Preview
1 SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
A Limited Liability Partnership
2 Including Professional Corporations ELECTRONICALLY
JASON W. KEARNAGHAN, Cal. Bar No. 207707
3 jkearnaghan@sheppardmullin.com F I L E D
Superior Court of California,
Y. DOUGLAS YANG, Cal. Bar No. 307550 County of San Francisco
4 dyang@sheppardmullin.com
333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor 04/21/2020
Clerk of the Court
5 Los Angeles, California 90071-1422 BY: DAVID YUEN
Telephone: 213.620.1780 Deputy Clerk
6 Facsimile: 213.620.1398
7 AMANDA E. BECKWITH, Cal. Bar No. 312967
th
Four Embarcadero Center, 17 Floor
8 San Francisco, California 94111-4109
Telephone: 415.434.9100
9 Facsimile: 415.434.3947
Email: abeckwith@sheppardmullin.com
10
Attorneys for Defendant
11 LEVI STRAUSS & CO.
12
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
13
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
14
15
WINONA POWERS, an individual, Case No. CGC-19-581624
16
Plaintiff, DEFENDANT LEVI STRAUSS & CO.’S,
17 OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF WINONA
v. POWERS’ MOTION FOR ORDER TO
18 QUASH SUBPOENAS; REQUEST FOR
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., a Delaware Corp.; MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST
19 and DOES 1-25, inclusive , PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL IN THE
AMOUNT OF $1,000
20 Defendants.
[Filed concurrently with Declaration of Y.
21 Douglas Yang; Proposed Order]
22 Hearing Information
Date: May 4, 2020
23 Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 302
24
25 [Complaint Filed: December 18, 2019]
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SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Plaintiff Winona Powers’ (“Plaintiff”) untimely Motion to Quash should be denied because
3 Defendant Levi Strauss & Co.’s (“Levi’s”) subpoenas to Plaintiff’s former employers are directly
4 relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. At issue is a subpoena for records from four prior modeling
5 agencies and a bank at which Plaintiff worked. In this lawsuit, Plaintiff claims that despite being
6 engaged by a third-party modeling agency that has been subpoenaed – Look Model Agency – to
7 perform in various photoshoots, and despite being paid by (and issued wage statements from) that
8 modeling agency for her work, she believes she was an employee of Levi’s as a matter of law.
9 Levi’s denies that it ever employed Plaintiff. Clearly, Plaintiff’s credibility is a central issue in
10 this case, and the subpoenas are carefully calculated in furtherance thereof. Plaintiff’s contentions
11 are wholly divorced from reality, but more important here is her attempt to preclude Levi’s from
12 obtaining relevant discovery.
13 Levi’s need for the records (to defend itself against Plaintiff’s wage-and-hour claims)
14 outweighs Plaintiff’s purported privacy interests. Tellingly, Plaintiff provides no particular factual
15 or legitimate legal basis for her Motion, other than to offer red-herring arguments concerning what
16 Plaintiff believes to be Levi’s burden of proof, and to make generalized assertions that the
17 requested records are private. Plaintiff cannot have her cake and eat it too; she cannot assert that
18 she was an employee of Levi’s and then refuse to permit discovery that supports Levi’s defenses,
19 tests her credibility, or provides insight into her knowledge of the modeling/talent industry, how
20 photoshoots are organized and directed, the relationship between modeling agencies and models,
21 and her relationship with the various subpoenaed entities.
22 Given that the subpoenaed records in this particular case are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s
23 wage-and-hour claims and given that Plaintiff’s Motion fails to establish that the records are
24 shielded from discovery, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s Motion. Further, the Court should
25 sanction Plaintiff’s Counsel in the amount of $1,000 for their obstruction of the discovery process
26 and bad faith tactics, including (1) serving notice of her Motion to Quash 10 days late in violation
27 of Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.6(f); and (2) misrepresenting to the subpoenaed parties
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SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH
1 that Levi’s had provided an extension of time for Plaintiff to file a Motion to Quash, when in fact
2 no such extension had been sought or granted.
3 II. RELEVANT FACTS
4 Levi’s is one of the world’s most recognizable brand-name apparel companies and a global
5 leader in denim apparel. Levi’s designs and manufactures jeans, casual wear and related
6 accessories. Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that from 2017 to 2019, Plaintiff worked as a model on
7 multiple photoshoots for Levi’s. (Complaint, ¶¶ 6, 14, 22, 30, 38, 46, 54, 62, 70, 78, 86, 94).
8 Plaintiff concedes that she was not hired by Levi’s; rather, she worked with a modeling agency to
9 secure photoshoots. (Declaration of Winona Powers ISO Motion to Quash, ¶¶ 2-3). Plaintiff
10 nonetheless claims that she was an employee of Levi’s and was not paid her “wages” in a timely
11 manner. (See generally Complaint).
