Preview
FILED
5/27/2022 10:11PM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
Terri Kilgore DEPUTY
CAUSE NO. DC-20-05169
TODD OFFEN, IN THE DISTRICT COURT
P1aimm:
v. 134TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CARLA KENYON, JOHN
KENYON, PROGRESSIVE
COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and STATE FARM
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
DEFENDANT STATE FARM’S
MOTION TO OUASH NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE
AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
TO THE JUDGE OF SAID HONORABLE COURT:
COMES NOW Defendant State Farm and respectfully asks this Court to quash Plaintiff‘ s
notice to take the deposition of corporate representative Jannet Garcia.
I.
Defendant State Farm would show that in light of the recent opinion out of the Fifth Court
of Appeals in Dallas County, this deposition violates TeX. R. CiV. P. 193.4‘3 proportionality
requirement under the standard articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in In re USAA General
Indemmy Ca, 624 S.W.3d 782 (T eX. 2021). See In re Home State Coma Mutual Imuremee Comma
D/ B /A Sey’em and Neyeera Aneem Saleem", 05-21000873-CV (opinion attached hereto).
II.
On Monday, May 23, 2022, Plaintiff issued a notice to depose Jannet Garcia as corporate
representative for Defendant State Farm, which was received by Defense Counsel via email on the
same day. See Exhibit A. At this time, Defendant was unaware of the I” re Home State opinion
rendering this corporate representative deposition unnecessary and harassing. In fact, this opinion
was not released until May 10, 2022 and as such it was reasonable that Defendant State Farm was
unaware as to its contents.
Defendant State Farm has provided Plaintiff with the entirety of the claims file, minus any
privileged documents or work product. That information, with the lack of personal knowledge by
State Farm, shows that a corporate representative deposition would provide little, if any, benefit in
relation to the cost. See In re Home State, page 10.
Defendant would further show that the late filed Notice of Deposition of Corporate
Representative Jannet Garcia, filed only 8 days before the deposition, would inherently preclude the
possibility of having this Motion heard before the deposition, and should Plaintiff proceed with
appearing for the deposition, Defendant State Farm should not be liable for any costs associated
with that appearance.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant State Farm requests that the
Court grant the motion, sustain the foregoing objection, grant the protective order, and grant such
other relief to which Defendant may be justly entitled
Respectfully submitted,
HARRISON HULL & MUMM PLLC
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS
112 West Virginia Street
McKinney, Texas 75069
(214) 585-0094
(214) 585-0942 facsimile
/s/ Michael P. Gross
MATTHEW R. MUMM
State Bar No. 24051095
—
mmumm@harrisonhull.com
MICHAEL P. GROSS
State Bar No. 24106033
—
mgross@harrisonhull.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company’s Motion to Quash Deposition Notice was electronically filed
and served Via Efile, on this the 27th day of May 2022, to the following counsel of record:
Counsel for Defendants Counsel for Defendant
Carla Kenyon and John Kenyon Progressive County Mutual
Wesley M. Hightower Insurance
Blaies 8c Hightower, LLP Randall G. Walters
420 Throckrnorton Street — Suite Walters, Balido & Crain, LLP
1200 10440 North Central Expressway
Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Meadow Park Tower — Suite 1500
Via Email to: —werbigbtoweflQb/ii/awwm Dallas, Texas 75231
afld/ or Vz’a Emil to:
Via—Esm —
ii/a/temedomioflifiiaiioméb ii/lac/awfim. 60/72
and/ or
Via ESemite
Counsel for Plaintiff Todd Offen
Collen A. Clark, Mitchell E. McCrea & Jacob Von Plonski
Clark & McCrea
3500 Maple Avenue — Suite 1250
Dallas, Texas 75231
Via ESemice
/s/ Michael P. Gross
MICHAEL P. GROSS
EXHIBIT A
CAUSE NO. DC-20-05169
TODD OFFEN IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§§§§§§§§§§§§§
Plaintiff,
VS. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
CARLA KENYON, JOHN KENYON,
PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and STATE
FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY
Defendants 134TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED
DEPOSITION OF JANNET GARCIA, CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE FOR STATE
FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
TO: Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, by and through their
attorney of record, Matthew R. Mumm and Michael P. Gross, HARRISON HULL & MUMM,
PLLC, 112 West Virginia Street, McKinney, Texas 75069.
