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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA
Dated and Entered: 03/01/2022 Time: 8:30 AM
Judicial Officer: James F Rigali
Deputy Clerk: Kelley Allain Dept: SM 2
Deputy Sheriff: Karl Koeller
Court Reporter: Sirena Ulibarri Case No: 20CV03544
Gary E. Hauenstein, et al. vs. Ara Baljian, et al.
Parties Present:
Edwards, William E, Jr., by Zoom Attorney for Plaintiff
Pugh, Fay, by Zoom Attorney for Defendant
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Case Management Conference; Demurrer by Ara Baljian and Le
Phuque; Demurrer by Defendant BMI Group; Motion to Strike by Defendant BMI Group and
Motion to Strike by Defendant’s Ara Baljian and Le Phuque
The hearing begins with Counsel present as indicated above.
The Court hears brief argument.
THE COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS AND ORDERS:
The Court adopts the following posted tentative ruling of 2/04/2022:
Hauenstein v. Baljian et al.
Case No: 20CV03544
Hearing Date: Fri Feb 04, 2022 8:30
Nature of Proceedings: Demurrer; Motion: Strike
According to the first amended complaint, plaintiffs Gary Hauenstein and Gwen Hauenstein (collectively, plaintiffs) allege
they owned title to 3333 Avena Road, Lompoc. In December 2015, plaintiffs’ daughter, Karin, held a power of attorney
over plaintiffs’ legal affairs. She entered into a lease with David Agazaryan, Mike Agazaryan and Arman Karkotsyan for
use of approximately fifteen (15) thousand square feet of the Hauenstein’s property for a monthly rental of $10,000.00.
During 2015-2017, David and Mike Agazaryan operated a commercial cannabis operation on the property. They fell
behind in rents due in an amount of approximately $110,000.00.
In 2017, David, Mike and Arman introduced Karin to Ara Baljian as a new investor in their cannabis operation. To
ameliorate the financial issues created by the outstanding rent owed, Ara Baljian proposed to the Hauensteins that he
would come in as an investor in the cannabis operation business and loan to or invest in the cannabis operation business
in an amount sufficient to (a) bring current the past due rent then owed to the Hauensteins in the amount of $110,000.00,
and (b) bring current the then existing first mortgage payment owed by the Hauensteins to Nationstar Mortgage Company
in the amount of $138,000.00. The total amount of Ara Baljian’s proposed investment or loan to David, Mike and Arman
SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
was to be $165,000 with $138,000.00 being used to satisfy the payment due Nationstar Mortgage Company.
To effectuate this transaction, Ara Baljian required the Hauensteins to enter into a new Land Lease Agreement with him,
and further “insisted” that that new Land Lease Agreement be “back dated” to March 02, 2015, telling the Hauensteins
that this backdating was necessary due to “issues with the County of Santa Barbara and the State of California” in
connection with related cannabis licenses.
In or about June 2017, Defendant Ara Baljian required the Hauensteins to execute a “lien” to the subject property to his
favor, and stated to the Hauensteins that the “lien” was for security purposes only so that Ara Baljian would know that the
Hauensteins would not “kick him off the property”, and that in any event, that he would never perfect the lien or use it
against the Hauensteins. Defendant Baljian assured Plaintiffs that the “loan (as made to David, Mike and/or Arman)” was
not to be repaid by Plaintiffs herein, as it was essentially for the benefit of David, Mike and Arman, and that the loan
would be recouped from the cannabis operations profits.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants now “have unlawfully sold, or threaten to sell, assign and/or transfer their alleged
ownership or security interest in a Deed of Trust and/or Promissory Note in the subject property.” (FAC, ¶ 11.)
The first amended complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) fraud; (3) fraud in the
inducement; (4) fraud in the concealment; (5) quiet title; and (6) declaratory relief. Defendant Ara Baljian and Le Phuque,
LLC demurrer to the FAC specially and generally and move to strike portions of the complaint. BMI Group also demurrers
to the FAC specially and generally and moves to strike portions of the complaint. Opposition and replies have been filed.
Request for Judicial Notice
1. Rules Violations
Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of 18 sets of documents. None of these 18 exhibits are bookmarked.
Unless they are submitted by a self-represented party, electronic exhibits must include electronic bookmarks with links to
the first page of each exhibit with bookmark titles that identify the exhibit number or letter and briefly describe the
exhibit. (CRC, rule 3.1110(f).) Bookmarks are not only required by law, they are critical to efficient navigation of electronic
documents, particularly in a case such as this one, where there are numerous documents submitted.