12 On February 27, 2020, Levi’s subpoenaed Plaintiff’s employment records from Bank of
13 America, MDT Agency, Inc., Look Model Agency, Exalt Model and Talent Agency, and Cast
14 Images Model and Talent Agency. (Declaration of Y. Douglas Yang (“Yang Decl.”), ¶ 2, Ex. A).
15 Based upon the service date of the Notice to Consumer and subpoena duces tecum, the
16 subpoenaed parties were expected to produce the requested documents by March 25, 2020. (Id.;
17 Code Civ. P. § 2020.410).
18 It is undisputed that Plaintiff worked for the aforementioned entities. Upon information
19 and belief, Plaintiff worked for Bank of America for more than 15 years before her employment
20 was suddenly terminated. (Yang Decl., ¶ 3). Levi’s contends that after her employment with
21 Bank of America ended, Plaintiff never found a subsequent job outside of modeling. (Id.)
22 Contemporaneous with her tenure with Bank of America, and continuing through the present,
23 Plaintiff worked with various model agencies, including MDT Agency, Look Model Agency,
24 Exalt Model and Talent Agency, and Cast Images Model and Talent Agency. (Id.) Levi’s asserts
25 that Plaintiff has approximately 18 years of experience in the modeling industry. (Id.)
26 On March 23, 2020 – just two days before the scheduled production date – counsel for
27 Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter to Levi’s, stating that Plaintiff intended to file a motion to
28 quash the records subpoenas on privacy and relevance grounds. (Yang Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. B, pp. 2-4).
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SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH
1 On the same date, counsel for Plaintiff sent letters to the subpoenaed parties (without copying
2 Levi’s or informing its counsel), instructing each of them not to comply with the subpoena and
3 falsely stating that Plaintiff received from Levi’s an additional 30 days to respond to the subpoena.
4 (Id. ¶ 5, Ex. C).
5 In the morning of March 25, 2020, Levi’s responded to Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter.
6 (Yang Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. B, pp. 1-2). Levi’s diligently explained the legitimate bases for its
7 subpoenas, addressing Plaintiff’s privacy and relevance concerns with support from case law.
8 (Id.)
9 On March 27, 2020 – seven days after her deadline – Plaintiff filed her Motion. Plaintiff
10 did not serve her Motion until March 30, 2020 – 10 days after the deadline. (Pla. Motion, Proof of
11 Serv., pp. 99-100).
12 On March 30, 2020, Levi’s discovered for the first time that counsel for Plaintiff had sent
13 the aforementioned letters to the subpoenaed parties on March 23, 2020. Upon reviewing counsel
14 for Plaintiff’s false representations, Levi’s sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel raising its concerns.
15 (Yang Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. D). Counsel for Plaintiff failed to respond. (Id., ¶ 6).
16 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT
17 A. Plaintiff’s Motion Is Untimely And Should Not Be Considered
18 To prevent the production of records by a subpoena duces tecum, Plaintiff must file a
19 Motion to Quash at least five days before the date set for the production of the subpoenaed
20 records. See Civ. Proc. Code § 1985.6(f)(1).
21 Here, the February 27, 2020 subpoena (and notice to consumer served on Plaintiff
22 beforehand) requested the production of Plaintiff’s records from Bank of America and Plaintiff’s
23 prior modeling agencies by March 25, 2020. (Yang Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A). Therefore, the Motion to
24 Quash Levi’s subpoenas must have been filed and served by no later than March 20, 2020. 1 See
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Levi’s is aware of the Court’s COVID-19 orders, the first of which as relevant to civil
27 matters was issued on March 24, 2020. None of those orders tolled the deadline for
Plaintiff to file and serve her Motion, as her deadline had already passed by March
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20, 2020, and those orders do not apply retroactively.
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SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH
1 Civ. Proc. Code § 1985.6(f)(1). However, Plaintiff did not file and serve her Motion until March
2 27, 2020, and waited until March 30, 2020 to serve it. (Pla. Motion, Proof of Serv., pp. 99-100).
3 As Plaintiff failed to timely file and serve her Motion, Plaintiff failed to timely move to quash.
4 Accordingly, on this ground alone, her Motion should be denied.
5 B. Levi’s Is Entitled To The Production Of Plaintiff’s Records, Which Are
6 Directly Relevant To Her Claims
7 It is well settled that “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
8 that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself
9 admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
10 evidence.” Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010. Discovery may relate to the claims or defenses asserted
11 by any party. See id. Indeed, when discovery is challenged, any doubts as to relevance should
12 generally be interpreted in favor of a liberal policy of discovery. See Valley Bank of Nev. v.
13 Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656 (1975); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355,
14 377-78 (1961) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Platt v. Superior Court, 214
15 Cal. App. 3d 779 (1989)). As recognized by the California Court of Appeal, “information is
16 relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or
17 facilitating settlement. Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is
18 discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 33
19 Cal. App. 4th 1539, 1546 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
20 Here, the records Levi’s seeks from Plaintiff’s former modeling agencies and Bank of
21 America are directly relevant to the issues and defenses in this lawsuit. With respect to the
22 modeling agencies, the case for permitting Levi’s to review Plaintiff’s records is clear: paychecks,
23 IRS Form 1099s, contracts, agreements, and information about Plaintiff’s photoshoots for other
24 companies is directly relevant to Levi’s defenses, Plaintiff’s credibility, her knowledge of how
25 photoshoots are directed and organized, her understanding of the relationship between talent
26 agencies and models, and her general knowledge of the modeling/talent industry as a whole. With
27 respect to Plaintiff’s records from Bank of America, these documents are directly relevant to the
28 issue of Plaintiff’s credibility, particularly in light of the fact that after 15 years with the bank,
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SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH
1 Plaintiff’s employment was suddenly terminated and, upon information and belief, she has not
2 found work outside of modeling since. “[E]vidence bearing on a witness’ credibility is always
3 relevant.” Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Trials & Evidence § 8:108 (The Rutter
4 Group 2004) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 215,
5 218 (S.D. N.Y. 1974) (“[O]ne of the purposes of discovery is to obtain information for use on
6 cross-examination and for the impeachment of witnesses.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, the
7 subpoenaed documents go to the heart of Plaintiff’s claim that she was an employee of Levi’s (as
8 opposed to an independent contractor), and therefore should be produced.
