City Of Berkeley Vs Jones

RG19008535: Perryman VS Lush Cosmetics LLC 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Preliminary Approval in Department 23 Tentative Ruling - 07/17/2024 Michael Markman The Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement filed by Amelia Perryman on 04/22/2024 is Granted. BACKGROUND This is a wage-and-hour class action and PAGA representative action. Plaintiff Amelia Perryman and defendant Lush Cosmetics LLC have agreed to settle the claims for a gross settlement amount of $1,800,000.00, which includes up to $599,999.99 in attorney’s fees; up to $45,000.00 in litigation costs and expenses incurred by counsel; an enhancement of $10,000.00 for plaintiff; settlement administration costs of up to $29,400.00, and $20,00.00 in PAGA civil penalties (75% of penalties go to California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25% to aggrieved employees). The remaining amount is to be distributed among participating class members in proportion to the number of pay periods worked by each. LEGAL STANDARD To prevent “fraud, collusion or unfairness to the class, the settlement or dismissal of a class action requires court approval.” (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800.) The Court “must determine the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.” (Id. at p. 1801.) “The well-recognized factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class action settlement agreement include ‘the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.’” (Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 [quoting Dunk, supra, at p. 1801].) Similarly, a “trial court should evaluate a PAGA settlement to determine whether it is fair, reasonable, and adequate in view of PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws.” (Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 77 [noting overlap of factors in class action analysis, “including the strength of the plaintiff's case, the risk, the stage of the proceeding, the complexity and likely duration of further litigation, and the settlement amount”].) PRELIMINARY APPROVAL Plaintiffs’ counsel investigated and obtained information from defendant, conducted interviews and a deposition, and analyzed defendants’ policies and sample time and payroll records. (See Setareh Decl., ¶ 14.) The parties then participated in an arm’s length mediation. (See id., ¶ 15.) Plaintiff includes an adequate Kullar analysis, providing a reasonable estimate of SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG19008535: Perryman VS Lush Cosmetics LLC 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Preliminary Approval in Department 23 the number of class members, the total estimated possible recovery, and an explanation why the settlement was reasonable in light thereof. (See id., ¶ 16.) The terms of the settlement and notice procedures appear generally fair, reasonable and adequate. SERVICE AWARD, FEES, & COSTS The court will not rule on a service award for the representative plaintiff, fees, or costs until final approval but provides the following preliminary guidance: Any incentive or service award must be supported with “quantification of time and effort expended on the litigation, and in the form of reasoned explanation of financial or other risks incurred by the named plaintiffs.” (Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 807.) This court is unlikely to approve an award of more than $7,500.00 absent special circumstances. The settlement agreement authorizes counsel to seek fees of up to one-third of the gross settlement amount. This court’s benchmark for the percentage of recovery approach is 30%. (See Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 495; Schulz v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1167, 1175; Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557 fn 13; Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 fn 11.) A “court approving a settlement that includes a negotiated fee [] is required to decide if the fee negotiated by the parties closely approximates the value of the attorneys’ work.” (Robbins v. Alibrandi, 127 Cal.App.4th 438, 452.) Counsel must address the value of the attorneys’ work, as well as the justification for any deviation from this court’s benchmark, in the fee application. Ten percent of the attorney’s fee award must be kept in the administrator’s trust fund until the completion of the distribution process and court approval of a final accounting. The settlement agreement authorizes reimbursement of litigation costs. Counsel must provide evidentiary support for the actual costs incurred at the time of final approval. The court’s preference is for Plaintiffs to move for final approval, for attorneys’ fees and costs, and for plaintiff’s enhancement payment in a single motion. ORDER Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement GRANTED. The court will sign the second amended proposed order filed on July 16, 2024. Within five (5) days of notice of entry of this order, plaintiffs’ counsel must submit a declaration attaching the PAGA notice letter referenced in paragraph 10 of Setareh Declaration. HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING? THROUGH eCOURT SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG19008535: Perryman VS Lush Cosmetics LLC 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Preliminary Approval in Department 23 Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed” BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK (dept23@alameda.courts.ca.gov) and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely. Notice via BOTH eCourt AND email is required. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no party contests the tentative ruling.

