Legal Document: GAETA VS AYALA

On June 15, 2021 a 57101Defen02303b was filed involving a dispute between Gaeta, Sandra, Sandra Gaeta, and Abraham Ayala, Ayala, Abraham, Jbbc, Inc., Jim Bailey, for 15-CV Other Employment - Civil Unlimited in the District Court of Kern County.

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1 Lyne A. Richardson, CA Bar No. 143566
lyne.richardson@ogletree.com
2 Steven Mannix, CA Bar No. 272014
steven.mannix@ogletree.com
steven.marmix@ogletree.com
3 OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C.
4 19191 S. Vermont Avenue, Suite 950
Torrance, CA 90502
5 Telephone: 310-217-8191
Facsimile: 310-217-8184
6
Attorneys for Defendant
7 JBBC, INC., d/b/a THE BROKEN YOLK CAFE
8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9 FOR THE COUNTY OF KERN

11 SANDRA GAETA, an individual, Case No. BCV-21-101362 TSC

12 Plaintiff, [Assignedfor for all purposes
purposes to The Honorable
Thomas S. Clark, Dept. 17]
13 vs.
VS.

14 JBBC, INC., d/b/a THE BROKEN YOLK DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S
CAFE, a California corporation; ABRAHAM PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT
PLAINTIFF'S
15 AYALA, an individual; and DOES 1 through 50, IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
PLAINTIFF’S
inclusive, RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL
16 DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES
DEFENDANT'S
Defendants. PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL
TO PLAINTIFF'S
17 INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE

18
Date: May 16, 2022
19 Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: 17
20

21 Action Filed: June 15, 2021
Trial Date: September 26, 2022
22

28 1
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
DEAKINS,
OGLETREE,
NASH, SMOAK
NASH,SMOAK &
& DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT'S PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
STEWART, P.C.
P.C.
STEWART,
PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S
PLAINTIFF'S DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S PLAINTIFF’S
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE
1 Defendant JBBC, INC., d/b/a THE BROKEN YOLK CAFE ("Defendant") (“Defendant”) hereby
2 responds to Plaintiff Sandra Gaeta's
Gaeta’s ("Plaintiff')
(“Plaintiff”) Separate Statement in support of Plaintiff's
Plaintiff’s

3 Motion to Compel Defendant JBBC, Inc. ("Defendant")
(“Defendant”) to Provide Further Responses to Plaintiff'sPlaintiff’s
4 Special Interrogatories Nos. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32.
5 SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 27:

6 DESCRIBE in detail all complaints of alleged sexual harassment or discrimination made by

7 any employee of DEFENDANT, other than PLAINTIFF, at any of YOUR locations in California

8 at any time from January 1, 2018 to the present.
9 RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 27:

10 Defendant hereby incorporates the preliminary statement set forth above. Defendant further
11 objects because this request: (1) is vague and ambiguous; (2) is overbroad; (3) calls for information
12 that is neither relevant, nor reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence; (4) calls for
13 information that is proprietary and/or confidential; (5) calls for information that is protected by the

14 right to privacy; (6) calls for information that is protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the
15 attorney work product doctrine; and (7) calls for a legal conclusion.
16 Subject to and without waiving said objections, Defendant responds as follows:
17 Plaintiff’s email that alleges harassment.
None prior to Plaintiff's

18 LEGAL AND FACTUAL ARGUMENT FOR COMPELLING A FURTHER RESPONSE

19 TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 27:
20 Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300(a)(1) and (3), "[o]n “[o]n receipt of a response to
21 interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the
22 propounding party deems that...that...[a]n
[a]n answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or

23 incomplete...[or] [a]n objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” general." Code Civ.
24 Proc. § 2030.300(a)(1) and (3).
25 Defendant’s attempt to limit its responses to this interrogatory to the date on which Plaintiff
Defendant's
26 sent an email alleging sexual harassment is completely arbitrary and intentionally evasive, and
27 Defendant’s objections do not provide a proper basis for Defendant's
Defendant's Defendant’s refusal to provide a complete
28 2
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
DEAKINS,
OGLETREE, DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT'S PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
NASH, SMOAK
NASH,SMOAK &
&
STEWART, P.C.
P.C.
STEWART, PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S
PLAINTIFF'S DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S PLAINTIFF’S
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE
1 substantive response from January 1, 2018 to the present. The right to discovery is broad, and
2 “[d]oubts as to whether particular matters will aid in a party's
"[d]oubts party’s preparation for trial should

3 generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery[.]"
discovery[.]” Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Superior
4 Court (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 1, 9-11. 9–11. A party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
5 privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved. Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010. Any
6 “might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or
information that "might
7 facilitating settlement"
settlement” falls within the definition of permissible discovery. Lipton v. Superior
8 Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611. Further, discovery rules are applied liberally in favor of
9 discovery, and all doubts about discovery are resolved in favor of disclosure. Glenfed Dev. Corp. v.