9 C. Levi’s’ Need For The Records Outweighs Plaintiff’s Purported Privacy Rights
10 Plaintiff’s right to privacy is not absolute. Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 5th 531, 552
11 (2017). Rather, it is subject to limitations depending on the circumstances, and must be balanced
12 against the right to discovery. See Vinson v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.3d 833, 839-42 (1987)
13 (recognizing that placing a private matter in controversy waives the right to privacy as to that
14 matter). The California Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that a party implicitly waives their
15 right to privacy under Article I of the California Constitution by bringing a lawsuit. Britt v.
16 Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 849 (1978) (plaintiffs “unquestionably waived their physician-
17 patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges as to all information concerning the medical
18 conditions which they have put in issue . . . ..”). This waiver is compounded by the fact that
19 California law recognizes a limited privacy right in employment (independent contractor) records.
20 See Bd. of Trustees v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 526-27 (1981) (disapproved on other
21 grounds by Williams, 3 Cal. 5th 531). Therefore, the state may compel disclosure of confidential
22 material otherwise protected by Article I’s right to privacy. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 427;
23 Vinson, 43 Cal. 3d at 839-40; Fremont Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d. 554, 557,
24 559-60 (1982) (holding that a plaintiff who puts facts in issue and then claims privilege as to those
25 facts “may yet claim his privilege, but he will have to dismiss his lawsuit if he persists in doing
26 so… he cannot have his cake and eat it too”). It follows that an individual’s right to privacy in
27 personnel/independent contractor documents may be abridged after a balancing of the need for
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SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH
1 discovery against that right of privacy. El Dorado Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court, 190 Cal.
2 App. 3d 342, 346 (1987) (disapproved on other grounds by Williams, 3 Cal. 5th 531).
3 The records at issue before the Court are Plaintiff’s records from her past and present
4 modeling agencies, and from Bank of America. The California Code of Civil Procedure
5 authorizes a party to seek and obtain a Plaintiff’s records from current and former entities with
6 whom she was employed and/or had a contractual relationship. See Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2020.410,
7 1985.6. Contrary to Plaintiff’s representations in her moving papers, Levi’s is not required to
8 establish a “compelling interest” or “compelling need,” but merely that its need for the records
9 outweighs Plaintiff’s privacy rights. Williams, 3 Cal. 5th at 557 (2017). 2
10 Here, Plaintiff cites nothing other than generalized case law about privacy rights in support
11 of her Motion. She has failed to establish that the records Levi’s seeks contain information with
12 such a high privacy interest that it outweighs Levi’s need for discovery of directly relevant
13 information, particularly records from Look Model Agency – the entity that contracted with, and
14 paid, Plaintiff to work as a model while wearing Levi’s apparel. It cannot be disputed that how,
15 and by whom, Plaintiff directly contracted with, and was paid (and issued wage statements) for the
16 photoshoots for which she claims untimely payment is directly relevant (or at a minimum would
17 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence) to the claims and defenses in this lawsuit.
18 Plaintiff alleges that Levi’s is seeking information concerning her “financial affairs,” (Pla.
19 Motion, 4:13-5-23), but cites wholly irrelevant case law that generally mention “financial affairs”
20 without supporting Plaintiff’s position that her records fall under that umbrella. Moreover,
21 Plaintiff ignores the fact that she has put her “financial affairs” at issue by filing the instant wage-
22 and-hour lawsuit, through which she asserts that Levi’s – not Look Model Agency – made late
23 payments for her services. (See generally Complaint). The wage statements reflecting when these
24 payments were made, were put directly at issue by Plaintiff.
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The “compelling need” standard cited by Plaintiff and her cited cases was disapproved by the
28 California Supreme Court, which recognized that a compelling interest or compelling need is not
automatically required. Williams, 3 Cal. 5th at 557 n. 8.
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SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH
1 Levi’s is seeking Plaintiff’s employment/independent contractor records, which, as shown
2 above, are directly relevant to this issues and defenses in this lawsuit. That Plaintiff worked for
3 other modeling agencies and/or on other photo shoots is a key defense of Levi’s, as one of the
4 factors to determine whether Plaintiff was an independent contractor is whether she was free to
5 work for other entities. S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 355
6 (1989) (“Borello”) (noting “degree of permanence of the working relationship” as direct evidence
7 of independent contractor status); Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1092 (N.D.
8 Cal. 2018) (holding that delivery driver who worked for competitors and had short stints was
9 independent contractor under California law).
10 While responsive records may include wage statements and/or paychecks, information
11 garnered from those records do not come close to the type of highly personal financial records at
12 issue in the cases cited by Plaintiff. Any privacy concern about Plaintiff’s “financial affairs” is
13 even further tempered by the fact that such information may be produced under the umbrella of a
14 protective order, to which Levi’s would be agreeable. Indeed, one of Plaintiff’s own cited cases,
15 Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313 (1982), 3 supports the discovery of highly
16 personal financial information when such information is covered under a protective order. Id. at
17 319; see also Davis v. Kelly Servs., Inc., No. CV 17-1699-GW (PLAX), 2017 WL 10562943, at *6
18 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2017) (denying motion to quash after noting placement of protective order).