23CV057116: ACOSTA, et al. vs AXLEHIRE, INC., A CORPORATION 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation (Defendant) in Department 21 Tentative Ruling - 07/12/2024 Noël Wise The Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation on 05/15/2024 is Granted in Part. The Motion of defendant Axlehire to compel arbitration in Acosta v. Axlehire, 23CV057116 (individual and class) is GRANTED. The Motion of defendant Axlehire to compel arbitration in Costa v. Axlehire, 23CV055896 (PAGA) is DENIED. The request to stay the LWDA’s claims under the PAGA is DENIED. PROCEDURE The two cases are CONSOLIDATED. See Order of 6/12/24 states: “The court ORDERS that on or before 6/28/24 counsel for plaintiff must file a First Amended Consolidated Complaint in the Class Action that includes the claims of plaintiff Heston on behalf of himself as an individual, on behalf of the putative class, and as agent and proxy for the LWDA under the PAGA.” Plaintiffs have not yet filed a First Amended Consolidated Complaint. GENERAL BACKGROUND Defendant Axlehire operates an online, application-based platform that connects independent providers of local delivery services with retail stores and other businesses seeking delivery services for consumer-packaged goods and other items. Plaintiffs worked for Axlehire. Axlehire’s opening brief presents the declaration of Chief Technology Officer Evan Robinson. Robinson states that persons who want to work for Axlehire enter into a Technology Services Agreement ("TSA") through an electronic sign-up process. (Robinson Dec para 7, 8.) Robinson provides screen shots of the sign-up process for both Acosta and Duarte. (Robinson para 15-18, Exhs B, C, D, E.) The TSAs at para 7 state the arbitration agreement. COMMON ISSUE – APPLICABILITY OF THE FAA. The FAA does not apply to the contract. The TSA at para 7(a) states “This Arbitration Provision is a contract governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 V.S.C. § I et seq.” The court would normally give effect to the FAA choice of law provision (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 174), but the FAA on its terms does not apply to workers “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The FAA does not apply to workers like plaintiff who are “actively” transportation workers. (Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024) 601 U.S. 246.) The FAA does not apply to SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV057116: ACOSTA, et al. vs AXLEHIRE, INC., A CORPORATION 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation (Defendant) in Department 21 “last mile” delivery drivers such as plaintiff. (Betancourt v. Transportation Brokerage Specialists, Inc. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 552, 558-561 [“last mile” delivery drivers fall under FAA exemption]; Nieto v. Fresno Beverage Co. (2019) 245 Cal. App. 5th 274, 284 [transporting goods is the “last mile” of a “continuous phase of interstate commerce”].) Plaintiff has presented evidence that supports a finding that he was actively engaged in the transport of goods in interstate commerce. MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS The motion of defendant Axlehire to compel plaintiffs Acosta and Duarte to arbitrate their individual claims in Acosta v. Axlehire, 23CV057116 (class) is GRANTED. An arbitration agreement may state that the arbitrator will decide issues of arbitrability if the delegation is “clear and unmistakable.” “This is a ‘heightened standard,’ higher than the evidentiary standard applicable to other matters of interpreting an arbitration agreement.” (Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1048.) The TSA at para 7(b) states: “Except as provided below regarding the Class Action Waiver and Representative Action Waiver, such disputes include without limitation disputes arising out of or relating to interpretation or application of this Arbitration Provision, including the formation, scope, enforceability, waiver, applicability, revocability or validity of this Arbitration Provision or any portion of this Arbitration Provision.” The court finds that the TSA delegates to the arbitrator the responsibility to decide issues of arbitrability regarding the individual claims. The arbitrator can consider the issue regarding whether the agreement is unenforceable because of the class waiver. (Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443.) The arbitrator can consider whether certain claims are exempt from arbitration under Labor Code 229. MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION OF LWDA’S CLAIMS ASSERTED UNDER THE PAGA The Motion of defendant Axlehire to compel arbitration in Acosta v. Axlehire, 23CV055896 (PAGA) is DENIED. The court will decide the issue of whether the LWDA entered into the TSA, which is a precursor issue to whether the LWDA agreed that the arbitrator could decide issues of arbitrability. (Theresa D. v. MBK Senior Living LLC (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 18, 25-27.) The court then addresses the issue of whether to compel the named plaintiffs to prosecute the “individual PAGA claims” in arbitration. The LWDA did not enter into any employment agreement with Axlehire. The private plaintiff entered into the employment agreement. A private person entering into an employment SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV057116: ACOSTA, et al. vs AXLEHIRE, INC., A CORPORATION 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation (Defendant) in Department 21 agreement (the TSA) does not have the authority to commit the LWDA to resolve its claims in arbitration. “[A] defendant cannot rely on a predispute waiver by a private employee to compel arbitration in a PAGA case, which is brought on behalf of the state.” (Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply (2017) 9 Cal. App. 5th 439, 445.) (See also Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 602, 621-622 [similar]; LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1194-1196 [the plaintiff's authority to act on behalf of the LWDA is defined by the date and scope of the PAGA notice letter].) Under the PAGA, a private person acts as proxy or agent of the LWDA and asserts an action on behalf of the LWDA. The claim belongs to the LWDA and is essentially a law enforcement action. (Estrada v. Royal Carpet Mills. Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582, 598-599; Adolph v. Uber Technologies (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1116; Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 81; ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 185; Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 381.) There is recent uncertainty about the nature of a claim on behalf of the LWDA regarding whether it is in the nature of a qui tam claim on behalf of the LWDA or whether the private person brining the action on behalf of the LWDA has some separately identifiable “individual PAGA claim.” In Gavriiloglou v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 595, 605 (review denied), the California Court of Appeal rejected the Viking River concept of “individual PAGA claims,” stating: “This is mere wordplay. What the Supreme Court called, as shorthand, an “individual PAGA claim” is not actually a PAGA claim at all. It would exist even if PAGA had never been enacted. It is what we are calling, more accurately, an individual Labor Code claim.” This trial court will follow the consistent California Supreme Court authority that an action under the PAGA is a law enforcement action and that under the PAGA an employee acts as proxy and agent for the LWDA. The Motion of defendant to compel arbitration of “individual PAGA claim” is DENIED because as a matter of law there is no such thing as an “individual PAGA claim.” The court addressed this issue in some detail in orders in other cases. (Esperson v. Cattlemens, Inc. (2/2/24) 2024 WL 555875; Contreras v. Davey Tree Surgery Co. (2/2/24) 2024 WL 555874.) MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO STAY CLAIMS OF THE LWDA The motion to stay the LWDA’s claims is DENIED. The TSA states that the signers agree to stay any representative claim pending arbitration of the contractor’s individual arbitration. A private person entering into an employment agreement (the TSA) does not have the authority to commit the LWDA to stay the law enforcement claim. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV057116: ACOSTA, et al. vs AXLEHIRE, INC., A CORPORATION 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation (Defendant) in Department 21 There is no requirement that the court stay the claims of the LWDA simply because an individual employee must arbitrate their claims. (Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539, 555-557.) In addition, the legislature recently amended CCP 1294(a) to state that although an aggrieved party may appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration, “the perfecting of such an appeal shall not automatically stay any proceedings in the trial court during the pendency of the appeal.” This indicates a legislative preference that trial courts make discretionary decisions about whether to stay a case. Furthermore, the court anticipates that arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual claims should be completed expeditiously. The stated benefits of arbitration are its “lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.” (Sonic- Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1143.) (See also Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 924 [“arbitration's fundamental attributes of speed and efficiency” ].) If defendant asserts that the results of the arbitration of the individual claims have any effect on the prosecution of the LWDA’s claims, then defendant can return to this case and seek appropriate relief. The court will not stay the LWDA’s claims. Plaintiff as agent and proxy of the LWDA may prosecute the LWDAs’ claims. CASE MANAGEMENT On 7/1/24, the PAGA was amended. Labor Code 2699(v)(1) states: “the amendments made to this section by the act adding this subdivision shall apply to a civil action brought on or after June 19, 2024.” The court does not address or decide the issue of whether the claims of the LWDA that are asserted in this case are limited to the claims arising in the statutes of limitations period before the filing of complaint (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 227 [“a cause of action is framed by the facts in existence when the underlying complaint is filed”]; whether the LWDA’s claims includes alleged Labor Code violations arising after the filing of the complaint; or whether plaintiff as agent and proxy of the LWDA may or must seek leave to file a supplemental complaint to assert claims arising after the filing of the complaint or after 7/1/24 ( Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 426; Flood v. Simpson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 644, 647). These issues will, however, likely affect the scope of the LWDA’s claims going forward and the penalties that the LWDA can seek in the case. PLEASE NOTE: This tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if uncontested by SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV057116: ACOSTA, et al. vs AXLEHIRE, INC., A CORPORATION 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation (Defendant) in Department 21 04:00pm the day before your hearing. If you wish to contest the tentative ruling, then both notify opposing counsel directly and the court at the eCourt portal found on the court’s website: www.alameda.courts.ca.gov. If you have contested the tentative ruling or your tentative ruling reads, “parties to appear,” please use the following link to access your hearing at the appropriate date and time: https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/department21 . If no party has contested the tentative ruling, then no appearance is necessary.

RG18933993: Stewart VS Red Bay Coffee Company LLC 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Compliance with Previous Court Orders; filed by Ashley Stewart (Plaintiff) in Department 22 Tentative Ruling - 07/12/2024 Brad Seligman The Motion for Sanctions filed by Ashley Stewart on 06/21/2024 is Granted in Part. Plaintiff Ashley Stewart’s Unopposed Motion for Issue Sanctions against Defendants Red Bay Coffee Company, Inc. and Keba Konte’s (“Defendants”) is GRANTED in part as to the establishment that Defendants Konte and Red Bay Coffee Company are alter egos of one another. As to Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims, the Court declines to issue an order that Plaintiff has proven those claims at this time. Unlike the alter ego claims, plaintiff has facts within her possession relevant to establishing a prima facie case. Since Defendants’ Answer has been stricken, they will be unable to rebut any evidence presented by Plaintiff, and cannot present a defense. HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING? THROUGH eCOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed” BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK (dept22@alameda.courts.ca.gov) and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely. Notice via BOTH eCourt AND email is required. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no party contests the tentative ruling.

