Exhibit,Appendix: JUSTIN LIE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated vs BENIHANA INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Delaware Corporation

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                                Constance E. Norton, Bar No. 146365
cnorton@littler.com

LITTLER MENDELSON P.C.

333 Bush Street

34th Floor

San Francisco, California 94104
Telephone: 415.433.1940

Fax No.: 415.399.8490

Chad D. Greeson, Bar No. 251928
cgreeson@littler.com

LITTLER MENDELSON P.C.
1255 Treat Boulevard

Suite 600

Walnut Creek, California 94597
Telephone: 925.927.4507
Fax No.: 925.946.9809

Attorneys for Defendant
BENIHANA INTERNATIONAL, INC.

(Additional Counsel on Following Page)

Electronically
by Superior Court of California
ON 5/31/2022
By /s/ Vanessa Jimenez

Deputy Clerk

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO

JUSTIN LIE, individually and on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,
Vv.
BENIHANA INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1-50,

inclusive,

Defendants.

Mit
Mit

Case No. 21-CIV-00153

APPENDIX OF FEDERAL CASES
CITED IN SUPPORT OF JOINT
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
TO APPROVE PAGA SETTLEME
AND DISMISSAL OF PAGA ACTION

ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO
JUDGE NANCY FINEMAN, DEPT. 4

Hearing Date: July 5, 2022
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Dept.: 4CRN

Complaint Filed: Jan. 12, 2021
First Amd. Compl. Filed: Dec. 5, 2021
Second Amd. Comp. Filed: Jan. 18, 2022

APPENDIX OF FEDERAL CASES CITED IN SUPPORT OF JOINT NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO APPROVE
PAGA SETTLEMENT AND DISMISSAL OF PAGA ACTION1 || James R. Hawkins (SBN 192925)
Christina M. Lucio (SBN 253677)
2 || JAMES HAWKINS APLC
9880 Research Drive
3 |) Suite 200
Irvine, California 92618
4 || Telephone: (949) 387-7200
Facismile: (949) 387-6676
5 || James@Jameshawkinsaple.com
Christina@Jameshawkinsaplic.com
6
Attorneys for Plaintiff JUSTIN LIE,
7 || on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
8
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APPENDIX OF FEDERAL CASES CITED IN SUPPORT OF JOINT NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO APPROVE

PAGA SETTLEMENT AND DISMISSAL OF PAGA ACTION1 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(i), Plaintiff Justin Lie (“Plaintiff”) and
2 || Defendant Benihana International, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Benihana’’) (collectively, the “Parties”)
3 || respectfully submit the following Appendix of Federal Authorities in support of their Joint Motion
4 || to Approve PAGA Settlement and Dismissal of PAGA action.
5 Case Exhibit
6 Wanderer v. Kiewit Infrastructure West Co., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158189 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2020) 1
7 Chamberlain v. Baker Hughes, a GE Co., LLC, 2020 WL 4350207 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2020) 2
8 Rincon v. W. Coast Tomato Growers, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22886 6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018) 3
9 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) 4
10 Patel v. Nike Retail Servs., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77988 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2019) 5
I O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 6
12 Titus v. McLane Foodservice, Inc., 2016 WL 4797497 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2016) 7
13 Ramirez v. C and J Well Service, Inc., 2020 WL 5846464 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 27, 2020) 8
14 Segal v. Aquent LLC, 2018 WL 4599754 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018) 9
15 Alcala v. Meyer Logistics, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166879 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2019) 10
16 Bernal v. Graham Packaging Pet Techs, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86393 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2021) 11
17
1g || DATED: May 26, 2022
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
19
° wb Daft
21 By: Cb
Constance E. Norton
22 Chad D. Greeson
23 Attorneys for Defendant BENIHANA
24 INTERNATIONAL, INC.
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26 4862-2420-8416.1 / 062447-1174
27
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oan APPENDIX OF FEDERAL CASES CITED IN SUPPORT OF JOINT NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO APPROVE

PAGA SETTLEMENT AND DISMISSAL OF PAGA ACTIONExhibit 18 Cited

As of: May 18, 2022 12:05 AM Z

Wanderer v. Kiewit Infrastructure West Co.

United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
August 28, 2020, Decided; August 31, 2020, Filed
Case No. 2:18-cv-02898 WBS-DB

Reporter
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158189 *; 2020 WL 5107618

STEPHEN WANDERER, as an individual and in
his representative capacity, Plaintiff, v. KIEWIT
INFRASTRUCTURE WEST CO.; and DOES 1
through 25, inclusive, Defendants.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Labor & Employment Law > Wage & Hour
Laws > Remedies > Private Suits

HN1[] Remedies, Private Suits

A Private Attomeys' General Act (PAGA) action is
a statutory action in which the penalties available
are measured by the number of Labor Code
violations committed by the employer. The
employees bringing the action do so as agents or
proxies of the state's labor law enforcement
agencies. Any agreement to waive PAGA claims is
an agreement to limit the penalties plaintiff-
employees may recover on behalf of the State.
Because a settlement of PAGA claims settles
claims that could otherwise be brought by the State,
the trial court must review and approve any
settlement of PAGA claims. Lab. Code, §
2699(1)(2). Before the trial court can review and
approve of any settlement of PAGA claims, the
proposed settlement shall be submitted to the
California Labor Workforce Development A gency
(LWDA) at the same time that it is submitted to the
court.

