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1 MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
MATTHEW J. MATERN (SBN 159798)
2 DEANNA S. LEIFER (SBN 265840)
OLIVIA GREEN (SBN 334128)
3 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
4 Tel: (310) 531-1900
Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
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Attorneys for Plaintiff SANDRA GAETA
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7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8 FOR THE COUNTY OF KERN
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10 SANDRA GAETA, an individual, CASE NO.: BCV-21-101362
11 [Assigned for all purposes to the
Plaintiff, Honorable Thomas S. Clark, Dept. 17]
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vs. PLAINTIFF SANDRA GAETA’S REPLY IN
13 SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO
JBBC, INC. D/B/A THE BROKEN YOLK COMPEL DEFENDANT JBBC, INC. TO
14 CAFÉ, a California corporation; ABRAHAM PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO
AYALA, an individual; and DOES 1 through PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL
15 50, inclusive, INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE)
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Defendants. Date: May 25, 2022
17 Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: 17
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19 Action Filed: June 15, 2021
Trial Date: September 26, 2022
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
2 I. INTRODUCTION
3 In its opposition to plaintiff Sandra Gaeta’s (“Plaintiff”) renewed motion to compel,
4 defendant JBBC, Inc. (“Defendant”) claims that Plaintiff’s motion is “untimely” and that Plaintiff
5 “missed the motion to compel deadline,” which is inaccurate and purposefully misleading.
6 Defendant is attempting to deprive Plaintiff of information that the Court has already determined
7 Plaintiff is entitled to. Plaintiff timely submitted a motion to compel further responses to special
8 interrogatories, which was denied without prejudice based on technicalities related to the separate
9 statement submitted in support of the motion to compel. In accordance with the Court’s March 8,
10 2022 Minute Order, Plaintiff submitted a renewed motion to compel with a separate statement that
11 corrected the issues outlined in the Court’s Minute Order. Thus, Defendant’s contention that
12 Plaintiff’s renewed motion to compel is “untimely” because it was submitted after February 4, 2022
13 is confusing, completely baseless, and blatantly ignores this Court’s Minute Order.
14 Further, Defendant’s remaining arguments utterly fail. The Court has already compelled
15 Defendant to provide documents regarding the same subject matter as the information sought in the
16 instant motion, based on the same arguments and evidence presented in Plaintiff’s prior motions to
17 compel (and reiterated herein), including information related to complaints of sexual harassment,
18 discrimination, and retaliation by employees other than Plaintiff, at any of Defendant’s locations in
19 California from January 1, 2018 to the present. Therefore, by ruling that Plaintiff was entitled to
20 such documents, the Court has already endorsed the arguments and evidence presented by Plaintiff
21 regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to the information sought here.
22 Lastly, Defendant uses its opposition to restate the same arguments as to why Plaintiff is not
23 entitled to the information sought, which, as explained above, already failed when the Court granted
24 Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to requests for production. Accordingly, Plaintiff
25 will reiterate the relevant law and arguments supporting her position that the information sought
26 through the special interrogatories at issue is indeed relevant and discoverable.
27 As Defendant has failed to provide sufficient evidence and arguments supporting its position
28 that Plaintiff’s renewed motion to compel is “untimely,” and failed to present evidence and
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 arguments negating Plaintiff’s entitlement to the requested information, and Plaintiff has cured all
2 defects in her original separate statement, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant
3 Plaintiff’s renewed motion to compel in its entirety.
4 II. ARGUMENT
5 A. Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Compel Was Timely and Proper
6 Plaintiff’s motion to compel deadline related to the special interrogatories at issue was
7 February 4, 2022. Declaration of Steven Mannix, ¶ 3. Plaintiff timely filed a motion to compel
8 further responses to special interrogatories on February 4, 2022. See Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff’s motion
9 was heard by this Court on March 8, 2022. Shortly after the hearing, the Court issued a Minute
10 Order specifying that the motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories was denied
11 without prejudice as a result of a couple of issues with Plaintiff’s separate statement submitted in
12 support of the motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed a renewed motion to compel with such issues
13 cured. Thus, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s renewed motion to compel is not timely
14 because Plaintiff’s motion to compel deadline was February 4, 2022 is nothing more than an
15 improper attempt to mislead this Court into denying Plaintiff’s access to information to which she
16 is entitled, and blatantly ignores this Court’s ruling and Minute Order. Thus, Plaintiff’s renewed
17 motion to compel should be granted.
