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CAUSE NO, 2016-54107
AMY SLATER, Individually and as Next
Friend of JOHN DOE,
Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
v.
CENTERPOINT ENERGY SERVICES
INC., CENTERPOINT ENERGY
SERVICE COMPANY, LLC,
CENTERPOINT ENERGY ELECTRIC
SERVICES, LLC, and CENTERPOINT
ENERGY POWER SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendants § 1297 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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CENTERPOINT ENERGY, INC., § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
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INTERVENOR PLAINTIFF CRYSTAL DAY’S OPPOSED
MOTION TO STRIKE DEEMED ADMISSIONS, IF ANY
COMES NOW, Intervenor Plaintiff Crystal Day, as next friend of Kari Engelhardt
and Wyatt Engelhardt (“Intervenor” or “Ms, Day”), and files her Motion to Strike
Deemed Admissions, if any, and in support thereof would show the following:
A. BACKGROUND
1. Intervenor filed her original petition on August 24, 2016, her first amended
petition on November 16, 2016, her second amended petition on August 26, 2019, and her
third amended petition on December 2, 2019.
2. Defendant CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC (hereinafter
“Defendant” or “CenterPoint”) filed its original answer to Intervenor’s original petition,
titled as Defendant’s first amended answer, on December 12, 2016,
3. Defendant filed its first amended answer to Intervenor’s second amended
petition on October 11, 2019.
Page | of 94. On October 11, 2019, Defendant also filed a traditional motion for summary
judgment against Intervenor (“D’s MSJ”) based in part upon allegedly deemed admissions.
5. Defendant alleges in D’s MSJ that it served requests for admission upon
Plaintiff and the two intervenors on March 16, 2017 and that none of the three parties
allegedly served-——not Plaintiff, nor Intervenors Robert and Kitty Engelhardt, nor
Intervenor Crystal Day—answered the requests for admissions allegedly served.
6. Defendant’s counsel asserts in D’s MSJ that the requests for admission were
served on “Tim Lassiter” as Intervenor’s counsel although there is no attorney “Tim Lassiter”
at Intervenor counsel’s firm. The attorneys representing Intervenor are James Lassiter and
Tim McHale. The certificate of service on the request for admissions to Ms. Day attached to
D’s MSJ indicates that the request was allegedly served by email upon only counsel James
Lassiter (but does not list any email address).
7. Intervenor Day’s counsel did not receive service of the requests for admissions
allegedly served 2 years and 8 months ago. Exs. A, B. Intervenor’s counsel was unaware
of the existence of the requests and of the alleged service until Defendant filed D’s MSJ.
Id.
8. Shortly after receiving service of D’s MSJ, Intervenor’s counsel reviewed
the inbox folders of the email received at the firm’s email address for service,
service@lassiterlaw.net, and did not find that any such email had been received. Jd. In an
abundance of caution, James Lassiter’s and Tim McHale’s personal email inboxes were
also searched and the alleged almost 3-year-old email was not found, Id.
9. Intervenor’s counsel searched its firm’s file in this case, its calendaring
system, and the Court’s file. Jd, Intervenor’s counsel found no mention of the requests for
Page 2 of 9admission and the Court’s file does not show that Defendant filed a certificate of written
discovery stating that any request for admissions was served, Id. The only certificate of
written discovery in the Court’s file is the one filed on March 9, 2017 by Intervenor’s
counsel certifying that Intervenor had responded on March 8, 2017 to Defendant’s requests
for production and request for answers to interrogatories,
10. Based upon their review, Intervenor’s counsel did not believe that they had
received service of the admission requests. Id.
1. While preparing Intervenor’s response to D's MSJ, Intervenor’s counsel
reviewed the junk folders for James Lassiter’s private email and the firm’s service email
(Defendant's certificate of service indicated only Mr. Lassiter had been served by email
without specifying the email address used) and again did not find the alleged email service.
Id.
12. On Tuesday, November 27, 2019, Mr. McHale, although he was not listed
on Defendant’s certificate of service, again searched his private email’s inbox and searched
his email’s junk folder. Jd Mr. McHale was very surprised to locate the emai! in his
tim@lassiterlaw.net email’s junk folder since he normally checks his email’s junk folder.