19 Perhaps sensing that her Motion is doomed to fail, Plaintiff’s Motion makes an ill-fated
20 attempt to divert the Court’s attention by making an argument concerning whether Plaintiff was an
21 employee of Levi’s. Plaintiff says that under Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 4
22 Cal. 5th 903 (2018) (“Dynamex”), she must have been an employee of Levi’s, and therefore
23 whatever records her former modeling agencies or any former employers have, cannot be relevant.
24 (Pla. Motion, 6: 3-24). This argument fails for two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that Dynamex
25 does not – and never did – apply to Plaintiff because that decision sets forth the ABC test for
26 employment status for the purposes of the IWC Wage Orders, which did not apply to Plaintiff
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28 The Moskowitz “compelling need” standard is disapproved of by Williams, 3 Cal. 5th 531.
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SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH
1 during her photoshoots. 4 Rather, to the extent she would have any viable argument to be
2 considered an “employee” of Levi’s, the appropriate test would be the analysis set forth in Borello.
3 48 Cal. 3d 341 (1989). Second, even if Plaintiff’s (misguided) representations on the law were
4 true, the fact of the matter remains that Plaintiff’s credibility, her knowledge of the modeling
5 world, and her relationships with other modeling agencies that paid her and/or provided her with
6 wage statements, are directly relevant to her claim that she (erroneously) believed that she was an
7 employee of Levi’s. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion must be denied, and the subpoenaed documents
8 should be produced.
9 IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD LEVI’S MONETARY SANCTIONS
10 A court may order the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s expenses, including
11 reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred opposing a Motion to Quash, if the Court finds that the motion
12 was “made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification…” Code Civ. Proc. §
13 1987.2(a). In addition, if a party presents a motion “primarily for an improper purpose, such as to
14 harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,” the Court may
15 order sanctions against that party. Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7.
16 Here, sanctions should be granted because Plaintiff’s attorneys brought this Motion
17 without substantial justification. It is clear that the primary purpose of the Motion was to
18 needlessly delay Levi’s legitimate discovery, and to harass Levi’s and run up its litigation costs.
19 Moreover, counsel for Plaintiff’s conduct in (1) deliberately serving the Motion to Quash 10 days
20 after the deadline under Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.6(f); and (2) making material
21 misrepresentations to the subpoenaed parties regarding Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to the
22 subpoenas in an effort to prevent them from complying therewith, warrant imposition of sanctions
23
24 4
On April 30, 2018, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Dynamex Operations W.,
25 Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018), setting forth the ABC test for employment status for
the purposes of the Wage Orders. Because the Dynamex decision expressly declined to decide
26 whether the ABC test applies to Labor Code claims that are not dependent on IWC Wage Orders,
the ABC test set forth in Dynamex does not apply to Plaintiff’s section 203 claims, which are not
27 predicated on IWC Wage Orders. Id. Moreover, all of the Labor Code violations alleged by
28 Plaintiff occurred before Dynamex was decided. Accordingly, Borello applies to Plaintiff’s ill-
fated claims for waiting time penalties.
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SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH
1 against Plaintiff’s counsel. Levi’s respectfully requests that the Court order that Plaintiff’s
2 counsel pay sanctions in the amount of $1,000.00 to Levi’s. (Yang Decl., ¶ 7).
3 V. CONCLUSION
4 For the foregoing reasons, Levi’s respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiff’s
5 Motion to Quash, and enter an order requiring Plaintiff’s counsel to pay sanctions in the amount of
6 $1,000.00 to Levi’s for bringing the instant Motion to Quash without substantial justification
7 under Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.2(a), and for engaging in conduct sanctionable under Code Civ.
8 Proc. § 128.7.
9
10
11 Dated: April 21, 2020
12 SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
13
14 By /s/ Jason W. Kearnaghan
15 JASON W. KEARNAGHAN
Y. DOUGLAS YANG
16 AMANDA E. BECKWITH
Attorneys for Defendant
17 LEVI STRAUSS & CO.
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SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I
am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is
4 333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071-1422.
5 On April 21, 2020, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as
DEFENDANT LEVI STRAUSS & CO.’S, OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF WINONA
6 POWERS’ MOTION FOR ORDER TO QUASH SUBPOENAS; REQUEST FOR
MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL IN THE AMOUNT OF
7 $1,000 on the interested parties in this action as follows:
8 SERVICE LIST
9 Joseph H. Low IV Attorneys for Plaintiff Winona Powers
THE LAW FIRM OF JOSEPH H. LOW IV
10 100 Oceangate, 12th Floor
Long Beach, CA 90802
11 Tel: (562) 901-0840
Fax: (562) 901-0841
12 E-Mail: joseph@jhllaw.com
13 Roger Y. Muse
John R. Matheny
14 EXCELSIOR LAW
9595 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 900
15 Beverly Hills, CA 90212
Tel: (310) 205—3981
16 Fax: (310) 205-0594
E-Mail: roger@excelsior-law.com;
17 john@excelsior-law.com
18 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the
document(s) to be sent from e-mail address bdelacruz@sheppardmullin.com to the persons
19 at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable
time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the
20 transmission was unsuccessful.
21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
22
Executed on April 21, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.