The court is considering issuance of an order to defendants’ counsel on its own motion pursuant to California Rules of
Court, rule 2.30, to show cause why reasonable monetary sanctions of up to $1,500 should not be imposed for violation
of California Rules of Court, rules 3.1110(f)(4) for counsel’s failure to include electronic bookmarks for the exhibits
attached to request for judicial notice.
Moreover, the request cites no legal authority whatsoever in support of its request for judicial notice. “[CRC] Rule
3.1113 rests on a policy-based allocation of resources, preventing the trial court from being cast as a tacit advocate for
the moving party's theories by freeing it from any obligation to comb the record and the law for factual and legal support
that a party has failed to identify or provide. On the record in this case, the trial court was justified in declining to look
beyond that failure.” (Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Assocs., Inc., (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 927, 934.) It isn’t
until its reply was submitted that defendants identified the bases for its submission. This is classic sandbagging, which
impacts not only the opposing party, but also the court.
1. Merits
Exhibit 1 is a property report generated by Chicago Title Co., which lists the foreclosure and mortgage records
SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
associated with the property. Exhibit 7 is a Note in the amount of $168,500 secured by Deed of Trust in which Gary and
Gwen Hauenstein promised to pay Le Phuque the entire amount by July 1, 2022.
Defendants argue that these items are “not reasonably subject to dispute.” (Ev. Code § 452, subd. (h)—“Facts and
propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by
resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy” are capable of judicial notice.)
Judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h) is intended to cover facts which are not reasonably
subject to dispute and are easily verified. These include, for example, facts which are widely accepted as established by
experts and specialists in the natural, physical, and social sciences which can be verified by reference to treatises,
encyclopedias, almanacs and the like or by persons learned in the subject matter. (Comment, Assem.Judiciary Comm.
accompanying enactment of Evid.Code, § 452, 29B Wests Ann.Evid.Code, pp. 351–352.) (Gould v. Maryland Sound
Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145.) Exhibits 1 and 7 do not fall within the intended parameters.
The request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1 and 7 is denied.
Exhibits 2 through 6, and 8 through 13 are documents recorded with the Santa Barbara Recorder’s Office. In Yvanova v.
New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924, fn. 1, the Cal. Supreme Court held the trial court properly took
judicial notice of the recorded deed of trust, assignment of the deed of trust, substitution of trustee, notices of default and
of trustee's sale, and trustee's deed upon sale. It stated: “The existence and facial contents of these recorded documents
were properly noticed in the trial court under Evidence Code sections 452, subdivisions (c) and (h), and 453. . . . We
therefore take notice of their existence and contents, though not of disputed or disputable facts stated therein.
(See Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1102, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 449.)” (Id.) The request for judicial
notice of these documents is granted subject to the limitations described, except for Exhibits 2-3, which reference
property known as 3249 Cebada Canyon Road, Lompoc, CA 93436.
Exhibits 14-18 are Docket Reports, Petitions and Orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court are records of a court in
the United States, which the court can judicially notice pursuant to Evidence Code §452 subdivision (d). Judicial notice of
other court records and files is limited to matters that are indisputably true. This generally means judicial notice is limited
to the orders and judgments in the other court file, as distinguished from the contents of documents filed therein.
(Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113; Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan,
Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482-484; see Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th
651, 659-660—trial court properly took judicial notice of Taiwanese complaints but should not have used them to resolve
factual dispute regarding whether the action was time-barred.) The court cannot accept as true the contents of pleadings
or exhibits in the other action just because they are part of the court record or file. Such documents are inadmissible
hearsay in the present case. (Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914.) The request for judicial notice of these
documents is granted subject to the limitations described.
General and Special Demurrer of Ara Baljian and Le Phuque LLC
Other than recitation of standard legal principles applicable to demurrers, and a bare assertions that each cause of action
was sufficiently alleged, the opposition provides little to no analysis. The court will rule accordingly. (See Quantum
Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Assocs., Inc., supra, 197 Cal. App. 4th at 934.)
