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San Francisco County Superior Court
APR 2 0 2022
CLEBK OF THE COURT
BY: a <
~ puty Clerk
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
DEPARTMENT 304
NACE REYNOLDS, an individual,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
ROBIN AMELIA SHEEHAN, et al.,
Defendants.
NACE REYNOLDS, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRIAN MORGAN HEIT, an individual; HEIT
LAW GROUP PC, a California professional
corporation; ROBIN AMELIA SHEEHAN, an
individual, MATTHEW JACOB FEAVER, an
individual; SHEEHAN LAW GROUP PC, a
(former) California professional corporation;
SHEEHAN & FEAVER PC, a California
professional corporation; and DOES 1-100,
Defendants.
Case No. CGC-21-594238 (consolidated with
No. CGC-21-594246)
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ AMENDED
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
COMPLAINT
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Reynolds v. Sheehan, et al., CGC-21-594238 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of ComplaintoC em ND HW BR Ww NY
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on A UN FF YW NY KF Oo 0D Oe HD DH FF Ww NY KY OC
Defendants’ amended motion to strike portions of the complaint in consolidated action Reynolds
v. Heit, et al., Case No. CGC-21-594246 came on regularly for hearing before the Court on April 19,
2022. All parties appeared through their counsel of record. The hearing was not reported. All parties
Stipulated to the Court’s tentative ruling, which was circulated in writing in advance of the hearing, and
which is hereby adopted. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is denied without prejudice.
BACKGROUND /
These two consolidated actions arise out of Defendant law firms’ and attorneys’ representation of
Plaintiff Nace Reynolds in actions brought under Business and Professions Code section 17529.5, which
makes it unlawful to advertise in commercial e-mails under specified circumstances. In Reynolds v.
Sheehan, et al., Case No. CGC-21-594238, filed on August 2, 2021, Plaintiff alleges that he entered into
multiple written contingency fee agreements with Defendants for legal services. He seeks declaratory
relief that: (1) the contingency fee agreements are void and unenforceable; and (2) notices of attorney’s
liens filed by Defendants in three separate lawsuits in which they formerly represented Plaintiff prior to
being discharged are void. In Reynolds v. Heit, et al., Case No. CGC-21-594246, filed on the same day,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed legal malpractice in their representation of him, and seeks to
state causes of action for professional negligence, conversion, fraud or deceit in concealment, accounting,
common counts, violation of the Unfair Competition Law, and unjust enrichment. He seeks monetary
damages on each of these causes of action in specific amounts ranging from $5,000 to $261,000,
unspecified punitive damages, an accounting, restitution in the amount of $100,000, and injunctive relief
“in the form of an Order prohibiting DEFENDANTS from bringing claims under or representing
individuals related to Section 17529.5 without competence in the area, and promoting and condoning the
unauthorized practice of law.” (Compl. { 308.)
By their amended motion, Defendants Robin Amelia Sheehan, Matthew Jacob Feaver, and
Sheehan & Feaver PC, fka Sheehan Law Group PC (together, “Sheehan & Feaver”), seek an order
striking Plaintiff's prayer for attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. That request
is found in Paragraph 312 of the complaint filed in Reynolds v. Heit, et al., Case No. CGC-21-594246,
which reads in its entirety as follows:
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Reynolds v. Sheehan, et al., CGC-21-594238 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of ComplaintCo ea NY DH FW NH
Yb NY BY NY WY NY NR NY YF FF KS et
&® Yak BSS F&F Fe DTA aAaEBEHRES
Attorneys’ fees, because by prosecuting this Action, REYNOLDS expects to enforce important
rights affecting the public interest and thereby conferring a significant benefit on the general
public or a large class of persons. The necessity and financial burden of private enforcement is
such as to make an award of attorneys’ fees appropriate, and the attorneys’ fees should not, in the
interest of justice, be paid out of the recovery of damages. Specifically, REYNOLDS expects that
this Action will reduce the likelihood of DEFENDANTS continuing their incompetent litigation
and committing malpractice by taking legal advice from a non-attorney, practicing in an area of
law in which they do not have sufficient knowledge or skill and have shown no interest or attempt
to obtain sufficient knowledge and skill, pressuring their clients to accept meager settlements,
negotiating aggregate settlements without full disclosure to each party, and abandoning clients’
claims outright, all of which have the potential of hurting a large number of Californians. See
Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's prayer for attorneys’ fees invokes Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the so-called
private attorneys’ general statute. Section 1021.5 reads in pertinent part,
Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more
opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right
affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has
been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial
burden of private enforcement, . . . , are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees
should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.
