MATTERS Defendant Deng evicted Plaintiff under the Rent Ordinance section 37.9(a)(8), which states: (8) The landlord seeks to recover possession in good faith, without ulterior reasons and with honest intent; (ii) For the use or occupancy of the landlords grandparents, grandchildren, parents, children, brother or sister, or the landlords spouse or the spouses of such relations, as their principal place of residency for a period of at least 36 months, in the same building in which the landlord resides as his or her principal place of residency, or in a building in which the landlord is simultaneously seeking possession of a rental unit under 37.9(a)(8)(i). (emphasis added.) Defendant served a 60-Day Notice pursuant to section 37.9(a)(8) above, and made the following representation within that notice: “The owners of the aforesaid premises, Chu Hua Deng and May Deng, seek to recover possession in good faith, without ulterior reasons and with honest intent for use as the principle place of residence of Chu Hua Deng's mother, Yu Yao Tan, for a period of at least 36 continuous months. Yu Yao Tan, who is over the age of 60, intends in good faith, without ulterior motives and with honest intent, to make the MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 5Ce YN DH PF WN = RY NY NY NY NN KN KY BS SB Be Be Be Be ew Se Be oN AA GF BH |S SOC eM AIA DHA RH NE DS premises her principal place of residence for a period of at least 36 continuous months.” (Hooshmand Decl., Exhibit B) The relevant portions of the trial transcript are attached as Exhibit F to the Declaration of Mark Hooshmand. Testimony at trial established that Defendant Deng had ulterior motives in evicting Plaintiff, in violation of 37.9(a)(8). Mr. Deng testified that he wanted Plaintiff's unit so he could gain full access to the garage,.have additional space for storage and parking, and have available space at the Subject Premises for out of town friends and family be able stay in, when they visit San Francisco. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 642:17-643:16) These constitute ulterior reasons for recovering possession of the Subject Premises. These reasons or motives are not simply “a residence for Yu Yao Tan, for a period of at least 36 continuous months”, which was what Defendant Deng had represented was his only motive in recovering possession of the Subject Premises. Therefore, where Defendant Deng himself admitted he had ulterior reasons for evicting Plaintiff from the Subject Premises, and where the law prevents a relative move-in eviction for ulterior reasons or motives, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should issue. Mr. Deng violated the Rent Ordinance, and the evidence introduced at trial clearly supported that. The jury’s verdict was therefore erroneous. Additionally, there was no testimony given at trial that Mrs. Tan actually planned to move into or live at the Subject Premises for a period of at least 36 continuous months. Defendant Deng testified he asked his mother if she would consider moving in downstairs and she said “okay.” Defendant Deng also testified that this conversation lasted mere minutes. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 614:20- 615:3) There was no discussions between Mr. Deng and Mrs. Tan as to when she would move in, when she would move out of her current apartment, or any of the other logistics of moving into the Subject Premises. (Tr. Tx. Vol. V, 393:14-21, 394:15-25) At no point did Defendant Deng and his mother discuss the requirements for when Mrs. Tan would have to move in, or how long she would have to live in the Subject Premises for. Mrs. Tan corroborated Defendant Deng’s testimony where she testified that the only conversation she had with Defendant Deng was limited to her agreement to a cursory plan where MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 6Co oe YN DH BF YW NY = BN RN YN ND De we a Se IDA RB YW KH BE DDO we NI DH H RB YW NY & Oo she might move into the Subject Premises. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 698:24-699:17) Mrs. Tan also renewed her lease at her apartment during the critical time period in June 2014, when Defendant represented to Ms. Rochelle that his mother would be moving in. The evidence also established that Ms. Tan told no one that she planned to move. Mrs. Tan did not actually move into the Subject Premises, and Defendant Deng renovated and re-rented the unit to new tenants, for $4,500/month in rent starting in January 2015. (Hooshmand Deecl., Exhibit D (Trial Exhibit No. 18; Tr. Tx. Vol. V, 413: 21-26; Vol. VI, 648:27-28) Indeed, there was no evidence presented at trial to show that Defendant Deng intended to comply with the Rent Ordinance and move his mother into the Subject Premises. The jury’s verdict was therefore unsupported by any substantial evidence. IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION A. Standard for Rendering a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Code of Civil Procedure section 629 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “[t]he court, before the expiration of its power to rule on a motion for a new trial, either of its own motion, after five days’ notice, or on motion of a party against whom a verdict has’ been rendered, shall render judgment in favor of the aggrieved party notwithstanding the verdict whenever a motion for a directed verdict for the aggrieved party should have been granted had a previous motion been made.” “The cardinal requirement for a directed verdict is that there be no substantial conflict in the evidence." (Osborn v, Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 234, 275, quoting Cal. Judges' Benchbook - Civil Trials (CJER 1981) § 9.87, p. 317 and authorities cited.) “If the evidence is conflicting or if several reasonable inferences may be drawn, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied." (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 110.) A motion for judgment “notwithstanding the verdict” challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party’s evidence. (See Jd; Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 877; Moore v. San Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 733-734.) Since a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper whenever a motion for directed yerdict should have been granted and a directed verdict may be granted as to some but MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 7Co mRNA HR YW DY = RDN YN NY NR KN NY & Se Be Be eB Be ewe ew ee eI DAA FO H KF SO we AR A HAF BH HEH S not all issues decided at trial, it follows that trial courts may likewise grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to less than all issues. This is also known as a “partial NOV.” (Beavers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 310, 323-324; Deil’Qca v. Bank of New York Trust Co.. N.A. (2008) 159 Cal-App.4th 531, 553; Hansen v. Simnyside Products, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1510.) Granting of a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict involves a determination that the moving party is entitled to judgment in its favor on some, but not all issues in dispute. Beavers vy. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 225 Cal. App. 3d 310. Unless a jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence, it may not be upheld. Where, as here, there is no substantial evidence and no reasonable inferences can be drawn to support the jury's verdict, the trial court should enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. (See Hauter, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 110.) B. Defendant Deng Admitted That He Had Ulterior Motives When He Evicted Angelique Rochelle, Which is a Direct Violation of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance. Testimony at trial established that Trevor Deng had ulterior motives in violation of 37.9(a)(8). Mr. Deng stated that he wanted Plaintiffs unit, so he could regain access to the garage, storage, and have guests stay in Plaintiffs former unit. Those are ulterior motives. Those motives are not simply “a residence for Yu Yao Tan, for a period of at least 36 continuous months”, which is what Mr. Deng represented was his only motive. The evidence of Mr. Deng’s “ulterior motives” was not in conflict. (See Osborn, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at 275.) Therefore, where Mr. Deng himself admitted he had ulterior motives, and the law prevents evictions for ulterior motives, the judgment must be changed. Mr. Deng violated the Rent Ordinance, and the only evidence introduced at trial supported this fact. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict should issue. C. Defendant Deng Lied Under Penalty of Perjury at His Deposition About Rent At His Previous Residence Being “Discounted” MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 8 |Coe ND HW FB YW DY YN YN NY NN BD De mm eet eo AA BOSH FS SF OC wM KA DAHA PHD DYH S&S DS In further support of Defendant’s dishonest intent and lack of good faith, Plaintiff's counsel played a video clip from Defendant Deng’s July 12, 2017 deposition in this case, in which Defendant had taken an oath to testify truthfully under penalty of perjury. When asked how much rent Defendant had paid at his previous residence in San Francisco, prior to purchasing the subject property, Defendant stated that he could not recall the exact amount but that it was “discounted” to something less than $1,400.00. (Tr. Tx. Vol. V, 371:18-372:24.) During Defendant’s testimony at trial however, where he was also under penalty of perjury to tell the truth, Defendant Deng testified that he had in fact paid no rent at this previous residence, and that he was simply embarrassed to say so during his deposition. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 654:21-655:25.) Such an excuse by Defendant is not a justification for lying, under penalty of perjury, at his deposition. Defendant Deng was clearly dishonest about paying rent because he wanted to give the impression that he had a financial need for moving into the subject building, since he had allegedly paid some amount of “rent” at his previous residence. Likewise, in his answers to Special Interrogatories read at trial, Defendant had claimed that due to the $25,000 he had to pay to Plaintiff to move out, “getting some rental income seemed like a good idea.” (Hooshmand Decl., Exhibit E (Trial Exhibit No. 42A).) In both instances, Defendant attempted to falsely claim financial difficulties to justify the actions that he took when he in fact, had a plan from the beginning to move into the subject building and to displace Ms. Rochelle from her rent-controlled unit. This is not an honest or permitted reason to evict Ms. Rochelle. D. There Was No Evidence That Defendant Deng’s Mother Was Actually Planning to Move into the Subject Premises or Live There for 36 Months as Required by the Law There was no testimony or evidence at trial showing that Yu Yao Tan actually intended to move into the Subject Premises, or live at the Subject Premises for a period of at least 36 continuous months, in accordance to the 60-Day Notice. Mr. Deng only testified that he had a conversation with Mrs. Tan which lasted a few minutes where he asked her if she would move and she replied “okay.” (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 614:20-615:3) No other discussions took place as to when or how she would move in, or when she would need to notify her apartment management MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 9Oo eo IN DA HW BW HY ° of moving out. And at no point did Mr. Deng and his mother discuss the requirement that Mrs. Tan had to live at the Subject Premises for any length of time. Mrs. Tan also testified that the only conversations she had with Mr. Deng was limited to her agreeing to a plan where she might move into the Subject Premises, without any discussions as to a date of move in or otherwise. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 698:24-699:17) Thereafter, Mrs. Tan took no other actions or steps to move in, but just waited for Mr. Deng to give her further instructions. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 703:24-704:1) Ms. Tan in fact, renewed her lease terms at her apartment while the eviction notice was pending in June 2014. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 706:4-707:13) Even after Plaintiff had vacated the Subject Premises, Mrs. Tan did not ask Mr. Deng whether she could move in now, or take any steps to begin the process of moving in. (Tr. Tx. Vol. VI, 711:17-27) There is no conflict in the evidence as to these points. (Osborn, supra 5 Cal.App.4th at 275.) Yet under the Rent Ordinance, Ms. Tan made representations and was required to actually intend to move to the Subject Premises to live in. Defendant produced no evidence that supports that Ms. Tan did in fact intend or plan to move. In fact, all of the evidence establishes that Ms. Tan did not intend to move to the subject premises, as she made no plans, she told no one, and she ultimately stayed at her apartment without even asking her son if the plan had changed. That fact proves there was no plan, and Ms. Tan never truly intended to move into the Subject Premises. There was no evidence presented at trial that Defendant Deng intended to comply or that he complied with Section 37.9(a)(8) Rent Ordinance. And for the foregoing reasons, there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict in this case. Vv. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle asks the Court to grant this motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The jury’s verdict was not supported by substantial evidence where Defendant Trevor Deng violated the law in planning to or actually moving his mother into the Subject Premises, pursuant to the relative move-in eviction served. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 10oOo ND HA BF BW NY _ °o Date: January 8, 2018 Respectfully submitted, HOOSHMAND LAW GROUP Mark Hooshmand, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff Angelique Rochelle MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ANGELIQUE ROCHELLE’S MOTION FOR A COMPLETE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 11