Business & Corporate Compliance >... > Wage
& Hour Laws > Administrative
Proceedings > Rulemaking Authority

Labor & Employment Law > Wage & Hour
Laws > Remedies > Private Suits

HN2[%] Administrative
Rulemaking Authority

Proceedings,

The trial court, in reviewing the award of civil
penalties under the Private Attorneys' General Act
(PAGA), may exercise its discretion to lower the
amount of penalties awarded if to do otherwise
would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary
and oppressive, or confiscatory. Lab. Code, §
2699(e)(2). Because State law enforcement
agencies are the real parties in interest, the court's
task is to ensure that the State's interest in enforcing
the law is upheld.

Civil Procedure > Special Proceedings > Class
Actions > Compromise & Settlement

Labor & Employment Law > Wage & Hour
Laws > Remedies > Class Actions

HN3[%]
Settlement

Class Actions, Compromise &

Other than the provisions previously discussed,
Private Attomeys' General Act (PAGA) does not
establish a standard for evaluating PAGAPage 2 of 7

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158189, *158189

settlements. The California Labor Workforce
Development A gency (LWDA) itself has stated that
it is not aware of any existing case law definitively
establishing a standard to review PAGA
settlements. At least a few district courts have
applied the factors in the case of Hanlon v. Chrysler
Corp. to evaluate a PAGA settlement. The factors
in the case of Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., which are
traditionally used to evaluate class action
settlements, include: (1) the strength of plaintiffs'
case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely
duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial;
(4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent
of discovery completed; (6) the expertise and views
of counsel; (7) the presence of government
participation; and (8) the reaction of class members
to the proposed settlement. Many of these factors
are not unique to class action lawsuits and bear on
whether a settlement is fair and has been reached
through an adequate adversarial process.

Administrative Law > Judicial
Review > Standards of Review > Arbitrary &
Capricious Standard of Review

Labor & Employment Law > Wage & Hour
Laws > Remedies > Class Actions

Civil Procedure > Special Proceedings > Class
Actions > Compromise & Settlement

Labor & Employment Law > Wage & Hour
Laws > Remedies > Private Suits

HN4[%] Standards of Review, Arbitrary &
Capricious Standard of Review

The third, seventh, and eighth factors in the case of
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., however, are
inapplicable in a Private Attorneys’ General Act
(PAGA) settlement that was not a class action,
which resolved only the plaintiff's individual
PAGA claims, and where the California Labor
Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) had

filed no submission reflecting a position on the
settlement. In addition to analyzing the settlement
under the five remaining factors in the case of
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., the court must determine
whether the settlement would be unjust, arbitrary
and oppressive, or confiscatory with respect to
defendant, Lab. Code, § 2699(e)(2), and whether
the settlement provisions are at least as effective as
the protections or remedies provided by state and
federal law or regulation for the alleged violation.
Lab. Code, § 2699.3(b)(4).

Civil Procedure > Settlements > Settlement
Agreements > Validity of Agreements

HN5[%] Settlement Agreements, Validity of
Agreements

Courts have noted that legal uncertainty favors
approval of a settlement.

Civil Procedure > Settlements > Settlement
Agreements > Validity of Agreements

HN6[%] Settlement Agreements, Validity of
Agreements

Where a settlement provides timely, certain, and
meaningful recovery, it ought to be favored.

Labor & Employment Law > Wage & Hour
Laws > Remedies > Private Suits

HN7[x&] Remedies, Private Suits

Given the statutory language of Private Attorneys’
General Act (PAGA), a plaintiff cannot recover on
behalf of individuals whom the plaintiff has not
proven suffered a violation of the Labor Code by
the defendant.

Civil Procedure >... > Attomey Fees &Page 3 of 7

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158189, *158189

Expenses > Basis of Recovery > Statutory
Awards

Labor & Employment Law > Wage & Hour
Laws > Remedies > Costs & Attorney Fees

HN8[] Basis of Recovery, Statutory Awards

Private Attomeys' General Act (PAGA) provides
for the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs in any
successful action. Lab. Code, § 2699(g)(1). Any
employee who prevails in any action shall be
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees
and costs.

Counsel: [*1] For Stephen Wanderer, Plaintiff:
Rachel Renno, LEAD ATTORNEY, Foos Gavin
Law Firm, P.C., Sacramento, CA.

For Kiewit Infrastructure West Co., Defendant:
Billie Desiree Wenter, Michael E. Brewer, LEAD
ATTORNEYS, Baker & McKenzie LLP, San
Francisco, CA.

Judges: WILLIAM B. SHUBB, UNITED
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Opinion by: WILLIAM B. SHUBB

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: JOINT
MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT OF
AND DISMISS CLAIM UNDER THE PRIVATE
ATTORNEY S' GENERAL ACT

Plaintiff Stephen Wanderer ("Plaintiff"),
individually and in a representative capacity,
brought this lawsuit against Defendant Kiewit
Infrastructure West Co. ("Defendant") alleging
wrongful termination, retaliation in violation of
California Labor Code §§ 1102.5 and 98.6,
violations of wage and hour laws, and seeking civil
penalties under the Private Attorneys' General Act
"PAGA") based on the alleged misclassification of
plaintiff and other employees as exempt from

overtime. (First Am. Compl. "FAC") (Docket No.
10).) Before the court is the parties' Joint Motion to
Approve of Settlement and to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Claim under the PAGA. ("Joint Mot. for
Settlement") (Docket No. 28.)

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant Kiewit is a construction company
incorporated under the laws of the [*2] State of
Delaware and with its "nerve center" located in the
State of Nebraska. (Notice of Removal ("NOR")
(Docket No. 1 at i] 12-13).) Defendant employed
plaintiff as a Site Safety and Health Officer
("SSHO") at various locations within California,
including the Oroville Dam, the Folsom Dam, and
Kiewit's Fairfield Office, from on or around
September 15, 2013 until May 12, 2018. (FAC at
9916-12.)