Please take notice that Plaintiff Todd Offen will take the oral deposition of Jannet Garcia,
Corporate Representative of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company at the date, time
and place referenced.
J annet Garcia, Corporate Representative of State Farm
Wednesday, June 1, 2022
10:00 a.m.
PLACE: Office of HARRISON HULL & MUMM, PLLC
112 West Virginia Street
McKinney, Texas 75069
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF JANNET GARCIA,
STATE FARM CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE - Page 1
Pursuant to T.R.C.P. 199.2(b)(1), State Farm County Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company is required to designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate
other persons who consent to testify on its behalf regarding the following matters upon which
examination is requested. The matters identified for examination with reasonable particularity are:
1. Whether JOHN KENYON, the third-party tortfeasor, was an underinsured motorist at
the time of the collision;
2. Any facts supporting Defendant State Farm County Mutual Insurance Company’ s legal
theories and defenses;
3. The amount and basis for the Defendant State Farm County Mutual Insurance
Company’s valuation of the Plaintiffs damages; and
4. The Defendant State Farm County Mutual Insurance Company’s claim and defenses
regarding Plaintiff s assertions in this lawsuit.
The witness is directed to produce at the commencement of his deposition the documents
and/or tangible things which its testimony is based, or which were used to refresh the recollection
of the deponent’s designated witness.
This deposition is taken pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Said deposition
will be reported by an official court reporter. You are also notified that the deposition will be
videotaped. You are invited to attend and cross-examine.
Respectfiilly submitted,
CLARK-VON PLONSKI - ANDERSON
/S/ Jacob von Plonski
COLLEN A. CLARK
State Bar No. 04309100
JACOB L. von PLONSKI
State Bar No. 24098554
R. CONNOR BARBE
State Bar No. 24108598
LINDA LE
State Bar No. 24126312
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF JANNET GARCIA,
STATE FARM CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE - Page 2
3500 Maple Avenue, Suite 1250
Dallas, Texas 75219
214-780-0500
214-780-0501 Fax
eservice@cvpalaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS WILL CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served
on all attorneys of record in this cause of action in accordance with the Rule 21a of the TEXAS
RULES 0F CIVIL PROCEDURE on the 23rd day of May, 2022.
Randall G. Walters
Nancy Raine
WALTERS, BALIDo & CRAIN, L.L.P.
Meadow Park Tower, Suite 1500
10440 North Central Expressway
Dallas, Texas 75231
Michael P. Gross
HARRISON HULL & MUMM, PLLC
112 West Virginia Street
McKinney, Texas 75069
/s/ Jacob von Plonskz'
JACOB von PLONSKI
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF JANNET GARCIA,
STATE FARM CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE - Page 3
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Debbie Bullard on behalf of Jacob von Plonski
Bar No. 24098554
debbie@cvpalaw.com
Envelope ID: 64768914
Status as of 5/23/2022 4:03 PM CST
Associated Case Party: STATEFARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Diane TWeisman dweisman@harrisonhu||.com 5/23/2022 4:02:39 PM SENT
Michael P.Gross mgross@harrisonhull.com 5/23/2022 4:02:39 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Randall GWalters waltersedocsnotifications@wbclawfirm.com 5/23/2022 4:02:39 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: TODD OFFEN
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Collen AClark eservice@cvpalaw.com 5/23/2022 4:02:39 PM SENT
EXHIBIT B
CONDITIONALLY GRANT and Opinion Filed May 10, 2022
FEE
In The
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N0. 05-21-00873-CV
IN RE HOME STATE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
D/B/A SAFECO AND NAJEEBA ANEESA SABOUR, Relators
Original Proceeding from the County Court at Law N o. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-17-04602-E
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Smith
Opinion by Justice Smith
In this original proceeding, relators Home State County Mutual Insurance
Company d/b/a Safeco and its adjuster, Naj eeba Aneesa Sabour, collectively referred
to as Safeco, seek mandamus relief from the trial court’s order denying their motion
to quash a corporate-representative deposition requested by real party in interest
Adediji Taiwo. Safeco contends the deposition violates rule of civil procedure
193 .4’s proportionality requirement under the standard articulated by the Texas
Supreme Court in In re USAA General Indemnity C0., 624 S.W.3d 782 (TeX. 2021)
(orig. proceeding). After reviewing the petition, response, reply, and the record, and
applying the standard with the facts articulated in USAA, we conditionally grant the
petition.