18 B. The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to
19 Requests for Production Evidences Plaintiff’s Entitlement to the
20 Information Sought Through The Instant Motion
21 Plaintiff previously submitted a motion to compel further responses to requests for
22 production of documents at the same time as her motion to compel further responses to special
23 interrogatories. Both motions sought information related to complaints of sexual harassment,
24 discrimination, and retaliation, and Defendant’s investigations of such complaints, by employees
25 other than Plaintiff, at any of Defendant’s locations in California from January 1, 2018 to the
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 present.1 Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to requests for production was granted as to
2 all requests seeking the aforementioned information, based on the same case law provided in
3 Plaintiff’s original motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories (and reiterated
4 herein), which evidences the Court’s position that Plaintiff is entitled to such categories of
5 information.
6 As discussed above, the Court’s March 8, 2022 Minute Order explained that Plaintiff’s
7 original motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories was denied based on issues
8 with the separate statement, and no mention was made whatsoever of any issues with the arguments
9 or evidence presented in the motion. Plaintiff has since cured the defects in Plaintiff’s separate
10 statement by submitting a new separate statement in support of the renewed motion to compel
11 further responses to special interrogatories. Accordingly, the Court should grant Plaintiff’s renewed
12 motion to compel.
13 C. Defendant’s “Similarly Situated” Standard Is Not Applicable to the Instant
14 Case And Does Negate Plaintiff’s Right to “Me Too” Evidence
15 Defendant’s argument that Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32 are overbroad because they
16 seek information that includes individuals who are not similarly situated to Plaintiff completely
17 fails. Defendant cites to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 804 to support
18 its argument that, in order to obtain “me too” evidence, “Plaintiff must establish that Defendant
19 treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected category, in similar circumstances,
20 more favorably than her.” Opposition, p. 4, lines 3-7. However, not only is McDonnell a non-
21 binding federal case, it is both factually and procedurally distinct from the instant case.
22 Furthermore, McDonnell simply does not support the proposition for which Defendant attempts to
23 use it.
24 In McDonnell, the respondent was a black civil rights activist who was employed as a
25 mechanic and laboratory technician by the petitioner, an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer.
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The requests for production at issue in Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to requests
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for production also sought documents related to the individual defendant’s bonuses and raises,
28 which is not at issue here.
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792 at 794. Approximately 8 years into the respondent’s employment, the
2 petitioner laid off the respondent, claiming a general reduction in workforce. Id. In protest of his
3 discharge, which the respondent claimed was racially motivated, he orchestrated illegal
4 demonstrations, including stalling cars on roads leading to the petitioner’s plant, and organizing a
5 “lock in” to prevent some of petitioner’s employees from leaving the plant. Id. at 794-795. When
6 the petitioner subsequently advertised for qualified mechanics, the respondent re-applied for his
7 job with petitioner, but was rejected. Id. at 796. The petitioner claimed that the rejection was
8 based on the respondent’s prior “stall in” and “lock in” demonstrations. Id. at 796-797.
9 The District Court found that the petitioner’s refusal to rehire the respondent was based on
10 the respondent’s participation in illegal demonstrations. McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792 at 794 at 797.
11 On appeal, the case was remanded as to the respondent’s claim that the petitioner refused to hire
12 him because of his race and civil rights activism. Id. at 797-798. The Supreme Court then granted
13 certiorari for the purpose of clarifying the standards governing an action challenging employment
14 discrimination. Id at 798. The Supreme Court concluded that, after a complainant in a Title VII
15 trial establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to
16 establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. at 802-803. The
17 Supreme Court then clarified that, on remand, the respondent must be afforded an opportunity to
18 show that petitioner's stated reason for its refusal to re-hire the respondent was pretext, and
19 “[e]specially relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts
20 against petitioner of comparable seriousness to the ‘stall-in’ were nevertheless retained or
21 rehired.” Id. at 804.