10 Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119.
11 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that, as a
Here, the information sought is highly relevant. Plaintiff's

12 Defendant’s unlawful acts and omissions, Plaintiff was sexually harassed, discriminated
result of Defendant's

13 against on the basis of her sex, and retaliated against, among other things. Plaintiff further alleges
14 that Defendant failed to prevent such sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, and

15 Defendant was negligent in the hiring, retention, and supervision of its employee, defendant

16 Abraham Ayala, who sexually harassed Plaintiff. Thus, this interrogatory, which seeks information

17 related to other complaints of sexual harassment or sex discrimination, is directly related to

18 whether Defendant changed any of its policies or practices related to sexual harassment and sex

19 discrimination.

20 A complete response to this interrogatory will also evidence whether Defendant received
21 any other complaints of sexual harassment against the same sexual harasser, which is directly
22 Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant was negligent in its hiring, supervision, and retention of
related to Plaintiff's

23 defendant Ayala. "Me “Me too"
too” evidence, even if it occurred outside the plaintiffs
plaintiff’s presence and at time
24 other than when plaintiff was employed, is relevant and discoverable. Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198

25 Cal.App.4th 87, 92. Moreover, Plaintiff has alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work

26 environment during her employment with Defendant, and that Defendant failed to prevent or

27 correct the sexual harassment. Evidence of other complaints of sexual harassment by Defendant's Defendant’s
28 3
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
DEAKINS,
OGLETREE, DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT'S PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
NASH, SMOAK
NASH,SMOAK &
&
STEWART, P.C.
P.C.
STEWART, PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S
PLAINTIFF'S DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S PLAINTIFF’S
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE
1 employees are directly relevant to these allegations. Plaintiff could reasonably request this
2 information from the beginning of Plaintiff's
Plaintiff’s employment in August 2016 to the present.
3 Nonetheless, Plaintiff limited this request to the time period of January 1, 2018 to the present. As
4 such, Defendant must provide a complete response.
5 “me-too” evidence requested is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead
Furthermore, the "me-too"
6 to the discovery of admissible evidence. Courts have consistently have held that evidence of
7 discrimination against other employees is admissible to show intent or motive, "for “for the purpose of
8 casting doubt on an employer's stated reason for an adverse employment action, and thereby
9 creating a triable issue of material fact a as to whether the stated reason was merely a pretext and

10 the actual reason was wrongful under employment law." law.” See Johnson v. United Cerebral
11 Palsy/Spastic Children's Foundation of of Los Angeles and Ventura
Ventura Counties (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
12 740, 760. See also Beyda v. City of of Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511; Pantoja v. Anton
13 (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 109-110 ("me-too" (“me-too” evidence of harassment by a Defendant against
14 third parties is admissible to show discriminatory intent or bias). As such, Plaintiff is entitled to

15 Defendant’s objection that this interrogatory is
such information through the present date, and Defendant's

16 overbroad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is

17 meritless and does not justify its failure to provide this information.

18 The burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond to interrogatories remains at
19 all times with the party resisting the interrogatory. Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Ca1.2d Cal.2d 210,
20 Defendant’s remaining objections to this interrogatory are all baseless. Defendant objects
220-2. Defendant's

21 that this interrogatory is vague and ambiguous. However, Defendant has failed to explain how this
22 interrogatory is either vague or ambiguous in any respect. See Code Civ. Proc. 2031.240(b)(2).

