Preview
FILED
SAN MATEO COUNTY
Alison Madden, Jn Pro Per
PO Box 620650 DEC 3 § 2021
Woodside, CA 94062 0 ste Court
maddenproper@gmail.com
Phone: 650.270.0066; No Fax DEPUTY CLERK
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
SOUTHERN BRANCH - REDWOOD CITY
10
CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, UD Action case #: 13UDL00816
Il Direct-Set to Dept. 2, Weiner, J.
12
Plaintiff, Civil Unlimited Case No.: 17CIV005387
13 Assigned for all purposes to Dept. 2, Weiner, J.
14
UD DEFENDANT (AND PETITIONER-
15
ALISON MADDEN, INTERVENOR IN CRAL ACTION) MADDEN’S
16 OTICES OF MOTION(S) AND MOTION(S):
['O STRIKE (OBJECTION TO) CITY’S NOTICE
17 Defendant. OF ORDERS; AND/OR, IN ALTERNATIVE, TO
STRIKE COMPLAINT W/PREJUDICE FOR
18 COMMENCING UD BEFORE ADOPTING
CRAL PLAN AND NON-PLEADING OF
19 MANDATORY VENUE; OR, IN
20 FAMBROUGH, et al., ALTERNATIVE, TO CONSOLIDATE UD WITH
CRAL AND/OR TO STAY UD WITH OR
21 WITHOUT CONSOLIDATION UNTIL POST-
Plaintiffs/Petitioner-Intervenors,
CRAL TRIAL DECISION RENDERED;
REQUEST TO CONFIRM POST-CRAL TRIAL
DECISION DATE-FEB. 18, 2022 (“COMBINED
MOTION”); MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
24 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS;
REDWOOD CITY, MADDEN DEC. IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS &
25 RULE 9.20 ADVI. NTS
26 Defendant. Date/Time: |, 22Z,
Dept.: 2 p.m.
27 Action(s) Filed: 9/4/18 (UD) 11/27/17 (CRAL)
Trial Date: Jury demanded, UDL
28 mm
m
1295350v1 TSUDL00816 RWC y. Madden; 17C1V05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
fo
NOTICE OF MOTION(S) AND MOTION(S)
To UD Complainant/Plaintiff & CRAL-Defendant Redwood City (“City”):
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on ,202_, at__ p.m., or as soon thereafter
as the matters may be heard, in Dept. 2 of the above-captioned Court, at 400 County Center (Hall of
Justice), Redwood City, Califoriia 94063, UD Defendant & CRAL Plaintiff-Intervenor Madden (“P-
I Madden”) will move the Court, Dept. 2, for Order(s) seeking the relieffprocedures set forth below.
This/these combined motions (“Combined Motion”) are based on the reasons below, along-
side each Motion. The Combined, and each, Motion thereof, are supported by this Notice of Motion
10 and Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed herewith, the Declaration of Alison
11 Madden filed herewith (“Madden Dec.”), and such other documentary and oral evidence as may be
12 accepted at hearing on the Motion(s), and such matters as may be judicially noticed by the Court.
13
Bases: this Combined Motion seeks, and the separate Motion(s) are:
14
(A) to Strike City’s recently-filed “Notice of Orders and Resumption of Trial Court Unlaw-
15
ful Detainer Proceedings”, filed in Redwood City v. Madden (Case #18UDL 00316) (Superior Court,
16
17 San Mateo) (“Objection” and “MTS”), as Madden is not remitted, among other reasons; and/or
18 (B) in the alternative, Strike the Complaint with Prejudice for lack of mandatory venue
19 pleading and commencing UD prior to adopting CRAL Plan, as required by law (“MTS”); or
20
(C) in the alternative, Consolidate Madden UD with CRAL Action, Fambrough, et al. v.
21
Redwood City (Case #17CIV05387) (“CRAL Action”); and/or
22
(D) in the alternative, or in combination, Stay Madden UD proceedings until post-CRAL
Trial Decision is rendered 6n or before Feb. 18, 2022; and
24
(E) Confirm Date for post-CRAL Trial Decision is 90 days from Reply (11/18/21-2/18/22).
25
The basis (grounds) for the MTS “(A)” is multifarious:
26 1 UD Defendant and P-I Madden (in CRAL) never acceded to e-seryice in UD proceéting,
27 [UDs are not complex, nor direct-, nor special-set, nor assigned for all purposes. Absent
“relation” by Dept. 2 (to which, in itself, UD Defendant and P-I Madden does not object),
28 there is no question e-service in UD requires express consent].
2
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
The e-served document was corrupted and not downloadable.
[City has “always” served hard copy backup of every document ever filed inall proce-
edings to date in the Docktown matters (“CEQA”, “jurisdiction”, admin writ & currently-
pending CRAL Action. Here, City did hard-copy serve the “Notices of Orders”; the
version sent by email was corrupted and not viewable; hence, hard copy controls].
UD Defendant and P-I Madden’s case has not been remitted, to her knowledge, from the
First District Court of Appeal (““1DCA”) to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court
(“App. Div.”), to the Superior Court.
[Stancil has been remitted in that order, but apparently the identical, related, “deferred” :
cases at the Supreme Court, that were granted review but deferred pending resolution of
Stancil $253783, one of which is Madden, are still at the 1DCA (pending confirmation in
the clerk’s office today, as UDs are not viewable on Odyssey)].
There is no “Resumption of Trial Court UD” process a UD Plaintiff may claim. The Cal.
Code of Civ. Proc. (“CCP”) provides P-I Madden’s post-Delta (& post- Stancil) response
10 is +10 days after effective Service of Notice of Entry of Order (“SoNoEoO”) §418.10(c).
Conditions antecedent (remittitur and effective NoNoHoO) must be settled first,
11
The basis ds) for the MTS Complaint-with Prejudice “ ’” is two-fold:
12
Special-venue pleading is a statutory requirement, and omitting venue supports MTS;
13
14 Commencing UD priorto adopting CRAL Plan is forbidden.by law, per Gov. Code §7260 et seq.
15 (CRAL) and 25 CRC §6000 et seq. (mandatory Guidelines).
16 The basis for the MTC UD with CRAL Action “(C)” is-supported by:
7 It is judicially economical and in the interests of justice to Consolidate (identical parties) the
18
Parties are identical and the issues are inter-dependent; jury trial is demanded.
19
The basis for the MTS (Stay) UD pending CRAL Decision “(D)” is supported by:
20
It is judicially economical and in the interests of justice to Stay the related proceedings and
21
22 determine the issues in a rational and logical order, and not commence UD until a post-CRAL Trial
23 Decision has been rendered, currently set for on or before Feb. 18, 2022; and
:
The basis for Request to Confirm post-CRAL Trial Decision Date “(E)” is supported by:
25
City’s City Attorney, in public meeting Sept. 27, 2021, stated Dept. 2 would render decision
26
“90 days from [Sept. 27, 2021]”. However, last Reply paper was to have been filed (and was filed
27
Nov. 18, 2021; this is considered submission in the absence of an earlier Court Order. The Minute
28
3
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
Orders post-CRAL Trial state “court concluded”, NOT “matter submitted”. Hence, default is
Nov. 18, 2021, and 90 days thence-forth is Feb. 18, 2022, Madden seeks confirmation.
Rule 9.20 / Interim Suspension (“IS”)
Finally, Madden presents in her Declaration information pertaining to her Bar status, as she
(Madden) was the last, sole counsel to other UD Defendants in the Superior Court. Madden properly
filed the applicable, ordered Rule 9.20 Notices of having provided Notice to Opposing Counsel, see
Rule 9.20(a)(4) (notice is of “disqualification to act as attorney”, see Rule 9.20(4)(1)). At Superior
Court level since Sept. 2018, P-I Madden represented herself pro per in 18UDL00316, and other UD
10 Defendants due to the Actions, facts, events and occurrences all being identical until suspension.
11
However, P-I Madden has been unable to represent any client(s) of any kind or sort, in any
12
type of action, as she has been on a lengthy administrative “interim suspension” (“IS”), without
13
having been adjudicated in the Bar until recently (pending, solely after 9/14-14, 2021), due to mis-
14
15 conduct by Finigan, J. Thus, other UD Defendants are unrepresented parties, with a former, sus-
16 pended counsel, and City has been made aware of this many, many times by Madden, as well as
17 TBM. See n.' below, for summary & Madden Dec., 2-6, 12-13.
18
J
Meet and Confer is not required in U.D. All, facts herein are in the Madden Dec., paras. 2-15.
fl IUGTadd[
19
Dated: Dee, 9, 2021
20 By 1. Le son
AlisonMadden, Pro Pé
21
22 [Memo of Points/Authorities; Madden Dec., follow]
1 Madden initially Appealed denial of a Motion to Withdraw No-Contest Plea EMT"), The Court,
25 Finigan, J., denied Certificate of Probable Cause (“CPC”) on a constitutional ineffective assistance
of counsel (IAC) claim, a highly unusual and irregular act. Thus, Madden did not get an Appeal, and
26 was unaware of no-CPC on Amended Notice of Appeal, until Nov. 2020 when appellate counsel
discovered it, more than a year after IS commenced. Had she known she would be denied’CPC, and
27 thus, Appeal, she would have long abandoned the Appeal and been long reinstated by now. In
28 addition, more conduct affected the MTW and other motions and writs (improper independent inves-
tigation and improper ex parte contact with D.A., both resulting in wrongful denial of MTW/MEB).
4
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CTV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, MaStay
1 I. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS
2 A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT/INTRODUCTION/PROCEDURE/FACTS
3
This Court has considered P-1 Madden’s prior Motions to Consolidate (“MTC”), and/or to Stay
4
with or without Consolidation, and has denied them without prejudice, mainly so as not to delay the
CRAL Trial. P-I Madden, of course, has no issue with this, and always advocated that consolidation
of UD (Madden) with the CRAL Action could have been done, with the UD stayed until post-CRAL
Trial Decision, as-applicability of CRAL is a relevant, if not the gating, determinative issue in UD.