Thus, “Section 1021.5 permits a trial court to award attorney’s fees to a successful party in any action that
‘(1) enforced an important public right, (2) conferred a significant public benefit, and (3) is of a type that
private enforcement was necessary, and the financial burden justifies subsidizing the successful party’s
attorneys.” (Burgess v. Coronado Unified Sch. Dist. (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 1, 7.)
Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff's prayer for fees under section 1021.5 is denied as
premature. “There is no requirement that the intent to seek attorney fees under section 1021.5 must be
pleaded in the underlying action. [Citation.] Such fees are not part of the underlying cause of action, but
are incidents to thé cause and are properly awarded after entry of a. . . judgment.” (Snatchko v. Westfield,
LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 469, 497, quoting Washburn v. City of Berkeley (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 578,
583; see also Faton v. Ahmedo (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1169 [“statutory attorney fees need not be
pleaded and proved at trial and may properly be awarded after entry of judgment”].) As the plain
statutory language makes clear, a party’s entitlement to fees under section 1021.5 cannot be addressed
until the end of the case, if and when it is determined to have been a “successful party” and, if so, whether
the action “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,” including
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Reynolds v. Sheehan, et al., CGC-21-594238 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Complaintoe YN DH FF BY
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whether “a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general
public or a large class of persons.” Because there is no requirement that a prayer for fees under section
1021.5 be pled at all, a trial court errs in striking such a prayer based on a failure to adequately plead their
basis. (Snatchko, 187 Cal.App.4th at 497 [“As there was no requirement they be pled at all, the trial court
erred in striking Snatchko's prayer for attorney fees based on a failure to adequately plead their basis”].)!
The Court is skeptical that Plaintiff ultimately will be entitled to the requested attorneys’ fees,
even if he prevails in this action, because Plaintiff has a direct pecuniary interest in pursuing this case for
his own benefit, and any relief he may obtain against Defendants will only coincidentally protect the
public interest, if at all. Plaintiff's complaint reveals on its face that it was not brought to benefit the
general public or a large class of persons. Rather, it is a legal malpractice action in which Plaintiff seeks
to recover substantial monetary damages and restitution. “The necessity and financial burden requirement
encompasses two issues: ‘whether private enforcement was necessary and whether the financial burden of
private enforcement warrants subsidizing the successful party’s attorneys.” (Citizens for Amending
Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal-App.5th 1159, 1192-1193.) “Section 1021.5 was not
designed as a method for rewarding litigants motivated by their own pecuniary interests who only
coincidentally protect the public interest.” (Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 166
Cal.App.3d 106, 114.) In order to justify an award of fees, the successful claimant must show that its
“financial burden of attorneys fees is out of proportion to its personal stake in litigating the case.” (Id. at
113.) Where, as here, the benefits it seeks are “immediately and directly translated into monetary terms,”
and “[t]he public benefits are not likely to result in any economic benefit to more than a few persons, even
in the future,” there is no basis for an award of fees under section 1021.5. (Jd.; see also Weeks v. Baker &
McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1137, 1170 [in sexual harassment action against law firm and one
of its partners, holding that § 1021.5 does not authorize an award of fees “in an action . . . brought by a
single individual to redress her own economic injury”]; DiPirro v. Bondo Corp. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th
150, 199 [defendant in Proposition 65 lawsuit not entitled to fees under § 1021.5 where “the essence and
fundamental outcome of its defense was the advancement of its own economic interests” ].)”