23 Indeed, this interrogatory was not so vague and ambiguous to preclude Defendant from providing
24 responses for the more limited time period. Further, such objections are generally disfavored and

25 are not upheld unless the request is entirely unintelligible, which Plaintiff's
Plaintiff’s interrogatory is clearly
26 not. Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 783. Even where a request is ambiguous, if

27 “the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate
"the

28 4
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
DEAKINS,
OGLETREE, DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT'S PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
NASH, SMOAK
NASH,SMOAK &
&
STEWART, P.C.
P.C.
STEWART, PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S
PLAINTIFF'S DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S PLAINTIFF’S
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE
1 response.” Id.
response."
2 Defendant’s objections based on privilege are similarly baseless. The attorney-client
Defendant's

3 privilege applies only where the communication between attorney and client is confidential and
4 made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. See Costco Wholesale Wholesale Corp. v. Super. Ct., 47 Cal.
5 4th 725, 732-33 (2009); see also Cal. Evid. Code § 954 et seq. Such privileged communications are
6 Plaintiff’s discovery request. As to work product, the protection only applies
not implicated by Plaintiffs
7 attorney’s tactics, impressions, or evaluation of the case or
when the disclosure would reveal the attorney's
8 would result in opposing counsel taking undue advantage of the attorney's attorney’s industry or efforts.
9 Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal. 4th 480, 486. This interrogatory does not seek any
10 information related to any communications between anyone and their attorney, nor does it seek any
11 attorney tactics, impressions, or evaluations. Rather, it seeks information related to complaints
12 Defendant’s employees to Defendant. Again, there did not seem to be any attorney-client
made by Defendant's
13 privilege implicated in Defendant's
Defendant’s response for the more limited time period.
14 Likewise, Defendant's
Defendant’s purported privacy and confidentiality objections are meritless. The
15 “protects the individual’s
right of privacy only "protects individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious
16 invasion.” Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Sup.
invasion." Ct. (Olmstead) (2007) 40 Cal.App.4th
Sup.Ct. th
360, 370.
17 Additionally, as stated above, "me “me too"
too” evidence, even if it occurred outside the plaintiffs
plaintiff’s
18 presence and at time other than when plaintiff was employed, is relevant and discoverable.
19 Pantoja, 198 Cal.App.4th at 92. Moreover, any privacy or confidentiality concerns can be easily
20 remedied through the use of a protective order, which Plaintiff is willing to immediately enter into.
21 Lastly, Defendant's
Defendant’s objection that this interrogatory call for a legal conclusion is entirely
22 unpersuasive. Even if the interrogatory called for a legal conclusion, that would not absolve
23 Defendant of the requirement to provide complete responses. See Rifkind v. Superior Court (1994)
24 22 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1263 (even though legal contention questions are not proper during

25 “entirely appropriate"
depositions of a represented party, they are "entirely appropriate” for written discovery). More
26 importantly, the interrogatory simply does not call for a legal conclusion. It asks whether other

27 employees of Defendant complained that they experienced sexual harassment or sex
28 5
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
DEAKINS,
OGLETREE, DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT'S PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
NASH, SMOAK
NASH,SMOAK &
&
STEWART, P.C.
P.C.
STEWART, PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S
PLAINTIFF'S DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S PLAINTIFF’S
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE
1 discrimination. Responding to this interrogatory does not require a legal conclusion. This is a
2 factual inquiry. And, as mentioned above, this objection did not render Defendant unable to

3 respond to this interrogatory for the time period of January 1, 2018 to March 30, 2021. Thus, there
4 is no reason why it should prevent Defendant from providing a response up until the present.
5 Defendant’s response is evasive and incomplete, and its boilerplate objections are
As such, Defendant's
6 without merit and do not justify its failure to provide a complete response.
7 LEGAL AND FACTUAL ARGUMENT FOR NOT NOT COMPELLING A FURTHER
8 RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 27:
9 This request is overbroad and calls for information that is neither relevant, nor reasonably
10 calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Plaintiff alleges that she was constructively terminated
11 on March 30, 2021, yet she seeks information of "...all “…all complaints of alleged sexual harassment or
12 discrimination made by any employee of DEFENDANT, other than PLAINTIFF, at any of YOUR

13 locations in California at any time from January 1, 2018 to the present." present.” To date, that means
14 Plaintiff is requesting information related to other claims of harassment, retaliation, and

15 discrimination for almost a year past the last day she worked for Defendant. Further, with a trial
16 set for September 2022 and the inevitable request to supplement discovery responses that will

17 come prior to trial, Plaintiff is claiming that she is entitled to information related to events that

18 potentially occurred more than a year after she stopped working for Defendant.