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25 Beannette De La Cruz
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SMRH:4820-9270-4178.1
Preview
1 SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP A Limited Liability Partnership 2 Including Professional Corporations ELECTRONICALLY JASON W. KEARNAGHAN, Cal. Bar No. 207707 3 jkearnaghan@sheppardmullin.com F I L E D Superior Court of California, Y. DOUGLAS YANG, Cal. Bar No. 307550 County of San Francisco 4 dyang@sheppardmullin.com 333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor 04/21/2020 Clerk of the Court 5 Los Angeles, California 90071-1422 BY: DAVID YUEN Telephone: 213.620.1780 Deputy Clerk 6 Facsimile: 213.620.1398 7 AMANDA E. BECKWITH, Cal. Bar No. 312967 th Four Embarcadero Center, 17 Floor 8 San Francisco, California 94111-4109 Telephone: 415.434.9100 9 Facsimile: 415.434.3947 Email: abeckwith@sheppardmullin.com 10 Attorneys for Defendant 11 LEVI STRAUSS & CO. 12 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 13 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 14 15 WINONA POWERS, an individual, Case No. CGC-19-581624 16 Plaintiff, DEFENDANT LEVI STRAUSS & CO.’S, 17 OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF WINONA v. POWERS’ MOTION FOR ORDER TO 18 QUASH SUBPOENAS; REQUEST FOR LEVI STRAUSS & CO., a Delaware Corp.; MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST 19 and DOES 1-25, inclusive , PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,000 20 Defendants. [Filed concurrently with Declaration of Y. 21 Douglas Yang; Proposed Order] 22 Hearing Information Date: May 4, 2020 23 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept.: 302 24 25 [Complaint Filed: December 18, 2019] 26 27 28 -1 SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 Plaintiff Winona Powers’ (“Plaintiff”) untimely Motion to Quash should be denied because 3 Defendant Levi Strauss & Co.’s (“Levi’s”) subpoenas to Plaintiff’s former employers are directly 4 relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. At issue is a subpoena for records from four prior modeling 5 agencies and a bank at which Plaintiff worked. In this lawsuit, Plaintiff claims that despite being 6 engaged by a third-party modeling agency that has been subpoenaed – Look Model Agency – to 7 perform in various photoshoots, and despite being paid by (and issued wage statements from) that 8 modeling agency for her work, she believes she was an employee of Levi’s as a matter of law. 9 Levi’s denies that it ever employed Plaintiff. Clearly, Plaintiff’s credibility is a central issue in 10 this case, and the subpoenas are carefully calculated in furtherance thereof. Plaintiff’s contentions 11 are wholly divorced from reality, but more important here is her attempt to preclude Levi’s from 12 obtaining relevant discovery. 13 Levi’s need for the records (to defend itself against Plaintiff’s wage-and-hour claims) 14 outweighs Plaintiff’s purported privacy interests. Tellingly, Plaintiff provides no particular factual 15 or legitimate legal basis for her Motion, other than to offer red-herring arguments concerning what 16 Plaintiff believes to be Levi’s burden of proof, and to make generalized assertions that the 17 requested records are private. Plaintiff cannot have her cake and eat it too; she cannot assert that 18 she was an employee of Levi’s and then refuse to permit discovery that supports Levi’s defenses, 19 tests her credibility, or provides insight into her knowledge of the modeling/talent industry, how 20 photoshoots are organized and directed, the relationship between modeling agencies and models, 21 and her relationship with the various subpoenaed entities. 22 Given that the subpoenaed records in this particular case are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s 23 wage-and-hour claims and given that Plaintiff’s Motion fails to establish that the records are 24 shielded from discovery, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s Motion. Further, the Court should 25 sanction Plaintiff’s Counsel in the amount of $1,000 for their obstruction of the discovery process 26 and bad faith tactics, including (1) serving notice of her Motion to Quash 10 days late in violation 27 of Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.6(f); and (2) misrepresenting to the subpoenaed parties 28 -2 SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH 1 that Levi’s had provided an extension of time for Plaintiff to file a Motion to Quash, when in fact 2 no such extension had been sought or granted. 3 II. RELEVANT FACTS 4 Levi’s is one of the world’s most recognizable brand-name apparel companies and a global 5 leader in denim apparel. Levi’s designs and manufactures jeans, casual wear and related 6 accessories. Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that from 2017 to 2019, Plaintiff worked as a model on 7 multiple photoshoots for Levi’s. (Complaint, ¶¶ 6, 14, 22, 30, 38, 46, 54, 62, 70, 78, 86, 94). 8 Plaintiff concedes that she was not hired by Levi’s; rather, she worked with a modeling agency to 9 secure photoshoots. (Declaration of Winona Powers ISO Motion to Quash, ¶¶ 2-3). Plaintiff 10 nonetheless claims that she was an employee of Levi’s and was not paid her “wages” in a timely 11 manner. (See generally Complaint). 12 On February 27, 2020, Levi’s subpoenaed Plaintiff’s employment records from Bank of 13 America, MDT Agency, Inc., Look Model Agency, Exalt Model and Talent Agency, and Cast 14 Images Model and Talent Agency. (Declaration of Y. Douglas Yang (“Yang Decl.”), ¶ 2, Ex. A). 15 Based upon the service date of the Notice to Consumer and subpoena duces tecum, the 16 subpoenaed parties were expected to produce the requested documents by March 25, 2020. (Id.; 17 Code Civ. P. § 2020.410). 