On July 5, 2018, plaintiff sent defendant a letter
stating that he intended to pursue a PAGA claim
based on defendant allegedly misclassifying him as
exempt from overtime. (See Mem. of Points and
Authorities in Supp. of Joint Mot. to Approve
Settlement and to Dismiss Claim under the PAGA
("Settlement Mem.") at 1 (Docket No. 29).)
Plaintiff submitted the same letter ("PAGA Letter")
to the California Labor Workforce Development
Agency ("LWDA"). (See Settlement Mem. at 1.)
The LWDA did not respond to the PAGA Letter.
(Id.)

The operative complaint asserts eight causes of
action: (1) wrongful termination in violation of
public policy; (2) retaliation in violation of
California Labor Code §§ 1102.5 and 98.6; (3)
violation of California Labor Code § 201; (4)
failure to pay overtime wages in violation of
California Labor Code § 510; (5) violation of
California Labor Code § 1174; (6) violation of
California Labor Code § 226(a); (7) civil
penalties [*3] under PAGA for violations of the
above Labor Code provisions; and (8) unfair
competition in violation of Business and
Professions Code § 17200. (See FAC at 4-13.)Page 4 of 7

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158189, *3

After exchanging extensive discovery, the parties
reached a settlement through the court's Voluntary
Dispute Resolution Program with Douglas Robert
Thorn of Thorn Law Firm. (See Settlement Mem. at
2.) Mr. Thorn has practiced law for over thirty
years, had extensive trial experience, and has
served as a neutral in over 200 cases, including
employment cases. (See id. at 3.)

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the parties
agreed to settle plaintiff's individual claims, without
admission of fault or liability, for a general release
and dismissal upon the Court's approval of the
parties' settlement as to the PAGA claim. (See id. at
2.) The parties entered into a separate confidential
settlement related to plaintiff's other claims. (See
id.) The parties settled plaintiff's individual claims
only,’ and the PAGA Settlement Agreement does
not release any claim on behalf of any other
allegedly affected employee. (See id.) The
settlement of plaintiff's claims is contingent on the
court issuing a final Order which approves the
settlement agreement, dismisses the action [*4]
(including plaintiff's PAGA Claim) with prejudice
as to the plaintiff and without prejudice as to other
allegedly affected employees, and denies an award
of civil penalties to the plaintiff. (See id.)

II. Discussion
A. PAGA Settlement

HN1[¥] "[A] PAGA action is a statutory action in
which the penalties available are measured by the
number of Labor Code violations committed by the
employer." Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc..
803 F.3d 425, 435 (9th Cir. 2015). The employees
bringing the action do so as agents or proxies of the
state's labor law enforcement agencies. See id. Any
agreement to waive PAGA claims is an agreement
to limit the penalties plaintiff-employees may
recover on behalf of the State. See id. at 436.
Because a settlement of PAGA claims settles
claims that could otherwise be brought by the State,

‘The parties have not given any indication as to the amount that
plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel will receive in the settlement of the
individual claims.

the trial court must "review and approve" any
settlement of PAGA claims. See Cal. Lab. Code. §
2699(1)(2). Before the trial court can review and
approve of any settlement of PAGA claims, "[t]he
proposed settlement shall be submitted to the
[LWDA] at the same time that it is submitted to the
court." Id. Plaintiff provided a copy of the proposed
settlement agreement to the LWDA on July 15,
2020, concurrently with the filing of the Joint Mot.
for Settlement.? (Decl. of Rachel Renno in Supp.
of [*5] Joint Mot. for Settlement at § 2 ("Renno
Decl.") (Docket No. 30)).

HN2[¥] The trial court, in reviewing the award of
civil penalties under the PAGA, may exercise its
discretion to lower the amount of penalties awarded
if "to do otherwise would result in an award that is
unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory."
See Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2). Because State
law enforcement agencies are the real parties in
interest, the court's task is to ensure that the State's
interest in enforcing the law is upheld. See
Rodriguez v. RCO Reforesting Inc., No. 2019, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12597) (citing Sakkab, 803 F.3d
at 435).

HN3[¥] Other than the provisions previously
discussed, "PAGA does not establish a standard for
evaluating PAGA settlements." See Rodriguez,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12597, 2019 WL 331159 at
*4 (citing Smith v. H.F.D. No. 55, Inc., No. 2:15-
CV-01293 KJM KJN, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67192
2018 WL 1899912, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20,
2018)). The LWDA itself has stated that it is not
aware of any existing case law definitively
establishing a standard to review PAGA
settlements. Id. (citing Ramirez v. Benito Valley
Farms, LLC, No. 16-CV-04708-LHK, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 137272, 2017 WL 3670794, at *3
N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017)). At least a few district
courts have applied the factors in Hanlon v.
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir.
1998), to evaluate a PAGA settlement. See, e.g.

2The LWDA has not appeared in this case and has not filed any
objection to the proposed joint settlement.Page 5 of 7

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158189, *5

Smith, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67192, 2018 WL
1899912, at *2; Ramirez, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
137272, 2017 WL 3670794, at *3; O'Connor v.
Uber Techs., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1134 (N.D.
Cal. 2016). The Hanlon factors, which are
traditionally used to evaluate class action
settlements, include (1) the strength of plaintiffs'
case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and [*6]
likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial;
(4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent
of discovery completed; (6) the expertise and views
of counsel; (7) the presence of government
participation; and (8) the reaction of class members
to the proposed settlement. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d
at 1026. "Many of these factors are not unique to
class action lawsuits and bear on whether a
settlement is fair and has been reached through an
adequate adversarial process." See Ramirez, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137272, 2017 WL 3670794, at *3.
Thus, the court finds these factors useful in
evaluating a settlement of PAGA claims.