19 To establish discrimination through comparative evidence (also known as "me “me too"
too”
20 evidence), Plaintiff must establish that Defendant treated similarly situated employees outside of
21 her protected category, in similar circumstances, more favorably than her. (See McDonnell
22 Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 804.) The Ninth Circuit and California courts have
23 set forth clear guidelines in explaining what constitutes similarly situated employees.
24 “[I]ndividuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct."
"[I]ndividuals conduct.”
25 (Josephs v. Pac. Bell (9th Cir. 2006) 443 F.3d 1050, 1065 [emphasis added] [relying on Vasquez Vasquez v.
26 County ofof Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2004) 349 F.3d 634, 641]; see also Guz v. Betchel Nat. Inc. (2000)
27 Cal.4th 317, 369.)
24 Ca1.4th The similarly situated requirement is "necessarily
“necessarily strict"
strict” (Harris v. Winter
Winter
28 6
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
DEAKINS,
OGLETREE, DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT'S PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
NASH, SMOAK
NASH,SMOAK &
&
STEWART, P.C.
P.C.
STEWART, PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S
PLAINTIFF'S DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S PLAINTIFF’S
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE
1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) 2007 WL 2900168, at *16, ard aff'd sub nom. Harris v. Penn (9th Cir. 2009)
2 323 F. App'x 619.) “No inference of discrimination reasonably arises when an employer has
"No
3 treated differently different kinds of misconduct by employees holding different positions." positions.”
4 (McGrory v. Applied Signal Tech. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1536.)
5 In assessing the requirement that comparators have similar jobs, the Ninth Circuit has held
6 that employees in supervisory or managerial positions are not similarly situated to lower level non-
7 supervisory employees. (Vasquez, supra, 349 F.3d at 641-42; Harris, supra, 2007 WL 2900168, at
8 [“Supervisory and lower level jobs are not similar"].)
*16 ["Supervisory similar”].) With respect to the requirement that
9 comparators display similar conduct, the Court of Appeal has made clear that "[d]ifferent “[d]ifferent types and
10 degrees of misconduct may warrant different types and degrees of discipline." discipline.” (McGrory, supra,
11 212 Cal.App.4th at 1536.) The Ninth Circuit concurs; for employees to be similarly situated, the
12 “comparable seriousness."
problematic conduct must be of "comparable seriousness.” (Vasquez, supra, 349 F.3d at 641.)
13 The authority supports a narrow interpretation of "similarly
“similarly situated."
situated.” For example, courts
14 have held that:
15 • A supervisory, level two probation officer with "greater “greater responsibility”
responsibility" was not
16 similarly situated to a level one probation officer (Vasquez, supra, 349 F.3d at 641-42);
17 • An employee was not similarly situated to two of his subordinate employees (McGrory,
18 supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 1535);

19 • An employee was not entitled to contact information of employees outside of the

20 plaintiff’s region who filed similar complaints of discrimination (Guruwaya v.
plaintiff's

21 Montgomery Ward, Ward, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1988) 119 F.R.D. 36, 39;
22 • Employees terminated for not disciplining their subordinates found sleeping on the job
23 did not engage in "similar
“similar conduct”
conduct" to employees terminated for not working their full
24 shift (McKinney v. Am. Airlines (C.D. Cal. 2009) 641 F.Supp.2d 962, 974-75);

25 • Where two employees participated in a football game in contravention of company
26 policy, the comparator "did “did not engage in problematic conduct of comparable
27 seriousness” to plaintiff because he did not disobey a direct order from supervisor
seriousness"
28 7
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
DEAKINS,
OGLETREE, DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT'S PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
NASH, SMOAK
NASH,SMOAK &
&
STEWART, P.C.
P.C.
STEWART, PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S
PLAINTIFF'S DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S PLAINTIFF’S
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE
1 (Vasquez, supra, 349 F.3d at 641-42)
2 These cases contain important lessons in setting the parameters for who are similarly
3 situated employees. The sexual harassment complaints involving non-party employees are only
4 relevant if the individuals held a job similar to Plaintiff (i.e., a non-supervisory associate) and were

5 harassed for the same reasons as Plaintiff or bore the same characteristics as Plaintiff. (McCoy v.
6 Cal.App.4th 283, 288-89 [Me too evidence of retaliation is only
Pacific Martime Assn., (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
7 admissible where factual scenarios are "sufficiently
“sufficiently similar"
similar” to those presented by Plaintiff].)
8 Further, Plaintiff broadly relies on Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 114 and

9 Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children's Foundation of of Los Angeles and Ventura
Ventura

10 Counties (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 759. Plaintiff’s reliance on these cases is misplaced.
Plaintiffs In
11 “me too"
Pantoja, the "me too” evidence that the court held was admissible was evidence of Defendant
12 Anton’s acts of sexual harassment and discrimination against other employees.
Anton's Nothing in Pantoja

13 suggests that all employees or alleged perpetrators—without regard for their position or protected
14 class—would be appropriate comparators. Johnson is also not instructive. The court only allowed
15 declarations as to employees who were not only similarly situated, but who had been discriminated

16 against on the same basis as Plaintiff (pregnancy discrimination). (Johnson, supra, 173

17 Cal.App.4th at 759 ["These
[“These employees worked at the same facility where plaintiff worked, they
18 were supervised by the same people that supervised plaintiff (Jimenez and Sandgren), and their

19 supervisors were, in turn, supervised by Jones.”].)
Jones."].)