In essence, a Consolidation of the 2 Actions, with Stay of UD proceedings and Trial until Phase
10 2, post-CRAL Trial Decision, was always possible, but a conservative approach is understood.
Il
Renewal of MTCiStay, in the Alternative, after consideration of MTS
12
P-I Madden now, therefore, renews her MTC, and/or to Stay with or without Consolidation, until
13
this Court’s post-CRAL Trial Decision is rendered, which P-I Madden has calendared as an outside
14
15 date of Feb. 18, 2022, based on last Reply paper filing due date.
16 Such MTC, and/or Stay, is reached only if this Court does not Strike the Complaint (and/or the
17 recent City “Notices & Resumption” document)), for City failing to plead an essential element/alle-
18 gation of UD, a creature of statute that must be strictly followed (i.e., mandatory venue pleading).
19
Even if this Court does not Strike for venue-basis (which is absolutely justified and should be
20
done), it may and should Strike the Complaint, as filing a UD prior to adopting a CRAL-compliant
21
Plan is an impermissible act in furtherance of displacement, in violation of the CRAL Gov. Code and
22
CCR mandatory Guidelines. Should Demurrer be required, it shall be expeditiously filed.
24 Moreover, this Court, Dept. 2, has now heard the CRAL Trial, and the post-CRAL Trial
25 Decision is only now under submission, in P-I Madden’s estimation, as of Nov. 18, 2021, the final
26
day of the Parties’ entitlement to have filed Reply papers. See CRC 2.900(a)(1), (2) (see full rule text
27
‘1
28 ‘il
5
TEUDEOORTE RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrou; igh etal. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
in n.2, below)’.
Requestto Confirm Feb. 18, 2022 as 90-day filing date of Post-CRAL Trial Decisior
P-I Madden requests, in this Combined Motion, at hearing or otherwise, that Hon. Marie Weiner
confirm for the Parties that the 90-day timeframe for post-CRAL Trial Decision is in fact from Nov.
18, 2021 to Feb. 18, 2022. The reason for this request is that the Redwood City City Attorney ad-
vised the Council of Redwood City and the public in a Sept. 27, 2021 public meeting, in response to
general public coniments about the Docktown matters and CRAL trial that P-I Madden had made at
that meeting. The City Attorney advised Council and all present, including by Zoom or phone dial
10 in, that this Court would render decision within 90 days of the Trial end.
11
However, a review of the 2 (two) Minute Orders that memorialize the end of CRAL Trial, on
12
Odyssey, reflect only that, “court concluded”, not that the “matter was submitted”. P-I Madden sees
13
no reference in any Order, Minute Order or other official document that the matter was submitted in
14
15 any manner other than as Rule 9.200(a) provides (last day of Reply filing, Nov. 18, 2021).
16 Rendering this clarity now, for the parties and public, would be a:service.
17 Facts Applicable to Motion:
18 P-I Madden raises the following facts re: issues and procedures in this Combined Motion:
19 1, P-I Madden never acceded to email service in the UD proceedings. Any prior MTC or to
20} Stay is properly viewed as having been made in relation to the CRAL Action;
21
2. Dept. 2 related the entire set of UD cases together, and related them to the CRAL Action.
22
Although all the UDs therefore appear single-assigned to Dept. 2, this not by CRC, Local Rule or
23
PJ. action. P-I Madden has no objection to Dept. 2 hearing the matters by consolidation, and would
24
25 have sought, in Law & Motion or Master Calendar, to have had them consolidated and transferred.
26
27
? Rule 2.900. Submission of a cause in a trial court: (a) Submission: A cause is deemed submitted
28 in a trial court when either of the following first occurs: (1) The date the court orders the matter
submitted; or (2) The date the final paper is {filed or] argument is heard, whichever is later.
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
However, P-I Madden does object to e-service, as the UDs are not complex, not consolidated,
either with each other nor with the CRAL Action, and are not stayed, only currently tolled. It is not
fair to accelerate UD timeframes by mandating Defendants accept e-service, especially at this stage.
3. The Burke law firm has always sent hard copy mail of all filings—every Motion, Trial
document, Reply, Opposition, Notice of Entry of Order, etc., even when it e-serves. P-I Madden did
not receive “Notices of Orders w Exhibits” and “Resumption of Trial Court Unlawful Detainer
Proceedings” in hard copy mail until this Combined Motion was nearly finished (after 9/6/2021).
Accordingly, response time runs from paper service plus mail days, for next response (see infra).
10 4. Also, it is not a thing, for a Plaintiff to determine “Resumption of Trial Court UD Proce-
11
edings”. The CCP allows a UD Defendant to elect its response, by calculating days after effective
12
Service of Notice of Entry of Order (“NoEoO”). All City need do is effectively serve, then available
13
here is MTS; then Demurrer, then Answer, then MSJ/MSA, then Trial, CCP §418.10(e).
14
15 5. Moreover, P-I Madden’s e-served document was corrupted and cannot be opened, and
16 this is atypical, in that P-I Madden’s laptop is downloading all .pdfs, and she has current licenses to
17 permit download. P-I Madden was able to open some of the document, but gets a corrupted notice,
18
and it messes with the pdf. program, which then cannot be shut and the first several pages cannot be
19
viewed. As a result, solely hard copy service is the driver for next response post-statutory writ
20
(which would be +10 days, +5 for mail, to wit 12/14/2021 (email +2 is Sat., ia 11, so Mon., 2/13).
ai
6. Moreover to P-I Madden's knowledge, her UD has not been remitted from 1DCA to App.
22
23 Div. of Superior Court, nor to Superior Court UD desk. Stancil has been so remitted, but P-I Madden
24 has received no notice nor information that 18UDL00316, was remitted, nor any other than Stancil.
7. Moreover, the Burke firm has served documents for other UD Defendants on Madden.
26
The Burke firm and City Attorney have been regularly updated and advised that P-I Madden is still
27
on administrative “interim suspension” (“IS”), and does not represent any other UD Defendant from
28
7
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CTV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
Docktown, only herself pro per. Thus, it is improper for City/Burke to send these documents to P-I
Madden, and such is not effective service on any other UD Defendant. (City has been so notified).
8. For total clarity, P-I Madden was only required to file Rule 9.20(a)(4) Notices in Stancil
o
and the other UD cases in Superior Court, in which she had made a special appearance by MTQ (the
“Delta Imports” MTQ that was taken on statutory writ to the Supreme Court). P-I Madden made her
Rule 9.20(a)(4) filings, in each case, in 2019, and they are notice of “subsequent disqualification” to
act as an attorney, in the verbiage of the Rule (together with the letter Notices per Rule 9.20(a) (1),
(4), which were also sent to opposing counsel (Ms. Ramirez and Ms. Kenyon et al. at Burke)).
10 9. These Rule 9.20 Notices were timely provided, and City has known since 2019, and sub-
il
sequent filing in Superior Court (all UDs), that Madden is on IS (and for procedural (not substantive)
12
reasons, has been to the present, over 2 years from IS). See supra, n.1 & Madden Dec. 2-6, 12-13.
13
10. The Superior Court clerk’s office appears to be operating under all correct presumptions,
14
15 and is “not” sending documents in non-Madden (18UDL00316) matters, to P-I Madden. Thus, only
16 Burke is operating under incorrect assumptions and presumptions as to Madden’s IS status and the
17 propriety (or impropriety) of sending non-Madden UD documents to Madden.
18
11. As a result, out of abundance of caution, contemporaneous with this Combined Motion,
19
P-I Madden will filé supplements (non-mandatory) to her former Rule 9.20 Notices of having provi-
20
ded Notice of IS & DQ to Opposing Counsel under Rule 9.20(a)(4) (likely as of 12/14/2021).
21
22
B. LEGAL ARGUMENT
23 A. UD is Creature of Statute, the Statutes Control, and Strict Compliance is Mandatory
CCP Sec. 1159 et seq., known as the Unlawful Detainer (UD) Act, supersedes other Code
25 provisions, and is the sole avenue to bring about a lawful eviction; it must be strictly followed and
26
there is no substantial compliance rule. See, e.g., WDT-Winchester v. Nilsson (1994) 27 Cal.4" 516,
27
520; Baugh v. Consumers Assocs., Ltd. (1996) 241 CalApp.24 672, 674-75. See n.3 for WDT detail.
28
8
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CTV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
,
In Baugh, the court stated, “Since [UD] is purely statutory in nature, it is essential that a party
seeking the remedy bring himself clearly within the statute.” 241 Cal.App.2d at 647 (citing Rankin v.
Super. Ct,, 157 Cal. 189), Baugh also held, “It is settled ... that a party may assert at any time that
the complaint does not state a cause of action.” Id., at 673-74 (citing Prichard v. Kimball 190 Cal.
757, 765 and Berryman y. ‘Quinlan, 29 Cal. App. 2d 608, 612 (secondary cites omitted)).*
B. AUD Defendant may MTQ, then MTS, then Demur, Serially or Together
AUD Defendant may ‘elect, at his or her option, and in this order, to Move to Quash Service
of Summons, Move to Strike, and/or Demur, either serially, or together, in the alternative. Both
10 WDT and Baugh support this Court striking the UD Complaint here, because the UD was an act in
11
furtherance of displacement before City adopted a mandatory CRAL Plan, and special-venue .
12
pleading is mandatory. On both grounds in this context, it is proper to Strike UD Complaint, or sus-
13
tain Demurrer (not yet brought but will be if these issues are not resolved on MTS), with prejudice.
14
15 C. MTS Applies Here for Failure to Plead Essential Element (Venue); and no CRAL Plan
16 P-I Madden previously brought a “Delta Imports” MTQ, which was the subject of the Stancil
17 statutory writ decided by the California Supreme Court May 3, 2020. On review, the Cal. Supreme
18
Court “did” recognize a basis for MTQ when an essential UD element is not pleaded. $253783, at 3-
19
4, and it ruled MTQ is not the proper remedy to challenge defects under CCP 1166 generally. Id.