22 Thus, McDonnell does not address or even relate to the issue of whether a plaintiff in a
23 sexual harassment case brought under the Fair Employment and House Act may obtain “me too”
24 evidence of other complaints of sexual harassment, sex discrimination, or retaliation by other
25 employees of the same defendant employer through discovery, nor does it support Defendant’s
26 proposition that Plaintiff must establish that Defendant treated similarly situated employees more
27 favorably. Instead, the precise questions at issue in McDonnell relate to “the proper order and
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 nature of proof” and the timing and “allocation of proof” at trial in discrimination actions under
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792, 793-794, 800-804.
3 Defendant’s use of McDonnell to support its argument that Plaintiff must show that
4 Defendant treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected category and in similar
5 circumstances more favorably than her is an improper attempt to mislead this Court into applying
6 a standard that simply does not apply under California law in these circumstances, and certainly
7 does not govern the determination of whether Plaintiff is entitled to the “me too” evidence sought
8 here. McDonnell is inapposite here and has no impact whatsoever on the determination as to
9 whether Plaintiff is entitled to “me too” evidence in discovery.
10 As a result, the remainder of Defendant’s analysis regarding what constitutes “similarly
11 situated” employees, and the cases to which Defendant cites to support its arguments for the
12 “similarly situated” standard and insistence on a narrow interpretation of “similarly situated” are
13 absolutely irrelevant here2. Moreover, the federal cases on which Defendant relies are not binding
14 on this Court, and they largely relate to factually and procedurally distinguishable discrimination
15 cases and therefore are not instructive in this case.
16 In addition, Defendant cites to McCoy v. Pacific Martime Assn. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
17 283, 288-89 for the contention that “sexual harassment complaints involving non-party employees
18 are only relevant if the individuals held a job similar to Plaintiff (i.e., a non-supervisory associate)
19 and were harassed for the same reasons as Plaintiff or bore the same characteristics as Plaintiff.”
20 Opposition, p. 5, lines 18-23. However, McCoy does not stand for this proposition. In another
21 attempt to mislead this Court into applying inapplicable standards, Defendant conveniently omits
22 the necessary context and fails to explain that the court in McCoy excluded “me too” evidence of
23 other instances of sexual harassment and race discrimination because the plaintiff’s sole remaining
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For instance, Defendant cites to Guz v. Betchel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 369; McGrory v.
25 Applied Signal Tech (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1536; Josephs v. Pac. Bell (9th Cir. 2006) 443
F.3d 1050, 1065, relying on Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2004) 349 F.3d 634, 641;
26 Harris v. Winter (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) 2007 WL 2900168, at *16, aff'd sub nom. Harris v.
Penn (9th Cir. 2009) 323 F. App'x 619; Guruwaya v. Montgomery Ward, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1988)
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119 F.R.D. 36, 39; McKinney v. Am. Airlines (C.D. Cal. 2009) 641 F.Supp.2d 962, 974-75. See
28 Opposition, pp. 4-6.
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 cause of action at trial was retaliation, and the court thought the evidence of other instances of
2 sexual harassment and discrimination would be prejudicial to the extent it would confuse the jury
3 regarding the sole remaining retaliation claim at issue. McCoy, 216 Cal.App.4th 283 at 296.
4 Here, Plaintiff has alleged sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation, among
5 other claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s special interrogatories seeking information related to other
6 complaints of sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation are proper. As Defendant has
7 failed to provide any relevant, binding authority negating Plaintiff’s ability to obtain the requested
8 “me too” evidence, the Court should grant Plaintiff’s motion to compel.
9 D. Defendant’s Privacy Objection Should Not Prevent Plaintiff from Obtaining
10 the Relevant Evidence Sought Through Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32
11 Defendant argues that its privacy objection is proper, but fails to address the fact that its
12 purported privacy concerns can be alleviated by a protective order, which Plaintiff has already
13 offered to enter into. Defendant bears the burden of justifying its failure to respond to Special
14 Interrogatories Nos. 27-32, and of justifying its privacy objections, and has failed to do so. See
15 Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-2. The “me too” evidence at issue is directly
16 relevant, and discoverable. See Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children's Foundation
17 of Los Angeles and Ventura Counties (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 760. See also Beyda v. City of
18 Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511; Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 109-110.