Ex, A. However, this particular email was delivered to Mr. McHale’s junk email folder
during his children’s 2017 Spring Break while he and his family were on vacation. Id.
13. Although Intervenor’s counsel questioned whether service was perfected,
Mr. McHale prompily prepared responses and contacted Defendant’s counsel. Id
Objections and responses to the five requests for admission were served on Defendant’s
counsel on November 27, 2019; the very same day that Mr, McHale found Defendant’s
email in his email’s junk folder. Id.
Page 3 of 9B. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES
14, If the Court believes that the five requests for admission could be deemed
in this case, Intervenor requests that any such deemed admissions be struck, A court may
strike or allow a party to withdraw or amend its admissions for good cause. TEX. R. Civ.
P. 198,3(a); Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. 2005); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Deggs, 968 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex, 1998); City of Houston v. Riner, 896 S.W.2d 317, 319
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
15. If a matter has been deemed admitted due to an untimely response that
admission can later be withdrawn if: (1) the party shows good cause; (2) the party relying
on the admissions will not be unduly prejudiced; and (3) presentation of the merits of the
case will be served by withdrawal. Tex. R. Civ, P. 198.2(c¢), 198.3, Wheeler v. Green, 157
§.W.3d 439, 442-43 (Tex. 2005); see also Boulet v. State, 189 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex.
App—Houston [Ist Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding it an abuse of discretion to deny
withdrawal of deemed admissions when there was good cause, no undue prejudice, and
where presentation of the merits would be served),
16. Good cause may be mere accident or mistake, Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442;
Wal-Mart Stores, 968 §,W.2d at 356; Cudd v. Hydrostatic Transmission, Inc., 867 S.W.2d
101, 104 (Tex. App.---Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
17, The traditional definition of “good cause” is when the failure to respond is
the result of an accident or mistake and is not intentional or the result of conscious
indifference. Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442; In re Kellogg-Brown & Root, Inc., 45 S.W.3d
772, 775 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.). The “good cause” requirement is lessened,
however, when, as in our case, a patty seeks to use deemed admissions to preclude the
presentation of the merits of the case, Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443; Boulet, 189 S.W.3d at
Page 4 of 9838 (finding the grant of summary judgment based on the deemed admissions is a “merits-
preclusive sanction”), Ifa party attempts to use a deemed admission as a merits-preclusive
sanction, a court must allow withdrawal or amendment of the admissions unless there is
flagrant bad faith or callous disregard for the rules on the part of the party attempting to
withdraw the admissions. Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443; Boulet, 189 §.W.3d at 838; see
Kellogg-Brown & Root, 45 S.W.3d at 775 (stating that it only takes a “slight excuse” to
establish good cause). Under this test, a party can establish good cause even if the delayed
response was due to negligence — as long as the negligence did not amount to conscious
indifference. Employers Ins. of Wausau vy. Halton, 792 $.W.2d 462, 465 (Tex. App.
Dallas 1990, no writ); Boulet, 189 $.W.3d at 837 (explaining that a clerical error, even if
caused by negligence, can be sufficient good cause).
18. | Numerous Texas cases have found legally sufficient “good cause” when the
untimely responses were due to an error caused by either the attorney or someone in the
attorney’s office. In Boulet, the court found good cause when the untimely responses were
because the attorney’s secretary accidentally stamped the wrong date on the requests for
admissions — causing a calendaring error. Boulet, 189 §.W.3d at 835-37. In Halton, good
cause was found even though plaintiff's attorney actually received the defendant’s requests
for admissions. Halton, 792 S.W.2d at 463. The plaintiff's attorney even prepared hand-
written responses to the requests during the responses period, but through an accident or
mistake, the hand-written responses were never transcribed or mailed. Jd. In Kellogg-
Brown & Root, while the defendant served requests for admissions on the plaintiff by
mailing them to the law firm representing the plaintiff, evidence suggested the requests
were mistakenly served on the wrong attorney within the firm. Kellogg-Brown & Root, 45
Page 5 of 9S.W.3d at 773-74. While the court found delivery to the wrong attorney within the same
firm was not necessarily a valid excuse, good cause was found because the attorney
representing the plaintiff never actually received the requests and the plaintiff's attorney
was not aware of the error until after responses were due. Id. at 774.