20
Accordingly, P-I Madden believes she could move to quash under Stancil on the grounds
21
City failed to special-plead venue, as required by CCP Sec. 392(a)(1) (not §1166); Rutter, Cal. Prac.
22
23
3 The Supreme Court’s pronouncements in WDT are: “[T]he unlawful detainer statutes are to be
strictly construed ....” and “The statutory requirements in such proceedings “must be followed
strictly, otherwise a landlord’s remedy is an ordinary suit for breach of contract with all the delays
26 that remedy normally involves and without restitution of the demised property”. (citing Superior
Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1070, 71)). And: “[A] landlord,
27
who invokes the summary procedures of unlawful detainer must strictly comply with the ...
28 requirements of the statute under which he/she elects to proceed.” (citing Cf. Kwok v. Bergren
(1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 596, 599-600 (secondary. citations omitted)).
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CTV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
Guide, LL-T (“Allegation of proper venue is an essential element of the complaint”), p.8-12, §8:21,
of, p.8-21, §8:38. The special venue pleading requirement includes both “title” (Super. Ct.San Mateo
Co.) arid “branch”, see id. “Branch” must be pleaded “in the Complaint”, not Summons, and is set by
Local Rule, per CCP §392(a). See also CCP §396a(a), & Item #3 JC-Form Complaint UD-100.
Indeed, failure to follow the mandate of the “other” sections of the CCP (cited above) may be
the only statutory defect that supports a Stancil MTQ. The reason being that the Stancil court itself
relied on a litmus test of finding a specific statute that modified
UD versus ordinary practice. Id.
Here, that is the case, and none of this was complied to. Even with all the above authority,
10 and a JC form available, (with boxes/spaces for Venue), and express requirements, City did not
11
special-plead venue as “Southern Branch—Redwood City” “in the Complaint”, as required by statute.
12
For clarity, P-I Madden is “not” now, and here, re-bringing a Stancil MTQ, but feels it would
13
be supported. The reason she is not, is short notice (hearing in 3-7 days). Broadly, MTQ challenges a
14
15 court’s personal jurisdiction, CCP §1167.4, 418.10, CRC 3.1327, Greener v. Workers Comp Appeals
16 Bad. (1993) 6 Cal.4 1028, 1036. A timely filed MTQ avoids entry of default, CCP §585(b), and is a
17 special, not general appearance. Greener, supra, at 1036-37, Parsons v. Super. Ct. (Arques Shipyard
18
Mgmt. Co. LLC) (2007) 149 Cal.App.4"* Supp.1, 5. That has occurred to date.
19
Moreover, any defect (procedural or substantive) that goes to the heart of ‘a court’s authority
20
to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant should (and must, or be waived) be raised by MTQ.
21
Greener, supra, at 1036. P-I Madden is mindful of Stancil, but finds the express statutory support to
22
23 fit within the Court’s stated respect for a statute that applies expressly to the UD context.
24 Deficient special-venue pleading may appear trivial or de minimus, but there is no such rule,
25 standard nor allowance in UD. As noted in dozens of cases, UD is exacting, and strict compliance to
26
the statute is required. City did not even try, and could have fixed this within days of being notified
27
fn Sept. 2018, and been done. But it forced Stancil to the Supreme Court rather than cure its error.
28
10
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
'
All the above briefing on MTQ and post-Stancil, however, P-I Madden applies to her.
Motion to Strike the Complaint with Prejudice.
To be sure, City would have had to re-file the UDs, had a MTQ been granted, and should
have to do so once stricken with prejudice (ie. re-file and re-serve, anew).
Given how City behaved, this re-filing is called for.
Here, City sued dead people (Logan), and gone people (several), in 2018. A review of the
UD ledger shows how many Docktown UD Actions were filed Sept. 2018. The filings were solely .
“on the paper”, likely done by OPC from an office without any due diligence. Most tenants had left.
10 The “move out” date was Aug. 31, 2018, a Friday (midnight)-of a 3-day week end (Labor
~N
11
Day). The UDs were filed Tuesday a.m., Sept. 4, 2018 and put out for service immediately. No one
12
went down to see who was still in possession, nor if boats had relocated. Tenants who vacated, gave
13
keys and signed over title, as well as signing all of City’s release, waiver and buyout documents, still
14
15 had UDs filed against them. Further, some of these tenants were then blackmailed into signing docu-
16 ments statirig they had not left, when indeed they had. Some signed, some refused. And, City got
7 court orders for deemed service on some of these vacated sellers. See Madden Dec., at 414.
18 Outrageous. —
19
This is one of the principled reasons why the MTQ was so vigorously litigated by Madden.
20
As to the substance on this MTS, San Mateo County has had 4 (four) branch court locations over the
21
past few decades. Central closed fairly recently, but street signs are still up for it, and much of the
22
23 public would not know it has closed (I went to jury duty and paid traffic infractions there).
24 The Southern “Annex” was moved to the Northem Branch during construction, where it
25 remains. With all this shifting and moving, it is not certain all UDs are heard in Redwood City, and,
26
indeed, it may not comply to law for Northern UDs to be heard in Southern Branch.
27
- Also, this issue and rule of law (branch-venue required) cannot vary by County.
28
1
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, MaStay
First, venue is not required to be pleaded at all in a regular, general civil action of any kind. ,
Solely UD has a mandatory venue-pleading requirement. So that in itself should be the answer.
In UD, venue pleading is both County and Branch, and must be “in the Complaint”. Alameda
hears UDs in only 1 of its many courts-Hayward. This is not intuitive, and a UD Complaint can be
filed in any branch in a County, even with all matters heard solely in another (Alamada, and L.A). -
A MTS is a general appearance, CCP §1014, and prevents default. Id. §§585, 86. Complaints
may be stricken, in full or part. CCP §435(a)(2), (b)(1). See also Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.
App. 4th 761, 768. ‘The MTW may be used to reach defects in or objections to pleadings, whether or
10 not also challengeable by demurrer. Jd. A MTS is permissible in scenarios where fundamental gating
IL
pre-conditions have not been met, See, e.g., Rutter, Civ, Proc, Before Trial, at 7(1)-73, 7:156
12
(certificates of merit, ADR, etc.). The meet and confer otherwise required, is not in UD. Id; CCP
13
Sec. 435.5(d)(2) (“This section [435.5] does not apply to ...-unlawful detainer.”).
14
15 Here, both mandatory venue pleading, and the mandatory pre-cursor of a CRAL-compliant
16 Plan are gating factors to the right to prosecute a UD Complaint. As is Remittitur. And, MTS is the
17 only basis by.which to Strike this Complaint for relying on the wrong lease (“LLA vs. “LRA”) (as
18
an “artfully pleaded” (i.e., read, lying, intentional, false) Complaint is taken as true for Demurrer).
19
AMTS lies where the challenged document, or any part of it, is not drawn nor filed in
20
conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court, CCP §436(b), and/or if
21
it contains any “irrelevant, false or improper matter”. CCP §436(a). As to.the former, the MTS
22
23 reaches, “improprieties in [the document’s] form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was
24 filed.” Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4" 509, 528-29 (emphasis in original). Absence
of the mandatory venue is a form/format and procedure issue. Lack of a pre-filing CRAL Plan is
26
filing a UD Complaint in violation of applicable law, see infra, and the Lease is a “false” matter.
27
Moreover, the “Notice” is subject to Strike and no effect, as Madden has not been Remitted.
28
12
18UDL00816 RWC ¥. Madden; TICIVOSSET Fambroi ugh et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
This MTS is sought with Prejudice, as to “this” UD. Once this Court issues a post-CRAL
Trial Decision, all parties shall know whether CRAL was triggered by the activities of the Redwood
City Council, as a public entity undertaking a public project (or even code enforcement).
If CRAL applies, these untimely UDs (Madden speaking solely for herself as of this Motion)
will have been premature and must be dismissed, as it is improper to take any step in furtherance of
displacement prior to a statutorily-required CRAL Plan having been properly adopted and circulated.
‘
AUD, otherwise lawful, is unlawful within the MTS standard, when commenced prior to a
pre-filing mandatory action. See supra, Rutter & cases viewing such acts as basis for MTS. Specifi-
10 cally, 25 CCR §§6010 & 6014, in the CRAL context, require adoption of a CRAL-compliant Plan,
Il
prior to any displacing activity (Prior Determinations & Prerequisites to Displacement, respectively).
12
Sec. 6010(a)(6): “A relocation plan meeting the requirements of section 6038 has been prepared.”
13
Sec. 6038 is Relocation Plan, is extensive and requires Citizen Participation (§6012) (§6038 requires
14
15 “prior to proceeding with any phase of a project or other activity....”; §6040 is Min Requirements).
16 Finally, Sec. 6058 of the CCR states, “Eviction is permissible only as a Tast resort.” City has
17 neither alleged any basis for last resort, and indeed, denied at trial it is even closing Docktown.
18
The “prejudice” therefore is that City may not simply fixa special-venue error, and re-file, as
19
the second, solid and mandatory basis for quashing or striking this complaint is CRAL. City can file
20
another
UD “after” the Court determiries CRAL and City does a CRAL Plan.4 (see n.4, below).
21
MTC/Stay
22
MTC authority was briefed in Madden’s prior MTCs and to Stay, and the cases therein apply.
23
24
25 ‘Arroyo Vista. The Arroyo case cited by P-I Madden in her Post-Trial Brief and Reply (wIRIN),
involved an initial Complaint, w/contemporaneous Motion for Preliminary Injunction/TRO. See C-
26 07-05794 (Patel, J., N.D. Cal. 2007-09). The MPI/TRO was brought in Jan. 2008, and renewed June
2008 after Judge Patel upheld in that CRAL Action, also a 1983 civil rights claim (on a HUD claim).
27
Arroyo did not involve a parallel UD, but contains briefing, Orders and Dismissal after court-
28 guided and directed settlement directly on point, which supports UD is wrongly started when CRAL
applies. See P-I Madden’s RIN, filed with Post-Trial Brief (attaching 3-pp. Order & 31 pp. SA).