19 Thus, Defendant’s privacy objections fails and Defendant must provide the requested “me too”
20 information.
21 E. Plaintiff Has Established Good Cause to Obtain the Requested Discovery
22 Despite Defendant’s contrary contentions regarding Pantoja and Johnson, neither Pantoja
23 nor Johnson contain any limitation whatsoever which would preclude Plaintiff from obtaining the
24 “me too” evidence sought as to other employees of Defendant during the relevant time period.
25 Further, both Pantoja and Johnson are instructive here. Pantoja stands for the proposition that
26 “me too” evidence, even if it occurred outside the plaintiff’s presence and at times other than when
27 plaintiff was employed, is both relevant and discoverable, and the failure to include such “me too”
28 evidence is prejudicial to the plaintiff. Pantoja, 198 Cal.App.4th at 92. Johnson supports the
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 proposition that “me too” evidence is admissible to show, among other things, discriminatory
2 animous. Johnson, 173 Cal.App.4th at 767.
3 Compliant responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32 will help Plaintiff establish
4 whether Defendant changed any of its policies or practices related to sexual harassment, sex
5 discrimination, and retaliation, and whether Defendant was negligent in its hiring, supervision,
6 and/or retention of defendant Ayala. Additionally, evidence of other complaints of sexual
7 harassment by Defendant’s employees will establish that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work
8 environment during her employment with Defendant, and that Defendant failed to prevent or
9 correct the sexual harassment. Thus, Plaintiff has established good cause for the evidence sought.
10 In sum, Defendant failed to set forth any arguments which justify its refusal to provide
11 complete responses to the special interrogatories at issue here. In fact, it is unclear what
12 Defendant is even arguing. Defendant originally objected to the time period for which Plaintiff
13 sought the “me too” evidence (See Declaration of Olivia Green, ¶ 8, Exh. A), and Defendant now
14 seemingly concedes that Plaintiff is entitled to certain “me too” evidence, but asks the Court to
15 apply a “similarly situated” standard while providing no authority which would permit the Court
16 to do so in this case. As set forth above, Defendant’s arguments are irrelevant, Defendant’s cited
17 case law is inapposite, and Defendant’s objections do not justify its failure to provide complete
18 responses.
19 Accordingly, Defendant must provide complete responses to Special Interrogatories Nos.
20 27-32.
21 III. CONCLUSION
22 Based on the foregoing argument and authority, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the
23 Court grant Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Compel Defendant to Provide Further Responses to
24 Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories Nos. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 (Set One) in its entirety.
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 DATED: May 9, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
2 MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
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By:
5 MATTHEW J. MATERN
DEANNA S. LEIFER
6 OLIVIA GREEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff SANDRA GAETA
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PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of
18 years, and not a party to this action. My business address is 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite
3 200, Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
4 On May 9, 2022, I served the following document or documents:
5 PLAINTIFF SANDRA GAETA’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO
6 COMPEL DEFENDANT JBBC, INC. TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE)
7
8 By e-mail or electronic transmission. I caused the documents to be sent to the person at
the e-mail addresses listed below. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the
9 transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was
unsuccessful.
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11 Lyne A. Richardson, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant JBBC, INC. DBA
Steven Mannix, Esq. THE BROKEN YOLK CAFE
12 lyne.richardson@ogletree.com
steven.mannix@ogletree.com
13 carolina.martis@ogletreedeakins.com
evelyn.coopwood@ogletree.com
14 OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK
& STEWART, P.C.
15 19191 S. Vermont Avenue, Suite 950
Torrance, CA 90502
16 Telephone: (310) 217-8191
Facsimile: (310) 217-8184
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18 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct. Executed on May 9, 2022 at Manhattan Beach, California.