19, If Intervenor’s response is required under these circumstances and held to
be untimely, failure to timely serve responses was not intentional. Rather, any failure to
timely respond was inadvertent and caused by the failure of Defendant’s email to be
received in either the inbox for the firm’s service email or the inbox of either of Intervenor’s
counsel’s private emails.
20, Once good cause is established, Rule 198.3 allows withdrawal of deemed
admissions if the party relying upon the deemed admissions will not be unduly prejudiced.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 198.3. Defendant will not be unduly prejudiced if the Court strikes any
deemed admissions. TEx. R. Crv. P, 198.3(b). Defendant will only be required to present
its proof as it would have been required to if Defendant had not obtained any such deemed
admissions (if in fact it did).
21. Acourt’s determination of undue prejudice depends on two factors: (1) will
withdrawal delay trial; or (2) will withdrawal significantly hamper the opposing party’s
ability to prepare for trial. See Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443. Losing the ability to secure a
summary judgment based on deemed admissions is not a factor because such an argument
would eviscerate the rule. Carlton Firm, P.C. v. Edwards, No. 08-03-00009-CV, 2004 WL
540324, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 18, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication);
see also Boulet, 189 S.W.3d at 837-38 (stating the mere fact that a trial on the merits is
necessary is not undue prejudice),
Page 6 of 922. This case is currently on the trial court’s two-week docket beginning
February 10, 2020, which is 70-days (or 10 weeks) from today. Case law dictates that if
withdrawal of deemed admissions is sought enough in advance of trial to allow the
opposing party to conduct additional discovery,' there will be no undue prejudice. For
example,. in Halton, the Dallas Court of Appeals found a “considerable lack of prejudice”
when the parties had almost a month before trial to conduct additional discovery. Halton,
792 S.W.2d at 467; see also Kellogg-Brown & Root, 45 8,W.3d at 776 (finding no undue
prejudice when responses were delivered eight weeks prior to trial because Plaintiff had
adequate time to assess the responses and take any appropriate action)
C. CONCLUSION
23. Because there is good cause for the Court to strike any deemed admissions,
and because Defendant will not be unduly prejudiced, the Court should strike any deemed
admissions and allow the responses already served by Intervenor to stand.
D. PRAYER
23. For these reasons, Intervenor Day asks the Court to set this motion for
hearing and, after the hearing, grant the motion to strike any deemed admissions.
Intervenor additionally requests any such other relief to which she may be entitled.
' Even without an extension, the current discovery period in this case continues until
January 10, 2020, which is 39 days from today.
Page 7 of 9Respectfully submitted,
LASSITER LAW FIRM
3120 Southwest Freeway, Suite 650
Houston, Texas 77098
(713) 521-0104 - Telephone
(713) 521-0103 - Facsimile
lasgffarlaw,net
ferticelas Sten
\d
es M. Lassiter, III
State Bar No, 11969825
Timothy M. McHale
State Bar No. 24046393
Mohammed Nabulsi
State Bar No. 24105686
yet
By:
ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
The undersigned hereby certifies that he conferred regarding the foregoing motion
with Defendant’s counsel, Justin Lipe, who stated that he needed to review Intervenor’s
Responses to Defendant’s Request for Admission before advising whether his client would
be opposed to this Motion. As Intervenor tendered those res; s on tha afternoon before
Thanksgiving and Intervenor’s counsel’s office was clos¢d i the is filing,
Plaintiff assumes Defendant is opposed.
Timothy M. McHale
Page 8 of 9CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document has been provided to all counsel via facsimile, certified mail/return receipt
requested, or hand delivery in accordance with Rules 21 and 21a of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure on this 2nd day of December 2019.
Anthony G, Buzbee Via eService
Andrew Dao
Chris Leavitt
THE BUZBEE LAW FIRM
600 Travis, Suite 7300
Houston, Texas 77002
Justin G, Lipe
BAKER Botts, L.L,P.