13
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
First, CCP §1048 supports consolidation when the parties and manifold issues are common,
or the same’, Here, the Parties are identical and the issues are common, as well as the same. Indeed,
the cases support it is an abuse of discretion to not stay a UD if another action also speaks to the
tight of possession. See, e.g., Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4 367; Wilson v. Gentile
(1992) 8 Cal.App.4"* 459; Asuncion v. Super. Ct. (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141. The CRAL issue is a
“right to possession” one: City may not reclaim lawful possession over the Creek prior to adopting a
CRAL compliant Plan, exactly “because” it displaces residential tenants for “more public access”.
As to City’s prior argument, “no other cause may be brought in UD”, to defeat a MTC, this
10 applies to a UD Plaintiff's (Landlord’s) Complaint. It means aUD Complainant may not allege more
1
than UD without an Action becoming a general civil action. It doesn’t prohibit consolidation or Stay,
12
as the cited cases demonstrate. The “one cause” rule means a Landlord may only file to recover
13
possession”; it may not also plead breach or seek relief beyond rent. A UD summary action is clean,
14
15 limited and narrow, and no cross- nor counter-claim is permitted, nor intervention or interpleader;
16 but this is much different than saying no UD may never be consolidated with another action (here,
17 17CIV05387, which was also first-filed). UDs absolutely may be consolidated and/or stayed.°
18
19
20 5 CCP 1048(a) reads, “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it
21 may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” Sec. (b) is less relevant and not quoted herein,
22 -® City’s prior attempts to argue consolidation in CRALis unwarranted because. Madden allegedly
“repeatedly” tried to consolidate her UDL is without merit. That argument pertains to a different
23 action, 17CTV00316 (“Jurisdiction Action”), which included the SLC & AG, and Mr. Hannig and
24 his associates & partner. Thus, the parties were not identical, and the MTC in that Action was minor,
and collateral. Also, jurisdiction actually remains an affirmative defense in this UD, as 17CIV00316
25 is only law of the case, given the unpublished and erroneous conclusions of the IDCA & Miram. In
a prior Opposition, City dropped a note that 17CIV00316 is final, as it is. The SLC & AG never took
26 the position (below or on Appeal) the 1DCA found dispositive--a more-than-tenuous position that
PRC 6009.1(c)(13) prohibits California local voters from enacting charters establishing independent
27
Ports (all of them do, and all of them are). Thus, City and Burke spent “years” solely trying to
28 preserve their right to collude with a politically connected lawyer and pay him $1.5 million out of
the General Fund, without ever even answering or challenging that Hannig Complaint in any way.
1
18UDL00816 RIC v. Madden; 17C1V05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
Further, “at issue” is not a dispositive inquiry, as a court may absolutely Consolidate and
Stay an action before it is “‘at issue”. Indeed, we (the united UD defendants at the time) sought in
Law & Motion to Consolidate all UDs with each other and Stay, but Judge Greenberg never ruled on
that, given the Motion to Quash (“MTQ”) that was taken up on statutory writ as provided by CCP.
Ironically, if City had agreed to consolidate (which it fought tooth and nail), there would be
only 1 UD action now, and if they listened to me in public comments that a public entity should use
the “American Rule” on attorneys fees, they wouldn’t now be exposed to nearly 10x fees for UDs
that will almost certainly be dismissed, and fees recoverable on such dismissal for prior work.
10 Conclusion
11
The traditional balancing inquiry for a “stay” in the context of a TRO or MPI is not the
12
standard here for staying this UD pending CRAL, it is the court’s inherent jurisdiction under CCP
13
Sec. 1048, as well as to manage its own docket. Indeed, especially in Dept. 2. Finally, the 1048
14
15 inquiry is for the public and courts generally, rather than for the most part for the parties’
16 convenience or interests. Here, the MTS is unquestionably the proper action. The filing of the
17 “Notice and Resumption” should be stricken, the UD Complaint in its entirety should be stricken
18
with prejudice until post-CRAL Trial Decision is rendered, then re-filed anew. Consolidation and/or
19
Stay are if this Court does not strike the Notice/Resumption or Complaint, both justified.
20
Dated: Dec. 9, 2021 ALIS FF) }
21
22 By: le
In Pro Per
23
24
25
26
27
They got away with that, but it does not confer jurisdiction by fiat. Miram also undermined this
holding by overruling City’s Demurrer to 2AC, stating jurisdiction under the Charter is a triable
issue (he eventually reversed every one of his OSC denial bases).
15
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay
V
Declaration of Alison Madden (“Madden Dec”) in support of Combined Motions:
1 My name is Alison Madden, I_am pro per in this Action. I am an Active attorney with
'
the State Bar of California, but on an administrative, interim suspension (“IS”), as noted in more
detail below. I am, thus, “disqualified” to act as an attorney for any other party, but may do so for
myself. I state the matters herein of my own, personal knowledge, or information and belief after
inquiry. If called as a witness hereto, I could and would competently testify the same as herein.
2. I was sole counsel to other Docktown UD Defendants in Superior Court, until my
Bar-ordered IS in 2019, from the practice of law, due to a no-contest plea and conviction, in 2018.
10 This was not only not my finest hour, and an occurrence for which I have deep remorse and regret,
11
and the Probation Officer who recommended a suspended sentence arrived at the conclusion this was
12 1
warranted due to that remorse and regret.
13
3 Following Review Dept. Order (of the State Bar Court), I filed in San Mateo County,
14
15 Superior Court, UDL Dept., the Rule 9.20 Notices of having provided Notice of IS to Opposing
16 Counsel. See Rule 9.20(a)(1), (4) “disqualification” to act as attornéy; no other act required).
17 4. At Superior Court since Sept. 2018, I have solely represented myself pro per in UD.
18
Lonly ever represented any otherUD Defendant(s) due to the Actions, facts, events and occurrences
19
being identical. I represented them until my IS (all cases were deferred on statutory writ at the time).
20
5 I have been unable to represent any client(s) of any kind or sort, in any type of action,
21
due to this lengthy administrative IS. Only recently was my Bar case heard, on Sept. 14-15, 2021.
22
23 This was due to improper actions and erroneous rulings by Finigan, J., including without limitation,
24 denial of a Cettificate of Probable Cause (“CPC”), thereby depriving me of having an Appeal on my
25 constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel (‘SIAC”) claim, an almost unheard of denial. There
26
was also improper ex parte communication with the D.A. by the court, and an improper, independent
27
investigation by the court into my “Bar Record” (both irrelevant and non-existent, due to a single
28
1
1295350v1 18UDL00816 RWC v, Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) Madden Dec. ISO MTS MTC, M4Stay
private “ALD” (agreement in lieu of discipline based on a non-mandatory self-report 2005
misdemeanor ). Judge Finigan got all law and facts wrong through this improper conduct, and I did
not find out about the denial of CPC on Amended Notice of Appeal until Nov. 2020, and would
certainly have been practicing again by that date had I not lost over a year from denial of Oct. 2019
Motion to Withdraw No-Contest
Plea for LAC, Accordingly, the IS has been longer than supported.
6 As a result, other UD Défendants are unrepresented, with former, suspended counsel,
and City has been made aware of this many, many times by Madden, as well as Ms. Frostom of the
San Diego “TBM” firm, who has advised and apprised City and Burke she is not UD counsel.
10 Salient emails can be provided for the court, and shall be on Reply or otherwise on request.
ll
7. Ina public, evening meeting, which was a regularly-noticed, calendared, official
12
meeting of the Redwood City “Council”, the Mayor invited the City Attorney to speak to Council
13
Members and the public after I made general public comments respecting the end of the Docktown
14
15 Trial. The City Attorney stated the Court would render its decision without 90 (ninety) days of that
16 day, Sept. 27, 2021. Apparently the City Attorney believed that the matter had been “submitted”,
17 although I believe it was submitted under applicable laws (CRC) as of Nov. 18, 2021.
18
8. It is my belief a Mayor inviting a retort by a City Attomey violates open meeting and
19
sunshine laws, including potentially (without limitation) the Brown Act (in that it was not a noticed/
20
agendized item). I also believe it was wrong to invite a City Attorney to respond to a member of the
21
public generally, at all, with a notation by the Mayor that the Mayor wanted the City Attomey to
22
address whether the speaker had been wrong about anything in such public speaker’s entitlement to
two minutes of speaking to elected members.
25 9. P-I Madden never acceded to email service in the UD proceedings. Moreover, P-I
26
Madden’s e-served document was corrupted and cannot be opened, and this is atypical, in that P-I
27
Madden’s laptop is downloading all .pdfs, and she has current licenses to permit download. P-I
28
2
18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CTV05387 Fambro ugh et al. (CRAL) Madden Dec. ISO MTS, MTC, MaStay
Madden was able to open some of the document, but gets a corrupted notice, and it messes with the
pdf. program, which then cannot be shut and the first several pages cannot be viewed.
10. Moreover to P-I Madden’s knowledge, her UD has not been remitted from 1DCA to
App.
Div. of Superior Court, nor to Superior Court UD desk. Stancil has been so remitted, but P-I Madden.
has received no notice nor information that 18UDL00316, was remitted, nor any other than Stancil.
ll. In addition, the Burke firm served the “Response” and “Resumption of UD Proce-
edings” documents, for other UD Defendants, on me, both by email and in hard copy. The Burke
10 firm and City Attorney were regularly updated and advised I am still on IS, and do not represent any
i
other UD Defendant (s)from Docktown, only myself pro per. Thus, it is improper for City/Burke to
12
send such documents to me. I advised them regularly before Nov. 29, 2021, but they served me
13
anyway. I thereafter emailed them several times, and have not received a response.