Background
After Taiwo was injured in an automobile accident between him and third-
party Valeria Torres, Taiwo settled With Torres for her policy limit of $30,000.
There was no judicial determination of liability or determination that Torres caused
any of Taiwo’s alleged injuries. Taiwo, believing his damages were greater than
$30,000, sued Safeco to recover underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits.
Taiwo sought to take the oral deposition of Safeco’s corporate representative.
Safeco moved to quash the deposition, arguing the requested deposition was not
relevant or proportional in the “car-wreck” phase of the proceeding and, in the
alternative, the topics were overly broad and beyond the scope of discovery during
the car-wreck phase.
In its motion to quash, Safeco admitted that (1) Taiwo had a valid insurance
policy with Safeco at the time of the accident; (2) Taiwo was a named insured under
the policy; (3) the vehicle involved in the accident was a “scheduled vehicle” under
the policy; and (4) the policy provided for UIM benefits up to a certain amount if
Taiwo established his entitlement to recover such benefits. Safeco clarified it
disputed liability, causation, and damages.
After a hearing, the trial court denied Safeco’s motion to quash and granted it
permission to appeal. This Court denied Safeco’s permissive appeal, and the
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supreme court denied review of that decision shortly before it issued its opinion in
USAA.
Using USAA as guidance, Taiwo subsequently served an amended notice of
intent to take the oral deposition of a Safeco corporate representative to testify about
the following limited matters:
1. Whether the negligent tortfeasor was an owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle at the time of the collision;
2. any facts supporting SAFECO’s legal theories and defenses;
3. the amount and basis for SAFECO’s valuation of the PLAINTIFF’s
damages; and
4. SAFECO’s claims and defenses regarding PLAINTIFF’s assertions
in this lawsuit, including but not limited to the following subject
matters:
a. SAFECO’s contentions regarding the cause of the collision
which forms the basis of this lawsuit including but not limited to
SAFECO’s contentions regarding the identity of each person
whose negligence was a proximate cause of the collision and
SAFECO’s contentions regarding the proportionate
responsibility of each such person and the factual bases of such
contentions[;]
b. SAFECO’s contentions regarding the nature and extent of the
alleged injuries brought by PLAINTIFF and the amount of
damages asserted by PLAINTIFF, and the factual bases for such
contentions; and
c. SAFECO’s contentions regarding other causes for the injuries
alleged by PLAINTIFF in this lawsuit and the factual bases for
such contentions.
In response, Safeco produced and disclosed approximately one thousand pages of
responsive documents, including its entire unprivileged claim f11e, which included
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Taiwo’s insurance policy, correspondence between the parties, the police report
stemming from the accident, and Witness statements regarding the accident.
The trial curt held a hearing on Safeco’s motion to quash. Taiwo’s counsel
argued his notice of intent to take the oral deposition complied with the topics
approved by the supreme court in USAA, and Safeco’s “document dump” did not
shield it from complying with the corporate-representative deposition. Safeco
alleged that USAA provided guidance to insurers regarding evidence that may
support proportionality objections; therefore, the documents it produced followed
USAA and were not a “document dump.” The trial court took the motion to quash
under advisement.
On September 15, 2021, the trial court denied Safeco’s motion to quash and
ordered the deposition take place within three weeks “on the topics previously
provided by Plaintiff, subject to the parameters In re USAA General Indem. C0.,
_ S.W.3d. _, N0. 20-02813” Safeco filed this original proceeding, and we
granted a stay pending its resolution.
Standard of Review
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy requiring the relator to show that (1)
the trial court abused its discretion and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy on
appeal. In re Prudential Ins. C0. 0fAm., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135—36 (TeX. 2004) (orig.
1
The italicized portion was hand—written by the trial judge.
_4_
proceeding). “The trial court abuses its discretion by ordering discovery that
exceeds that permitted by the rules of procedure.” In re CSX Corp, 124 S.W.3d
149, 152 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Depositions, once taken,
cannot be “untaken,” and mandamus has historically issued for discovery that is
“outside the proper bounds.” See In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 419 (Tex. 2008)
(orig. proceeding); In re Am. Optical C0rp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam). In particular, mandamus is appropriate to review a trial
court’s determinations regarding proportionality objections to discovery. See
USAA, 624 S.W.3d at 791—93; In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 615 (Tex.