One Shell Plaza
910 Louisiana \
Houston, Texas 77002-4995
Via eService
Timothy M. McHale
Page 9 of 9
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CAUSE NO, 2016-54107 AMY SLATER, Individually and as Next Friend of JOHN DOE, Plaintiffs IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF v. CENTERPOINT ENERGY SERVICES INC., CENTERPOINT ENERGY SERVICE COMPANY, LLC, CENTERPOINT ENERGY ELECTRIC SERVICES, LLC, and CENTERPOINT ENERGY POWER SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants § 1297 JUDICIAL DISTRICT § § § § CENTERPOINT ENERGY, INC., § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS § § § § § § INTERVENOR PLAINTIFF CRYSTAL DAY’S OPPOSED MOTION TO STRIKE DEEMED ADMISSIONS, IF ANY COMES NOW, Intervenor Plaintiff Crystal Day, as next friend of Kari Engelhardt and Wyatt Engelhardt (“Intervenor” or “Ms, Day”), and files her Motion to Strike Deemed Admissions, if any, and in support thereof would show the following: A. BACKGROUND 1. Intervenor filed her original petition on August 24, 2016, her first amended petition on November 16, 2016, her second amended petition on August 26, 2019, and her third amended petition on December 2, 2019. 2. Defendant CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC (hereinafter “Defendant” or “CenterPoint”) filed its original answer to Intervenor’s original petition, titled as Defendant’s first amended answer, on December 12, 2016, 3. Defendant filed its first amended answer to Intervenor’s second amended petition on October 11, 2019. Page | of 94. On October 11, 2019, Defendant also filed a traditional motion for summary judgment against Intervenor (“D’s MSJ”) based in part upon allegedly deemed admissions. 5. Defendant alleges in D’s MSJ that it served requests for admission upon Plaintiff and the two intervenors on March 16, 2017 and that none of the three parties allegedly served-——not Plaintiff, nor Intervenors Robert and Kitty Engelhardt, nor Intervenor Crystal Day—answered the requests for admissions allegedly served. 6. Defendant’s counsel asserts in D’s MSJ that the requests for admission were served on “Tim Lassiter” as Intervenor’s counsel although there is no attorney “Tim Lassiter” at Intervenor counsel’s firm. The attorneys representing Intervenor are James Lassiter and Tim McHale. The certificate of service on the request for admissions to Ms. Day attached to D’s MSJ indicates that the request was allegedly served by email upon only counsel James Lassiter (but does not list any email address). 7. Intervenor Day’s counsel did not receive service of the requests for admissions allegedly served 2 years and 8 months ago. Exs. A, B. Intervenor’s counsel was unaware of the existence of the requests and of the alleged service until Defendant filed D’s MSJ. Id. 8. Shortly after receiving service of D’s MSJ, Intervenor’s counsel reviewed the inbox folders of the email received at the firm’s email address for service, service@lassiterlaw.net, and did not find that any such email had been received. Jd. In an abundance of caution, James Lassiter’s and Tim McHale’s personal email inboxes were also searched and the alleged almost 3-year-old email was not found, Id. 9. Intervenor’s counsel searched its firm’s file in this case, its calendaring system, and the Court’s file. Jd, Intervenor’s counsel found no mention of the requests for Page 2 of 9admission and the Court’s file does not show that Defendant filed a certificate of written discovery stating that any request for admissions was served, Id. The only certificate of written discovery in the Court’s file is the one filed on March 9, 2017 by Intervenor’s counsel certifying that Intervenor had responded on March 8, 2017 to Defendant’s requests for production and request for answers to interrogatories, 10. Based upon their review, Intervenor’s counsel did not believe that they had received service of the admission requests. Id. 1. While preparing Intervenor’s response to D's MSJ, Intervenor’s counsel reviewed the junk folders for James Lassiter’s private email and the firm’s service email (Defendant's certificate of service indicated only Mr. Lassiter had been served by email without specifying the email address used) and again did not find the alleged email service. Id. 12. On Tuesday, November 27, 2019, Mr. McHale, although he was not listed on Defendant’s certificate of service, again searched his private email’s inbox and searched his email’s junk folder. Jd Mr. McHale was very surprised to locate the emai! in his tim@lassiterlaw.net email’s junk folder since he normally checks his email’s junk folder. Ex, A. However, this particular email was delivered to Mr. McHale’s junk email folder during his children’s 2017 Spring Break while he and his family were on vacation. Id. 13. Although Intervenor’s counsel questioned whether service was perfected, Mr. McHale prompily prepared responses and contacted Defendant’s counsel. Id Objections and responses to the five requests for admission were served on Defendant’s counsel on November 27, 2019; the very same day that Mr, McHale found Defendant’s email in his email’s junk folder. Id. Page 3 of 9B. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES 14, If the Court believes that the five requests for admission could be deemed in this case, Intervenor requests that any such deemed admissions be struck, A court may strike or allow a party to withdraw or amend its admissions for good cause. TEX. R. Civ. P. 198,3(a); Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. 2005); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Deggs, 968 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex, 1998); City of Houston v. Riner, 896 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). 15. If a matter has been deemed admitted due to an untimely response that admission can later be withdrawn if: (1) the party shows good cause; (2) the party relying on the admissions will not be unduly prejudiced; and (3) presentation of the merits of the case will be served by withdrawal. Tex. R. Civ, P. 198.2(c¢), 198.3, Wheeler v. Green, 157 §.W.3d 439, 442-43 (Tex. 2005); see also Boulet v. State, 189 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex. App—Houston [Ist Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding it an abuse of discretion to deny withdrawal of deemed admissions when there was good cause, no undue prejudice, and where presentation of the merits would be served), 16. Good cause may be mere accident or mistake, Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442; Wal-Mart Stores, 968 §,W.2d at 356; Cudd v. Hydrostatic Transmission, Inc., 867 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex. App.---Corpus Christi 1993, no writ). 17, The traditional definition of “good cause” is when the failure to respond is the result of an accident or mistake and is not intentional or the result of conscious indifference. Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442; In re Kellogg-Brown & Root, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 772, 775 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.). The “good cause” requirement is lessened, however, when, as in our case, a patty seeks to use deemed admissions to preclude the presentation of the merits of the case, Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443; Boulet, 189 S.W.3d at Page 4 of 9838 (finding the grant of summary judgment based on the deemed admissions is a “merits- preclusive sanction”), Ifa party attempts to use a deemed admission as a merits-preclusive sanction, a court must allow withdrawal or amendment of the admissions unless there is flagrant bad faith or callous disregard for the rules on the part of the party attempting to withdraw the admissions. Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443; Boulet, 189 §.W.3d at 838; see Kellogg-Brown & Root, 45 S.W.3d at 775 (stating that it only takes a “slight excuse” to establish good cause). Under this test, a party can establish good cause even if the delayed response was due to negligence — as long as the negligence did not amount to conscious indifference. Employers Ins. of Wausau vy. Halton, 792 $.W.2d 462, 465 (Tex. App. Dallas 1990, no writ); Boulet, 189 $.W.3d at 837 (explaining that a clerical error, even if caused by negligence, can be sufficient good cause). 18. | Numerous Texas cases have found legally sufficient “good cause” when the untimely responses were due to an error caused by either the attorney or someone in the attorney’s office. In Boulet, the court found good cause when the untimely responses were because the attorney’s secretary accidentally stamped the wrong date on the requests for admissions — causing a calendaring error. Boulet, 189 §.W.3d at 835-37. In Halton, good cause was found even though plaintiff's attorney actually received the defendant’s requests for admissions. Halton, 792 S.W.2d at 463. The plaintiff's attorney even prepared hand- written responses to the requests during the responses period, but through an accident or mistake, the hand-written responses were never transcribed or mailed. Jd. In Kellogg- Brown & Root, while the defendant served requests for admissions on the plaintiff by mailing them to the law firm representing the plaintiff, evidence suggested the requests were mistakenly served on the wrong attorney within the firm. Kellogg-Brown & Root, 45 Page 5 of 9S.W.3d at 773-74. While the court found delivery to the wrong attorney within the same firm was not necessarily a valid excuse, good cause was found because the attorney representing the plaintiff never actually received the requests and the plaintiff's attorney was not aware of the error until after responses were due. Id. at 774. 