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21 Yeshenia Zambrano
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PROOF OF SERVICE
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1 MATERN LAW GROUP, PC MATTHEW J. MATERN (SBN 159798) 2 DEANNA S. LEIFER (SBN 265840) OLIVIA GREEN (SBN 334128) 3 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200 Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 4 Tel: (310) 531-1900 Facsimile: (310) 531-1901 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff SANDRA GAETA 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 FOR THE COUNTY OF KERN 9 10 SANDRA GAETA, an individual, CASE NO.: BCV-21-101362 11 [Assigned for all purposes to the Plaintiff, Honorable Thomas S. Clark, Dept. 17] 12 vs. PLAINTIFF SANDRA GAETA’S REPLY IN 13 SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO JBBC, INC. D/B/A THE BROKEN YOLK COMPEL DEFENDANT JBBC, INC. TO 14 CAFÉ, a California corporation; ABRAHAM PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO AYALA, an individual; and DOES 1 through PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL 15 50, inclusive, INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE) 16 Defendants. Date: May 25, 2022 17 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept.: 17 18 19 Action Filed: June 15, 2021 Trial Date: September 26, 2022 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -1- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 2 I. INTRODUCTION 3 In its opposition to plaintiff Sandra Gaeta’s (“Plaintiff”) renewed motion to compel, 4 defendant JBBC, Inc. (“Defendant”) claims that Plaintiff’s motion is “untimely” and that Plaintiff 5 “missed the motion to compel deadline,” which is inaccurate and purposefully misleading. 6 Defendant is attempting to deprive Plaintiff of information that the Court has already determined 7 Plaintiff is entitled to. Plaintiff timely submitted a motion to compel further responses to special 8 interrogatories, which was denied without prejudice based on technicalities related to the separate 9 statement submitted in support of the motion to compel. In accordance with the Court’s March 8, 10 2022 Minute Order, Plaintiff submitted a renewed motion to compel with a separate statement that 11 corrected the issues outlined in the Court’s Minute Order. Thus, Defendant’s contention that 12 Plaintiff’s renewed motion to compel is “untimely” because it was submitted after February 4, 2022 13 is confusing, completely baseless, and blatantly ignores this Court’s Minute Order. 14 Further, Defendant’s remaining arguments utterly fail. The Court has already compelled 15 Defendant to provide documents regarding the same subject matter as the information sought in the 16 instant motion, based on the same arguments and evidence presented in Plaintiff’s prior motions to 17 compel (and reiterated herein), including information related to complaints of sexual harassment, 18 discrimination, and retaliation by employees other than Plaintiff, at any of Defendant’s locations in 19 California from January 1, 2018 to the present. Therefore, by ruling that Plaintiff was entitled to 20 such documents, the Court has already endorsed the arguments and evidence presented by Plaintiff 21 regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to the information sought here. 22 Lastly, Defendant uses its opposition to restate the same arguments as to why Plaintiff is not 23 entitled to the information sought, which, as explained above, already failed when the Court granted 24 Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to requests for production. Accordingly, Plaintiff 25 will reiterate the relevant law and arguments supporting her position that the information sought 26 through the special interrogatories at issue is indeed relevant and discoverable. 27 As Defendant has failed to provide sufficient evidence and arguments supporting its position 28 that Plaintiff’s renewed motion to compel is “untimely,” and failed to present evidence and -2- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 arguments negating Plaintiff’s entitlement to the requested information, and Plaintiff has cured all 2 defects in her original separate statement, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant 3 Plaintiff’s renewed motion to compel in its entirety. 4 II. ARGUMENT 5 A. Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Compel Was Timely and Proper 6 Plaintiff’s motion to compel deadline related to the special interrogatories at issue was 7 February 4, 2022. Declaration of Steven Mannix, ¶ 3. Plaintiff timely filed a motion to compel 8 further responses to special interrogatories on February 4, 2022. See Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff’s motion 9 was heard by this Court on March 8, 2022. Shortly after the hearing, the Court issued a Minute 10 Order specifying that the motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories was denied 11 without prejudice as a result of a couple of issues with Plaintiff’s separate statement submitted in 12 support of the motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed a renewed motion to compel with such issues 13 cured. Thus, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s renewed motion to compel is not timely 14 because Plaintiff’s motion to compel deadline was February 4, 2022 is nothing more than an 15 improper attempt to mislead this Court into denying Plaintiff’s access to information to which she 16 is entitled, and blatantly ignores this Court’s ruling and Minute Order. Thus, Plaintiff’s renewed 17 motion to compel should be granted. 