HN4[¥] The third, seventh, and eighth factors,
however, are not relevant to this settlement because
it is not a class action and the LWDA has not
participated. See Smith, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67192, 2018 WL 1899912, at *2 (holding that these
factors were inapplicable in a PAGA settlement
that was not a class action, which resolved only the
plaintiff's individual PAGA claims, and where the
LWDA had filed no submission reflecting a
position on the settlement.) In addition to analyzing
the settlement under the five remaining Hanlon
factors, the court must determine whether the
settlement would be “unjust, arbitrary and
oppressive, or confiscatory" with respect [*7] to
defendant, see Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2), and
whether "the settlement provisions are at least as
effective as the protections or remedies provided by
state and federal law or regulation for the alleged
violation." See Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(b)(4).

First, there is no indication that the settlement
would be unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or
confiscatory as to defendants. Both sides have

agreed that the settlement is fair and reasonable.
(See Settlement Mem. at 4.) Defendant has given
no indication that the settlement would be unduly
burdensome or unjust. Based on the exchange of
substantial information and Mr. Thom's
recommendation, both sides have agreed to allocate
zero dollars to plaintiff's individual PAGA claim.
(See id. at 3.) Plaintiff voluntarily entered into an
agreement to accept a monetary benefit to settle his
individual claims and not pursue his PAGA claim.
(See id. at 4.) Given that both sides have agreed to
the settlement and to avoid the further expense of
litigation, and the Settlement Agreement does not
release any claim on behalf of any other allegedly
affected employee, the court concludes that a
settlement would not be “unjust, arbitrary and
oppressive, or confiscatory." See Rodriguez, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12597, 2019 WL 331159, at *4.

Second, the "strength of plaintiff's case" factor [*8]
also favors approval of settlement. The parties
exchanged substantial information at mediation,
and the parties' mediator, Mr. Thorn, concluded
that the defendant presented compelling evidence
and arguments that it properly classified plaintiff as
exempt under  Califomia's administrative
exemption. (See Settlement Mem. at 3.) Mr. Thorn
likewise concluded that defendant raised a
convincing argument that plaintiff did not comply
with PAGA's administrative requirement because
his PAGA letter referred only to plaintiff and did
not place the LWDA or defendant on notice of his
intention to pursue a representative claim. (See id.
at 3.); see Khan v. Dunn-Edwards Corp., 19 Cal.
App. 5th 804, 809, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90 (2nd Dist.
2018) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
where notice "expressly applied only to [plaintiff]"
and failed to give the LWDA an adequate
opportunity to decide whether to investigate a
representative action or provide the company an
adequate opportunity to respond to the agency.).)
These defenses present a substantial risk to
plaintiff's PAGA Claim and the likelihood that the
penalties sought by the plaintiff, either in whole or
in part, will not be awarded. HN5[¥] Courts have
noted that legal uncertainty favors approval of aPage 6 of 7

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158189, *8

settlement. See Smith, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67192, 2018 WL 1899912, at*3.

Third, "the risk, expense, [*9] complexity, and
likely duration of further litigation" factor strongly
favors approval of the settlement. The parties
reached this settlement after nearly two years of
litigation. The parties have conducted extensive
investigation, discovery, and  arms-length
negotiation between experienced and informed
counsel and with the assistance of a seasoned and
well-respected mediator. (See Settlement Mem. at
3.) Further litigation would necessitate further
expenses and costs for both parties. HN6[¥]
Where a settlement "provides timely, certain, and
meaningful recovery," it ought to be favored. See
Ramirez, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137272, 2017 WL
3670794, at*5.

Fourth, the settlement reflects the parties' mutual
agreement to allocate zero dollars to plaintiff's
individual PAGA claim. (See Settlement Mem. at
3.) The parties arrived at this claim based on the
exchange of substantial information, Defendant's
anticipated defenses and Mr. Thom's
recommendation. (Id.) Plaintiff voluntarily entered
into an agreement to accept a monetary benefit to
settle his individual claims and not pursue his
PAGA claim. (Id. at 4.) Courts have previously
approved settlements where parties mutually agree
to allocate zero dollars or another nominal amount
to a PAGA claim. See Nordstrom Comm'n Cases,
186 Cal. App. 4th 576, 589, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27
4th Dist. 2010)(holding that [*10] there was "no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's approval of
the settlement agreement" which allocated zero
dollars for PAGA penalty claims as part of the
overall settlement of the case.); see also Alcala v.
Meyer Logistics, Inc., No. CV 17-7211
PSG(AGRx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166879, 2019
WL 4452961, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2019)
(observing that courts have approved PAGA claims
which fall "within the zero to two percent range.")
Moreover, plaintiff's settlement does not impair the
rights or release the claims of other allegedly
aggrieved employees. (See Settlement Mem. at 4.)

Accordingly, "the amount offered in settlement"
factor favors approval.

Fifth, regarding the extent of discovery completed
and the stage of the proceedings, the parties
conducted informal and formal investigation and
discovery into plaintiff's claims. (See id. at 3.) The
parties engaged in written discovery, including
requests for production, requests for admission, and
interrogatories. (Decl. of Billie D. Wenter in Supp.
of Joint Mot. for Settlement at § 2("Wenter Decl.")
(Docket No. 31).). Defendant produced over 12,000
pages in response to requests for production. Id. In
addition, defendant deposed plaintiff on February
11, 2020. Id. Moreover, on June 30, 2020, the
parties mediated the action through [*11] the
court's Voluntary Dispute Resolution Program with
Mr. Thorn. (See Settlement Mem. at 2.) Both sides
thereby developed a good sense of the risks and
benefits of continuing litigation. See Ontiveros v.
Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 371 (E.D. Cal. 2014)
(Shubb, J.)(observing that the parties use of
mediation, which took place after significant
discovery, and their reliance on the mediator’s
proposal demonstrated that they had carefully
considered and evaluated the strength of their
arguments.) Accordingly, this factor weighs in
favor of approval.

