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SHAWN IBRAHIM, INC., MAHMOOD § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
AKHTAR, and MUHAMMAD AMIN §
vs. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
HOUSTON-GALVESTON AREA §
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION §
and SUNNYLAND DEVELOPMENT §
CORPORATION, §
. § 113
Defendant, Houston-Galveston Area Local Development Corporation (the “CDC”), files this
motion to stay further proceedings in this case
1. CDC is a “governmental unit” within the meaning of Section 101.001(3)(D) of the Tort
Claims Act, since it is an “institution, agency, or organ of government the status and authority of which
are derived from . . . laws passed by the legislature under the constitution.” T
§ 101.001(3)(D). The CDC derives its status and authority from an act of the Federal Legislature
– the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. §§ 695-697(f). CDC is closely affiliated with
H-GAC, a regional planning commission and clearly a governmental unit. T
Chap. 391. CDC has no employees of its own; all of its employees, including the CDC’s executive
director, are employees of H-GAC, paid by H-GAC, and carrying out H-GAC’s governmental purpose
of advancing the economy of the 13-county Houston-Galveston metropolitan area. Steele Declar, at ¶
alternatively, motion for summary judgment). CDC’s directors are all appointed by the H-GAC board
and can be removed by H-GAC’s board at will. Steele Declar., at ¶ 3 & CDC Articles of Incorporation,
Bylaws. The SBA has expressly authorized CDCs to operate in “affiliation” with local councils of
government, such as H-GAC.
2. Plaintiffs filed this suit more than one year ago, on June 12, 2016, asserting claims against
CDC for breach of contract, promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance, and fraud.
3. On November 4, 2016, CDC filed a plea to the jurisdiction/motion for summary judgment.
Defendant requested and the Court set a hearing date on the motion for December 9, 2016. CDC’s
motion was based, in part, on governmental immunity from suit and lack of standing – both
4. On November 29, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a first amended petition which asserts the same
three claims against the CDC – breach of contract, promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance, and fraud,
and adds an alternative claim for negligent misrepresentation. The amended petition added a new party.
In the amended petition, Plaintiffs have also asserted a suit for a declaratory judgment seeking
5. On December 1, 2016, two days after Plaintiffs amended their petition, CDC filed a
supplement to their plea to the jurisdiction/MSJ.
6. The Court heard the CDC’s plea to the jurisdiction/MSJ on December 9, 2016. The Court
took the plea/MSJ under advisement. A ruling is still pending.
7. On June 14, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed notice of a hearing on their own, presumably to-be-
filed motion for summary judgment.
II. Argument.
8. The CDC’s plea/motion raises jurisdictional arguments, some of which implicate
constitutional subject matter jurisdiction, and others immunity from suit. As the Supreme Court has
noted, “[t]he jurisdictional determination should be made as soon as practicable because a court should
not proceed with a case over which it has no jurisdiction.” See Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson
see Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000) (“a
court must not act without determining that it has subject-matter jurisdiction to do so”).
9. CDC’s jurisdictional challenge has been pending for seven months. CDC understands that
the Court has a busy docket and may not have had ample time to consider the issues raised; however,
10. Immunity from suit implicates a substantive right not to stand trial. If the Court were to
deny CDC’s plea to the jurisdiction, such a ruling is subject to the right of an interlocutory appeal,
which automatically stays the commencement of a tr ngs in the trial court
pending resolution of the appeal. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(b). A trial court’s refusal
to rule on immunity while permitting merits-based proceedings can thus be challenged by mandamus.
City of Galveston v. Gray, 93 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied)
(there is no adequate remedy at law because the city and the county will not be able to avail themselves
11. “A summary judgment hearing is a trial for purposes of rule 63.” Mensa-Wilmot v. Smith
Int'l, Inc., 312 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). Thus, for the Court to
entertain a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in advance of a ruling on CDC’s
jurisdictional challenge would improperly deprive CDC of its appellate right to challenge the Court’s
Accordingly, Defendant CDC requests the Court to stay all proceedings in this case until CDC’s
subject-matter jurisdictional challenges, which were heard on December 9, 2016, have been ruled upon
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/
Ramón G. Viada
Email:
I certify that on June 14, 2017, I conferred with counsel for Plaintiffs, and he is opposed to this
relief sought herein. I also emailed Mr. Yardas, counsel for the co-Defendant, who has not yet
responded to my question whether his client is or is not opposed.