18 B. The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to 19 Requests for Production Evidences Plaintiff’s Entitlement to the 20 Information Sought Through The Instant Motion 21 Plaintiff previously submitted a motion to compel further responses to requests for 22 production of documents at the same time as her motion to compel further responses to special 23 interrogatories. Both motions sought information related to complaints of sexual harassment, 24 discrimination, and retaliation, and Defendant’s investigations of such complaints, by employees 25 other than Plaintiff, at any of Defendant’s locations in California from January 1, 2018 to the 26 27 28 -3- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 present.1 Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to requests for production was granted as to 2 all requests seeking the aforementioned information, based on the same case law provided in 3 Plaintiff’s original motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories (and reiterated 4 herein), which evidences the Court’s position that Plaintiff is entitled to such categories of 5 information. 6 As discussed above, the Court’s March 8, 2022 Minute Order explained that Plaintiff’s 7 original motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories was denied based on issues 8 with the separate statement, and no mention was made whatsoever of any issues with the arguments 9 or evidence presented in the motion. Plaintiff has since cured the defects in Plaintiff’s separate 10 statement by submitting a new separate statement in support of the renewed motion to compel 11 further responses to special interrogatories. Accordingly, the Court should grant Plaintiff’s renewed 12 motion to compel. 13 C. Defendant’s “Similarly Situated” Standard Is Not Applicable to the Instant 14 Case And Does Negate Plaintiff’s Right to “Me Too” Evidence 15 Defendant’s argument that Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32 are overbroad because they 16 seek information that includes individuals who are not similarly situated to Plaintiff completely 17 fails. Defendant cites to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 804 to support 18 its argument that, in order to obtain “me too” evidence, “Plaintiff must establish that Defendant 19 treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected category, in similar circumstances, 20 more favorably than her.” Opposition, p. 4, lines 3-7. However, not only is McDonnell a non- 21 binding federal case, it is both factually and procedurally distinct from the instant case. 22 Furthermore, McDonnell simply does not support the proposition for which Defendant attempts to 23 use it. 24 In McDonnell, the respondent was a black civil rights activist who was employed as a 25 mechanic and laboratory technician by the petitioner, an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer. 26 1 The requests for production at issue in Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to requests 27 for production also sought documents related to the individual defendant’s bonuses and raises, 28 which is not at issue here. -4- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792 at 794. Approximately 8 years into the respondent’s employment, the 2 petitioner laid off the respondent, claiming a general reduction in workforce. Id. In protest of his 3 discharge, which the respondent claimed was racially motivated, he orchestrated illegal 4 demonstrations, including stalling cars on roads leading to the petitioner’s plant, and organizing a 5 “lock in” to prevent some of petitioner’s employees from leaving the plant. Id. at 794-795. When 6 the petitioner subsequently advertised for qualified mechanics, the respondent re-applied for his 7 job with petitioner, but was rejected. Id. at 796. The petitioner claimed that the rejection was 8 based on the respondent’s prior “stall in” and “lock in” demonstrations. Id. at 796-797. 9 The District Court found that the petitioner’s refusal to rehire the respondent was based on 10 the respondent’s participation in illegal demonstrations. McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792 at 794 at 797. 11 On appeal, the case was remanded as to the respondent’s claim that the petitioner refused to hire 12 him because of his race and civil rights activism. Id. at 797-798. The Supreme Court then granted 13 certiorari for the purpose of clarifying the standards governing an action challenging employment 14 discrimination. Id at 798. The Supreme Court concluded that, after a complainant in a Title VII 15 trial establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to 16 establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. at 802-803. The 17 Supreme Court then clarified that, on remand, the respondent must be afforded an opportunity to 18 show that petitioner's stated reason for its refusal to re-hire the respondent was pretext, and 19 “[e]specially relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts 20 against petitioner of comparable seriousness to the ‘stall-in’ were nevertheless retained or 21 rehired.” Id. at 804. 