20 Here, Plaintiff is seeking information related any complaint of sexual harassment,

21 retaliation, or discrimination made by any employee from January 1, 2018 to the present. This
22 does nothing to take into account individuals that are similarly situated in job title, protected

23 category, and/or temporal proximity. Defendant offered to respond to these Requests if the time
24 frame was narrowed to January 1, 2018 to March 30, 2021 (the date in which Plaintiff claims she
25 was constructively terminated) but Plaintiff refused to narrow her Requests. Because Plaintiff has

26 not sought evidence regarding similarly situated employees, and rather sought information

27 regarding all employees at Defendant for an unreasonable time frame, her motion to compel must

28 8
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
DEAKINS,
OGLETREE, DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT'S PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
NASH, SMOAK
NASH,SMOAK &
&
STEWART, P.C.
P.C.
STEWART, PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S
PLAINTIFF'S DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S PLAINTIFF’S
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE
1 be denied.
2 SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 28:

3 DESCRIBE in detail all complaints of retaliation made by any employee of DEFENDANT,

4 other than PLAINTIFF, at any of YOUR locations in California at any time from January 1, 2018

5 to the present.
6 RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 28:

7 Defendant hereby incorporates the preliminary statement set forth above. Defendant further
8 objects because this request: (1) is vague and ambiguous; (2) is overbroad; (3) calls for information
9 that is neither relevant, nor reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence; (4) calls for

10 information that is proprietary and/or confidential; (5) calls for information that is protected by the

11 right to privacy; (6) calls for information that is protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the
12 attorney work product doctrine; and (7) calls for a legal conclusion.
13 Subject to and without waiving said objections, Defendant responds as follows:
14 Plaintiff’s email that alleges harassment.
None prior to Plaintiff's

15 LEGAL AND FACTUAL ARGUMENT FOR COMPELLING A FURTHER RESPONSE

16 TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 28:
17 Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300(a)(1) and (3), "[o]n “[o]n receipt of a response to
18 interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the

19 propounding party deems that...that...[a]n
[a]n answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or

20 incomplete...[or] [a]n objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” general." Code Civ.
21 Proc. § 2030.300(a)(1) and (3).
22 Defendant’s attempt to limit its responses to this interrogatory to the date on which Plaintiff
Defendant's
23 sent an email alleging sexual harassment is completely arbitrary and intentionally evasive, and
24 Defendant’s objections do not provide a proper basis for Defendant's
Defendant's Defendant’s refusal to provide a complete
25 substantive response from January 1, 2018 to the present. The right to discovery is broad, and

26 “[d]oubts as to whether particular matters will aid in a party's
"[d]oubts party’s preparation for trial should generally
27 be resolved in favor of permitting discovery[.]”
discovery[.]" Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court

28 9
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
DEAKINS,
OGLETREE, DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT'S PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
NASH, SMOAK
NASH,SMOAK &
&
STEWART, P.C.
P.C.
STEWART, PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S
PLAINTIFF'S DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S PLAINTIFF’S
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE
1 (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 1, 9-11. 9–11. A party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
2 that is relevant to the subject matter involved. Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010. Any information that
3 “might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating
"might
4 settlement” falls within the definition of permissible discovery. Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48
settlement"

5 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611. Further, discovery rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery, and all
6 doubts about discovery are resolved in favor of disclosure. Glenfed Dev. Corp. v. Superior Court
7 (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119.
8 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that, as a
Here, the information sought is highly relevant. Plaintiff's

9 Defendant’s unlawful acts and omissions, Plaintiff was sexually harassed, discriminated
result of Defendant's

10 against on the basis of her sex, and retaliated against, among other things. Plaintiff further alleges
11 that Defendant failed to prevent such sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, and
12 Defendant was negligent in the hiring, retention, and supervision of its employee, defendant

13 Abraham Ayala, who sexually harassed Plaintiff. Thus, this interrogatory, which seeks information
14 related to other complaints of retaliation, is directly related to whether Defendant changed any of

15 its policies or practices related to retaliation.