14
15 12. For total clarity, I was only required to file Rule 9.20(@)(4) Notices in Superior Court
16 (vs. a “withdrawal” by noticed motion or otherwise; or any other document until requested (i.e., a
17 substitution with new counsel, etc.)). I made solely a special appearance by MTQ (“Delta Imports”)
18 that was taken on statutory writ to the Supreme Court (Stancil $263783). I made a Rule 9.20(a)(4)
19
filing in each
Preview
FILED SAN MATEO COUNTY Alison Madden, Jn Pro Per PO Box 620650 DEC 3 § 2021 Woodside, CA 94062 0 ste Court maddenproper@gmail.com Phone: 650.270.0066; No Fax DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN MATEO SOUTHERN BRANCH - REDWOOD CITY 10 CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, UD Action case #: 13UDL00816 Il Direct-Set to Dept. 2, Weiner, J. 12 Plaintiff, Civil Unlimited Case No.: 17CIV005387 13 Assigned for all purposes to Dept. 2, Weiner, J. 14 UD DEFENDANT (AND PETITIONER- 15 ALISON MADDEN, INTERVENOR IN CRAL ACTION) MADDEN’S 16 OTICES OF MOTION(S) AND MOTION(S): ['O STRIKE (OBJECTION TO) CITY’S NOTICE 17 Defendant. OF ORDERS; AND/OR, IN ALTERNATIVE, TO STRIKE COMPLAINT W/PREJUDICE FOR 18 COMMENCING UD BEFORE ADOPTING CRAL PLAN AND NON-PLEADING OF 19 MANDATORY VENUE; OR, IN 20 FAMBROUGH, et al., ALTERNATIVE, TO CONSOLIDATE UD WITH CRAL AND/OR TO STAY UD WITH OR 21 WITHOUT CONSOLIDATION UNTIL POST- Plaintiffs/Petitioner-Intervenors, CRAL TRIAL DECISION RENDERED; REQUEST TO CONFIRM POST-CRAL TRIAL DECISION DATE-FEB. 18, 2022 (“COMBINED MOTION”); MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 24 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS; REDWOOD CITY, MADDEN DEC. IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS & 25 RULE 9.20 ADVI. NTS 26 Defendant. Date/Time: |, 22Z, Dept.: 2 p.m. 27 Action(s) Filed: 9/4/18 (UD) 11/27/17 (CRAL) Trial Date: Jury demanded, UDL 28 mm m 1295350v1 TSUDL00816 RWC y. Madden; 17C1V05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay fo NOTICE OF MOTION(S) AND MOTION(S) To UD Complainant/Plaintiff & CRAL-Defendant Redwood City (“City”): NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on ,202_, at__ p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matters may be heard, in Dept. 2 of the above-captioned Court, at 400 County Center (Hall of Justice), Redwood City, Califoriia 94063, UD Defendant & CRAL Plaintiff-Intervenor Madden (“P- I Madden”) will move the Court, Dept. 2, for Order(s) seeking the relieffprocedures set forth below. This/these combined motions (“Combined Motion”) are based on the reasons below, along- side each Motion. The Combined, and each, Motion thereof, are supported by this Notice of Motion 10 and Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed herewith, the Declaration of Alison 11 Madden filed herewith (“Madden Dec.”), and such other documentary and oral evidence as may be 12 accepted at hearing on the Motion(s), and such matters as may be judicially noticed by the Court. 13 Bases: this Combined Motion seeks, and the separate Motion(s) are: 14 (A) to Strike City’s recently-filed “Notice of Orders and Resumption of Trial Court Unlaw- 15 ful Detainer Proceedings”, filed in Redwood City v. Madden (Case #18UDL 00316) (Superior Court, 16 17 San Mateo) (“Objection” and “MTS”), as Madden is not remitted, among other reasons; and/or 18 (B) in the alternative, Strike the Complaint with Prejudice for lack of mandatory venue 19 pleading and commencing UD prior to adopting CRAL Plan, as required by law (“MTS”); or 20 (C) in the alternative, Consolidate Madden UD with CRAL Action, Fambrough, et al. v. 21 Redwood City (Case #17CIV05387) (“CRAL Action”); and/or 22 (D) in the alternative, or in combination, Stay Madden UD proceedings until post-CRAL Trial Decision is rendered 6n or before Feb. 18, 2022; and 24 (E) Confirm Date for post-CRAL Trial Decision is 90 days from Reply (11/18/21-2/18/22). 25 The basis (grounds) for the MTS “(A)” is multifarious: 26 1 UD Defendant and P-I Madden (in CRAL) never acceded to e-seryice in UD proceéting, 27 [UDs are not complex, nor direct-, nor special-set, nor assigned for all purposes. Absent “relation” by Dept. 2 (to which, in itself, UD Defendant and P-I Madden does not object), 28 there is no question e-service in UD requires express consent]. 2 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay The e-served document was corrupted and not downloadable. [City has “always” served hard copy backup of every document ever filed inall proce- edings to date in the Docktown matters (“CEQA”, “jurisdiction”, admin writ & currently- pending CRAL Action. Here, City did hard-copy serve the “Notices of Orders”; the version sent by email was corrupted and not viewable; hence, hard copy controls]. UD Defendant and P-I Madden’s case has not been remitted, to her knowledge, from the First District Court of Appeal (““1DCA”) to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court (“App. Div.”), to the Superior Court. [Stancil has been remitted in that order, but apparently the identical, related, “deferred” : cases at the Supreme Court, that were granted review but deferred pending resolution of Stancil $253783, one of which is Madden, are still at the 1DCA (pending confirmation in the clerk’s office today, as UDs are not viewable on Odyssey)]. There is no “Resumption of Trial Court UD” process a UD Plaintiff may claim. The Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. (“CCP”) provides P-I Madden’s post-Delta (& post- Stancil) response 10 is +10 days after effective Service of Notice of Entry of Order (“SoNoEoO”) §418.10(c). Conditions antecedent (remittitur and effective NoNoHoO) must be settled first, 11 The basis ds) for the MTS Complaint-with Prejudice “ ’” is two-fold: 12 Special-venue pleading is a statutory requirement, and omitting venue supports MTS; 13 14 Commencing UD priorto adopting CRAL Plan is forbidden.by law, per Gov. Code §7260 et seq. 15 (CRAL) and 25 CRC §6000 et seq. (mandatory Guidelines). 16 The basis for the MTC UD with CRAL Action “(C)” is-supported by: 7 It is judicially economical and in the interests of justice to Consolidate (identical parties) the 18 Parties are identical and the issues are inter-dependent; jury trial is demanded. 19 The basis for the MTS (Stay) UD pending CRAL Decision “(D)” is supported by: 20 It is judicially economical and in the interests of justice to Stay the related proceedings and 21 22 determine the issues in a rational and logical order, and not commence UD until a post-CRAL Trial 23 Decision has been rendered, currently set for on or before Feb. 18, 2022; and : The basis for Request to Confirm post-CRAL Trial Decision Date “(E)” is supported by: 25 City’s City Attorney, in public meeting Sept. 27, 2021, stated Dept. 2 would render decision 26 “90 days from [Sept. 27, 2021]”. However, last Reply paper was to have been filed (and was filed 27 Nov. 18, 2021; this is considered submission in the absence of an earlier Court Order. The Minute 28 3 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay Orders post-CRAL Trial state “court concluded”, NOT “matter submitted”. Hence, default is Nov. 18, 2021, and 90 days thence-forth is Feb. 18, 2022, Madden seeks confirmation. Rule 9.20 / Interim Suspension (“IS”) Finally, Madden presents in her Declaration information pertaining to her Bar status, as she (Madden) was the last, sole counsel to other UD Defendants in the Superior Court. Madden properly filed the applicable, ordered Rule 9.20 Notices of having provided Notice to Opposing Counsel, see Rule 9.20(a)(4) (notice is of “disqualification to act as attorney”, see Rule 9.20(4)(1)). At Superior Court level since Sept. 2018, P-I Madden represented herself pro per in 18UDL00316, and other UD 10 Defendants due to the Actions, facts, events and occurrences all being identical until suspension. 11 However, P-I Madden has been unable to represent any client(s) of any kind or sort, in any 12 type of action, as she has been on a lengthy administrative “interim suspension” (“IS”), without 13 having been adjudicated in the Bar until recently (pending, solely after 9/14-14, 2021), due to mis- 14 15 conduct by Finigan, J. Thus, other UD Defendants are unrepresented parties, with a former, sus- 16 pended counsel, and City has been made aware of this many, many times by Madden, as well as 17 TBM. See n.' below, for summary & Madden Dec., 2-6, 12-13. 18 J Meet and Confer is not required in U.D. All, facts herein are in the Madden Dec., paras. 2-15. fl IUGTadd[ 19 Dated: Dee, 9, 2021 20 By 1. Le son AlisonMadden, Pro Pé 21 22 [Memo of Points/Authorities; Madden Dec., follow] 1 Madden initially Appealed denial of a Motion to Withdraw No-Contest Plea EMT"), The Court, 25 Finigan, J., denied Certificate of Probable Cause (“CPC”) on a constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim, a highly unusual and irregular act. Thus, Madden did not get an Appeal, and 26 was unaware of no-CPC on Amended Notice of Appeal, until Nov. 2020 when appellate counsel discovered it, more than a year after IS commenced. Had she known she would be denied’CPC, and 27 thus, Appeal, she would have long abandoned the Appeal and been long reinstated by now. In 28 addition, more conduct affected the MTW and other motions and writs (improper independent inves- tigation and improper ex parte contact with D.A., both resulting in wrongful denial of MTW/MEB). 4 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CTV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, MaStay 1 I. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS 2 A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT/INTRODUCTION/PROCEDURE/FACTS 3 This Court has considered P-1 Madden’s prior Motions to Consolidate (“MTC”), and/or to Stay 4 with or without Consolidation, and has denied them without prejudice, mainly so as not to delay the CRAL Trial. P-I Madden, of course, has no issue with this, and always advocated that consolidation of UD (Madden) with the CRAL Action could have been done, with the UD stayed until post-CRAL Trial Decision, as-applicability of CRAL is a relevant, if not the gating, determinative issue in UD. In essence, a Consolidation of the 2 Actions, with Stay of UD proceedings and Trial until Phase 10 2, post-CRAL Trial Decision, was always possible, but a conservative approach is understood. Il Renewal of MTCiStay, in the Alternative, after consideration of MTS 12 P-I Madden now, therefore, renews her MTC, and/or to Stay with or without Consolidation, until 13 this Court’s post-CRAL Trial Decision is rendered, which P-I Madden has calendared as an outside 14 15 date of Feb. 18, 2022, based on last Reply paper filing due date. 16 Such MTC, and/or Stay, is reached only if this Court does not Strike the Complaint (and/or the 17 recent City “Notices & Resumption” document)), for City failing to plead an essential element/alle- 18 gation of UD, a creature of statute that must be strictly followed (i.e., mandatory venue pleading). 