71 Fountain Terrace Condominium Association, Inc. V. Adalja, Nilima Et Al

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HG19018129: Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, LLP VS Ferris 07/15/2024 Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs filed by Minh Ngoc Thi Ferris (Defendant) in Department 19 Tentative Ruling - 07/11/2024 Joscelyn Jones The Motion to Tax Costs filed by Minh Ngoc Thi Ferris on 05/14/2024 is Granted. The Motion by Defendant and Cross-Complainant Minh Ngoc Thi Ferris to Strike the Memorandum of Costs filed by Costs filed by Cross-Defendant Lorie Williams is GRANTED. Williams prevailed in two special motions to strike, directed at two different cross-complaints (one filed by Ming Ngoc Thi Ferris, one filed by Michael Ferris.) Williams then filed one Memorandum of Costs that does not identify or distinguish which costs were incurred in defending against which cross-complaint. Williams’ failure to do so makes her Memorandum of Costs defective and inadequate. This case is distinguishable from Acosta v. SI Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376, cited by Williams, in which a defendant was sued by several plaintiffs who were represented by a single law firm and pursued a single cause of action against the defendant. Here, Minh Ngoc Thi Ferris and Michael Ferris were represented by separate counsel who filed separate cross-complaints that were the subject of two separate motions to strike. Even if the Court were to find that filing one Memorandum of Costs combining the costs of prevailing against two separate cross-complainants on two separate cross-complaints were procedurally appropriate, the Court cannot determine what costs were incurred by Williams in prevailing on those cross-complaints. The Memorandum of Costs provides no information as to how those costs were incurred, and the declaration of James Pagano apparently refers to exhibits that he did not attach to his declaration. Rather than sequentially numbering his exhibits, Pagano has attached exhibits “JLP-1”, “JLP-2”, “JLP-2A” through “JLP-2H”, and “JLP-3A” through “JLP-3B”, but his declaration (at paragraphs 10(A)-10(B)) refers to documents purportedly attached as Exhibits “JLP-4A” through “JLP-4H”.

Case Number: 24PSCV00591 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 6 Plaintiff Tawa, Inc. (Retail)s Request for Entry of Default Judgment Defendant: Liming Luo TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice. BACKGROUND This is a commercial lease dispute. On February 26, 2024, plaintiff Tawa, Inc. (Retail)[1] (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Liming Luo (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging causes of action for breach of contract lease agreement, account stated, and book account. Default was entered against Defendant on June 4, 2024. Plaintiff requested entry of default judgment on June 13, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) declaration of nonmilitary status; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.) ANALYSIS Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants in the total amount of $49,960.37, including $41,948.32 in damages, $5,838.29 in interest, $1,648.45 in attorney fees, and $525.31 in costs. The Court finds Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment has some issues. First, Form CIV-100 incorrectly indicated that it was requesting a clerks judgment, to which the clerks office sent a notice of rejection on June 25, 2024. (Notice of Rejection Default/Clerks Judgment (6/25/24).) Plaintiff should instead complete paragraph 1, subdivision (d), on Form CIV-100. Second, the amount stated in paragraph 2, subdivision (a), of Form CIV-100 does not match the amount stated in Exhibit 4. (Form CIV-100, ¶ 2, subd. (2)(a); Plaintiffs Exhibits in Support of Request for Entry of Default Judgment, Ex. 4.) Third, Plaintiff did not provide a proposed judgment per Rule 3.1800, subdivision (a)(6), of the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subd. (a)(6).) CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice. [1] The parenthetical (Retail) is how Plaintiffs name is alleged in the complaint, and is not a defined term.