22CV009928: MOZQUEDA vs ONPOINT TESTING, INC 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to be Relieved as Counsel filed by ONPOINT TESTING, INC (Defendant) in Department 23 Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2024 Michael Markman Join ZoomGov Meeting https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16061942036 Meeting ID: 160 6194 2036 --- One tap mobile +16692545252,,16061942036# US (San Jose) +14154494000,,16061942036# US (US Spanish Line)

23CV027428: ADCOCK vs EDEN HOUSING, INC., et al. 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel by Defendants Eden Housing, Inc., Eden Housing Management, Inc., and Daniel Villalon’s Re: Compliance with Deposition Subpoena [C.C.P. § 2020]; filed by Eden Housing, Inc. (Defendant) + in Department 24 Tentative Ruling - 07/12/2024 Rebekah Evenson The Hearing on Motion to Compel by Defendants Eden Housing, Inc., Eden Housing Management, Inc., and Daniel Villalon’s Re: Compliance with Deposition Subpoena [C.C.P. § 2020]; filed by Eden Housing, Inc. (Defendant) + scheduled for 07/18/2024 is continued to 08/22/2024 at 09:00 AM in Department 24 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse . Defendants’ unopposed Motion to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena is CONTINUED to August 22, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 24. Defendants seek to compel nonparty Aaron Todd Oravetz to produce documents in response to a subpoena. The only evidence the Court has of the subpoena is the Declaration of Daniela Lagunas filed on November 20, 2023. The deposition subpoena is attached as Exhibit 1 to Lagunas’ declaration, but it is missing (1) Attachment 3, which specifies the documents that Defendants are requesting from Oravetz, and (2) the Notice to Consumer or Employee, along with proof of service of the Notice. By no later than July 25, Defendants shall file and serve a supplemental declaration of Daniela Lagunas (or the declaration of any other person qualified to authenticate the documents) that attaches the complete subpoena served on Oravetz, including Attachment 3, along with the Notice to Consumer and the proof of service of the Notice. By July 25, Defendants shall serve notice on Oravetz that this motion is being continued to August 22. Service by overnight mail at Oravetz’s office address will be sufficient. Defendants shall file the proof of service by July 26.

RG20070369: Dionicio VS Pacific Agri-Products, INC, a California corpora 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Further Class Certification in Department 23 Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2024 Michael Markman Afternoon, Parties to Appear: Join ZoomGov Meeting https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16061942036 Meeting ID: 160 6194 2036 --- One tap mobile +16692545252,,16061942036# US (San Jose) +14154494000,,16061942036# US (US Spanish Line) The Motion for Class Certification filed by Jose Alonzo Sorto, Robert Shepner, Luis Melchor, Agustin Carmona Dionicio, Mario Ramirez on 05/03/2024 is Granted in Part. BACKGROUND FACTS This is a wage-and-hour class action and PAGA representative action. In the Fourth Amended Complaint (FAC), plaintiffs Agustin Carmona Dionicio, Luis Melchor, Robert Shepner, Jose Alonso Sorto, and Mario Ramriez assert eight causes of action for violations of the Labor Code and Unfair Competition Law. Plaintiff Ramirez, on behalf of the state, seeks to recover civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Pacific Agri-Products, Inc. is a wholesale meat products distributor, with facilities in South San Francisco, the Port of Oakland, and Oakdale (near Modesto). (See FAC, ¶ 17; Riparbelli Decl., ¶ 2.) Defendant has “about 96 non-exempt employees on payroll with 25 of those employees working at South San Francisco (14 warehouse employees, 5 office employees, 6 drivers), 29 in Oakland (13 warehouse employees, 6 office employees, 10 drivers), and 42 in Oakdale (22 warehouse employees, 5 office employees, 15 drivers).” (Riparbelli Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s policy and practice resulted in widespread meal break violations. This court previously certified two meal period subclasses and a derivative claims subclass: Meal Period Subclass No. 1: All current and former non-exempt employees of Pacific Agri-Products, Inc. who worked as a driver and who worked at least one shift greater than five hours between August 6, 2016 and April 30, 2021. Meal Period Subclass No. 2: All current and former non-exempt employees of SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20070369: Dionicio VS Pacific Agri-Products, INC, a California corpora 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Further Class Certification in Department 23 Pacific Agri-Products, Inc. who worked as a driver and who worked at least one shift greater than ten hours between August 6, 2016 and April 30, 2021. Derivative Claims Subclass: All members of the Meal Period Subclasses who were not timely provided wage statements at termination or who were provided wage statements that did not accurately reflect itemized wages under Labor Code §§ 201–203 and § 226. Plaintiff have since amended the complaint to add additional named plaintiff and seek further certification of meal period subclasses for warehouse workers and officer workers. Plaintiff Jose Alonso Sorto was employed as a warehouse worker from approximately January 26, 2017 to March 26, 2017. Plaintiff Robert Shepner was employed as an officer worker from approximately March 2016 to March 2019. LEGAL STANDARD “[W]hen the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) “The party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” (Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Ct. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) The community-of-interest requirement embodies three factors: “(1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (Ibid.) DISCUSSION Defendant challenges plaintiffs’ showing with respect (1) Sorto’s typicality as a representative plaintiff, (2) Sorto’s and class counsel’s adequacy; and (4) the benefits of certifying the proposed classes. First, Sorto meets the requirement of typicality to represent classes of warehouse workers employed between August 6, 2016 and April 30, 2021. The test of typicality “is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” (Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 362, 375.) Plaintiffs submit evidence that he worked shifts of greater than five hours and greater than 10 hours during the relevant period and experienced potential meal break violations. (See Breshears Decl., ¶¶ 16–18.) Defendant contends that a statute of limitations issue renders Sorto atypical of the proposed class. “[E]vidence that a representative is subject to unique defenses is one factor to be SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20070369: Dionicio VS Pacific Agri-Products, INC, a California corpora 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Further Class Certification in Department 23 considered in deciding the propriety of certification,” but “a defendant's raising of unique defenses against a proposed class representative does not automatically render the proposed representative atypical.” (Fireside Bank v. Superior Ct. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1090–91.) In this case, the court is not persuaded that any statute of limitations defense is so “factually intensive” or “legally complex” as to “consume an inordinate amount of time and become a major focus of the litigation.” (Id., p. 1092.) Class claims for Sorto may or may not be time barred, but the issue is not specific to Sorto—other class members may be affected as well. Any statute of limitations question based on the date of the filing of the complaint may be determined on a class-wide basis. The question of class certification is “essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is legally or factually meritorious.” (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th429, 439–40.) While “the important interests of fairness and efficiency sometimes may be served better when class causes of action are screened for legal sufficiency before the matter of certification is decided,” when the “substantive theories and claims of a proposed class suit are alleged to be without legal or factual merit, the interests of fairness and efficiency are furthered when the contention is resolved in the context of a formal pleading (demurrer) or motion (judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or summary adjudication) that affords proper notice and employs clear standards.” (Id., p. 440.) In this case, the statute of limitations question is more properly decided on a noticed, pre-trial motion. Second, Sorto is an adequate representative plaintiff. While defendant cites unrebutted evidence that “Dionicio’s managerial responsibilities included management of PacAgri’s rest break and meal period policy and procedures for warehouse workers,”—including Sorto— defendant does not cite evidence that Sorto had responsibility for managing the breaks of any other employees. (See Riparbelli Decl., ¶ 6.) As discussed in this court’s prior order (issued by Judge Seligman), Dionicio is not an adequate representative for warehouse workers because of the potential conflict with other class members. (See, e.g., Lampe v. Queen of the Valley Med. Ctr. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 832, 840 [McNair was responsible for scheduling meal breaks for the nurses in her unit which created a conflict between proposed members of the class”].) That conflict, however, may be resolved by adjusting the class definition for the 5-year warehouse class to exclude those whose “responsibilities included management of PacAgri’s rest break and meal period policy and procedures for warehouse workers.” It would defeat the purpose of wage-and-hour class actions if the existence of a manager with a conflict were enough to defeat class certification entirely. Defendant’s challenge to the adequacy of class counsel may be resolved on the same basis. Plaintiffs’ theory of liability for the 10-hour classes, moreover, is based on defendant’s overall policy. In certifying the second meal period subclass, this court noted that defendant’s policy was undisputedly “facially non-compliant because it did not mention a second meal break” and cited expert analysis of pay records showing that “approximately 99.1% of the shifts in excess of ten hours had a potential second meal break violation and no record of premium pay.” (Class Certification Order, entered Dec. 1, 2023, at p. 6.) The court certified the 10-hour subclass based on defendant’s express policy and statistical evidence; thus, there is no inconsistency or conflict in plaintiff’s class theory of liability. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20070369: Dionicio VS Pacific Agri-Products, INC, a California corpora 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Further Class Certification in Department 23 Third, this court has already considered the manageability and superiority of resolving plaintiffs’ meal break violation claims on a class basis. “In general, a class action is proper where it provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress and when numerous parties suffer injury of insufficient size to warrant individual action.” (Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1353.) Where plaintiffs’ claims are based on “policy and statistical evidence” and defendant “offers no evidence of waiver,” the court is not persuaded that resolution of the class claims is unmanageable. (Class Certification Order, entered Dec. 1, 2023, at p. 17.) Even if the trial involves evidence on the implementation of policy across warehouses, defendant operates out of only three locations. Similarly, the court is satisfied that the derivate claims are manageable. “Missed-break premium pay” counts as “wages subject to the Labor Code's timely payment and reporting requirements, and it can support section 203 waiting time penalties and section 226 wage statement penalties where the relevant conditions for imposing penalties are met.” (Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 93, 125.) Defendant argues that trial would be unmanageable because of its due process right to present evidence regarding its state of mind. While plaintiff’s proposed trial plan is not specific on this point, it estimates a full day of trial spent on determination of derivative violations. Defendant has not provided any basis for the court to assume that more time would be required. ORDER Meal Period Subclasses Nos. 1 & 2 were previously certified and Luis Melchor appointed class representative. The court further certifies the following subclasses: Meal Period Subclass No. 3: All current and former non-exempt employees of Pacific Agri-Products, Inc. who worked as a warehouse worker—except those warehouse workers whose responsibilities included management of PacAgri’s rest break and meal period policy and procedures for warehouse workers—and who worked at least one shift greater than five hours between August 6, 2016 and April 30, 2021. Meal Period Subclass No. 4: All current and former non-exempt employees of Pacific Agri-Products, Inc. who worked as a warehouse worker and who worked at least one shift greater than ten hours between August 6, 2016 and April 30, 2021. Meal Period Subclass No. 5: All current and former non-exempt employees of Pacific Agri-Products, Inc. who worked as an officer worker and who worked at least one shift greater than five hours between August 6, 2016 and April 30, 2021. Meal Period Subclass No. 6: All current and former non-exempt employees of Pacific Agri-Products, Inc. who worked as an officer worker and who worked at least one shift greater than ten hours between August 6, 2016 and April 30, 2021. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG20070369: Dionicio VS Pacific Agri-Products, INC, a California corpora 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Further Class Certification in Department 23 Jose Sorto is appointed class representative for Meal Period Subclasses Nos. 3 & 4, and Robert Shepner is appointed class representative for Meal Period Subclasses Nos. 5 & 6. Advocates for Worker Rights LLP is appointed class counsel. The derivative claims subclass is modified to correct a typographical error referring to “wage statements” rather than “wages” applied at termination; the derivative claims subclass applies to all meal period subclasses now certified: Derivative Claims Subclass: All members of the Meal Period Subclasses who were not timely provided wage at termination or who were provided wage statements that did not accurately reflect itemized wages under Labor Code §§ 201-203 and § 226. The court is posting this tentative ruling after the statutory deadline and so anticipates that the parties will appear and that this tentative ruling will help guide the argument. Alternatively, the parties may inform the court that they submit to the tentative ruling at the hearing

23CV027464: NORSWORTHY vs HUNGRY MARKETPLACE, INC. A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 07/16/2024 Complex Determination Hearing in Department 21 Tentative Ruling - 07/16/2024 Noël Wise COMPLEX DETERMINATION The Court designates this case as complex pursuant to Rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court. Counsel are advised to be familiar with the Alameda County Local Rules concerning complex litigation, including Rule 3.250 et seq. An order assigning the case to a judge and an initial case management order will be issued. COMPLEX CASE FEES Pursuant to Government Code section 70616, any non-exempt party who has appeared in the action but has not paid the complex case fee is required to pay the fee within ten days of the filing of this order. The complex case fee is $1,000 for each plaintiff or group of plaintiffs appearing together and $1,000 PER PARTY for each defendant, intervenor, respondent or other adverse party, whether filing separately or jointly, up to a maximum of $18,000 for all adverse parties. All payments must identify on whose behalf the fee is submitted. Please submit payment to the attention of the Complex Litigation Clerk located in the Civil Division at the Rene C. Davidson Courthouse, 1225 Fallon Street, Oakland, CA 94612. Please make check(s) payable to the Clerk of the Superior Court. Documents may continue to be filed as allowed under Local Rule 1.9. Note that for those admitted pro hac vice, there is also an annual fee. (Gov't Code section 70617.) PROCEDURES Calendar information, filings, and tentative rulings are available to the public at http://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/domainweb/. All counsel are expected to be familiar and to comply with pertinent provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the California Rules of Court, the Alameda County Superior Court Local Rules and the procedures outlined on the domain web page of the assigned department. SERVICE OF THIS ORDER Counsel for plaintiff(s) shall have a continuing obligation to serve a copy of this order on newly joined parties defendant not listed on the proof of service of this order and file proof of service. Each party defendant joining any third party cross-defendant shall have a continuing duty to serve a copy of this order on newly joined cross-defendants and to file proof of service. Pursuant to Government Code Sections 70616(a) and 70616(b), a single complex fee of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) must be paid on behalf of all plaintiffs. For defendants, a complex fee of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) must be paid for each defendant, intervenor, respondent SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV027464: NORSWORTHY vs HUNGRY MARKETPLACE, INC. A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 07/16/2024 Complex Determination Hearing in Department 21 or adverse party, not to exceed, for each separate case number, a total of eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000.00), collected from all defendants, intervenors, respondents, or adverse parties. All such fees are ordered to be paid to Alameda Superior Court, within 10 days of service of this order. This case is hereby determined to be complex within the meaning of Rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court. The case is ordered reassigned to Judge Michael Markman in Department 23 at the Rene C. Davidson Courthouse for all further proceedings and for all purposes. The case is ordered stayed until the Initial Status Conference date. Notice of Initial Status Conference is to be given by the Clerk in Department 23. No responsive pleadings may be filed until further order of the Court. Parties may file a Notice of Appearance in lieu of an Answer or other responsive pleading. The filing of a Notice of Appearance shall not constitute a general appearance, and shall not waive any substantive or procedural challenge to the complaint. Nothing herein stays the time for filing Affidavit of Prejudice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. Pursuant to Government Code section 70616 subdivisions (a) and (b), each party is ordered to pay $1,000.00 for complex fees, payable to Alameda County Superior Court, within ten (10) calendar days of service of this order. Any party objecting to the complex designation must file an objection with proof of service in Department 24 within ten (10) days of service of this minute order. Any response to the objection must be filed in Department 24 within seven (7) days of service of the objection. This Court will make its ruling on the submitted pleadings. Order has been filed. PLEASE NOTE: This tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if uncontested by 04:00pm the day before your hearing. If you wish to contest the tentative ruling, then both notify opposing counsel directly and the court at the eCourt portal found on the court’s website: www.alameda.courts.ca.gov. If you have contested the tentative ruling or your tentative ruling reads, “parties to appear,” please use the following link to access your hearing at the appropriate date and time: https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/department21 . If no party has contested the tentative ruling, then no appearance is necessary. Clerk is directed to serve copies of this order, with proof of service, to counsel and to self- represented parties of record.