2017) (orig. proceeding).
USAA and Scope of Discovery
The parties to a lawsuit generally may obtain discovery of information that is
not privileged and is “relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.” TEX. R.
CIV. P. 192.3(a). Such evidence is discoverable even if it would not be admissible
at trial so long as it “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.” Id. However, the trial court “should” limit otherwise
permissible discovery if:
(a) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; or
(b) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs
its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount
in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at
_5_
stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4.
The supreme court describes rule 192.4 as imposing a “proportionality
standard that requires ‘a case—by-case balancing of jurisprudential considerations.”’
In re K & L Auto Crushers, 627 S.W.3d 239, 253 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)
(quoting State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d at 599). Proportionality “acts as a governor
to guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the court
authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters that are
otherwise proper subjects of inquiry.” State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d at 614.
Complaints about proportionality must be supported with evidence, and conclusory
allegations are insufficient. K & L Auto Crushers, 627 S.W.3d at 253.
The supreme court recently addressed the scope of discovery an insured may
pursue from the insurer in an underinsured/uninsured motorist (UM/UIM) case. See
generally USAA, 624 S.W.3d 782. In that case, the insured was injured in an
automobile accident With a third party. Id. at 785. After settling with the third party,
he sued the insurer seeking to recover benefits under his policy’s UM/UIM
provisions. Id. at 786. The insured served the insurer with notice of intent to take
the oral deposition of the insurer’s corporate representative. Id. The notice included
a subpoena duces tecum instructing the representative to produce “any and all”
reports produced concerning the insured’s claim. Id. The insurer filed a motion to
—a
quash the deposition and subpoena. Id. at 7 87. After a hearing, the trial court denied
the motion to quash. Id.
The supreme court held that relevance concerns under rule 192.3(a) do not
categorically foreclose the deposition of an insurer’s corporate representative,
although they do inform its scope. Id. at 790. The court reasoned that the scope of
discovery differs in UM/UIM cases from the scope of discovery in other insurance
disputes because contractual liability hinges on the liability of the uninsured third-
party motorist. Thus, the court affirmed deposition topics which sought information
regarding the “facts supporting [the insurer’s] legal theories and defenses,” Whether
the third-party motorist “was an uninsured/underinsured motorist at the time of the
collision,” and [the insurer’s] “claims and defenses regarding [the insured’s]
assertions in this lawsuit.” Id. at 793. But the court held that topics that
encompassed “a general inquiry into [the insurer’s] UIM policy” or claim-handling
process exceeded the subject matter of the suit and were improper. Id. at 791.
Additionally, the supreme court held that the insurer failed to prove that the
deposition was foreclosed by rule 192.4’s proportionality requirement because the
insurer submitted only the police’s accident report in support of its motion to quash
the deposition, which the insurer argued showed that the insurer had no personal
knowledge of the accident. Id. at 792. The supreme court further reasoned that a
lack of personal knowledge does not conclusively support a proportionality
argument. Id. The supreme court explained it was not holding that a UMMIM
_7_
carrier could never demonstrate that proportionality concerns foreclose a corporate
representative’s deposition. Id. Rather, in moving to quash the deposition, “USAA
could have disclosed documents, or referenced previously disclosed documents
providing the information in its possession regarding the liability and damages issues
in the case.” Id. That information, combined with the lack of personal knowledge
of any relevant facts on behalf of the insurer, could show that a corporate
representative’s deposition would provide little if any additional benefit in relation
to the cost. Id. at 793.
Discussion
Safeco alleges in its petition that, unlike the insurer in USAA, it supported its
proportionality objection by disclosing documents and referencing previously
disclosed documents that provided the information in its possession regarding the
liability and damages issues in this case. According to Safeco, that information,
combined with its lack of personal knowledge, shows that a corporate-representative
deposition would provide little, if any, benefit in relation to the cost. Taiwo argues
we should deny mandamus relief for three reasons: (l) Safeco failed to support its
proportionality objection with any evidence; (2) Safeco failed to show how Taiwo’s
topics differed from those the supreme court expressly permitted in USAA; and (3)
Safeco failed to show it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal.