Case Number: 22TRCV00276 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Tuesday, July 16, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 13 PROCEEDINGS Wendy Newton v. Clay Claudino, et al. 22TRCV00276 1. Clay Claudino, et al.s Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint 2. Clay Claudino, et al.s Motion to Strike Portions of Third Amended Complaint TENTATIVE RULING Clay Claudino, et al.s Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint is overruled, in part, and sustained with 20 days leave to amend, in part. Clay Claudino, et al.s Motion to Strike Portions of Third Amended Complaint is denied, in part, and deemed moot, in part. Background Plaintiffs Complaint was filed on April 11, 2022, and the Third Amended Complaint (TAC) was filed on April 4, 2024. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff was a tenant of a property located at 509 Longfellow Avenue, Hermosa Beach, California 90254. The property suffered from numerous habitability problems. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: 1. Negligence 2. Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability 3. Statutory Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability 4. Breach of Contract 5. Nuisance 6. Fraud 7. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 8. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Use and Enjoyment 9. Trespass 10. Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress 11. Violation of Civil Code Section 827 12. Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.2 13. Retaliatory Eviction 14. Constructive Eviction 15. Conversion. Meet and Confer Defendants set forth meet and confer declarations in sufficient compliance with CCP § 430.41 and CCP § 435.5. (Decls. Rudolf Petrosyan.) Request for Judicial Notice Defendants request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code Section 452(d). Demurrer A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. ( Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. ( Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th 634, 638.) Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. ( Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. (C.C.P., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.) Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. ( Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) "Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer." ( Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609610.) Under Code Civil Procedure § 430.10(f), a demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is uncertain. Uncertainty exists where a complaints factual allegations are so confusing they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. ( Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) Defendants demur to the entire TAC and each cause of action pursuant to CCP § 430.10(a)(e) and (f) on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter, that the causes of action fail to state sufficient facts, and that the TAC is uncertain. First, Defendants again demur to the entire TAC on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction because a prior unlawful detainer judgment acts as collateral estoppel to bar the causes of action of the TAC. The Court has again taken judicial notice of the Complaint, Answer, and Judgment in Case No. 20IWUD00738. In ruling to the demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint, the Court already determined that the demurrer based on lack of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. It is not clear why Defendants again demurred on these same grounds. Defendants are instructed in the future to read the Courts minutes and rulings prior to filing documents or making appearances in this Court. For Defendants benefit the Court will repeat what was written in the Courts prior ruling: An unlawful detainer action is a special limited summary proceeding limited to the issue of the right to possession. As such, the parties cannot raise extrinsic issues and are generally limited in the issues that they can litigate. Thus, usually, the judgment in the unlawful detainer action does not have a res judicata effect on any issue other than one that was necessarily litigated to determine the right of possession. [T]he critical question is whether or not the unlawful detainer defendant has had adequate opportunity to present his case. Gonzales v. Gem Properties, Inc. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1036. In some circumstances, the unlawful detainer judgment does bar a subsequent action by the parties. Any issue that was necessarily litigated in the unlawful detainer to resolve the issue of the right to possession cannot be raised in any subsequent action between the parties. The party asserting issue preclusion bears the burden of establishing these requirements. Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 757. The unlawful detainer judgment may be barred by res judicata on issues that were not necessary to the issue of possession when the issue is raised in the proceedings without objection and fully litigated by the parties. Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal. 3d 251, 25657. Here, a review of the UD Complaint, Answer, and Judgment does not reveal, at least for purposes of the instant demurrer, a complete bar to the causes of action based on principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata. First, the Court notes that the UD Judgment was entered only in favor of Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007. Defendants have failed to establish, at this time, that the other two Defendants named in the Complaint can utilize the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata in their favor. Second, a review of the UD Judgment only reflects a discussion of issues involving Newtons alleged maintenance of a nuisance by placing undue restrictions on the asbestos abatement efforts. As the parties are probably aware, there are a multitude of issues that are alleged in the instant Complaint which are not addressed at all in the UD Judgment. The Court declines to dismiss the action or sustain the demurrer, at this time, based on principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata. The Court notes that the prior demurrer was sustained based solely on uncertainty grounds based on the failure to differentiate the parties that committed certain acts. The Court will review the TAC to determine if the TAC has now rectified those uncertainty issues. As to the demurrer of Clay Claudino, individually, the demurrer is overruled. Plaintiff states sufficient facts to state the causes of action and the Third Amended Complaint is not uncertain. Numerous factual allegations have been alleged against this Defendant to support the elements of the cause of action and Clay Claudino is specifically named as