19, If Intervenor’s response is required under these circumstances and held to be untimely, failure to timely serve responses was not intentional. Rather, any failure to timely respond was inadvertent and caused by the failure of Defendant’s email to be received in either the inbox for the firm’s service email or the inbox of either of Intervenor’s counsel’s private emails. 20, Once good cause is established, Rule 198.3 allows withdrawal of deemed admissions if the party relying upon the deemed admissions will not be unduly prejudiced. Tex. R. Civ. P. 198.3. Defendant will not be unduly prejudiced if the Court strikes any deemed admissions. TEx. R. Crv. P, 198.3(b). Defendant will only be required to present its proof as it would have been required to if Defendant had not obtained any such deemed admissions (if in fact it did). 21. Acourt’s determination of undue prejudice depends on two factors: (1) will withdrawal delay trial; or (2) will withdrawal significantly hamper the opposing party’s ability to prepare for trial. See Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443. Losing the ability to secure a summary judgment based on deemed admissions is not a factor because such an argument would eviscerate the rule. Carlton Firm, P.C. v. Edwards, No. 08-03-00009-CV, 2004 WL 540324, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 18, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication); see also Boulet, 189 S.W.3d at 837-38 (stating the mere fact that a trial on the merits is necessary is not undue prejudice), Page 6 of 922. This case is currently on the trial court’s two-week docket beginning February 10, 2020, which is 70-days (or 10 weeks) from today. Case law dictates that if withdrawal of deemed admissions is sought enough in advance of trial to allow the opposing party to conduct additional discovery,' there will be no undue prejudice. For example,. in Halton, the Dallas Court of Appeals found a “considerable lack of prejudice” when the parties had almost a month before trial to conduct additional discovery. Halton, 792 S.W.2d at 467; see also Kellogg-Brown & Root, 45 8,W.3d at 776 (finding no undue prejudice when responses were delivered eight weeks prior to trial because Plaintiff had adequate time to assess the responses and take any appropriate action) C. CONCLUSION 23. Because there is good cause for the Court to strike any deemed admissions, and because Defendant will not be unduly prejudiced, the Court should strike any deemed admissions and allow the responses already served by Intervenor to stand. D. PRAYER 23. For these reasons, Intervenor Day asks the Court to set this motion for hearing and, after the hearing, grant the motion to strike any deemed admissions. Intervenor additionally requests any such other relief to which she may be entitled. ' Even without an extension, the current discovery period in this case continues until January 10, 2020, which is 39 days from today. Page 7 of 9Respectfully submitted, LASSITER LAW FIRM 3120 Southwest Freeway, Suite 650 Houston, Texas 77098 (713) 521-0104 - Telephone (713) 521-0103 - Facsimile lasgffarlaw,net ferticelas Sten \d es M. Lassiter, III State Bar No, 11969825 Timothy M. McHale State Bar No. 24046393 Mohammed Nabulsi State Bar No. 24105686 yet By: ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE The undersigned hereby certifies that he conferred regarding the foregoing motion with Defendant’s counsel, Justin Lipe, who stated that he needed to review Intervenor’s Responses to Defendant’s Request for Admission before advising whether his client would be opposed to this Motion. As Intervenor tendered those res; s on tha afternoon before Thanksgiving and Intervenor’s counsel’s office was clos¢d i the is filing, Plaintiff assumes Defendant is opposed. Timothy M. McHale Page 8 of 9CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been provided to all counsel via facsimile, certified mail/return receipt requested, or hand delivery in accordance with Rules 21 and 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 2nd day of December 2019. Anthony G, Buzbee Via eService Andrew Dao Chris Leavitt THE BUZBEE LAW FIRM 600 Travis, Suite 7300 Houston, Texas 77002 Justin G, Lipe BAKER Botts, L.L,P. One Shell Plaza 910 Louisiana \ Houston, Texas 77002-4995 Via eService Timothy M. McHale Page 9 of 9