' Defendants suggest on reply that Snatchko was “incorrectly decided.” (Reply, 5.) However, it is
binding on this Court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
? Plaintiff's improper request for judicial notice of a decision of this Court in another case is denied. A
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Reynolds v. Sheehan, et al., CGC-21-594238 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of ComplaintCo ewe ND HH FF YW NY
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Plaintiff s arguments that if he prevails, the lawsuit will have the incidental effect of deterring
Defendants from further alleged misconduct, or even more broadly of preventing such conduct from
having “a chilling effect on the public’s trust in lawyers and the legal system in general,” (Opp. at 6), are
unpersuasive.? “ ‘[I]t has been repeatedly held that an award of attorney fees is not justified under section
1021.5 if the public benefit gained from the law suit (assuming arguendo there is such a benefit here) and
the important public right enforced by the suit (assuming arguendo such a right was vindicated here) are
coincidental’ to the monetary or other personal gain realized by the party seeking fees.” (DiPirro, 153
Cal.App.4th at 199, quoting Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1996) 41
Cal.App.4th 1153, 1165; see also Beach Colony II, 166 Cal.App.3d at 115 [“Section 1021.5’s policy of
encouraging public interest lawsuits is not promoted by awarding fees to persons having strong personal
economic interests in litigating matters.”].) However, for the reasons discussed above, the Court believes
that these issues should be addressed, if at all, on a complete record at the conclusion of the case.*
IT IS SO ORDERED. Sj
Dated: ap/f, 2022 Ethdn P. Schi
Judge of the Superior Court
written, ie court ruling has no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th
744, 761.
3 Plaintiff's request for an injunction to prohibit Defendants from continuing to practice in a particular
area of the law without the requisite competence to do so, or from “condoning” the unauthorized practice
of law, is particularly dubious. Unlike the State Bar of California, which may order disciplinary action
against attorneys that includes suspending their right to practice or conditioning their right to practice
upon completion of professional ethics courses or other conditions in appropriate cases, a court in a legal
malpractice action does not assume continuing jurisdiction or oversight over a defendant attorney’s future
conduct after judgment has been entered.
4 To the extent that Defendants’ stated concerns in bringing the motion to strike are that unless it is
granted, Plaintiffs prayer “may justify discovery on issues that are not properly part of the case” or that
“Plaintiff may be able to put before the jury evidence of his attorneys’ fees incurred in this action” (Reply,
3), those concerns can properly be addressed in other ways.
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Reynolds v. Sheehan, et al., CGC-21-594238 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of ComplaintCERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE
(CCP 1010.6(6) & CRC 2.251)
I, Ericka Larnauti, a Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court of the County of San Francisco,
certify that I am not a party to the within action.
On April 20, 2022, I electronically served the attached document via File & ServeXpress
on the recipients designated on the Transaction Receipt located on the File & ServeXpress
website.
Dated: April 20, 2022
T. Michael Yuen, Clerk
By:
Ericka Larnauti, Deputy Clerk
Preview
oC me ND HW BF BN NN YN YN RN NY SB Be BeBe Be Be Be Be Be ot A A BF BH F&F SF GD we A DH BF WN |S San Francisco County Superior Court APR 2 0 2022 CLEBK OF THE COURT BY: a < ~ puty Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO DEPARTMENT 304 NACE REYNOLDS, an individual, Plaintiff, Vv. ROBIN AMELIA SHEEHAN, et al., Defendants. NACE REYNOLDS, an individual, Plaintiff, v. BRIAN MORGAN HEIT, an individual; HEIT LAW GROUP PC, a California professional corporation; ROBIN AMELIA SHEEHAN, an individual, MATTHEW JACOB FEAVER, an individual; SHEEHAN LAW GROUP PC, a (former) California professional corporation; SHEEHAN & FEAVER PC, a California professional corporation; and DOES 1-100, Defendants. Case No. CGC-21-594238 (consolidated with No. CGC-21-594246) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ AMENDED MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT -1- Reynolds v. Sheehan, et al., CGC-21-594238 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of ComplaintoC em ND HW BR Ww NY RR YN NN NRK HK Be wee ewe ewe we we we ew on A UN FF YW NY KF Oo 0D Oe HD DH FF Ww NY KY OC Defendants’ amended motion to strike portions of the complaint in consolidated action Reynolds v. Heit, et al., Case No. CGC-21-594246 came on regularly for hearing before the Court on April 19, 2022. All parties appeared through their counsel of record. The hearing was not reported. All parties Stipulated to the Court’s tentative ruling, which was circulated in writing in advance of the hearing, and which is hereby adopted. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is denied without prejudice. BACKGROUND / These two consolidated actions arise out of Defendant law firms’ and attorneys’ representation of Plaintiff Nace Reynolds in actions brought under Business and Professions Code section 17529.5, which makes it unlawful to advertise in commercial e-mails under specified circumstances. In Reynolds v. Sheehan, et al., Case No. CGC-21-594238, filed on August 2, 2021, Plaintiff alleges that he entered into multiple written contingency fee agreements with Defendants for legal services. He seeks declaratory relief that: (1) the contingency fee agreements are void and unenforceable; and (2) notices of attorney’s liens filed by Defendants in three separate lawsuits in which they formerly represented Plaintiff prior to being discharged are void. In Reynolds v. Heit, et al., Case No. CGC-21-594246, filed on the same day, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed legal malpractice in their representation of him, and seeks to state causes of action for professional negligence, conversion, fraud or deceit in concealment, accounting, common counts, violation of the Unfair Competition Law, and unjust enrichment. He seeks monetary damages on each of these causes of action in specific amounts ranging from $5,000 to $261,000, unspecified punitive damages, an accounting, restitution in the amount of $100,000, and injunctive relief “in the form of an Order prohibiting DEFENDANTS from bringing claims under or representing individuals related to Section 17529.5 without competence in the area, and promoting and condoning the unauthorized practice of law.” (Compl. { 308.) By their amended motion, Defendants Robin Amelia Sheehan, Matthew Jacob Feaver, and Sheehan & Feaver PC, fka Sheehan Law Group PC (together, “Sheehan & Feaver”), seek an order striking Plaintiff's prayer for attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. That request is found in Paragraph 312 of the complaint filed in Reynolds v. Heit, et al., Case No. CGC-21-594246, which reads in its entirety as follows: -2- Reynolds v. Sheehan, et al., CGC-21-594238 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of ComplaintCo ea NY DH FW NH Yb NY BY NY WY NY NR NY YF FF KS et &® Yak BSS F&F Fe DTA aAaEBEHRES Attorneys’ fees, because by prosecuting this Action, REYNOLDS expects to enforce important rights affecting the public interest and thereby conferring a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons. The necessity and financial burden of private enforcement is such as to make an award of attorneys’ fees appropriate, and the attorneys’ fees should not, in the interest of justice, be paid out of the recovery of damages. Specifically, REYNOLDS expects that this Action will reduce the likelihood of DEFENDANTS continuing their incompetent litigation and committing malpractice by taking legal advice from a non-attorney, practicing in an area of law in which they do not have sufficient knowledge or skill and have shown no interest or attempt to obtain sufficient knowledge and skill, pressuring their clients to accept meager settlements, negotiating aggregate settlements without full disclosure to each party, and abandoning clients’ claims outright, all of which have the potential of hurting a large number of Californians. See Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5. DISCUSSION Plaintiff's prayer for attorneys’ fees invokes Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the so-called private attorneys’ general statute. Section 1021.5 reads in pertinent part, Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, . . . , are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any. Thus, “Section 1021.5 permits a trial court to award attorney’s fees to a successful party in any action that ‘(1) enforced an important public right, (2) conferred a significant public benefit, and (3) is of a type that private enforcement was necessary, and the financial burden justifies subsidizing the successful party’s attorneys.” (Burgess v. Coronado Unified Sch. Dist. (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 1, 7.) Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff's prayer for fees under section 1021.5 is denied as premature. “There is no requirement that the intent to seek attorney fees under section 1021.5 must be pleaded in the underlying action. [Citation.] Such fees are not part of the underlying cause of action, but are incidents to thé cause and are properly awarded after entry of a. . . judgment.” (Snatchko v. Westfield, LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 469, 497, quoting Washburn v. City of Berkeley (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 578, 583; see also Faton v. Ahmedo (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1169 [“statutory attorney fees need not be pleaded and proved at trial and may properly be awarded after entry of judgment”].) As the plain statutory language makes clear, a party’s entitlement to fees under section 1021.5 cannot be addressed until the end of the case, if and when it is determined to have been a “successful party” and, if so, whether the action “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,” including =3- Reynolds v. Sheehan, et al., CGC-21-594238 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Complaintoe YN DH FF BY Nb oN YN N ee BNRRRPBBRBSEaBSWTABDEBHKES whether “a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons.” Because there is no requirement that a prayer for fees under section 1021.5 be pled at all, a trial court errs in striking such a prayer based on a failure to adequately plead their basis. (Snatchko, 187 Cal.App.4th at 497 [“As there was no requirement they be pled at all, the trial court erred in striking Snatchko's prayer for attorney fees based on a failure to adequately plead their basis”].)