the landlord/lessor in the lease agreement attached to the TAC. However, as to the demurrer of Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, as Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007, the demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. As to these Defendants, the Court again sustains the demurrer based on uncertainty. The Court again notes that the attached lease reflects the parties to the lease as Plaintiff and Defendant Clay Claudino only. Most of the causes of action alleged against Defendants would only be applicable to the landlord - Clay Claudino. Despite Plaintiffs constant reference to the other Defendants as also being landlords, the only lessor named in the lease agreement is Clay Claudino. There are several causes of action that may be applicable to a Defendant solely based on ownership of the property. However, the allegation of ownership is completely uncertain. Plaintiff appears to allege that the owners are all of the following: Clay Claudino, individually, Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007. This allegation is uncertain because generally when a trust is the title owner of the property it would not hold joint ownership with individuals. Typically, ownership of property would be held by individuals or a Trust, but usually not co-owned by individuals and a Trust. Curiously, Defendants made specific arguments in this regard only related to the Fraud and IIED causes of action. However, the uncertainty in the allegation of ownership of the property permeates every cause of action. As to the Fraud and IIED causes of action, the Court notes that there does not appear to be any factual allegations within these causes of action directed against Defendants Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007 and Lee Marie Claudino. The factual allegations are directed solely to Clay Claudino, individually. Thus, the demurrer of Clay Claudino, individually, is overruled. The demurrer of Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, as Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007 is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Motion to Strike The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. CCP § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. CCP § 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP § 437. Defendants move to strike the following: 1. Page 2. line 4, which states, "Ms. Newton is a single, approximately 59-year old woman." 2. Page 4, lines 3-5, which states, "Plaintiff, believing that her sister and her very young niece would be moving into the residence with her as a result of her brother-in-law dying from asbestos exposure&" 3. Page 29, lines 14-15, which state "Defendants engaged in conduct, which was malicious, oppressive, and fraudulent, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages." 4. Page 29, lines 23-26, which state "Defendants' conduct in breaching the implied warranty of habitability has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 5. Page 31, lines 10-11, which state "Civil Code § 3294 allows for punitive damages where a defendant's actions were done with malice, oppression, or fraud." 6. Page 35, lines 19-21, which state "Defendants' conduct in breaching the covenant of quiet enjoyment has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 7. Page 37, lines 19-21, which state "Defendants' conduct in breaching the covenant of quiet enjoyment has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 8. Page 38, lines 23-24, which state "Plaintiffs are thus entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial." 9. Page 44, lines 18-19, which state "Plaintiff is thus entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial." 10. Page 49, lines 1-4, which state "Any lessor or agent of lessor who violates §1942.5, shall be liable to the lessee in a civil action for all of the following 1) The actual damages sustained by the lessee; (2) Punitive damages in an amount of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) no more than two thousand ($2000) for each retaliatory act where the lessor or agent has been guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice with respect to that act." 11. Page 49, lines 17-20, which state "Defendants have individually, and in concert, acted with reckless and conscious disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff Defendants' conduct has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 12. Page 51, lines 8-10, which state "Plaintiffs are thus entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial." 13. Page 52, lines 23-28, which state "Defendants unauthorized acts of conversion were done with the intent o [sic] depriving Plaintiff of their property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury, and were despicable, malicious, oppressive, and/or fraudulent conduct that subjected Plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive damages to Plaintiff in an amount not yet ascertained but which amount is within the jurisdictional requirements of this Court and will be proven at time of trial." 14. Prayer for relief items 6, which state "For treble damages according to proof at time of trial" 15. Prayer for relief items 7, which state "For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof at time of trial" (Notice of Motion, pages 2-3). As to Defendant Clay Claudino, the motion to strike is denied. Civ. Code, § 3294 states, in relevant part: (a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. (b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. [I]t is clear that the availability of a remedy for breach of implied warranty of habitability does not preclude a tenant from suing his landlord for intentional infliction of mental distress if the landlord's acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress. Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921. Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. Id. [I]f the tenant wrongfully evicted elects to sue in tort, damages may be awarded for mental anguish and pain or physical injury; exemplary damages may also be recovered when the landlord's conduct justifies the award[.] Id. at 926. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient specific facts that Defendant Clay Claudino acted with malice, oppression, and/or fraud to support the allegations and prayer for punitive damages. In addition, Plaintiff has alleged facts to support the request for statutory penalties. Finally, the allegations are not false, irrelevant, or improper on their face. As to Defendants Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, as Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007, the motion to strike is deemed moot pursuant to the Courts ruling sustaining the demurrer to the entire TAC. Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