Preliminarily, the court sustains the demurrer to each and every cause of action on the basis plaintiffs fail to identify the
parties against whom each cause of action is based, rendering it uncertain. (CRC, rule 2.112—each separately stated
cause of action must state the party or parties to whom it is directed; see Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996,
1014.) Although the pleading identifies Le Phuque, LLC and BMI Group, Inc. as defendants, it subsequently fails to allege
SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
either entity engaged in any activity; instead, defendant Ara Baljian is the alleged actor. Although the FAC occasionally
alleges actions by “defendants, and each of them,” without charging allegations identifying the defendants against whom
the cause of action is taken, the court cannot identify which “defendants” are referred to in such allegations. This is a
basic pleading failure that the court expects to be ameliorated if an amended pleading is filed.
The court additionally sustains the demurrer to the first cause of action for breach of contract. The essential elements to
be pleaded in an action for breach of contract are (i) the existence of the contract, (ii) plaintiff’s performance of the
contract or excuse for nonperformance, (iii) defendant’s breach of the contract and (iv) the resulting damage to the
plaintiff. (Lortz v. Connell (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 286, 290.) Here, the identity of the contract sued upon is uncertain.
Plaintiffs allege that Ara Baljian was going to invest in the cannabis business, which was allegedly run by their tenants,
not plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege they were going to benefit from that investment, as apparently Baljian promised to pay the
past due rent owed by the tenants as well as the outstanding mortgage due by plaintiffs to Nationstar Mortgage. Plaintiffs
have failed to adequately allege whether this contract was directly between themselves and defendants. If the contract
was between Baljian and their tenants, as is currently alleged, plaintiffs have failed to allege their standing to pursue any
breach. Plaintiffs also allege executing a Land Lease Agreement directly with Baljian and a lien on the property. They
allege Baljian represented he would not perfect the lien or use it against plaintiffs. It is unclear from this complaint
whether Baljian used the lien to foreclose on the property and if so, whether that is the contract that is alleged to have
been breached. The terms and formation of the contract(s) are insufficiently alleged and uncertain, as is the breach.
The court sustains the demurrer to the second, third and fourth causes of action for fraud, fraud in the inducement, and
fraud in the concealment, respectively. All are alleged in the FAC ¶¶ 30-34. Plaintiffs have failed to meet the specific fact-
pleading requirements required for all versions of fraud. As noted in Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, fraud
must be pleaded specifically. This necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom and by what
means the representations were tendered. A plaintiff’s burden in asserting a fraud claim against a corporate employer is
even greater. In such a case, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons how made the allegedly fraudulent
representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said of written.
(Id. at p. 645.) Plaintiffs’ allegations continue to fall far short of these requirements.
The court sustains the demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action for quiet title and declaratory relief (with the latter
based on the same claim as advanced in the former) because the judicially noticed record indicates that plaintiffs may
have transferred their interest in the real property, meaning they have no real property interest to quiet or declare. (See,
e.g., Chao Fu, Inc. v. Chen (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 48, 58-59 [absent an interest in the real property, a party has not
standing to ask the court to quiet title in the property]; Cummins Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1484, 1289 [while declaratory relief is extremely broad, there must be an actual controversy that is currently
active, and standing criteria are appropriate in this determination].) Plaintiffs must address this issue and show a
sufficient interest in the real property at issue and/or allege any existing factual disputes as to the content of the judicially
noticeable documents.
Motion to Strike of Ara Baljian and Le Phuque LLC
As for the separately filed motion to strike, it is moot in light of the court’s conclusions about the demurrer. That being
said, the court notes that the motion to strike focuses on the components of the prayer for relief. It follows from the court’s
conclusions as to the demurrer that the motion to strike challenges to the enumerated statements in the prayer are
appropriate. Claims in the prayer will only survive if the causes of action survive. Moreover, any request for attorney’s
fees must be justified – whether contractual or statutory. The basis of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fee prayer remains unclear and
is undefended in their opposition. Upon amendment, plaintiffs will have to identify the basis for any attorney’s fee
request.
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General and Special Demurrer of BMI Group/Motion to Strike of BMI Group
BMI Group filed a separate demurrer and motion to strike, as it was newly added as a defendant with the filing of
the FAC. The defects in the FAC noted above equally apply here.
Summary of Rulings
The court denies the request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1 and 7. The court grants the request for judicial notice
of the existence and contents of the recorded documents in Exhibits 4 through 6, and 8 through 13, but not of disputed or
disputable facts stated therein. The court grants the request for judicial notice of the orders and judgments in Exhibits 14-
18 but not the contents of the documents filed therein.