19 Even if this Court does not Strike for venue-basis (which is absolutely justified and should be 20 done), it may and should Strike the Complaint, as filing a UD prior to adopting a CRAL-compliant 21 Plan is an impermissible act in furtherance of displacement, in violation of the CRAL Gov. Code and 22 CCR mandatory Guidelines. Should Demurrer be required, it shall be expeditiously filed. 24 Moreover, this Court, Dept. 2, has now heard the CRAL Trial, and the post-CRAL Trial 25 Decision is only now under submission, in P-I Madden’s estimation, as of Nov. 18, 2021, the final 26 day of the Parties’ entitlement to have filed Reply papers. See CRC 2.900(a)(1), (2) (see full rule text 27 ‘1 28 ‘il 5 TEUDEOORTE RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrou; igh etal. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay in n.2, below)’. Requestto Confirm Feb. 18, 2022 as 90-day filing date of Post-CRAL Trial Decisior P-I Madden requests, in this Combined Motion, at hearing or otherwise, that Hon. Marie Weiner confirm for the Parties that the 90-day timeframe for post-CRAL Trial Decision is in fact from Nov. 18, 2021 to Feb. 18, 2022. The reason for this request is that the Redwood City City Attorney ad- vised the Council of Redwood City and the public in a Sept. 27, 2021 public meeting, in response to general public coniments about the Docktown matters and CRAL trial that P-I Madden had made at that meeting. The City Attorney advised Council and all present, including by Zoom or phone dial 10 in, that this Court would render decision within 90 days of the Trial end. 11 However, a review of the 2 (two) Minute Orders that memorialize the end of CRAL Trial, on 12 Odyssey, reflect only that, “court concluded”, not that the “matter was submitted”. P-I Madden sees 13 no reference in any Order, Minute Order or other official document that the matter was submitted in 14 15 any manner other than as Rule 9.200(a) provides (last day of Reply filing, Nov. 18, 2021). 16 Rendering this clarity now, for the parties and public, would be a:service. 17 Facts Applicable to Motion: 18 P-I Madden raises the following facts re: issues and procedures in this Combined Motion: 19 1, P-I Madden never acceded to email service in the UD proceedings. Any prior MTC or to 20} Stay is properly viewed as having been made in relation to the CRAL Action; 21 2. Dept. 2 related the entire set of UD cases together, and related them to the CRAL Action. 22 Although all the UDs therefore appear single-assigned to Dept. 2, this not by CRC, Local Rule or 23 PJ. action. P-I Madden has no objection to Dept. 2 hearing the matters by consolidation, and would 24 25 have sought, in Law & Motion or Master Calendar, to have had them consolidated and transferred. 26 27 ? Rule 2.900. Submission of a cause in a trial court: (a) Submission: A cause is deemed submitted 28 in a trial court when either of the following first occurs: (1) The date the court orders the matter submitted; or (2) The date the final paper is {filed or] argument is heard, whichever is later. 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay However, P-I Madden does object to e-service, as the UDs are not complex, not consolidated, either with each other nor with the CRAL Action, and are not stayed, only currently tolled. It is not fair to accelerate UD timeframes by mandating Defendants accept e-service, especially at this stage. 3. The Burke law firm has always sent hard copy mail of all filings—every Motion, Trial document, Reply, Opposition, Notice of Entry of Order, etc., even when it e-serves. P-I Madden did not receive “Notices of Orders w Exhibits” and “Resumption of Trial Court Unlawful Detainer Proceedings” in hard copy mail until this Combined Motion was nearly finished (after 9/6/2021). Accordingly, response time runs from paper service plus mail days, for next response (see infra). 10 4. Also, it is not a thing, for a Plaintiff to determine “Resumption of Trial Court UD Proce- 11 edings”. The CCP allows a UD Defendant to elect its response, by calculating days after effective 12 Service of Notice of Entry of Order (“NoEoO”). All City need do is effectively serve, then available 13 here is MTS; then Demurrer, then Answer, then MSJ/MSA, then Trial, CCP §418.10(e). 14 15 5. Moreover, P-I Madden’s e-served document was corrupted and cannot be opened, and 16 this is atypical, in that P-I Madden’s laptop is downloading all .pdfs, and she has current licenses to 17 permit download. P-I Madden was able to open some of the document, but gets a corrupted notice, 18 and it messes with the pdf. program, which then cannot be shut and the first several pages cannot be 19 viewed. As a result, solely hard copy service is the driver for next response post-statutory writ 20 (which would be +10 days, +5 for mail, to wit 12/14/2021 (email +2 is Sat., ia 11, so Mon., 2/13). ai 6. Moreover to P-I Madden's knowledge, her UD has not been remitted from 1DCA to App. 22 23 Div. of Superior Court, nor to Superior Court UD desk. Stancil has been so remitted, but P-I Madden 24 has received no notice nor information that 18UDL00316, was remitted, nor any other than Stancil. 7. Moreover, the Burke firm has served documents for other UD Defendants on Madden. 26 The Burke firm and City Attorney have been regularly updated and advised that P-I Madden is still 27 on administrative “interim suspension” (“IS”), and does not represent any other UD Defendant from 28 7 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CTV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay Docktown, only herself pro per. Thus, it is improper for City/Burke to send these documents to P-I Madden, and such is not effective service on any other UD Defendant. (City has been so notified). 8. For total clarity, P-I Madden was only required to file Rule 9.20(a)(4) Notices in Stancil o and the other UD cases in Superior Court, in which she had made a special appearance by MTQ (the “Delta Imports” MTQ that was taken on statutory writ to the Supreme Court). P-I Madden made her Rule 9.20(a)(4) filings, in each case, in 2019, and they are notice of “subsequent disqualification” to act as an attorney, in the verbiage of the Rule (together with the letter Notices per Rule 9.20(a) (1), (4), which were also sent to opposing counsel (Ms. Ramirez and Ms. Kenyon et al. at Burke)). 10 9. These Rule 9.20 Notices were timely provided, and City has known since 2019, and sub- il sequent filing in Superior Court (all UDs), that Madden is on IS (and for procedural (not substantive) 12 reasons, has been to the present, over 2 years from IS). See supra, n.1 & Madden Dec. 2-6, 12-13. 13 10. The Superior Court clerk’s office appears to be operating under all correct presumptions, 14 15 and is “not” sending documents in non-Madden (18UDL00316) matters, to P-I Madden. Thus, only 16 Burke is operating under incorrect assumptions and presumptions as to Madden’s IS status and the 17 propriety (or impropriety) of sending non-Madden UD documents to Madden. 18 11. As a result, out of abundance of caution, contemporaneous with this Combined Motion, 19 P-I Madden will filé supplements (non-mandatory) to her former Rule 9.20 Notices of having provi- 20 ded Notice of IS & DQ to Opposing Counsel under Rule 9.20(a)(4) (likely as of 12/14/2021). 21 22 B. LEGAL ARGUMENT 23 A. UD is Creature of Statute, the Statutes Control, and Strict Compliance is Mandatory CCP Sec. 1159 et seq., known as the Unlawful Detainer (UD) Act, supersedes other Code 25 provisions, and is the sole avenue to bring about a lawful eviction; it must be strictly followed and 26 there is no substantial compliance rule. See, e.g., WDT-Winchester v. Nilsson (1994) 27 Cal.4" 516, 27 520; Baugh v. Consumers Assocs., Ltd. (1996) 241 CalApp.24 672, 674-75. See n.3 for WDT detail. 28 8 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CTV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay , In Baugh, the court stated, “Since [UD] is purely statutory in nature, it is essential that a party seeking the remedy bring himself clearly within the statute.” 241 Cal.App.2d at 647 (citing Rankin v. Super. Ct,, 157 Cal. 189), Baugh also held, “It is settled ... that a party may assert at any time that the complaint does not state a cause of action.” Id., at 673-74 (citing Prichard v. Kimball 190 Cal. 757, 765 and Berryman y. ‘Quinlan, 29 Cal. App. 2d 608, 612 (secondary cites omitted)).* B. AUD Defendant may MTQ, then MTS, then Demur, Serially or Together AUD Defendant may ‘elect, at his or her option, and in this order, to Move to Quash Service of Summons, Move to Strike, and/or Demur, either serially, or together, in the alternative. Both 10 WDT and Baugh support this Court striking the UD Complaint here, because the UD was an act in 11 furtherance of displacement before City adopted a mandatory CRAL Plan, and special-venue . 12 pleading is mandatory. On both grounds in this context, it is proper to Strike UD Complaint, or sus- 13 tain Demurrer (not yet brought but will be if these issues are not resolved on MTS), with prejudice. 14 15 C. MTS Applies Here for Failure to Plead Essential Element (Venue); and no CRAL Plan 16 P-I Madden previously brought a “Delta Imports” MTQ, which was the subject of the Stancil 17 statutory writ decided by the California Supreme Court May 3, 2020. On review, the Cal. Supreme 18 Court “did” recognize a basis for MTQ when an essential UD element is not pleaded. $253783, at 3- 19 4, and it ruled MTQ is not the proper remedy to challenge defects under CCP 1166 generally. Id. 20 Accordingly, P-I Madden believes she could move to quash under Stancil on the grounds 21 City failed to special-plead venue, as required by CCP Sec. 392(a)(1) (not §1166); Rutter, Cal. Prac. 22 23 3 The Supreme Court’s pronouncements in WDT are: “[T]he unlawful detainer statutes are to be strictly construed ....” and “The statutory requirements in such proceedings “must be followed strictly, otherwise a landlord’s remedy is an ordinary suit for breach of contract with all the delays 26 that remedy normally involves and without restitution of the demised property”. (citing Superior Motels, Inc. v. Rinn Motor Hotels, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1070, 71)). And: “[A] landlord, 27 who invokes the summary procedures of unlawful detainer must strictly comply with the ... 