18 It is undisputed that Plaintiff worked for the aforementioned entities. Upon information 19 and belief, Plaintiff worked for Bank of America for more than 15 years before her employment 20 was suddenly terminated. (Yang Decl., ¶ 3). Levi’s contends that after her employment with 21 Bank of America ended, Plaintiff never found a subsequent job outside of modeling. (Id.) 22 Contemporaneous with her tenure with Bank of America, and continuing through the present, 23 Plaintiff worked with various model agencies, including MDT Agency, Look Model Agency, 24 Exalt Model and Talent Agency, and Cast Images Model and Talent Agency. (Id.) Levi’s asserts 25 that Plaintiff has approximately 18 years of experience in the modeling industry. (Id.) 26 On March 23, 2020 – just two days before the scheduled production date – counsel for 27 Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter to Levi’s, stating that Plaintiff intended to file a motion to 28 quash the records subpoenas on privacy and relevance grounds. (Yang Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. B, pp. 2-4). -3 SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH 1 On the same date, counsel for Plaintiff sent letters to the subpoenaed parties (without copying 2 Levi’s or informing its counsel), instructing each of them not to comply with the subpoena and 3 falsely stating that Plaintiff received from Levi’s an additional 30 days to respond to the subpoena. 4 (Id. ¶ 5, Ex. C). 5 In the morning of March 25, 2020, Levi’s responded to Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter. 6 (Yang Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. B, pp. 1-2). Levi’s diligently explained the legitimate bases for its 7 subpoenas, addressing Plaintiff’s privacy and relevance concerns with support from case law. 8 (Id.) 9 On March 27, 2020 – seven days after her deadline – Plaintiff filed her Motion. Plaintiff 10 did not serve her Motion until March 30, 2020 – 10 days after the deadline. (Pla. Motion, Proof of 11 Serv., pp. 99-100). 12 On March 30, 2020, Levi’s discovered for the first time that counsel for Plaintiff had sent 13 the aforementioned letters to the subpoenaed parties on March 23, 2020. Upon reviewing counsel 14 for Plaintiff’s false representations, Levi’s sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel raising its concerns. 15 (Yang Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. D). Counsel for Plaintiff failed to respond. (Id., ¶ 6). 16 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT 17 A. Plaintiff’s Motion Is Untimely And Should Not Be Considered 18 To prevent the production of records by a subpoena duces tecum, Plaintiff must file a 19 Motion to Quash at least five days before the date set for the production of the subpoenaed 20 records. See Civ. Proc. Code § 1985.6(f)(1). 21 Here, the February 27, 2020 subpoena (and notice to consumer served on Plaintiff 22 beforehand) requested the production of Plaintiff’s records from Bank of America and Plaintiff’s 23 prior modeling agencies by March 25, 2020. (Yang Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A). Therefore, the Motion to 24 Quash Levi’s subpoenas must have been filed and served by no later than March 20, 2020. 1 See 25 26 1 Levi’s is aware of the Court’s COVID-19 orders, the first of which as relevant to civil 27 matters was issued on March 24, 2020. None of those orders tolled the deadline for Plaintiff to file and serve her Motion, as her deadline had already passed by March 28 20, 2020, and those orders do not apply retroactively. -4 SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH 1 Civ. Proc. Code § 1985.6(f)(1). However, Plaintiff did not file and serve her Motion until March 2 27, 2020, and waited until March 30, 2020 to serve it. (Pla. Motion, Proof of Serv., pp. 99-100). 3 As Plaintiff failed to timely file and serve her Motion, Plaintiff failed to timely move to quash. 4 Accordingly, on this ground alone, her Motion should be denied. 5 B. Levi’s Is Entitled To The Production Of Plaintiff’s Records, Which Are 6 Directly Relevant To Her Claims 7 It is well settled that “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, 8 that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter either is itself 9 admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 10 evidence.” Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010. Discovery may relate to the claims or defenses asserted 11 by any party. See id. Indeed, when discovery is challenged, any doubts as to relevance should 12 generally be interpreted in favor of a liberal policy of discovery. See Valley Bank of Nev. v. 13 Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 656 (1975); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 14 377-78 (1961) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Platt v. Superior Court, 214 15 Cal. App. 3d 779 (1989)). As recognized by the California Court of Appeal, “information is 16 relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or 17 facilitating settlement. Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is 18 discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 33 19 Cal. App. 4th 1539, 1546 (1995) (internal citations omitted). 20 Here, the records Levi’s seeks from Plaintiff’s former modeling agencies and Bank of 21 America are directly relevant to the issues and defenses in this lawsuit. With respect to the 22 modeling agencies, the case for permitting Levi’s to review Plaintiff’s records is clear: paychecks, 23 IRS Form 1099s, contracts, agreements, and information about Plaintiff’s photoshoots for other 24 companies is directly relevant to Levi’s defenses, Plaintiff’s credibility, her knowledge of how 25 photoshoots are directed and organized, her understanding of the relationship between talent 26 agencies and models, and her general knowledge of the modeling/talent industry as a whole. With 27 respect to Plaintiff’s records from Bank of America, these documents are directly relevant to the 28 issue of Plaintiff’s credibility, particularly in light of the fact that after 15 years with the bank, -5 SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH 1 Plaintiff’s employment was suddenly terminated and, upon information and belief, she has not 2 found work outside of modeling since. “[E]vidence bearing on a witness’ credibility is always 3 relevant.” Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Trials & Evidence § 8:108 (The Rutter 4 Group 2004) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 215, 5 218 (S.D. N.Y. 1974) (“[O]ne of the purposes of discovery is to obtain information for use on 6 cross-examination and for the impeachment of witnesses.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, the 7 subpoenaed documents go to the heart of Plaintiff’s claim that she was an employee of Levi’s (as 8 opposed to an independent contractor), and therefore should be produced. 