The court sustains the general and special demurrer of Ara Baljian and Le Phuque LLC as well as the general
and special demurrer of BMI Group on the basis plaintiffs fail to identify the parties against whom each cause of action is
based, rendering it uncertain and that plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts in support of each cause of action. Plaintiffs
have 30 days to file an amended pleading. The motion to strike is moot in light of the court’s conclusions about the
demurrer, although the court notes that any request for attorney’s fees must be justified – whether contractual or
statutory.
The court notes that defendants’ counsel documented numerous attempts to meet and confer with plaintiffs’ counsel prior
to the filing of this (and the previous) demurrer. (Pugh Decl., filed 10/29/21.)[1] Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to respond. In the
event that an amended pleading draws another demurrer and motion to strike, plaintiff’s counsel is advised to make time
for a meaningful meet and confer. Both parties are directed to conduct the meet and confer with an eye toward reducing
the number of issues or eliminating the need for a demurrer.
The parties are directed to appear.
Meet and Confer
In the event that an amended pleading draws another demurrer and motion to strike, plaintiff’s counsel is advised to
make time for a meaningful meet and confer. Both parties are directed to conduct the meet and confer with an eye
toward reducing the number of issues or eliminating the need for a demurrer.
The court admonishes counsel to follow the Rules of Court in all future filings.
How to Appear
The court is open to the public for court business. Entry to any court building requires a face covering. The court is also
conducting hearings via Zoom videoconference. Each department has a unique Zoom Meeting ID number, which will not
change. Each department has a unique password which will change every month. If you do not have the Meeting ID or
month appropriate password for a department, please call (805) 614-6414, and select option 9. To call the recording
directly, dial (805) 614-6498.
[1] The demurring party must meet and confer “in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading “at least
five days” before the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Here, defendants’ attorney
Fay Pugh represents that she made efforts to meet and confer with plaintiffs’ counsel, who did not respond, before the
filing of the first demurrer. (See Pugh Decl., filed 10/29/21, ¶¶ 4-21.) There was no opposition to the demurrer and the
SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
court granted it on August 3, 2021with leave to amend. The first amended complaint was filed on September 7, 2021.
Defendants counsel again attempted to meet and confer with plaintiffs’ counsel on three separate occasions. (Pugh
Decl., filed 10/29/21, ¶¶ 23-32.) Plaintiffs’ counsel reportedly did not respond.
Gary E. Hauenstein, et al. vs. Ara Baljian, et al.
Case Number: 20CV03544
March 1, 2022
Page 6
DARREL E. PARKER, EXECUTIVE OFFICER Minutes Prepared by:
Kelley Allain , Deputy
SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA Dated and Entered: 03/01/2022 Time: 8:30 AM Judicial Officer: James F Rigali Deputy Clerk: Kelley Allain Dept: SM 2 Deputy Sheriff: Karl Koeller Court Reporter: Sirena Ulibarri Case No: 20CV03544 Gary E. Hauenstein, et al. vs. Ara Baljian, et al. Parties Present: Edwards, William E, Jr., by Zoom Attorney for Plaintiff Pugh, Fay, by Zoom Attorney for Defendant NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Case Management Conference; Demurrer by Ara Baljian and Le Phuque; Demurrer by Defendant BMI Group; Motion to Strike by Defendant BMI Group and Motion to Strike by Defendant’s Ara Baljian and Le Phuque The hearing begins with Counsel present as indicated above. The Court hears brief argument. THE COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS AND ORDERS: The Court adopts the following posted tentative ruling of 2/04/2022: Hauenstein v. Baljian et al. Case No: 20CV03544 Hearing Date: Fri Feb 04, 2022 8:30 Nature of Proceedings: Demurrer; Motion: Strike According to the first amended complaint, plaintiffs Gary Hauenstein and Gwen Hauenstein (collectively, plaintiffs) allege they owned title to 3333 Avena Road, Lompoc. In December 2015, plaintiffs’ daughter, Karin, held a power of attorney over plaintiffs’ legal affairs. She entered into a lease with David Agazaryan, Mike Agazaryan and Arman Karkotsyan for use of approximately fifteen (15) thousand square feet of the Hauenstein’s property for a monthly rental of $10,000.00. During 2015-2017, David and Mike Agazaryan operated a commercial cannabis operation on the property. They fell behind in rents due in an amount of approximately $110,000.00. In 2017, David, Mike and Arman introduced Karin to Ara Baljian as a new investor in their cannabis operation. To ameliorate the financial issues created by the outstanding rent owed, Ara Baljian proposed to the Hauensteins that he would come in as an investor in the cannabis operation business and loan to or invest in the cannabis operation business in an amount sufficient to (a) bring current the past due rent then owed to the Hauensteins in the amount of $110,000.00, and (b) bring current the then existing first mortgage payment owed by the Hauensteins to Nationstar Mortgage Company in the amount of $138,000.00. The total amount of Ara Baljian’s proposed investment or loan to David, Mike and Arman SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER was to be $165,000 with $138,000.00 being used to satisfy