28 requirements of the statute under which he/she elects to proceed.” (citing Cf. Kwok v. Bergren (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 596, 599-600 (secondary. citations omitted)). 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CTV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay Guide, LL-T (“Allegation of proper venue is an essential element of the complaint”), p.8-12, §8:21, of, p.8-21, §8:38. The special venue pleading requirement includes both “title” (Super. Ct.San Mateo Co.) arid “branch”, see id. “Branch” must be pleaded “in the Complaint”, not Summons, and is set by Local Rule, per CCP §392(a). See also CCP §396a(a), & Item #3 JC-Form Complaint UD-100. Indeed, failure to follow the mandate of the “other” sections of the CCP (cited above) may be the only statutory defect that supports a Stancil MTQ. The reason being that the Stancil court itself relied on a litmus test of finding a specific statute that modified UD versus ordinary practice. Id. Here, that is the case, and none of this was complied to. Even with all the above authority, 10 and a JC form available, (with boxes/spaces for Venue), and express requirements, City did not 11 special-plead venue as “Southern Branch—Redwood City” “in the Complaint”, as required by statute. 12 For clarity, P-I Madden is “not” now, and here, re-bringing a Stancil MTQ, but feels it would 13 be supported. The reason she is not, is short notice (hearing in 3-7 days). Broadly, MTQ challenges a 14 15 court’s personal jurisdiction, CCP §1167.4, 418.10, CRC 3.1327, Greener v. Workers Comp Appeals 16 Bad. (1993) 6 Cal.4 1028, 1036. A timely filed MTQ avoids entry of default, CCP §585(b), and is a 17 special, not general appearance. Greener, supra, at 1036-37, Parsons v. Super. Ct. (Arques Shipyard 18 Mgmt. Co. LLC) (2007) 149 Cal.App.4"* Supp.1, 5. That has occurred to date. 19 Moreover, any defect (procedural or substantive) that goes to the heart of ‘a court’s authority 20 to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant should (and must, or be waived) be raised by MTQ. 21 Greener, supra, at 1036. P-I Madden is mindful of Stancil, but finds the express statutory support to 22 23 fit within the Court’s stated respect for a statute that applies expressly to the UD context. 24 Deficient special-venue pleading may appear trivial or de minimus, but there is no such rule, 25 standard nor allowance in UD. As noted in dozens of cases, UD is exacting, and strict compliance to 26 the statute is required. City did not even try, and could have fixed this within days of being notified 27 fn Sept. 2018, and been done. But it forced Stancil to the Supreme Court rather than cure its error. 28 10 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay ' All the above briefing on MTQ and post-Stancil, however, P-I Madden applies to her. Motion to Strike the Complaint with Prejudice. To be sure, City would have had to re-file the UDs, had a MTQ been granted, and should have to do so once stricken with prejudice (ie. re-file and re-serve, anew). Given how City behaved, this re-filing is called for. Here, City sued dead people (Logan), and gone people (several), in 2018. A review of the UD ledger shows how many Docktown UD Actions were filed Sept. 2018. The filings were solely . “on the paper”, likely done by OPC from an office without any due diligence. Most tenants had left. 10 The “move out” date was Aug. 31, 2018, a Friday (midnight)-of a 3-day week end (Labor ~N 11 Day). The UDs were filed Tuesday a.m., Sept. 4, 2018 and put out for service immediately. No one 12 went down to see who was still in possession, nor if boats had relocated. Tenants who vacated, gave 13 keys and signed over title, as well as signing all of City’s release, waiver and buyout documents, still 14 15 had UDs filed against them. Further, some of these tenants were then blackmailed into signing docu- 16 ments statirig they had not left, when indeed they had. Some signed, some refused. And, City got 7 court orders for deemed service on some of these vacated sellers. See Madden Dec., at 414. 18 Outrageous. — 19 This is one of the principled reasons why the MTQ was so vigorously litigated by Madden. 20 As to the substance on this MTS, San Mateo County has had 4 (four) branch court locations over the 21 past few decades. Central closed fairly recently, but street signs are still up for it, and much of the 22 23 public would not know it has closed (I went to jury duty and paid traffic infractions there). 24 The Southern “Annex” was moved to the Northem Branch during construction, where it 25 remains. With all this shifting and moving, it is not certain all UDs are heard in Redwood City, and, 26 indeed, it may not comply to law for Northern UDs to be heard in Southern Branch. 27 - Also, this issue and rule of law (branch-venue required) cannot vary by County. 28 1 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, MaStay First, venue is not required to be pleaded at all in a regular, general civil action of any kind. , Solely UD has a mandatory venue-pleading requirement. So that in itself should be the answer. In UD, venue pleading is both County and Branch, and must be “in the Complaint”. Alameda hears UDs in only 1 of its many courts-Hayward. This is not intuitive, and a UD Complaint can be filed in any branch in a County, even with all matters heard solely in another (Alamada, and L.A). - A MTS is a general appearance, CCP §1014, and prevents default. Id. §§585, 86. Complaints may be stricken, in full or part. CCP §435(a)(2), (b)(1). See also Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal. App. 4th 761, 768. ‘The MTW may be used to reach defects in or objections to pleadings, whether or 10 not also challengeable by demurrer. Jd. A MTS is permissible in scenarios where fundamental gating IL pre-conditions have not been met, See, e.g., Rutter, Civ, Proc, Before Trial, at 7(1)-73, 7:156 12 (certificates of merit, ADR, etc.). The meet and confer otherwise required, is not in UD. Id; CCP 13 Sec. 435.5(d)(2) (“This section [435.5] does not apply to ...-unlawful detainer.”). 14 15 Here, both mandatory venue pleading, and the mandatory pre-cursor of a CRAL-compliant 16 Plan are gating factors to the right to prosecute a UD Complaint. As is Remittitur. And, MTS is the 17 only basis by.which to Strike this Complaint for relying on the wrong lease (“LLA vs. “LRA”) (as 18 an “artfully pleaded” (i.e., read, lying, intentional, false) Complaint is taken as true for Demurrer). 19 AMTS lies where the challenged document, or any part of it, is not drawn nor filed in 20 conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court, CCP §436(b), and/or if 21 it contains any “irrelevant, false or improper matter”. CCP §436(a). As to.the former, the MTS 22 23 reaches, “improprieties in [the document’s] form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was 24 filed.” Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4" 509, 528-29 (emphasis in original). Absence of the mandatory venue is a form/format and procedure issue. Lack of a pre-filing CRAL Plan is 26 filing a UD Complaint in violation of applicable law, see infra, and the Lease is a “false” matter. 27 Moreover, the “Notice” is subject to Strike and no effect, as Madden has not been Remitted. 28 12 18UDL00816 RWC ¥. Madden; TICIVOSSET Fambroi ugh et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay This MTS is sought with Prejudice, as to “this” UD. Once this Court issues a post-CRAL Trial Decision, all parties shall know whether CRAL was triggered by the activities of the Redwood City Council, as a public entity undertaking a public project (or even code enforcement). If CRAL applies, these untimely UDs (Madden speaking solely for herself as of this Motion) will have been premature and must be dismissed, as it is improper to take any step in furtherance of displacement prior to a statutorily-required CRAL Plan having been properly adopted and circulated. ‘ AUD, otherwise lawful, is unlawful within the MTS standard, when commenced prior to a pre-filing mandatory action. See supra, Rutter & cases viewing such acts as basis for MTS. Specifi- 10 cally, 25 CCR §§6010 & 6014, in the CRAL context, require adoption of a CRAL-compliant Plan, Il prior to any displacing activity (Prior Determinations & Prerequisites to Displacement, respectively). 12 Sec. 6010(a)(6): “A relocation plan meeting the requirements of section 6038 has been prepared.” 13 Sec. 6038 is Relocation Plan, is extensive and requires Citizen Participation (§6012) (§6038 requires 14 15 “prior to proceeding with any phase of a project or other activity....”; §6040 is Min Requirements). 16 Finally, Sec. 6058 of the CCR states, “Eviction is permissible only as a Tast resort.” City has 17 neither alleged any basis for last resort, and indeed, denied at trial it is even closing Docktown. 18 The “prejudice” therefore is that City may not simply fixa special-venue error, and re-file, as 19 the second, solid and mandatory basis for quashing or striking this complaint is CRAL. City can file 20 another UD “after” the Court determiries CRAL and City does a CRAL Plan.4 (see n.4, below). 21 MTC/Stay 22 MTC authority was briefed in Madden’s prior MTCs and to Stay, and the cases therein apply. 23 24 25 ‘Arroyo Vista. The Arroyo case cited by P-I Madden in her Post-Trial Brief and Reply (wIRIN), involved an initial Complaint, w/contemporaneous Motion for Preliminary Injunction/TRO. See C- 26 07-05794 (Patel, J., N.D. Cal. 2007-09). The MPI/TRO was brought in Jan. 2008, and renewed June 2008 after Judge Patel upheld in that CRAL Action, also a 1983 civil rights claim (on a HUD claim). 27 Arroyo did not involve a parallel UD, but contains briefing, Orders and Dismissal after court- 28 guided and directed settlement directly on point, which supports UD is wrongly started when CRAL applies. See P-I Madden’s RIN, filed with Post-Trial Brief (attaching 3-pp. Order & 31 pp. SA). 