Sixth, with respect to the experience and views of
counsel, plaintiff was represented by experienced
counsel who arrived at this Settlement Agreement
through arms-length negotiations and _ by
participating in mediation through the court's
Voluntary Dispute Resolution Program with the
assistance of Mr. Thorn. (See Settlement Mem. at
1.) Plaintiff's counsel believes that the dismissal of
the PAGA claim appropriately accounts for the
challenges and potential risks of continuing
litigation. (See id.) Thus, counsel's conclusion that
this settlement is plaintiffs' best chance at recovery
is given considerable weight. See Rodriguez, 2019
U.S. Dist, LEXIS 12597, 2019 WL 331159 at *5.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of
approval.Page 7 of 7

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158189, *11

Seventh, and finally, this settlement [*12] is "at
least as effective as the protections or remedies
provided by state and federal law or regulation for
the alleged violation." See Cal. Lab. Code §
2699.3(b)(4). As mentioned previously, this
settlement resolves only plaintiff's individual
claims for civil penalties; it is not a class settlement
and therefore does not impair the rights or release
the claims of any other allegedly aggrieved
employees. (See Settlement Mem. at 1.) Here, Mr.
Thorn concluded that plaintiff was properly
classified as an employee exempt from overtime
under Califomia's administrative exemption. (Id. at
3); See 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 11040(1)(A)(2). HN7[
] "Given the statutory language [of PAGA], a
plaintiff cannot recover on behalf of individuals
whom the plaintiff has not proven suffered a
violation of the Labor Code by the defendant."
Cardenas v. McLane Foodservice, Inc., No. SACV
10-473 DOC (FFMx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13126, 2011 WL 379413 at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
The plaintiff has not demonstrated the violation of
the Labor Code by defendant for any additional
employees and may not even be able to
demonstrate a violation of the Labor Code by
defendant in his own case. The court, therefore,
finds that the settlement satisfies this provision of
the California Labor Code.

Accordingly, because every relevant factor favors
final approval of the settlement, the [*13] court
will approve the parties' settlement of plaintiff's
PAGA claims.

B. Attorneys’ Fees

HN8[¥#] PAGA provides for the recovery of
attomeys' fees and costs in any successful action.
See Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(q)(1) ("Any employee
who prevails in any action shall be entitled to an
award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs.").
Here, the parties have agreed to bear their own
attomeys' fees and costs related to this action, and
plaintiff's counsel waives any and all rights to
further attomeys' fees and costs in connection with
this action, except as separately agreed upon
between plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel. See

Stipulated Settlement Agreement (Docket No. 31-1
at 4.) The parties have also agreed to a mutual
waiver of any right to pursue recovery of costs.
(See Settlement Mem. at 4.) As plaintiff has not
prevailed on any PAGA claim, he is not entitled to
any attomey's fees under PAGA. Accordingly, the
court approves of the joint decision by the parties to
bear their own attomey's fees and waive their rights
to pursue recovery of costs.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties'
Joint Mot. for Settlement (Docket No. 28) be, and
the same hereby is, GRANTED. Plaintiff is not
entitled to any civil penalties under [*14] PAGA.
This action, including plaintiff's PAGA Claim, is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to plaintiff,
and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to
any individual or representative claims, including
any PAGA claim, that may be brought by any other
employees that may have been affected by
defendant's alleged conduct.

The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter judgment
accordingly.

Dated: August 28, 2020

/s/ William B. Shubb

WILLIAM B. SHUBB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

End of DocumentExhibit 2Chamberlain v. Baker Hughes, a GE Company, LLC, Slip Copy (2020)

2020 WL 4350207
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. California.

Michael CHAMBERLAIN, Plaintiff,
v.
BAKER HUGHES, A GE COMPANY,
LLC, Defendant.

No. 1:19-cv-00831-DAD-JLT
|
Signed 07/29/2020

Attorneys and Law Firms

Karl Gerber, Ann Benin Guleser, Employment Lawyers
Group, Sherman Oaks, CA, for Plaintiff.

Michele Haydel Gehrke, Reed Smith LLP, San Francisco,
CA, Fatemeh S. Mashouf, Reed Smith LLP, Los Angeles,
CA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF
PAGA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Dale A. Drozd, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

*1 This matter is before the court on plaintiff's unopposed
motion for approval of a settlement agreement and
dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's sixth cause of
action against defendant pursuant to the Private Attorneys
General Act (“PAGA”). (Doc. No. 19.) Pursuant to
General Order No. 617 addressing the public health
emergency posed by the coronavirus outbreak, on April
22, 2020, the court took the motion under submission to
be decided on the papers. (Doc. No. 24.) Having
considered the unopposed motion and despite some
reservation, the court will approve the settlement
agreement.

BACKGROUND
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On May 14, 2019, plaintiff Michael Chamberlain filed
this action in Kern County Superior Court asserting five
causes of action. (Doc. No. 4-1.) Defendant Baker
Hughes, a GE Company, LLC (“Baker Hughes”) removed
the action to this federal court on June 13, 2019. (See
generally Doc. No. 1.) On July 13, 2019, the parties filed
a joint stipulation allowing plaintiff to file a first amended
complaint to add a PAGA claim. (Doc. No. 10 at 2.) In
that stipulation, the parties agreed that plaintiffs
non-PAGA claims should proceed under an arbitration
agreement without the need for a motion to enforce the
arbitration agreement. (/d.) The parties also agreed that
they would proceed to submit the non-PAGA claims to
arbitration if the action was not resolved by private
mediation by December 31, 2019. (/d.) Pursuant to the
stipulation, the court was to retain jurisdiction as to
plaintiff's PAGA claim, lifting the stay at such time that
the parties submit a motion to approve settlement and/or
the arbitration came to a final resolution. (/d. at 3.) On
August 1, 2019, the court gave effect to the stipulation
and stayed this action. (Doc. No. 11.)