Ramon G. Viada III
I certify that all counsel of record have been served a copy of the foregoing by electronic
submission for filing and service through the Texas Online EFiling for Courts and/or an approved
Ramon G. Viada III
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SHAWN IBRAHIM, INC., MAHMOOD § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF AKHTAR, and MUHAMMAD AMIN § vs. § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS HOUSTON-GALVESTON AREA § LOCAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION § and SUNNYLAND DEVELOPMENT § CORPORATION, § . § 113 Defendant, Houston-Galveston Area Local Development Corporation (the “CDC”), files this motion to stay further proceedings in this case 1. CDC is a “governmental unit” within the meaning of Section 101.001(3)(D) of the Tort Claims Act, since it is an “institution, agency, or organ of government the status and authority of which are derived from . . . laws passed by the legislature under the constitution.” T § 101.001(3)(D). The CDC derives its status and authority from an act of the Federal Legislature – the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. §§ 695-697(f). CDC is closely affiliated with H-GAC, a regional planning commission and clearly a governmental unit. T Chap. 391. CDC has no employees of its own; all of its employees, including the CDC’s executive director, are employees of H-GAC, paid by H-GAC, and carrying out H-GAC’s governmental purpose of advancing the economy of the 13-county Houston-Galveston metropolitan area. Steele Declar, at ¶ alternatively, motion for summary judgment). CDC’s directors are all appointed by the H-GAC board and can be removed by H-GAC’s board at will. Steele Declar., at ¶ 3 & CDC Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws. The SBA has expressly authorized CDCs to operate in “affiliation” with local councils of government, such as H-GAC. 2. Plaintiffs filed this suit more than one year ago, on June 12, 2016, asserting claims against CDC for breach of contract, promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance, and fraud. 3. On November 4, 2016, CDC filed a plea to the jurisdiction/motion for summary judgment. Defendant requested and the Court set a hearing date on the motion for December 9, 2016. CDC’s motion was based, in part, on governmental immunity from suit and lack of standing – both 4. On November 29, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a first amended petition which asserts the same three claims against the CDC – breach of contract, promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance, and fraud, and adds an alternative claim for negligent misrepresentation. The amended petition added a new party. In the amended petition, Plaintiffs have also asserted a suit for a declaratory judgment seeking 5. On December 1, 2016, two days after Plaintiffs amended their petition, CDC filed a supplement to their plea to the jurisdiction/MSJ. 6. The Court heard the CDC’s plea to the jurisdiction/MSJ on December 9, 2016. The Court took the plea/MSJ under advisement. A ruling is still pending. 7. On June 14, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed notice of a hearing on their own, presumably to-be- filed motion for summary judgment. II. Argument. 8. The CDC’s plea/motion raises jurisdictional arguments, some of which implicate constitutional subject matter jurisdiction, and others immunity from suit. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he jurisdictional determination should be made as soon as practicable because a court should not proceed with a case over which it has no jurisdiction.” See Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson see Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000) (“a court must not act without determining that it has subject-matter jurisdiction to do so”). 9. CDC’s jurisdictional challenge has been pending for seven months. CDC understands that the Court has a busy docket and may not have had ample time to consider the issues raised; however, 10. Immunity from suit implicates a substantive right not to stand trial. If the Court were to deny CDC’s plea to the jurisdiction, such a ruling is subject to the right of an interlocutory appeal, which automatically stays the commencement of a tr ngs in the trial court pending resolution of the appeal. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(b). A trial court’s refusal to rule on immunity while permitting merits-based proceedings can thus be challenged by mandamus. City of Galveston v. Gray, 93 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (there is no adequate remedy at law because the city and the county will not be able to avail themselves 11. “A summary judgment hearing is a trial for purposes of rule 63.” Mensa-Wilmot v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 312 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). Thus, for the Court to entertain a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in advance of a ruling on CDC’s jurisdictional challenge would improperly deprive CDC of its appellate right to challenge the Court’s Accordingly, Defendant CDC requests the Court to stay all proceedings in this case until CDC’s subject-matter jurisdictional challenges, which were heard on December 9, 2016, have been ruled upon Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Ramón G. Viada Email: I certify that on June 14, 2017, I conferred with counsel for Plaintiffs, and he is opposed to this relief sought herein. I also emailed Mr. Yardas, counsel for the co-Defendant, who has not yet responded to my question whether his client is or is not opposed. Ramon G. Viada III I certify that all counsel of record have been served a copy of the foregoing by electronic submission for filing and service through the Texas Online EFiling for Courts and/or an approved Ramon G. Viada III