Contrary to Taiwo’s assertion, Safeco supported its proportionality objection
with evidence. Safeco provided the trial court with a business record affidavit and
_8_
two hearing exhibits, one containing a chain of e-mails between counsel and the
other containing its supplemental responses to Taiwo’s request for disclosure.
Further, the declaration of Barbara Spearman, Senior Complex Resolution Specialist
IV for Safeco, stated that Safeco had produced and disclosed “1,208 pages of
responsive documents and things in this matter, including its entire, unprivileged
claim file, which included Plaintiff’s Policy, correspondence between the parties,
the police report stemming from the accident and witness statements regarding the
Accident.”
As explained in USAA, a party’s proportionality objections may be supported
by reference to “previously disclosed documents providing the information in its
possession regarding the liability and damages issues in the case.” See USAA, 624
S.W.3d at 792—93. Safeco followed the supreme court’s guidance.
Although we agree with Taiwo that his requests fell squarely within those
permitted by USAA, the supreme court expressly permitted the topics in the context
of relevancy. Id. at 795. But here, Safeco seeks mandamus relief because it contends
taking the deposition would Violate the proportionality requirement applicable to all
discovery. In USAA, the court allowed the deposition to move forward because,
based on the record before it, the requested discovery was “not out of proportion to
the needs and circumstances of the case.” Id.
Proportionality guards against redundant or disproportionate discovery by
giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to
_9_
matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. See State Farm Lloyds, 520
S.W.3d at 614. Safeco does not argue that the deposition should be quashed because
the topics noticed are irrelevant. It argues the deposition’s burden or expense
outweighs its likely benefit because Safeco has disclosed the information in its
possession relevant to the issues of liability and damages (unlike USAA in which
relator produced only the police accident report) and otherwise has no personal
knowledge of the accident.
Applying the reasoning in USAA, we conclude the information Safeco
provided, combined with its lack of personal knowledge, established that a corporate
representative’s deposition would provide little, if any, additional benefit in relation
to the cost. See USAA, 624 S.W.3d at 793. Because the trial court ordered discovery
“outside the proper bounds of discovery,” it abused its discretion by denying
Safeco’s motion to quash and ordering the deposition of a corporate representative
to proceed. See CSX, 124 S.W.3d at 152; see also Am. Optical Corp, 988 S.W.2d
at 713.
We reject Taiwo’s argument that Safeco has an adequate remedy on appeal.
Texas law is clear that a discovery order that compels production beyond the rules
of procedure is an abuse of discretion for which mandamus is the proper remedy.
See CSX, 124 S.W.3d at 153 (holding there was no adequate remedy for discovery
order compelling production of “patently irrelevant or duplicative documents”
_10_
because order “imposes a burden . . . far out of proportion to any benefit that may
obtain to the requesting party”).
Conclusion
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying Safeco’s motion
to quash a corporate-representative deposition, and the trial court’s order leaves
Safeco Without an adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant
the petition for writ of mandamus and lift the stay imposed by our October 19, 2021
amended order. We direct the trial court to vacate its September 15, 2021 order
denying Safeco’s motion to quash and motion for protective order and enter an order
granting the motion within fifteen days of this opinion. A writ will issue only if the
trial court fails to comply.
/Craig Smith/
CRAIG SMITH
JUSTICE
Molberg, J., would deny the writ without opinion.
210873F.P05
_11_
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Angelica Paluch on behalf of Michael Gross
Bar No. 24106033
apaluch@harrisonhull.com
Envelope ID: 64948679
Status as of 5/31/2022 11:44 AM CST
Associated Case Party: STATEFARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Diane TWeisman dweisman@harrisonhull.com 5/27/2022 10:11:21 PM SENT
Michael P.Gross mgross@harrisonhull.com 5/27/2022 10:11:21 PM SENT
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Francine Ly fly@dallascourts.org 5/27/2022 10:11:21 PM SENT
Karen Whitney kwhitney@bhilaw.com 5/27/2022 10:11:21 PM SENT
Wesley Hightower weshightower@bhilaw.com 5/27/2022 10:11:21 PM SENT
Rhonda Lambert rlambert@bhi|aw.com 5/27/2022 10:11:21 PM SENT
M. ChasePrice cprice@bhilaw.com 5/27/2022 10:11:21 PM ERROR
Victoria Rodriguez vrodriguez@bhilaw.com 5/27/2022 10:11:21 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Randall GWalters