RG18927787: Mendoza VS West Coast Quartz Corporation 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication filed by Luis Mendoza (Plaintiff) in Department 23 Tentative Ruling - 07/17/2024 Michael Markman Parties to appear. Topic: Department 23's Personal Meeting Room Join ZoomGov Meeting https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16061942036 Meeting ID: 160 6194 2036 --- One tap mobile +16692545252,,16061942036# US (San Jose) +14154494000,,16061942036# US (US Spanish Line)

23CV055896: ACOSTA, et al. vs AXLEHIRE, INC., A CORPORATION 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation (Defendant) in Department 21 Tentative Ruling - 07/12/2024 Noël Wise The Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation on 05/15/2024 is Granted in Part. The Motion of defendant Axlehire to compel arbitration in Acosta v. Axlehire, 23CV057116 (individual and class) is GRANTED. The Motion of defendant Axlehire to compel arbitration in Costa v. Axlehire, 23CV055896 (PAGA) is DENIED. The request to stay the LWDA’s claims under the PAGA is DENIED. PROCEDURE The two cases are CONSOLIDATED. See Order of 6/12/24 states: “The court ORDERS that on or before 6/28/24 counsel for plaintiff must file a First Amended Consolidated Complaint in the Class Action that includes the claims of plaintiff Heston on behalf of himself as an individual, on behalf of the putative class, and as agent and proxy for the LWDA under the PAGA.” Plaintiffs have not yet filed a First Amended Consolidated Complaint. GENERAL BACKGROUND Defendant Axlehire operates an online, application-based platform that connects independent providers of local delivery services with retail stores and other businesses seeking delivery services for consumer-packaged goods and other items. Plaintiffs worked for Axlehire. Axlehire’s opening brief presents the declaration of Chief Technology Officer Evan Robinson. Robinson states that persons who want to work for Axlehire enter into a Technology Services Agreement ("TSA") through an electronic sign-up process. (Robinson Dec para 7, 8.) Robinson provides screen shots of the sign-up process for both Acosta and Duarte. (Robinson para 15-18, Exhs B, C, D, E.) The TSAs at para 7 state the arbitration agreement. COMMON ISSUE – APPLICABILITY OF THE FAA. The FAA does not apply to the contract. The TSA at para 7(a) states “This Arbitration Provision is a contract governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 V.S.C. § I et seq.” The court would normally give effect to the FAA choice of law provision (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 174), but the FAA on its terms does not apply to workers “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The FAA does not apply to workers like plaintiff who are “actively” transportation workers. (Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024) 601 U.S. 246.) The FAA does not apply to SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV055896: ACOSTA, et al. vs AXLEHIRE, INC., A CORPORATION 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation (Defendant) in Department 21 “last mile” delivery drivers such as plaintiff. (Betancourt v. Transportation Brokerage Specialists, Inc. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 552, 558-561 [“last mile” delivery drivers fall under FAA exemption]; Nieto v. Fresno Beverage Co. (2019) 245 Cal. App. 5th 274, 284 [transporting goods is the “last mile” of a “continuous phase of interstate commerce”].) Plaintiff has presented evidence that supports a finding that he was actively engaged in the transport of goods in interstate commerce. MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS The motion of defendant Axlehire to compel plaintiffs Acosta and Duarte to arbitrate their individual claims in Acosta v. Axlehire, 23CV057116 (class) is GRANTED. An arbitration agreement may state that the arbitrator will decide issues of arbitrability if the delegation is “clear and unmistakable.” “This is a ‘heightened standard,’ higher than the evidentiary standard applicable to other matters of interpreting an arbitration agreement.” (Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1048.) The TSA at para 7(b) states: “Except as provided below regarding the Class Action Waiver and Representative Action Waiver, such disputes include without limitation disputes arising out of or relating to interpretation or application of this Arbitration Provision, including the formation, scope, enforceability, waiver, applicability, revocability or validity of this Arbitration Provision or any portion of this Arbitration Provision.” The court finds that the TSA delegates to the arbitrator the responsibility to decide issues of arbitrability regarding the individual claims. The arbitrator can consider the issue regarding whether the agreement is unenforceable because of the class waiver. (Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 443.) The arbitrator can consider whether certain claims are exempt from arbitration under Labor Code 229. MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION OF LWDA’S CLAIMS ASSERTED UNDER THE PAGA The Motion of defendant Axlehire to compel arbitration in Acosta v. Axlehire, 23CV055896 (PAGA) is DENIED. The court will decide the issue of whether the LWDA entered into the TSA, which is a precursor issue to whether the LWDA agreed that the arbitrator could decide issues of arbitrability. (Theresa D. v. MBK Senior Living LLC (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 18, 25-27.) The court then addresses the issue of whether to compel the named plaintiffs to prosecute the “individual PAGA claims” in arbitration. The LWDA did not enter into any employment agreement with Axlehire. The private plaintiff entered into the employment agreement. A private person entering into an employment SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV055896: ACOSTA, et al. vs AXLEHIRE, INC., A CORPORATION 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation (Defendant) in Department 21 agreement (the TSA) does not have the authority to commit the LWDA to resolve its claims in arbitration. “[A] defendant cannot rely on a predispute waiver by a private employee to compel arbitration in a PAGA case, which is brought on behalf of the state.” (Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply (2017) 9 Cal. App. 5th 439, 445.) (See also Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 602, 621-622 [similar]; LaCour v. Marshalls of California, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1194-1196 [the plaintiff's authority to act on behalf of the LWDA is defined by the date and scope of the PAGA notice letter].) Under the PAGA, a private person acts as proxy or agent of the LWDA and asserts an action on behalf of the LWDA. The claim belongs to the LWDA and is essentially a law enforcement action. (Estrada v. Royal Carpet Mills. Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 582, 598-599; Adolph v. Uber Technologies (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1116; Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 81; ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 185; Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 381.) There is recent uncertainty about the nature of a claim on behalf of the LWDA regarding whether it is in the nature of a qui tam claim on behalf of the LWDA or whether the private person brining the action on behalf of the LWDA has some separately identifiable “individual PAGA claim.” In Gavriiloglou v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 595, 605 (review denied), the California Court of Appeal rejected the Viking River concept of “individual PAGA claims,” stating: “This is mere wordplay. What the Supreme Court called, as shorthand, an “individual PAGA claim” is not actually a PAGA claim at all. It would exist even if PAGA had never been enacted. It is what we are calling, more accurately, an individual Labor Code claim.” This trial court will follow the consistent California Supreme Court authority that an action under the PAGA is a law enforcement action and that under the PAGA an employee acts as proxy and agent for the LWDA. The Motion of defendant to compel arbitration of “individual PAGA claim” is DENIED because as a matter of law there is no such thing as an “individual PAGA claim.” The court addressed this issue in some detail in orders in other cases. (Esperson v. Cattlemens, Inc. (2/2/24) 2024 WL 555875; Contreras v. Davey Tree Surgery Co. (2/2/24) 2024 WL 555874.) MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO STAY CLAIMS OF THE LWDA The motion to stay the LWDA’s claims is DENIED. The TSA states that the signers agree to stay any representative claim pending arbitration of the contractor’s individual arbitration. A private person entering into an employment agreement (the TSA) does not have the authority to commit the LWDA to stay the law enforcement claim. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV055896: ACOSTA, et al. vs AXLEHIRE, INC., A CORPORATION 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation (Defendant) in Department 21 There is no requirement that the court stay the claims of the LWDA simply because an individual employee must arbitrate their claims. (Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539, 555-557.) In addition, the legislature recently amended CCP 1294(a) to state that although an aggrieved party may appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration, “the perfecting of such an appeal shall not automatically stay any proceedings in the trial court during the pendency of the appeal.” This indicates a legislative preference that trial courts make discretionary decisions about whether to stay a case. Furthermore, the court anticipates that arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual claims should be completed expeditiously. The stated benefits of arbitration are its “lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.” (Sonic- Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1143.) (See also Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 924 [“arbitration's fundamental attributes of speed and efficiency” ].) If defendant asserts that the results of the arbitration of the individual claims have any effect on the prosecution of the LWDA’s claims, then defendant can return to this case and seek appropriate relief. The court will not stay the LWDA’s claims. Plaintiff as agent and proxy of the LWDA may prosecute the LWDAs’ claims. CASE MANAGEMENT On 7/1/24, the PAGA was amended. Labor Code 2699(v)(1) states: “the amendments made to this section by the act adding this subdivision shall apply to a civil action brought on or after June 19, 2024.” The court does not address or decide the issue of whether the claims of the LWDA that are asserted in this case are limited to the claims arising in the statutes of limitations period before the filing of complaint (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 227 [“a cause of action is framed by the facts in existence when the underlying complaint is filed”]; whether the LWDA’s claims includes alleged Labor Code violations arising after the filing of the complaint; or whether plaintiff as agent and proxy of the LWDA may or must seek leave to file a supplemental complaint to assert claims arising after the filing of the complaint or after 7/1/24 ( Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd. (1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 426; Flood v. Simpson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 644, 647). These issues will, however, likely affect the scope of the LWDA’s claims going forward and the penalties that the LWDA can seek in the case. PLEASE NOTE: This tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if uncontested by SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV055896: ACOSTA, et al. vs AXLEHIRE, INC., A CORPORATION 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Axlehire, Inc., a Corporation (Defendant) in Department 21 04:00pm the day before your hearing. If you wish to contest the tentative ruling, then both notify opposing counsel directly and the court at the eCourt portal found on the court’s website: www.alameda.courts.ca.gov. If you have contested the tentative ruling or your tentative ruling reads, “parties to appear,” please use the following link to access your hearing at the appropriate date and time: https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/department21 . If no party has contested the tentative ruling, then no appearance is necessary.