9 C. Levi’s’ Need For The Records Outweighs Plaintiff’s Purported Privacy Rights 10 Plaintiff’s right to privacy is not absolute. Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 5th 531, 552 11 (2017). Rather, it is subject to limitations depending on the circumstances, and must be balanced 12 against the right to discovery. See Vinson v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.3d 833, 839-42 (1987) 13 (recognizing that placing a private matter in controversy waives the right to privacy as to that 14 matter). The California Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that a party implicitly waives their 15 right to privacy under Article I of the California Constitution by bringing a lawsuit. Britt v. 16 Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 849 (1978) (plaintiffs “unquestionably waived their physician- 17 patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges as to all information concerning the medical 18 conditions which they have put in issue . . . ..”). This waiver is compounded by the fact that 19 California law recognizes a limited privacy right in employment (independent contractor) records. 20 See Bd. of Trustees v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 526-27 (1981) (disapproved on other 21 grounds by Williams, 3 Cal. 5th 531). Therefore, the state may compel disclosure of confidential 22 material otherwise protected by Article I’s right to privacy. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 427; 23 Vinson, 43 Cal. 3d at 839-40; Fremont Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d. 554, 557, 24 559-60 (1982) (holding that a plaintiff who puts facts in issue and then claims privilege as to those 25 facts “may yet claim his privilege, but he will have to dismiss his lawsuit if he persists in doing 26 so… he cannot have his cake and eat it too”). It follows that an individual’s right to privacy in 27 personnel/independent contractor documents may be abridged after a balancing of the need for 28 -6 SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH 1 discovery against that right of privacy. El Dorado Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. 2 App. 3d 342, 346 (1987) (disapproved on other grounds by Williams, 3 Cal. 5th 531). 3 The records at issue before the Court are Plaintiff’s records from her past and present 4 modeling agencies, and from Bank of America. The California Code of Civil Procedure 5 authorizes a party to seek and obtain a Plaintiff’s records from current and former entities with 6 whom she was employed and/or had a contractual relationship. See Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2020.410, 7 1985.6. Contrary to Plaintiff’s representations in her moving papers, Levi’s is not required to 8 establish a “compelling interest” or “compelling need,” but merely that its need for the records 9 outweighs Plaintiff’s privacy rights. Williams, 3 Cal. 5th at 557 (2017). 2 10 Here, Plaintiff cites nothing other than generalized case law about privacy rights in support 11 of her Motion. She has failed to establish that the records Levi’s seeks contain information with 12 such a high privacy interest that it outweighs Levi’s need for discovery of directly relevant 13 information, particularly records from Look Model Agency – the entity that contracted with, and 14 paid, Plaintiff to work as a model while wearing Levi’s apparel. It cannot be disputed that how, 15 and by whom, Plaintiff directly contracted with, and was paid (and issued wage statements) for the 16 photoshoots for which she claims untimely payment is directly relevant (or at a minimum would 17 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence) to the claims and defenses in this lawsuit. 18 Plaintiff alleges that Levi’s is seeking information concerning her “financial affairs,” (Pla. 19 Motion, 4:13-5-23), but cites wholly irrelevant case law that generally mention “financial affairs” 20 without supporting Plaintiff’s position that her records fall under that umbrella. Moreover, 21 Plaintiff ignores the fact that she has put her “financial affairs” at issue by filing the instant wage- 22 and-hour lawsuit, through which she asserts that Levi’s – not Look Model Agency – made late 23 payments for her services. (See generally Complaint). The wage statements reflecting when these 24 payments were made, were put directly at issue by Plaintiff. 25 26 27 2 The “compelling need” standard cited by Plaintiff and her cited cases was disapproved by the 28 California Supreme Court, which recognized that a compelling interest or compelling need is not automatically required. Williams, 3 Cal. 5th at 557 n. 8. -7 SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH 1 Levi’s is seeking Plaintiff’s employment/independent contractor records, which, as shown 2 above, are directly relevant to this issues and defenses in this lawsuit. That Plaintiff worked for 3 other modeling agencies and/or on other photo shoots is a key defense of Levi’s, as one of the 4 factors to determine whether Plaintiff was an independent contractor is whether she was free to 5 work for other entities. S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 355 6 (1989) (“Borello”) (noting “degree of permanence of the working relationship” as direct evidence 7 of independent contractor status); Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1092 (N.D. 8 Cal. 2018) (holding that delivery driver who worked for competitors and had short stints was 9 independent contractor under California law). 10 While responsive records may include wage statements and/or paychecks, information 11 garnered from those records do not come close to the type of highly personal financial records at 12 issue in the cases cited by Plaintiff. Any privacy concern about Plaintiff’s “financial affairs” is 13 even further tempered by the fact that such information may be produced under the umbrella of a 14 protective order, to which Levi’s would be agreeable. Indeed, one of Plaintiff’s own cited cases, 15 Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313 (1982), 3 supports the discovery of highly 16 personal financial information when such information is covered under a protective order. Id. at 17 319; see also Davis v. Kelly Servs., Inc., No. CV 17-1699-GW (PLAX), 2017 WL 10562943, at *6 18 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2017) (denying motion to quash after noting placement of protective order). 