the payment due Nationstar Mortgage Company. To effectuate this transaction, Ara Baljian required the Hauensteins to enter into a new Land Lease Agreement with him, and further “insisted” that that new Land Lease Agreement be “back dated” to March 02, 2015, telling the Hauensteins that this backdating was necessary due to “issues with the County of Santa Barbara and the State of California” in connection with related cannabis licenses. In or about June 2017, Defendant Ara Baljian required the Hauensteins to execute a “lien” to the subject property to his favor, and stated to the Hauensteins that the “lien” was for security purposes only so that Ara Baljian would know that the Hauensteins would not “kick him off the property”, and that in any event, that he would never perfect the lien or use it against the Hauensteins. Defendant Baljian assured Plaintiffs that the “loan (as made to David, Mike and/or Arman)” was not to be repaid by Plaintiffs herein, as it was essentially for the benefit of David, Mike and Arman, and that the loan would be recouped from the cannabis operations profits. Plaintiffs allege that defendants now “have unlawfully sold, or threaten to sell, assign and/or transfer their alleged ownership or security interest in a Deed of Trust and/or Promissory Note in the subject property.” (FAC, ¶ 11.) The first amended complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) fraud; (3) fraud in the inducement; (4) fraud in the concealment; (5) quiet title; and (6) declaratory relief. Defendant Ara Baljian and Le Phuque, LLC demurrer to the FAC specially and generally and move to strike portions of the complaint. BMI Group also demurrers to the FAC specially and generally and moves to strike portions of the complaint. Opposition and replies have been filed. Request for Judicial Notice 1. Rules Violations Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of 18 sets of documents. None of these 18 exhibits are bookmarked. Unless they are submitted by a self-represented party, electronic exhibits must include electronic bookmarks with links to the first page of each exhibit with bookmark titles that identify the exhibit number or letter and briefly describe the exhibit. (CRC, rule 3.1110(f).) Bookmarks are not only required by law, they are critical to efficient navigation of electronic documents, particularly in a case such as this one, where there are numerous documents submitted. The court is considering issuance of an order to defendants’ counsel on its own motion pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2.30, to show cause why reasonable monetary sanctions of up to $1,500 should not be imposed for violation of California Rules of Court, rules 3.1110(f)(4) for counsel’s failure to include electronic bookmarks for the exhibits attached to request for judicial notice. Moreover, the request cites no legal authority whatsoever in support of its request for judicial notice. “[CRC] Rule 3.1113 rests on a policy-based allocation of resources, preventing the trial court from being cast as a tacit advocate for the moving party's theories by freeing it from any obligation to comb the record and the law for factual and legal support that a party has failed to identify or provide. On the record in this case, the trial court was justified in declining to look beyond that failure.” (Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Assocs., Inc., (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 927, 934.) It isn’t until its reply was submitted that defendants identified the bases for its submission. This is classic sandbagging, which impacts not only the opposing party, but also the court. 1. Merits Exhibit 1 is a property report generated by Chicago Title Co., which lists the foreclosure and mortgage records SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER associated with the property. Exhibit 7 is a Note in the amount of $168,500 secured by Deed of Trust in which Gary and Gwen Hauenstein promised to pay Le Phuque the entire amount by July 1, 2022. Defendants argue that these items are “not reasonably subject to dispute.” (Ev. Code § 452, subd. (h)—“Facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy” are capable of judicial notice.) Judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h) is intended to cover facts which are not reasonably subject to dispute and are easily verified. These include, for example, facts which are widely accepted as established by experts and specialists in the natural, physical, and social sciences which can be verified by reference to treatises, encyclopedias, almanacs and the like or by persons learned in the subject matter. (Comment, Assem.Judiciary Comm. accompanying enactment of Evid.Code, § 452, 29B Wests Ann.Evid.Code, pp. 351–352.) (Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145.) Exhibits 1 and 7 do not fall within the intended parameters. The request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1 and 7 is denied. Exhibits 2 through 6, and 8 through 13 are documents recorded with the Santa Barbara Recorder’s Office. In Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924, fn. 1, the Cal. Supreme Court held the trial court properly took judicial notice of the recorded deed of trust, assignment of the deed of trust, substitution of trustee, notices of default and of trustee's sale, and trustee's deed upon sale. It stated: “The existence and facial contents of these recorded documents were properly noticed in the trial court under Evidence Code sections 452, subdivisions (c) and (h), and 453. . . . We therefore take notice of their existence and contents, though