Plaintiffs first amended complaint alleges that on or
about March 26, 2017, plaintiff returned to work as a
directional driller at Baker Hughes after being laid off.
(Doc. No. 12 at § 4.) As it pertains to his PAGA claim,
plaintiff alleges that PAGA penalties are owed for the
following California Labor Code § 226 violations:

1) the paystubs do not state an hourly rate for the daily
rate, or the car allowance; 2) The paystubs do not state
how many hours of work the daily rate or car allowance
is for; 3) The paystubs fail to specify the correct
overtime, double time, or regular rates of pay; 4)
Defendant has failed to preserve the actual paystubs for
each pay period in their electronic system. They have
changed paystubs insofar as rates of pay, total
compensation, why the compensation was paid, and
how many hours the pay was for; 5) in approximately
May of 2019 Defendant created a series of bi-weekly
paystubs from on or about December 21, 2018 to
5-10-19 which make it virtually impossible to
determine what hourly rates are paid, how many hours
the sums are paid for, why there are substations of
hours and gross sums, the same issues described in 1-4
above but even worse because these stubs show zero
hours at regular pay, zero hours for an overtime bonus
but gross sums are listed. The same has been done for
other members of the PAGA group at other dates; 6)
The paystubs state OT Bonus but fail to specify the
number of hours or hourly rate for that itemization.
Because the employer failed to properly provide
employee wage deduction statements for each payChamberlain v. Baker Hughes, a GE Company, LLC, Slip Copy (2020)

period during the statutory time a total of $600 is due
per pay period per employee. The employees were paid
biweekly; 7) Meal Break penalties do not appear and
the general number of regular, overtime, and double
time hours worked are incorrect.
*2 (id. at § 26.) Additionally, plaintiff asserts that
defendant violated § 226 by failing to pay overtime and
double time, and because not all wages were paid as
required by statute. (/d. at § 27.) Plaintiff alleges that the
total PAGA violations are worth $1,600.00 in PAGA
penalties per employee per weekly pay period, go back a
year before this action was filed, and relate to defendant’s
nonexempt directional drillers and measurement well
drillers who were paid daily bonuses and travel time. (/d.)
Plaintiff estimates that there are thirty to fifty of these
employees in the statutory period. (/d.)

On January 9, 2020, the parties engaged in private
mediation with employment law mediator Steve Cerveris
(Doc. No. 20 at 6), which resulted in the finalizing of
the terms of a PAGA settlement agreement (Doc. No.
20-3 (“the Agreement”)) on February 5, 2020 (id. at J 4).
On April 6, 2020, plaintiff filed this unopposed motion
for settlement approval.! (Doc. No. 19.) On April 16,
2020, the court directed the parties to submit
supplemental briefing providing additional information
regarding litigation costs accrued, the reasonableness of
the attorneys’ fees provision, and the fundamental
fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the Agreement.
(Doc. No. 23.) On April 24, 2020, plaintiff's counsel,
attorney Karl Gerber, submitted a supplemental
declaration (“the supplemental Gerber declaration”) and
exhibits. (Doc. No. 25.) Defendant submitted a
supplemental brief on April 27, 2020. (Doc. No. 27.)

THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

According to the Agreement, defendant will pay a gross
settlement payment of $25,000.00. (The Agreement at
38.) The gross settlement payment will include (1) claims
administration costs of up to $1,000.00 to Phoenix
Settlement Administrators; plaintiff's litigation costs of
up to $1,000.00, subject to court approval; (3) plaintiff's
attorneys’ fees of 40 percent of the gross settlement
payment, subject to court approval; and (4) the PAGA
fund comprising the remaining funds, to be divided 75
percent to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency
(LWDA) and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees. (/d.
at §§ 25, 38.) If the actual amount of claims
administration, litigation costs, and/or attorneys’ fees are
less or more than the amounts set forth above, those funds
shall be added to or subtracted from the PAGA fund. (/d.

WESTLAW

at { 39.) The total amount of the gross settlement payment
shall not exceed $25,000.00. (/d.)

The Agreement defines “aggrieved employee(s)” as
“Plaintiff and all persons who are or were employed by
defendant working in California as non-exempt
directional drillers and/or measurement well drillers who
were paid daily bonuses and/or travel time from May 10,
2018 through January 9, 2020.” (/d. at § 1.) The 25
percent that is allocated to the aggrieved employees will
be divided by the total number of eligible pay periods for
all aggrieved employees, which will yield a pay period
amount. (/d. at § 42.) The gross amount of each individual
PAGA payment shall be calculated by multiplying the
number of eligible pay periods worked by the individual
aggrieved employee by the pay period amount. (/d.)
“Eligible pay periods” are the total number of pay periods
worked by each aggrieved employee during the covered
period—May 10, 2018 to January 9, 2020—in California
as a non-exempt directional drillers and/or measurement
well drillers. (/d. at §§] 6, 9.) The covered claims are as
follows:

*3 all claims, causes of action, and legal theories of
relief alleged or which could have been alleged or
otherwise raised based on the facts in the FAC...or the
LWDA Letter for PAGA penalties, including: (1)
failure to provide meal and rest breaks or premium
payments in lieu thereof (including Labor Code 226.7.,
512, Wage Order 16); (2) failure to pay all wages and
the regular rate, overtime rate or double time rate
(including Labor Code 558,204,210,215, and 216); (3)
failure to timely pay all wages, including upon
termination, and waiting time penalties; (4) failure to
provide complete and accurate wage statements; (5)
failure to indemnify for business expenses; (6)
unlawful deductions from wages; (7) unfair business
practices (California Business & Professions Code
section 17200 et seq.) that could have been premised on
the facts, claims causes of action or legal theories
described above or on any of the claims, causes of
action or legal theories of relief pleaded in the FAC for
restitution claims premised on the above-referenced
violations; (8) all claims under PAGA that could have
been premised on the facts, claims, causes of action or
legal theories described above or on any of the claims,
causes of action or legal theories of relief pleaded in the
FAC; and (9) all damages, penalties, interest, costs
(including attorney’s fees) and other amounts
recoverable under said claims or causes of action as to
the facts and/or legal theories alleged or which could
have been alleged in the FAC.
(Id. at] 5.)

The Agreement provides that, as of the effective date,Chamberlain v. Baker Hughes, a GE Company, LLC, Slip Copy (2020)

each aggrieved employee shall fully release and forever
discharge defendant from any and all claims, causes of
action, demands, rights, liabilities, penalties, attorneys’
fees, costs, damages, interest, restitution, and/or liability
that were or could have been asserted against defendant in
the PAGA lawsuit and/or the PAGA letter to LWDA
based on the covered claims. (/d. at § 49.) This release
extends to all PAGA claims arising from or relating to
any and all acts, events and omissions that occurred
and/or accrued during the covered period. (/d.) Upon the
court’s approval of the Agreement, aggrieved employees
will have no standing to appeal, object or request
exclusion from the settlement. (/d.)

LEGAL STANDARD

In 2003, the California Legislature enacted the Private
Attorney General Act, California Labor Code §§ 2698 et
seq., after declaring: (i) that adequate financing of labor
law enforcement was necessary to achieve maximum
compliance; (ii) that staffing levels for state labor law
enforcement agencies have declined and were unable to
keep up with a growing labor market; (iii) that vigorous
assessment and collection of civil penalties provides a
meaningful deterrent to unlawful conduct; and (iv) that it
was therefore in the public interest to allow aggrieved
employees, acting as private attorneys general, to seek
and recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations.
2003 Cal. Stat. 6629. Under PAGA, an “aggrieved
employee” may bring an action for civil penalties for
labor code violations on behalf of herself and other
current or former employees. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a).?
A plaintiff suing under PAGA “does so as the proxy or
agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.”
Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 986 (2009).
Accordingly, a judgment in a PAGA action “binds all
those, including nonparty aggrieved employees, who
would be bound by a judgment in an action brought by
the government.” Jd. (emphasis added); see also Iskanian
v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 381 (2014)
(“When a government agency is authorized to bring an
action on behalf of an individual or in the public interest,
and a private person lacks an independent legal right to
bring the action, a person who is not a party but who is
represented by the agency is bound by the judgment as
though the person were a party.”).

The PAGA statute imposes a number of limits on
litigants. First, because a PAGA action functions as a
“substitute” for an action brought by the state
government, a plaintiff suing under PAGA is limited to
recovery of civil penalties only, rather than damages

WESTLAW

available privately through direct or class action claims.
Id. Second, to bring an action under PAGA, an aggrieved
employee must first provide written notice to the LWDA
as well as to the employer. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(a)(1).
Third, any civil penalties recovered must be distributed as
follows: 75 percent to the LWDA, and the remaining 25
percent to the aggrieved employees. Jd. § 2699(i).

*4 Finally, a trial court must “review and approve” any
settlement of PAGA claims. Id. § 2699(/)(2).* There is no
binding authority identifying the proper standard of
review of PAGA settlements to be employed by the court.
Tn the class action context, where PAGA claims often also
appear, a district court must independently determine that
a proposed settlement agreement is “fundamentally fair,
adequate and reasonable” before granting approval. See
Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cty.
of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Heritage Bond Litig., 546 F.3d 667, 674-75 (9th Cir.
2008). However, this is not a class action, and PAGA
claims are intended to serve a decidedly different
purpose—namely to protect the public rather than for the
benefit of private parties. See Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 986.
The LWDA has provided some guidance regarding court
approval of PAGA settlements. See California Labor and
Workforce Development Agency’s Comments on
Proposed PAGA Settlement (“LWDA Comments”),
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-03826-EMC
(N.D. Cal. Jul. 29, 2016) (Doc. No. 736 at 2-3.). In that
case, where both class action and PAGA claims were
covered by a proposed settlement, the LWDA stressed
that

when a PAGA claim is settled, the relief provided for
under the PAGA [must] be genuine and meaningful,
consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute to
benefit the public and, in the context of a class action,
the court [must] evaluate whether the settlement meets
the standards of being “fundamentally fair, reasonable,
and adequate” with reference to the public policies
underlying the PAGA.

Id.; see also O'Connor y. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp.

3d 1110, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citing the same with

approval).

Recognizing the distinct issues presented by class actions,
this court is nevertheless persuaded by the LWDA’s
reasoning in O’Connor and therefore adopts its proposed
standard in evaluating the PAGA-only _ settlement
agreement now before the court. Accordingly, the court
will approve a settlement of PAGA claims upon a
showing that the settlement terms (1) meet the statutory
requirements set forth by PAGA, and (2) are
fundamentally fair, reasonable, and adequate in view of
PAGA’s public policy goals. See Tenorio v. Gallardo,Chamberlain v. Baker Hughes, a GE Company, LLC, Slip Copy (2020)

No. 1:16-cv-00283-DAD-JLT, 2019 WL 4747949, at *3
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2019).