16 “Me too"
"Me too” evidence, even if it occurred outside the plaintiff's
plaintiff’s presence and at time other than
17 when plaintiff was employed, is relevant and discoverable. Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198

18 Cal.App.4th 87, 92. Moreover, Plaintiff has alleged Defendant failed to prevent or correct the

19 retaliation. Evidence of other complaints of retaliation by Defendant's
Defendant’s employees are directly
20 relevant to these allegations. Plaintiff could reasonably request this information from the beginning
21 Plaintiff’s employment in August 2016 to the present. Nonetheless, Plaintiff limited this request
of Plaintiff's

22 to the time period of January 1, 2018 to the present. As such, Defendant must provide a complete

23 response.
24 “me-too” evidence requested is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead
Furthermore, the "me-too"

25 to the discovery of admissible evidence. Courts have consistently have held that evidence of

26 discrimination against other employees is admissible to show intent or motive, "for “for the purpose of
27 casting doubt on an employer's stated reason for an adverse employment action, and thereby

28 10
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
DEAKINS,
OGLETREE, DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT'S PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
NASH, SMOAK
NASH,SMOAK &
&
STEWART, P.C.
P.C.
STEWART, PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S
PLAINTIFF'S DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S PLAINTIFF’S
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE
1 creating a triable issue of material fact a as to whether the stated reason was merely a pretext and
2 the actual reason was wrongful under employment law." law.” See Johnson v. United Cerebral

3 Palsy/Spastic Children's Foundation of of Los Angeles and Ventura
Ventura Counties (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
4 740, 760. See also Beyda v. City of of Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511; Pantoja v. Anton
5 (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 109-110 ("me-too" (“me-too” evidence of harassment by a Defendant against
6 third parties is admissible to show discriminatory intent or bias). As such, Plaintiff is entitled to
7 Defendant’s objection that this interrogatory is
such information through the present date, and Defendant's
8 overbroad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is
9 meritless and does not justify its failure to provide this information.

10 The burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond to interrogatories remains at
11 all times with the party resisting the interrogatory. Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Ca1.2d Cal.2d 210,
12 Defendant’s remaining objections to this interrogatory are all baseless. Defendant objects
220-2. Defendant's

13 that this interrogatory is vague and ambiguous. However, Defendant has failed to explain how this
14 interrogatory is either vague or ambiguous in any respect. See Code Civ. Proc. 2031.240(b)(2).

15 Indeed, this interrogatory was not so vague and ambiguous to preclude Defendant from providing
16 responses for the more limited time period. Further, such objections are generally disfavored and

17 are not upheld unless the request is entirely unintelligible, which Plaintiff's
Plaintiff’s interrogatory is clearly
18 not. Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 783. Even where a request is ambiguous, if

19 “the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate
"the

20 response.” Id.
response."
21 Defendant’s objections based on privilege are similarly baseless. The attorney-client
Defendant's
22 privilege applies only where the communication between attorney and client is confidential and

23 made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. See Costco Wholesale Wholesale Corp. v. Super. Ct., 47 Cal.
24 4th 725, 732-33 (2009); see also Cal. Evid. Code § 954 et seq. Such privileged communications are

25 Plaintiff’s discovery request. As to work product, the protection only applies
not implicated by Plaintiff's

26 attorney’s tactics, impressions, or evaluation of the case or
when the disclosure would reveal the attorney's

27 would result in opposing counsel taking undue advantage of the attorney's attorney’s industry or efforts.
28 11
OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
DEAKINS,
OGLETREE, DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
DEFENDANT'S PLAINTIFF’S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF
NASH, SMOAK
NASH,SMOAK &
&
STEWART, P.C.
P.C.
STEWART, PLAINTIFF’S RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT'S
PLAINTIFF'S DEFENDANT’S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S PL

Case Info

Judge

Clark, Thomas S. Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

May 03, 2022

Case Filing Date

June 15, 2021

County

Parties

ABRAHAM AYALA Defendant
AYALA, ABRAHAM Defendant
GAETA, SANDRA Plaintiff
JBBC, INC. Defendant
JBBC, INC. Defendant
JIM BAILEY Defendant
LEIFER, DEANNA S. Attorney for the Plaintiff
LEIFER, DEANNA S. Attorney for the Plaintiff
RICHARDSON, LYNE A Attorney for the Defendant
SANDRA GAETA Plaintiff
Olivia Green Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Steven Mannix Attorneys for Defendants
Matthew Mesnik Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Document for GAETA VS AYALA

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