not of disputed or disputable facts stated therein. (See Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1102, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 449.)” (Id.) The request for judicial notice of these documents is granted subject to the limitations described, except for Exhibits 2-3, which reference property known as 3249 Cebada Canyon Road, Lompoc, CA 93436. Exhibits 14-18 are Docket Reports, Petitions and Orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court are records of a court in the United States, which the court can judicially notice pursuant to Evidence Code §452 subdivision (d). Judicial notice of other court records and files is limited to matters that are indisputably true. This generally means judicial notice is limited to the orders and judgments in the other court file, as distinguished from the contents of documents filed therein. (Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113; Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482-484; see Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 659-660—trial court properly took judicial notice of Taiwanese complaints but should not have used them to resolve factual dispute regarding whether the action was time-barred.) The court cannot accept as true the contents of pleadings or exhibits in the other action just because they are part of the court record or file. Such documents are inadmissible hearsay in the present case. (Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914.) The request for judicial notice of these documents is granted subject to the limitations described. General and Special Demurrer of Ara Baljian and Le Phuque LLC Other than recitation of standard legal principles applicable to demurrers, and a bare assertions that each cause of action was sufficiently alleged, the opposition provides little to no analysis. The court will rule accordingly. (See Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Assocs., Inc., supra, 197 Cal. App. 4th at 934.) Preliminarily, the court sustains the demurrer to each and every cause of action on the basis plaintiffs fail to identify the parties against whom each cause of action is based, rendering it uncertain. (CRC, rule 2.112—each separately stated cause of action must state the party or parties to whom it is directed; see Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1014.) Although the pleading identifies Le Phuque, LLC and BMI Group, Inc. as defendants, it subsequently fails to allege SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER either entity engaged in any activity; instead, defendant Ara Baljian is the alleged actor. Although the FAC occasionally alleges actions by “defendants, and each of them,” without charging allegations identifying the defendants against whom the cause of action is taken, the court cannot identify which “defendants” are referred to in such allegations. This is a basic pleading failure that the court expects to be ameliorated if an amended pleading is filed. The court additionally sustains the demurrer to the first cause of action for breach of contract. The essential elements to be pleaded in an action for breach of contract are (i) the existence of the contract, (ii) plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (iii) defendant’s breach of the contract and (iv) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. (Lortz v. Connell (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 286, 290.) Here, the identity of the contract sued upon is uncertain. Plaintiffs allege that Ara Baljian was going to invest in the cannabis business, which was allegedly run by their tenants, not plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege they were going to benefit from that investment, as apparently Baljian promised to pay the past due rent owed by the tenants as well as the outstanding mortgage due by plaintiffs to Nationstar Mortgage. Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege whether this contract was directly between themselves and defendants. If the contract was between Baljian and their tenants, as is currently alleged, plaintiffs have failed to allege their standing to pursue any breach. Plaintiffs also allege executing a Land Lease Agreement directly with Baljian and a lien on the property. They allege Baljian represented he would not perfect the lien or use it against plaintiffs. It is unclear from this complaint whether Baljian used the lien to foreclose on the property and if so, whether that is the contract that is alleged to have been breached. The terms and formation of the contract(s) are insufficiently alleged and uncertain, as is the breach. The court sustains the demurrer to the second, third and fourth causes of action for fraud, fraud in the inducement, and fraud in the concealment, respectively. All are alleged in the FAC ¶¶ 30-34. Plaintiffs have failed to meet the specific fact- pleading requirements required for all versions of fraud. As noted in Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, fraud must be pleaded specifically. This necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom and by what means the representations were tendered. A plaintiff’s burden in asserting a fraud claim against a corporate employer is even greater. In such a case, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons how made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said of written. (Id. at p. 645.) Plaintiffs’ allegations continue to fall far short of these requirements. The court sustains the demurrer to the fifth and sixth causes of action for quiet title and declaratory relief (with the latter based