19 Perhaps sensing that her Motion is doomed to fail, Plaintiff’s Motion makes an ill-fated 20 attempt to divert the Court’s attention by making an argument concerning whether Plaintiff was an 21 employee of Levi’s. Plaintiff says that under Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 22 Cal. 5th 903 (2018) (“Dynamex”), she must have been an employee of Levi’s, and therefore 23 whatever records her former modeling agencies or any former employers have, cannot be relevant. 24 (Pla. Motion, 6: 3-24). This argument fails for two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that Dynamex 25 does not – and never did – apply to Plaintiff because that decision sets forth the ABC test for 26 employment status for the purposes of the IWC Wage Orders, which did not apply to Plaintiff 27 3 28 The Moskowitz “compelling need” standard is disapproved of by Williams, 3 Cal. 5th 531. -8 SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH 1 during her photoshoots. 4 Rather, to the extent she would have any viable argument to be 2 considered an “employee” of Levi’s, the appropriate test would be the analysis set forth in Borello. 3 48 Cal. 3d 341 (1989). Second, even if Plaintiff’s (misguided) representations on the law were 4 true, the fact of the matter remains that Plaintiff’s credibility, her knowledge of the modeling 5 world, and her relationships with other modeling agencies that paid her and/or provided her with 6 wage statements, are directly relevant to her claim that she (erroneously) believed that she was an 7 employee of Levi’s. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion must be denied, and the subpoenaed documents 8 should be produced. 9 IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD LEVI’S MONETARY SANCTIONS 10 A court may order the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s expenses, including 11 reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred opposing a Motion to Quash, if the Court finds that the motion 12 was “made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification…” Code Civ. Proc. § 13 1987.2(a). In addition, if a party presents a motion “primarily for an improper purpose, such as to 14 harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,” the Court may 15 order sanctions against that party. Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7. 16 Here, sanctions should be granted because Plaintiff’s attorneys brought this Motion 17 without substantial justification. It is clear that the primary purpose of the Motion was to 18 needlessly delay Levi’s legitimate discovery, and to harass Levi’s and run up its litigation costs. 19 Moreover, counsel for Plaintiff’s conduct in (1) deliberately serving the Motion to Quash 10 days 20 after the deadline under Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.6(f); and (2) making material 21 misrepresentations to the subpoenaed parties regarding Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to the 22 subpoenas in an effort to prevent them from complying therewith, warrant imposition of sanctions 23 24 4 On April 30, 2018, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Dynamex Operations W., 25 Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018), setting forth the ABC test for employment status for the purposes of the Wage Orders. Because the Dynamex decision expressly declined to decide 26 whether the ABC test applies to Labor Code claims that are not dependent on IWC Wage Orders, the ABC test set forth in Dynamex does not apply to Plaintiff’s section 203 claims, which are not 27 predicated on IWC Wage Orders. Id. Moreover, all of the Labor Code violations alleged by 28 Plaintiff occurred before Dynamex was decided. Accordingly, Borello applies to Plaintiff’s ill- fated claims for waiting time penalties. -9 SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH 1 against Plaintiff’s counsel. Levi’s respectfully requests that the Court order that Plaintiff’s 2 counsel pay sanctions in the amount of $1,000.00 to Levi’s. (Yang Decl., ¶ 7). 3 V. CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, Levi’s respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiff’s 5 Motion to Quash, and enter an order requiring Plaintiff’s counsel to pay sanctions in the amount of 6 $1,000.00 to Levi’s for bringing the instant Motion to Quash without substantial justification 7 under Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.2(a), and for engaging in conduct sanctionable under Code Civ. 8 Proc. § 128.7. 9 10 11 Dated: April 21, 2020 12 SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP 13 14 By /s/ Jason W. Kearnaghan 15 JASON W. KEARNAGHAN Y. DOUGLAS YANG 16 AMANDA E. BECKWITH Attorneys for Defendant 17 LEVI STRAUSS & CO. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -10 SMRH:4840-7399-4936.4 LEVI’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO QUASH 1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 4 333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071-1422. 5 On April 21, 2020, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as DEFENDANT LEVI STRAUSS & CO.’S, OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF WINONA 6 POWERS’ MOTION FOR ORDER TO QUASH SUBPOENAS; REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL IN THE AMOUNT OF 7 $1,000 on the interested parties in this action as follows: 8 SERVICE LIST 9 Joseph H. Low IV Attorneys for Plaintiff Winona Powers THE LAW FIRM OF JOSEPH H. LOW IV 10 100 Oceangate, 12th Floor Long Beach, CA 90802 11 Tel: (562) 901-0840 Fax: (562) 901-0841 12 E-Mail: joseph@jhllaw.com 13 Roger Y. Muse John R. Matheny 14 EXCELSIOR LAW 9595 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 900 15 Beverly Hills, CA 90212 Tel: (310) 205—3981 16 Fax: (310) 205-0594 E-Mail: roger@excelsior-law.com; 17 john@excelsior-law.com 18 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address bdelacruz@sheppardmullin.com to the persons 19 at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the 20 transmission was unsuccessful. 21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 22 Executed on April 21, 2020, at Los Angeles, California. 23 24 25 Beannette De La Cruz 26 27 28 SMRH:4820-9270-4178.1