! The Court is skeptical that Plaintiff ultimately will be entitled to the requested attorneys’ fees, even if he prevails in this action, because Plaintiff has a direct pecuniary interest in pursuing this case for his own benefit, and any relief he may obtain against Defendants will only coincidentally protect the public interest, if at all. Plaintiff's complaint reveals on its face that it was not brought to benefit the general public or a large class of persons. Rather, it is a legal malpractice action in which Plaintiff seeks to recover substantial monetary damages and restitution. “The necessity and financial burden requirement encompasses two issues: ‘whether private enforcement was necessary and whether the financial burden of private enforcement warrants subsidizing the successful party’s attorneys.” (Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal-App.5th 1159, 1192-1193.) “Section 1021.5 was not designed as a method for rewarding litigants motivated by their own pecuniary interests who only coincidentally protect the public interest.” (Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 106, 114.) In order to justify an award of fees, the successful claimant must show that its “financial burden of attorneys fees is out of proportion to its personal stake in litigating the case.” (Id. at 113.) Where, as here, the benefits it seeks are “immediately and directly translated into monetary terms,” and “[t]he public benefits are not likely to result in any economic benefit to more than a few persons, even in the future,” there is no basis for an award of fees under section 1021.5. (Jd.; see also Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1137, 1170 [in sexual harassment action against law firm and one of its partners, holding that § 1021.5 does not authorize an award of fees “in an action . . . brought by a single individual to redress her own economic injury”]; DiPirro v. Bondo Corp. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 150, 199 [defendant in Proposition 65 lawsuit not entitled to fees under § 1021.5 where “the essence and fundamental outcome of its defense was the advancement of its own economic interests” ].)” ' Defendants suggest on reply that Snatchko was “incorrectly decided.” (Reply, 5.) However, it is binding on this Court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) ? Plaintiff's improper request for judicial notice of a decision of this Court in another case is denied. A -4- Reynolds v. Sheehan, et al., CGC-21-594238 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of ComplaintCo ewe ND HH FF YW NY NY NY NY NY NY NY NY & ed BNRRRPBBRHBRSESEWABESHRESS Plaintiff s arguments that if he prevails, the lawsuit will have the incidental effect of deterring Defendants from further alleged misconduct, or even more broadly of preventing such conduct from having “a chilling effect on the public’s trust in lawyers and the legal system in general,” (Opp. at 6), are unpersuasive.? “ ‘[I]t has been repeatedly held that an award of attorney fees is not justified under section 1021.5 if the public benefit gained from the law suit (assuming arguendo there is such a benefit here) and the important public right enforced by the suit (assuming arguendo such a right was vindicated here) are coincidental’ to the monetary or other personal gain realized by the party seeking fees.” (DiPirro, 153 Cal.App.4th at 199, quoting Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1165; see also Beach Colony II, 166 Cal.App.3d at 115 [“Section 1021.5’s policy of encouraging public interest lawsuits is not promoted by awarding fees to persons having strong personal economic interests in litigating matters.”].) However, for the reasons discussed above, the Court believes that these issues should be addressed, if at all, on a complete record at the conclusion of the case.* IT IS SO ORDERED. Sj Dated: ap/f, 2022 Ethdn P. Schi Judge of the Superior Court written, ie court ruling has no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761. 3 Plaintiff's request for an injunction to prohibit Defendants from continuing to practice in a particular area of the law without the requisite competence to do so, or from “condoning” the unauthorized practice of law, is particularly dubious. Unlike the State Bar of California, which may order disciplinary action against attorneys that includes suspending their right to practice or conditioning their right to practice upon completion of professional ethics courses or other conditions in appropriate cases, a court in a legal malpractice action does not assume continuing jurisdiction or oversight over a defendant attorney’s future conduct after judgment has been entered. 4 To the extent that Defendants’ stated concerns in bringing the motion to strike are that unless it is granted, Plaintiffs prayer “may justify discovery on issues that are not properly part of the case” or that “Plaintiff may be able to put before the jury evidence of his attorneys’ fees incurred in this action” (Reply, 3), those concerns can properly be addressed in other ways. -5- Reynolds v. Sheehan, et al., CGC-21-594238 Order on Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of ComplaintCERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE (CCP 1010.6(6) & CRC 2.251) I, Ericka Larnauti, a Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court of the County of San Francisco, certify that I am not a party to the within action. On April 20, 2022, I electronically served the attached document via File & ServeXpress on the recipients designated on the Transaction Receipt located on the File & ServeXpress website. Dated: April 20, 2022 T. Michael Yuen, Clerk By: Ericka Larnauti, Deputy Clerk