22 Thus, McDonnell does not address or even relate to the issue of whether a plaintiff in a 23 sexual harassment case brought under the Fair Employment and House Act may obtain “me too” 24 evidence of other complaints of sexual harassment, sex discrimination, or retaliation by other 25 employees of the same defendant employer through discovery, nor does it support Defendant’s 26 proposition that Plaintiff must establish that Defendant treated similarly situated employees more 27 favorably. Instead, the precise questions at issue in McDonnell relate to “the proper order and 28 -5- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 nature of proof” and the timing and “allocation of proof” at trial in discrimination actions under 2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. McDonnell, 411 U.S. 792, 793-794, 800-804. 3 Defendant’s use of McDonnell to support its argument that Plaintiff must show that 4 Defendant treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected category and in similar 5 circumstances more favorably than her is an improper attempt to mislead this Court into applying 6 a standard that simply does not apply under California law in these circumstances, and certainly 7 does not govern the determination of whether Plaintiff is entitled to the “me too” evidence sought 8 here. McDonnell is inapposite here and has no impact whatsoever on the determination as to 9 whether Plaintiff is entitled to “me too” evidence in discovery. 10 As a result, the remainder of Defendant’s analysis regarding what constitutes “similarly 11 situated” employees, and the cases to which Defendant cites to support its arguments for the 12 “similarly situated” standard and insistence on a narrow interpretation of “similarly situated” are 13 absolutely irrelevant here2. Moreover, the federal cases on which Defendant relies are not binding 14 on this Court, and they largely relate to factually and procedurally distinguishable discrimination 15 cases and therefore are not instructive in this case. 16 In addition, Defendant cites to McCoy v. Pacific Martime Assn. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 17 283, 288-89 for the contention that “sexual harassment complaints involving non-party employees 18 are only relevant if the individuals held a job similar to Plaintiff (i.e., a non-supervisory associate) 19 and were harassed for the same reasons as Plaintiff or bore the same characteristics as Plaintiff.” 20 Opposition, p. 5, lines 18-23. However, McCoy does not stand for this proposition. In another 21 attempt to mislead this Court into applying inapplicable standards, Defendant conveniently omits 22 the necessary context and fails to explain that the court in McCoy excluded “me too” evidence of 23 other instances of sexual harassment and race discrimination because the plaintiff’s sole remaining 24 2 For instance, Defendant cites to Guz v. Betchel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 369; McGrory v. 25 Applied Signal Tech (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1536; Josephs v. Pac. Bell (9th Cir. 2006) 443 F.3d 1050, 1065, relying on Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2004) 349 F.3d 634, 641; 26 Harris v. Winter (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) 2007 WL 2900168, at *16, aff'd sub nom. Harris v. Penn (9th Cir. 2009) 323 F. App'x 619; Guruwaya v. Montgomery Ward, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1988) 27 119 F.R.D. 36, 39; McKinney v. Am. Airlines (C.D. Cal. 2009) 641 F.Supp.2d 962, 974-75. See 28 Opposition, pp. 4-6. -6- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 cause of action at trial was retaliation, and the court thought the evidence of other instances of 2 sexual harassment and discrimination would be prejudicial to the extent it would confuse the jury 3 regarding the sole remaining retaliation claim at issue. McCoy, 216 Cal.App.4th 283 at 296. 4 Here, Plaintiff has alleged sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation, among 5 other claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s special interrogatories seeking information related to other 6 complaints of sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation are proper. As Defendant has 7 failed to provide any relevant, binding authority negating Plaintiff’s ability to obtain the requested 8 “me too” evidence, the Court should grant Plaintiff’s motion to compel. 9 D. Defendant’s Privacy Objection Should Not Prevent Plaintiff from Obtaining 10 the Relevant Evidence Sought Through Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32 11 Defendant argues that its privacy objection is proper, but fails to address the fact that its 12 purported privacy concerns can be alleviated by a protective order, which Plaintiff has already 13 offered to enter into. Defendant bears the burden of justifying its failure to respond to Special 14 Interrogatories Nos. 27-32, and of justifying its privacy objections, and has failed to do so. See 15 Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-2. The “me too” evidence at issue is directly 16 relevant, and discoverable. See Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children's Foundation 17 of Los Angeles and Ventura Counties (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 760. See also Beyda v. City of 18 Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511; Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 109-110. 