13 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay First, CCP §1048 supports consolidation when the parties and manifold issues are common, or the same’, Here, the Parties are identical and the issues are common, as well as the same. Indeed, the cases support it is an abuse of discretion to not stay a UD if another action also speaks to the tight of possession. See, e.g., Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4 367; Wilson v. Gentile (1992) 8 Cal.App.4"* 459; Asuncion v. Super. Ct. (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141. The CRAL issue is a “right to possession” one: City may not reclaim lawful possession over the Creek prior to adopting a CRAL compliant Plan, exactly “because” it displaces residential tenants for “more public access”. As to City’s prior argument, “no other cause may be brought in UD”, to defeat a MTC, this 10 applies to a UD Plaintiff's (Landlord’s) Complaint. It means aUD Complainant may not allege more 1 than UD without an Action becoming a general civil action. It doesn’t prohibit consolidation or Stay, 12 as the cited cases demonstrate. The “one cause” rule means a Landlord may only file to recover 13 possession”; it may not also plead breach or seek relief beyond rent. A UD summary action is clean, 14 15 limited and narrow, and no cross- nor counter-claim is permitted, nor intervention or interpleader; 16 but this is much different than saying no UD may never be consolidated with another action (here, 17 17CIV05387, which was also first-filed). UDs absolutely may be consolidated and/or stayed.° 18 19 20 5 CCP 1048(a) reads, “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it 21 may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” Sec. (b) is less relevant and not quoted herein, 22 -® City’s prior attempts to argue consolidation in CRALis unwarranted because. Madden allegedly “repeatedly” tried to consolidate her UDL is without merit. That argument pertains to a different 23 action, 17CTV00316 (“Jurisdiction Action”), which included the SLC & AG, and Mr. Hannig and 24 his associates & partner. Thus, the parties were not identical, and the MTC in that Action was minor, and collateral. Also, jurisdiction actually remains an affirmative defense in this UD, as 17CIV00316 25 is only law of the case, given the unpublished and erroneous conclusions of the IDCA & Miram. In a prior Opposition, City dropped a note that 17CIV00316 is final, as it is. The SLC & AG never took 26 the position (below or on Appeal) the 1DCA found dispositive--a more-than-tenuous position that PRC 6009.1(c)(13) prohibits California local voters from enacting charters establishing independent 27 Ports (all of them do, and all of them are). Thus, City and Burke spent “years” solely trying to 28 preserve their right to collude with a politically connected lawyer and pay him $1.5 million out of the General Fund, without ever even answering or challenging that Hannig Complaint in any way. 1 18UDL00816 RIC v. Madden; 17C1V05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay Further, “at issue” is not a dispositive inquiry, as a court may absolutely Consolidate and Stay an action before it is “‘at issue”. Indeed, we (the united UD defendants at the time) sought in Law & Motion to Consolidate all UDs with each other and Stay, but Judge Greenberg never ruled on that, given the Motion to Quash (“MTQ”) that was taken up on statutory writ as provided by CCP. Ironically, if City had agreed to consolidate (which it fought tooth and nail), there would be only 1 UD action now, and if they listened to me in public comments that a public entity should use the “American Rule” on attorneys fees, they wouldn’t now be exposed to nearly 10x fees for UDs that will almost certainly be dismissed, and fees recoverable on such dismissal for prior work. 10 Conclusion 11 The traditional balancing inquiry for a “stay” in the context of a TRO or MPI is not the 12 standard here for staying this UD pending CRAL, it is the court’s inherent jurisdiction under CCP 13 Sec. 1048, as well as to manage its own docket. Indeed, especially in Dept. 2. Finally, the 1048 14 15 inquiry is for the public and courts generally, rather than for the most part for the parties’ 16 convenience or interests. Here, the MTS is unquestionably the proper action. The filing of the 17 “Notice and Resumption” should be stricken, the UD Complaint in its entirety should be stricken 18 with prejudice until post-CRAL Trial Decision is rendered, then re-filed anew. Consolidation and/or 19 Stay are if this Court does not strike the Notice/Resumption or Complaint, both justified. 20 Dated: Dec. 9, 2021 ALIS FF) } 21 22 By: le In Pro Per 23 24 25 26 27 They got away with that, but it does not confer jurisdiction by fiat. Miram also undermined this holding by overruling City’s Demurrer to 2AC, stating jurisdiction under the Charter is a triable issue (he eventually reversed every one of his OSC denial bases). 15 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) MTS, MTC, M4Stay V Declaration of Alison Madden (“Madden Dec”) in support of Combined Motions: 1 My name is Alison Madden, I_am pro per in this Action. I am an Active attorney with ' the State Bar of California, but on an administrative, interim suspension (“IS”), as noted in more detail below. I am, thus, “disqualified” to act as an attorney for any other party, but may do so for myself. I state the matters herein of my own, personal knowledge, or information and belief after inquiry. If called as a witness hereto, I could and would competently testify the same as herein. 2. I was sole counsel to other Docktown UD Defendants in Superior Court, until my Bar-ordered IS in 2019, from the practice of law, due to a no-contest plea and conviction, in 2018. 10 This was not only not my finest hour, and an occurrence for which I have deep remorse and regret, 11 and the Probation Officer who recommended a suspended sentence arrived at the conclusion this was 12 1 warranted due to that remorse and regret. 13 3 Following Review Dept. Order (of the State Bar Court), I filed in San Mateo County, 14 15 Superior Court, UDL Dept., the Rule 9.20 Notices of having provided Notice of IS to Opposing 16 Counsel. See Rule 9.20(a)(1), (4) “disqualification” to act as attornéy; no other act required). 17 4. At Superior Court since Sept. 2018, I have solely represented myself pro per in UD. 18 Lonly ever represented any otherUD Defendant(s) due to the Actions, facts, events and occurrences 19 being identical. I represented them until my IS (all cases were deferred on statutory writ at the time). 20 5 I have been unable to represent any client(s) of any kind or sort, in any type of action, 21 due to this lengthy administrative IS. Only recently was my Bar case heard, on Sept. 14-15, 2021. 22 23 This was due to improper actions and erroneous rulings by Finigan, J., including without limitation, 24 denial of a Cettificate of Probable Cause (“CPC”), thereby depriving me of having an Appeal on my 25 constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel (‘SIAC”) claim, an almost unheard of denial. There 26 was also improper ex parte communication with the D.A. by the court, and an improper, independent 27 investigation by the court into my “Bar Record” (both irrelevant and non-existent, due to a single 28 1 1295350v1 18UDL00816 RWC v, Madden; 17CIV05387 Fambrough et al. (CRAL) Madden Dec. ISO MTS MTC, M4Stay private “ALD” (agreement in lieu of discipline based on a non-mandatory self-report 2005 misdemeanor ). Judge Finigan got all law and facts wrong through this improper conduct, and I did not find out about the denial of CPC on Amended Notice of Appeal until Nov. 2020, and would certainly have been practicing again by that date had I not lost over a year from denial of Oct. 2019 Motion to Withdraw No-Contest Plea for LAC, Accordingly, the IS has been longer than supported. 6 As a result, other UD Défendants are unrepresented, with former, suspended counsel, and City has been made aware of this many, many times by Madden, as well as Ms. Frostom of the San Diego “TBM” firm, who has advised and apprised City and Burke she is not UD counsel. 10 Salient emails can be provided for the court, and shall be on Reply or otherwise on request. ll 7. Ina public, evening meeting, which was a regularly-noticed, calendared, official 12 meeting of the Redwood City “Council”, the Mayor invited the City Attorney to speak to Council 13 Members and the public after I made general public comments respecting the end of the Docktown 14 15 Trial. The City Attorney stated the Court would render its decision without 90 (ninety) days of that 16 day, Sept. 27, 2021. Apparently the City Attorney believed that the matter had been “submitted”, 17 although I believe it was submitted under applicable laws (CRC) as of Nov. 18, 2021. 18 8. It is my belief a Mayor inviting a retort by a City Attomey violates open meeting and 19 sunshine laws, including potentially (without limitation) the Brown Act (in that it was not a noticed/ 20 agendized item). I also believe it was wrong to invite a City Attorney to respond to a member of the 21 public generally, at all, with a notation by the Mayor that the Mayor wanted the City Attomey to 22 address whether the speaker had been wrong about anything in such public speaker’s entitlement to two minutes of speaking to elected members. 25 9. P-I Madden never acceded to email service in the UD proceedings. Moreover, P-I 26 Madden’s e-served document was corrupted and cannot be opened, and this is atypical, in that P-I 27 Madden’s laptop is downloading all .pdfs, and she has current licenses to permit download. P-I 28 2 18UDL00816 RWC v. Madden; 17CTV05387 Fambro ugh et al. (CRAL) Madden Dec. ISO MTS, MTC, MaStay Madden was able to open some of the document, but gets a corrupted notice, and it messes with the pdf. program, which then cannot be shut and the first several pages cannot be viewed. 10. Moreover to P-I Madden’s knowledge, her UD has not been remitted from 1DCA to App. Div. of Superior Court, nor to Superior Court UD desk. Stancil has been so remitted, but P-I Madden. has received no notice nor information that 18UDL00316, was remitted, nor any other than Stancil. ll. In addition, the Burke firm served the “Response” and “Resumption of UD Proce- edings” documents, for other UD Defendants, on me, both by email and in hard copy. The Burke 10 firm and City Attorney were regularly updated and advised I am still on IS, and do not represent any i other UD Defendant (s)from Docktown, only myself pro per. Thus, it is improper for City/Burke to 12 send such documents to me. I advised them regularly before Nov. 29, 2021, but they served me 13 anyway. I thereafter emailed them several times, and have not received a response. 14 15 12. For total clarity, I was only required to file Rule 9.20(@)(4) Notices in Superior Court 16 (vs. a “withdrawal” by noticed motion or otherwise; or any other document until requested (i.e., a 17 substitution with new counsel, etc.)). I made solely a special appearance by MTQ (“Delta Imports”) 18 that was taken on statutory writ to the Supreme Court (Stancil $263783). I made a Rule 9.20(a)(4) 19 filing in each