on the same claim as advanced in the former) because the judicially noticed record indicates that plaintiffs may have transferred their interest in the real property, meaning they have no real property interest to quiet or declare. (See, e.g., Chao Fu, Inc. v. Chen (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 48, 58-59 [absent an interest in the real property, a party has not standing to ask the court to quiet title in the property]; Cummins Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1289 [while declaratory relief is extremely broad, there must be an actual controversy that is currently active, and standing criteria are appropriate in this determination].) Plaintiffs must address this issue and show a sufficient interest in the real property at issue and/or allege any existing factual disputes as to the content of the judicially noticeable documents. Motion to Strike of Ara Baljian and Le Phuque LLC As for the separately filed motion to strike, it is moot in light of the court’s conclusions about the demurrer. That being said, the court notes that the motion to strike focuses on the components of the prayer for relief. It follows from the court’s conclusions as to the demurrer that the motion to strike challenges to the enumerated statements in the prayer are appropriate. Claims in the prayer will only survive if the causes of action survive. Moreover, any request for attorney’s fees must be justified – whether contractual or statutory. The basis of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fee prayer remains unclear and is undefended in their opposition. Upon amendment, plaintiffs will have to identify the basis for any attorney’s fee request. SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER General and Special Demurrer of BMI Group/Motion to Strike of BMI Group BMI Group filed a separate demurrer and motion to strike, as it was newly added as a defendant with the filing of the FAC. The defects in the FAC noted above equally apply here. Summary of Rulings The court denies the request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1 and 7. The court grants the request for judicial notice of the existence and contents of the recorded documents in Exhibits 4 through 6, and 8 through 13, but not of disputed or disputable facts stated therein. The court grants the request for judicial notice of the orders and judgments in Exhibits 14- 18 but not the contents of the documents filed therein. The court sustains the general and special demurrer of Ara Baljian and Le Phuque LLC as well as the general and special demurrer of BMI Group on the basis plaintiffs fail to identify the parties against whom each cause of action is based, rendering it uncertain and that plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts in support of each cause of action. Plaintiffs have 30 days to file an amended pleading. The motion to strike is moot in light of the court’s conclusions about the demurrer, although the court notes that any request for attorney’s fees must be justified – whether contractual or statutory. The court notes that defendants’ counsel documented numerous attempts to meet and confer with plaintiffs’ counsel prior to the filing of this (and the previous) demurrer. (Pugh Decl., filed 10/29/21.)[1] Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to respond. In the event that an amended pleading draws another demurrer and motion to strike, plaintiff’s counsel is advised to make time for a meaningful meet and confer. Both parties are directed to conduct the meet and confer with an eye toward reducing the number of issues or eliminating the need for a demurrer. The parties are directed to appear. Meet and Confer In the event that an amended pleading draws another demurrer and motion to strike, plaintiff’s counsel is advised to make time for a meaningful meet and confer. Both parties are directed to conduct the meet and confer with an eye toward reducing the number of issues or eliminating the need for a demurrer. The court admonishes counsel to follow the Rules of Court in all future filings. How to Appear The court is open to the public for court business. Entry to any court building requires a face covering. The court is also conducting hearings via Zoom videoconference. Each department has a unique Zoom Meeting ID number, which will not change. Each department has a unique password which will change every month. If you do not have the Meeting ID or month appropriate password for a department, please call (805) 614-6414, and select option 9. To call the recording directly, dial (805) 614-6498. [1] The demurring party must meet and confer “in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading “at least five days” before the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Here, defendants’ attorney Fay Pugh represents that she made efforts to meet and confer with plaintiffs’ counsel, who did not respond, before the filing of the first demurrer. (See Pugh Decl., filed 10/29/21, ¶¶ 4-21.) There was no opposition to the demurrer and the SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER court granted it on August 3, 2021with leave to amend. The first amended complaint was filed on September 7, 2021. Defendants counsel again attempted to meet and confer with plaintiffs’ counsel on three separate occasions. (Pugh Decl., filed 10/29/21, ¶¶ 23-32.) Plaintiffs’ counsel reportedly did not respond. Gary E. Hauenstein, et al. vs. Ara Baljian, et al. Case Number: 20CV03544 March 1, 2022 Page 6 DARREL E. PARKER, EXECUTIVE OFFICER Minutes Prepared by: Kelley Allain , Deputy SC-2411 (Revised July 1, 2013) MINUTE ORDER