19 Thus, Defendant’s privacy objections fails and Defendant must provide the requested “me too” 20 information. 21 E. Plaintiff Has Established Good Cause to Obtain the Requested Discovery 22 Despite Defendant’s contrary contentions regarding Pantoja and Johnson, neither Pantoja 23 nor Johnson contain any limitation whatsoever which would preclude Plaintiff from obtaining the 24 “me too” evidence sought as to other employees of Defendant during the relevant time period. 25 Further, both Pantoja and Johnson are instructive here. Pantoja stands for the proposition that 26 “me too” evidence, even if it occurred outside the plaintiff’s presence and at times other than when 27 plaintiff was employed, is both relevant and discoverable, and the failure to include such “me too” 28 evidence is prejudicial to the plaintiff. Pantoja, 198 Cal.App.4th at 92. Johnson supports the -7- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 proposition that “me too” evidence is admissible to show, among other things, discriminatory 2 animous. Johnson, 173 Cal.App.4th at 767. 3 Compliant responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 27-32 will help Plaintiff establish 4 whether Defendant changed any of its policies or practices related to sexual harassment, sex 5 discrimination, and retaliation, and whether Defendant was negligent in its hiring, supervision, 6 and/or retention of defendant Ayala. Additionally, evidence of other complaints of sexual 7 harassment by Defendant’s employees will establish that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work 8 environment during her employment with Defendant, and that Defendant failed to prevent or 9 correct the sexual harassment. Thus, Plaintiff has established good cause for the evidence sought. 10 In sum, Defendant failed to set forth any arguments which justify its refusal to provide 11 complete responses to the special interrogatories at issue here. In fact, it is unclear what 12 Defendant is even arguing. Defendant originally objected to the time period for which Plaintiff 13 sought the “me too” evidence (See Declaration of Olivia Green, ¶ 8, Exh. A), and Defendant now 14 seemingly concedes that Plaintiff is entitled to certain “me too” evidence, but asks the Court to 15 apply a “similarly situated” standard while providing no authority which would permit the Court 16 to do so in this case. As set forth above, Defendant’s arguments are irrelevant, Defendant’s cited 17 case law is inapposite, and Defendant’s objections do not justify its failure to provide complete 18 responses. 19 Accordingly, Defendant must provide complete responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 20 27-32. 21 III. CONCLUSION 22 Based on the foregoing argument and authority, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the 23 Court grant Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Compel Defendant to Provide Further Responses to 24 Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories Nos. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 (Set One) in its entirety. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// -8- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 DATED: May 9, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 2 MATERN LAW GROUP, PC 3 4 By: 5 MATTHEW J. MATERN DEANNA S. LEIFER 6 OLIVIA GREEN Attorneys for Plaintiff SANDRA GAETA 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -9- PLAINTIFF’S REPLY ISO RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years, and not a party to this action. My business address is 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 3 200, Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 4 On May 9, 2022, I served the following document or documents: 5 PLAINTIFF SANDRA GAETA’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO 6 COMPEL DEFENDANT JBBC, INC. TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE) 7 8 By e-mail or electronic transmission. I caused the documents to be sent to the person at the e-mail addresses listed below. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the 9 transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 10 11 Lyne A. Richardson, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant JBBC, INC. DBA Steven Mannix, Esq. THE BROKEN YOLK CAFE 12 lyne.richardson@ogletree.com steven.mannix@ogletree.com 13 carolina.martis@ogletreedeakins.com evelyn.coopwood@ogletree.com 14 OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. 15 19191 S. Vermont Avenue, Suite 950 Torrance, CA 90502 16 Telephone: (310) 217-8191 Facsimile: (310) 217-8184 17 18 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on May 9, 2022 at Manhattan Beach, California. 19 20 21 Yeshenia Zambrano 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Page 1 PROOF OF SERVICE