23CV02337 COX v. MROCZEK, et al. CONFIRMATION OF 6/28/24 ORDER TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT AND OBJECTION TO DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS The court has reviewed plaintiff’s Notification of Objection to and Disapproval of Any Proposed Order or Other Order: 1) Granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Complaint; or 2) Striking Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s objections merely go to the process by which parties engage on proposed orders; CRC 3.1312 has no impact on the power of the court to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint and dismiss this action. The court’s previous order of 6/28/24 granting defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint is confirmed, as is dismissal of this action. Defendants are ordered to submit a formal dismissal order for the court’s signature. Page 1 of 2 Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 2 of 2

ECKELMAN, ET AL. VS. OLCO, INC Case Number: 23CV-0202690 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case and trial setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than January 22, 2025. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 15, 2024 line 1. DEFENDANT A-NHI LE INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE QU YAN KUANG AND A-NHI LE REVOCABLE TRUST Notice Of Motion And Motion To (1) Reopen Discovery For The Limited Purpose Of Compelling Plaintiffs Deposition; And (2) Compel Plaintiffs Deposition Request For Sanctions Of $10,495.00 Against Plaintiff Enkhdul Batsukh And Her Attorneys Of Record, Thomas W. J. Purtell, Esq. And The Law Offices Of Thomas W.J. Purtell; Memorandum Of Points And Authorities is granted in part. Plaintiff's deposition shall occur on a mutually agreeable date no later than July 19, 2024. Defendants are awarded sanctions against plaintiff and her attorney in the amount of $3,137.50, consisting of ten hours or reasonable attorney time at the reasonable rate of $225 per hour plus .3 hours of reasonable attorney time at the reasonable rate of $275 per hour plus costs of $805. Plaintiff's request in her conditional non-opposition papers for affirmative discovery relief is not considered in connection with defendants' motion because it was not properly raised in opposition papers and, in all events, now appears to be the subject of a separate noticed motion to be heard on August 1, 2024. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 22TRCV00944 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Monday, July 15,2024 Department M Calen dar No. 7 PROCEEDINGS Christopher Nowlin, et al. v. Coastline Real Estate Advisors, Inc., et al. 22TRCV00944 1. Coastline Real Estate Advisors, Inc.s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 2. Coastline Real Estate Advisors, Inc.s Motion to Strike TENTATIVE RULING Coastline Real Estate Advisors, Inc.s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied, in part, granted without leave to amend, in part, and granted with 20 days leave to amend, in part. Coastline Real Estate Advisors, Inc.s Motion to Strike is denied, in part, granted with 20 days leave to amend, in part, and moot in part. Background Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on October 13, 2022, and the First Amended Complaint on January 16, 2024. Plaintiffs allege the following facts. Plaintiffs were tenants at the property that was owned and managed by the Defendant. The property suffered from mold and other substandard conditions that were not repaired. Plaintiffs were harassed and constructively evicted. Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action: 1. Nuisance; 2. Violation of Civil Code 1940.2; 3. Breach of Contract; 4. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; 5. Negligence; 6. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; 7. Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability; 8. Intentional Misrepresentation. Meet and Confer Defendant filed meet and confer declarations in sufficient compliance with CCP § 439 and CCP § 435.5. (Decl., Susan Gruskin, ¶¶ 4-6.) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f). Except as provided by statute, the rules governing demurrers apply. Civic Partners Stockton, LLC v. Youssefi (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1012. Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. Rolfe v. Cal. Transp. Commn (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 239, 242; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(3)(B)(ii). Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion [for judgment on the pleadings] must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. Civic Partners Stockton, LLC , supra , 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, [a]ll allegations in the complaint and matters upon which judicial notice may be taken are assumed to be true. Rippon v. Bowen (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1313. Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the first through fourth and sixth through eighth causes of action on the grounds that the causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. First, the Court addresses Defendants argument that Plaintiffs made changes and additions to the Complaint in the First Amended Complaint. Under the sham pleading doctrine, a pleader cannot circumvent prior admissions by amending a pleading without explanation. Womack v. Lovell (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 772, 787. Here, while there are a few minor changes in dates and additional facts alleged, nothing rises to the level of significant admissions that are attempted to be circumvented with the amended pleading. The sham pleading doctrine does not apply in this instance. First Cause of Action for Nuisance The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first cause of action is denied. Plaintiffs state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Civil Code section 3479 defines a nuisance as [a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property. Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 919. The elements of an action for private nuisance are: First, the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property. Second, the invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the use and enjoyment of the land [must be] substantial, i.e., that it cause[s] the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage. Third, [t]he interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262-63 (internal citations and quotations omitted). A private nuisance cause of action requires the plaintiff to prove an injury specifically referable to the use and enjoyment of his or her land. Pursuant to Civil Code section 3501, a plaintiff seeking to remedy a private nuisance is limited to a civil action or abatement. Unlike public nuisance, which is an interference with the rights of the community at large, private nuisance is a civil wrong based on disturbance of rights in land.... [T]o proceed on a private nuisance theory the plaintiff must prove an injury specifically referable to the use and enjoyment of his or her land. The injury, however, need not be different in kind from that suffered by the general public. Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action based on private nuisance. Plaintiffs have alleged facts that Defendant interfered with Plaintiffs use and enjoyment of the property by failing to promptly remedy the water leak issue and subsequent mold, as well as numerous other instances of interference. (FAC, ¶¶ 8-39.) Defendant argues that the interference was not substantial. However, whether the interference was or was not substantial to ultimately prove Plaintiffs claims are not at issue with this motion, which operates similarly to a demurrer. The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first cause of action is denied. Second Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code 1940.2(a) The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the second cause of action is denied. Plaintiffs state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs state sufficient facts to state a cause of action for Retaliatory Eviction pursuant to CC § 1940.2(a)(3). Civ. Code, § 1940.2(a)(3) states: It is unlawful for a landlord to do any of the following for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling: (3) Use, or threaten to use, force, willful threats, or menacing conduct constituting a course of conduct that interferes with the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises in violation of Section 1927 that would create an apprehension of harm in a reasonable person. Nothing in this paragraph requires a tenant to be actually or constructively evicted in order to obtain relief. Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts of menacing conduct that interfered with the quiet enjoyment of the premises. (FAC, ¶¶ 8-33.) These facts were incorporated into this cause of action. Contrary to Defendants arguments, Plaintiffs have alleged more than mere conclusions. The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the second cause of action is denied. Third Cause of Action for Breach of Contract The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action is denied. Plaintiffs state sufficient facts to state a cause of action. The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff. Coles v. Glaser (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 384, 391(internal quotations omitted). [T]he complaint must indicate on its face whether the contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct. [...] If the action is based on an alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written instrument must be attached and incorporated by reference. Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 45859. Plaintiffs must either: (a) set forth the terms of the contract verbatim, (b) attach a copy of the contract and incorporate it by reference, or (c) plead its legal effect. McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489. The elements of the cause of action have been sufficiently stated. (FAC, ¶¶ 47-54.) Defendant appears to take issue with the fact that the written contract was not attached. However, Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated the legal effect of the contract which appears to be a typical and routine rental lease agreement. The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action is denied. Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fourth cause of action is denied. Plaintiffs state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [E]very lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, whereby the landlord impliedly covenants that the tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession of the premises. The covenant of quiet enjoyment insulates the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with a tenants right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy. [...] To be actionable, the landlords act or omission must substantially interfere with a tenants (sic) right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy. Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 58889 (internal citations and quotations omitted; emphasis in original). Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to meet each of the elements of the cause of action. (FAC, ¶¶ 8-33; 55-58.) Essentially, the alleged facts of the nuisance, harassment, and breach of contract noted above are restated to support grounds for the alleged disturbance with quiet enjoyment. Like the first cause of action, whether Defendants actions constitute substantial interference will be a factual issue not appropriate for adjudication with this motion. The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fourth cause of action is denied. Sixth Cause of Action for NIED The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth cause of action is granted without leave to amend. Plaintiffs fail to state sufficient facts to state a cause of action for NIED. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress is not an independent cause of action. Instead, emotional distress is a component of damages that may be recoverable in a Negligence cause of action. See, Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583, 588. Thus, because a separate cause of action for Negligence has been asserted to which no demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings was directed, the NIED cause of action is simply duplicative of the negligence cause of action. Thus, the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth cause of action is granted without leave to amend. Seventh Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the seventh cause of action is denied. Plaintiffs state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. [A] warranty of habitability is implied by law in residential leases. The elements of a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises' habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages. The alleged defective condition must affect the tenant's apartment or the common areas which he uses. Peviani v. Arbors at California Oaks Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874, 891 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it untenantable, except such as are mentioned in section nineteen hundred and twenty-nine. Civ. Code, § 1941. As noted above, sufficient facts have been alleged that would also support a cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability. (FAC, ¶¶ 8-33; 70-77.) The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the seventh cause of action is denied. Eighth Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation The motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the eighth cause of action is granted with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiffs fail to state sufficient specific to state a cause of action. A complaint for fraud must allege the following elements: (1) a knowingly false representation by the defendant; (2) an intent to deceive or induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) resulting damages. Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1816. [T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on a concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he has known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage. Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc . (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248. Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made. Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157. Plaintiff must state facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645. In the opposition, Plaintiffs contend that they have alleged a representation, or representations made by Jimmy Ordaz, a property manager. However, Plaintiffs have not alleged specific facts as to whom the representations were made, and when, where, and by what means the representations were made. Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted with 20 days leave to amend. Motion to Strike The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. CCP § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. CCP § 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP § 437. Defendant moves to strike the following: 1. Prayer for Relief, Page 19, line 17, Paragraph e: Attorneys fees and costs of this action; 2. Prayer for Relief, Page 19, line 19, Paragraph g: Punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 3. Prayer for Relief, Page 19, line 20, Paragraph h: Statutory penalties as proscribed by law; 4. Paragraph 39, Page 10, line 25- Page 11, line 1: Their conduct and lack of proactive good management practices was willful, negligent, oppressive, and malicious. Defendants nonfeasance created the unsafe and dangerous conditions at the Unit and the Complex. Defendants conduct is part of a pattern which shows Defendants conscious disregard for ensuring a healthy environment for tenants in general, and of Plaintiffs in particular. 5. Paragraph 39, Page 11, lines 4-8: Therefore, Defendant intentionally, or with a reckless disregard, have failed to maintain the Unit during Plaintiffs tenure. This conduct and lack of proactive good management practices was willful, intentional, and done with oppression and malice against Plaintiffs, and is with a total disregard for Plaintiffs health, safety, and well-being. This behavior warrants the imposition of punitive damages in a sum appropriate to punish the Defendants and deter future, similar misconduct. 6. Paragraph 45, Page 11, lines 23-24: As a result of Defendants repeated violations of Civil Code §1940.2, Plaintiffs are entitled to statutory damages of $2,000 for each violation. 7. Paragraph 46, Page 12, lines 4-8: Defendants conduct was negligent and willful, intentional, outrageous, and done with oppression and malice against Plaintiffs, and with a total disregard for Plaintiffs as well as their fetus health, safety, and well-being. This behavior warrants the imposition of punitive damages in a sum appropriate to punish Defendants and deter future, similar misconduct. Plaintiffs therefore seek punitive damages. 8. Paragraph 77, Page 17, lines 17-19: Defendant ignored the conditions at the Unit. Defendants conduct is part of a pattern of inaction by Defendants which shows their conscious disregard for ensuring a healthy environment for tenants in general. 9. Paragraph 77, Page 17, lines 22-23: Therefore, Defendant intentionally, or with a reckless disregard, failed to maintain the Unit during Plaintiffs tenure. 10. Paragraph 77, Page 17, line 25- Page 18, line 2: Therefore, Defendants intentionally, or with a reckless disregard, failed to maintain the Unit during Plaintiffs' tenure. This conduct and lack of proactive good management practices was willful, intentional, and done with oppression and malice against Plaintiffs, and is with a total disregard for Plaintiffs health, safety, and well-being. This behavior warrants the imposition of punitive damages in a sum appropriate to punish the Defendants and deter future, similar misconduct. 11. Paragraph 83, Page 19, lines 4-6: On information and belief, Defendant acted with fraud, oppression, and malice. Defendants actions and inactions were outrageous and maliciously motivated by a desire to increase their financial profits at the expense of their tenants. 12. Paragraph 83, Page 19, lines 8-10: Such actions justify an award of fines and penalties under Civil Code §§ 72 and 789.3a and Health and Safety Code §17995, punitive damages under Civil Code §3294 to punish and deter other landlords from taking advantage of unsuspecting tenants. (Notice of Motion, pages ii and iii). As to Item 1, and only as to attorneys fees, the motion is granted with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiffs have failed to set forth a contractual or statutory basis for attorneys fees. As to Items 2, 4, 5, and 7 to 10, the motion is denied. Civ. Code, § 3294 states, in relevant part: (a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. (b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. [I]t is clear that the availability of a remedy for breach of implied warranty of habitability does not preclude a tenant from suing his landlord for intentional infliction of mental distress if the landlord's acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress. Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921. Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. Id. [I]f the tenant wrongfully evicted elects to sue in tort, damages may be awarded for mental anguish and pain or physical injury; exemplary damages may also be recovered when the landlord's conduct justifies the award[.] Id. at 926. Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient specific facts that Defendant acted with malice and/or oppression to support the allegations and prayer for punitive damages. Plaintiffs have also alleged facts that the acts were committed by an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant, or was authorized or ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent. As to Items 3 and 6, the motion is denied. Plaintiffs have adequately pled a statutory cause of action to support a claim for statutory penalties. As to Items 11 and 12, the motion is moot upon the granting of the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the eighth cause of action. Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of this ruling.