ANALYSIS

A. The PAGA Settlement

PAGA’s statutory requirements require that 75 percent of
the civil penalties recovered by aggrieved employees
must be allocated to the LWDA and 25 percent allocated
to aggrieved employees.’ Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(i). As
stated above, the Agreement in this case allocates the
PAGA fund accordingly. (See the Agreement at § 42.)
Although the Agreement does not specify the dollar
amounts for the PAGA fund’s allocations, according to
the motion, the PAGA fund will total $13,363.29. (Doc.
No. 19 at 7.) The claims administrator will pay 75 percent
of the PAGA fund, or $10,022.46, to the LWDA, with the
remaining 25 percent, or $3,340.83, to be distributed
among the aggrieved employees on a pro-rata basis. (/d.;
the Agreement at 42.) As stated above, the Agreement
lists Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the settlement
administrator. (The Agreement at §] 25; see also Doc. No.
20-6.) According to plaintiff's motion, attorney Gerber
has used Phoenix Settlement Administrators for multiple
PAGA settlements, and they have delivered timely and
economical services. (Doc. Nos. 19 at 7; 20 at J 6.)
Attorney Gerber also attaches to his declaration the form
by which he submitted the proposed settlement to the
LWDA. (Doc. No. 20-4.)

*5 Plaintiff's counsel ultimately concludes, albeit by a
somewhat circuitous route, that a $200,000.00 PAGA
verdict would be a success in this case. (Doc. No. 19 at 5.)
If the court accepts the $200,000.00 valuation, the
$25,000.00 settlement represents a 12 percent of the likely
verdict in this case. (/d. at 6.) In his supplemental
declaration, attorney Gerber states that he proposed the
settlement amount “based upon the size of the group, the
total potential, the defenses, and [his] experience in this
area of the law.” (Doc. No. 25 at § 26.) In its
supplemental brief, defendant maintains that it does not
concede any liability whatsoever under PAGA in this case
and that in its view the settlement amount “is still grossly
over-valued” in light of its valid defenses to the
underlying claims. (Doc. No. 27 at 22-23.)

Plaintiff's counsel anticipates encountering the following
difficulties should this matter proceed. Counsel states that
defendant, who is in the oil business, is at risk of filing for

WESTLAW

bankruptcy and being unable to pay this settlement given
the current state of the oil market. (Doc. No. 25 at § 26.)
Counsel also explains that very few potential litigants
were willing to participate in this action. (/d. at § 24.) He
represents that most employees involved in this PAGA
group are short-term employees, and adds “that a large
part of this group are not California residents who [he]
cannot get to come to court in Fresno.” (/d.) In his motion
for final approval, plaintiff notes that the Agreement will
provide LWDA with penalties while paying a number of
affected employees who are not motivated to participate
in this suit. (Doc. No. 19 at 8.) Plaintiff also observes that
the affected employees can still bring individual actions to
recover their actual damages because the Agreement only
releases PAGA liability. (/d. at 6.)

With this understanding, the court will approve the
Agreement as it pertains to the award of PAGA penalties.
Because of the concrete risk attendant with the pursuit of
further litigation in this action and, most critically, the
lack of objection from the LWDA despite being provided
timely notice of the terms of this proposed settlement, the
court finds that the amount offered in settlement of the
PAGA claims here weighs in favor of approval. Having
reviewed the parties’ submissions and the terms of the
proposed settlement, the court finds that the settlement
amount related to plaintiffs’ PAGA claims is fair,
reasonable, and adequate in light of the public policy
goals of PAGA. See O'Connor, 201 F. Supp. 3d at
1132-33 (defining PAGA’s goals as __ including
“benefit[ting] the public by augmenting the state’s
enforcement capabilities, encouraging compliance with
Labor Code provisions, and deterring noncompliance”)
(emphasis added).

B. Attorneys’ Fees

The court now turns to the attorneys’ fees provision of the
Agreement. The relevant provision of PAGA provides
that “[a]ny employee who prevails in any action shall be
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(g). Calculating attorneys’
fees under this provision requires application of the
lodestar. See Steenhuyse v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 317 F.
Supp. 3d 1062, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2018); PLCM Grp. v.
Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000) (noting that “the
fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the
‘lodestar’ ”); Margolin v. Reg’l Planning Comm'n, 134
Cal. App. 3d 999, 1004 (1982) (“California courts have
consistently held that a computation of time spent on a
case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental
to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ feeChamberlain v. Baker Hughes, a GE Company, LLC, Slip Copy (2020)

award.”). “In determining reasonable hours, counsel bears
the burden of submitting detailed time records justifying
the hours claimed to have been expended.” Chalmers v.
City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986).
“Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the
district court may reduce the award accordingly.” Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). A district court
should also exclude from the lodestar fee calculation any
hours that were not “reasonably expended,” such as hours
that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.
See id. at 434; J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Napuri, No. C
10-04171 SBA, 2013 WL 4428573, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
15, 2013).

*6 In assessing fee applications, the reasonable hourly
rates are calculated according to the prevailing market
rates in the relevant legal community. Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Gonzalez v. City of Maywood,
729 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013); Ingram vy.
Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We have
held that ‘[iJn determining a reasonable hourly rate, the
district court should be guided by the rate prevailing in
the community for similar work performed by attorneys
of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’ ”)
(quoting Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210-11); Van Skike v.
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 557 F.3d 1041,
1046 (9th Cir. 2009); Carson v. Billings Police Dep’t, 470
F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2006). Typically, the “relevant
legal community” is the forum district’ and the local
hourly rates for similar work should normally be
employed. Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1205; Prison Legal
News, 608 F.3d at 454; Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439,
1449 (9th Cir. 1994); Deukmejian, 987 F.2d at 1405.

The fee