Pyramid Tubular Products Llc V. Great Western Petroleum Llc Et Al

MOTION FOR ORDER DEEMING CVSW2400642 CAPITAL ONE, N.A. VS RICE REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS ADMITTED BY CAPITAL ONE, N.A. Tentative Ruling: Motion is unopposed. Motion is GRANTED. Requests for Admission propounded on March 26, 2024 are deemed admitted. Court to sign proposed order.

For Plaintiff Partners Personnel Management Services, LLC.: Cheryl A. Canty For Defendant Powdercoat Services, LLC: David Bland RULING For all reasons discussed herein, plaintiff Partners Personnel Management Services, LLC’s motion to enter judgment pursuant to defendants’ default under settlement and release agreement is GRANTED. The court will sign the proposed order submitted by plaintiff. Background: This action commenced on January 8, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Partners Personnel Management Services, LLC (“plaintiff”) against defendant Powdercoat Services, LLC, (“defendant”) for breach of contract, nonpayment on an open book account, and nonpayment on an account stated. As alleged in the complaint: In July 2017, defendant entered into a written agreement with plaintiff for the provision of staffing services. (Complaint, ¶ 5.) Between October 2023, and December 2023, defendant utilized plaintiff’s temporary labor and plaintiff paid the wages, taxes, benefits, and workers’ compensation premiums for the labor utilized by defendant. (Id., ¶ 7.) Despite demands for payment, defendant has not paid plaintiff, as agreed, between October 2023, and December 2023. (Id., at ¶ 9.) If defendant was served with the summons and complaint, plaintiff did not file proof of service of the same. On March 1, 2024, the parties entered into a written settlement agreement providing for the payment of $100,000.00, in equal payments made over a twelve-month period beginning on March 28, 2024. (Canty Dec., ¶ 3 & Exh. A.) The parties also executed a “Stipulation for Entry of Order Re: Court’s Retention of Jurisdiction Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6.” (Id., at ¶ 4 & Exh. B.) Defendant defaulted and, as of the date of the filing of the present motion, has failed to cure the default or make any payment. (Id., at ¶ 5.) The settlement agreement provides that in the event of default, plaintiff could recover interest from the date of default at the rate of ten percent plus costs and attorney’s fees. (Id., at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff seeks the balance owed pursuant to the agreement of $100,000.00, $40.00 for motion fees, interest of $2,000.00 and attorney’s fees of $5,050.00, for a total of $107,090.00. Plaintiff now moves to enter judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, including agreed upon costs, attorney’s fees, and interest. No opposition or other responsive documents have been filed by defendant. Analysis Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides: “(a) If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. (b) For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any of the following: “(1) The party. “(2) An attorney who represents the party. “(3) If the party is an insurer, an agent who is authorized in writing by the insurer to sign on the insurer’s behalf. (c) Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subdivision (b) do not apply in a civil harassment action, an action brought pursuant to the Family Code, an action brought pursuant to the Probate Code, or a matter that is being adjudicated in a juvenile court or a dependency court. (d) In addition to any available civil remedies, an attorney who signs a writing on behalf of a party pursuant to subdivision (b) without the party’s express authorization shall, absent good cause, be subject to professional discipline.” “A court ruling on a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182.) “If the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Id.) A court hearing a motion brought under section 664.6 may “receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment”, but may not “create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon.” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810.) “A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts.” (Ibid.) “In order for acceptance of a proposal to result in the formation of a contract, the proposal “ ‘must be sufficiently definite, or must call for such definite terms in the acceptance, that the performance promised is reasonably certain.’ ” [Citation.] A proposal “ ‘cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain. [¶] The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining . . . the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.’ ” [Citation.] If, by contrast, a supposed “ ‘contract’ ” does not provide a basis for determining what obligations the parties have agreed to, and hence does not make possible a determination of whether those agreed obligations have been breached, there is no contract. (See, e.g., 1 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 1990, Lord) § 4:18, p. 414 [“It is a necessary requirement that an agreement, in order to be binding, must be sufficiently definite to enable the courts to give it an exact meaning.”]; see also Civ. Code § 3390, subd. 5 [a contract is not specifically enforceable unless the terms are “ ‘sufficiently certain to make the precise act which is to be done clearly ascertainable.’ ”] )” (Id. at pp. 811-812.) The parties entered into a valid and enforceable contract, with reasonably certain terms, and have agreed that the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. As noted above, the parties executed and filed a “Stipulation for Entry of Order Re: Court’s Retention of Jurisdiction Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6.” “A written stipulation between attorneys recognizing jurisdiction of the court over the parties constitutes a General appearance by defendant.” (General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 449, 453.) The motion will be granted. The court has reviewed the proposed order submitted by plaintiff and will sign it as drafted.

Case Number: 23TRCV04042 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Wednesday, July 17, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 8 PROCEEDINGS Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc. v. Mark Ferrera, et al. 23TRCV04042 1. Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc.s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike TENTATIVE RULING Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc.s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike is denied. Background Plaintiff filed the Complaint on December 4, 2023. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Defendant owes a balance due from a loan provided to Defendant by Plaintiffs assignor. On February 5, 2024, Defendant filed a Cross-Complaint. Cross-Complainant alleges the following facts. Cross-Defendant maintains and practices a policy of attempting to collect on student loans without providing the mandated information, and without possessing and providing the mandated documentation. Cross-Defendant employs unfair and deceptive practices in their loan collection process. Cross-Complainant alleges the following causes of action for violations of: 1. California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act; 2. Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; 3. Private Student Loan Collections Reform Act; 4. Unfair Competition Law. Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike Cross-Defendant filed a special motion to strike the Cross-Complaint under CCP § 425.16, also known as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendants constitutionally protected conduct from the undue burden of frivolous litigation. Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376, 393. The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. Id. at 384. Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. Baral, 1 Cal.5 th at 384 (citation omitted). The California Supreme Court has described this second step as a summary-judgment-like procedure. The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiffs evidence as true, and evaluates the defendants showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiffs claim as a matter of law. [C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed. Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted). The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper. The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing. Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(f). Subdivision (f) does not require the moving party to ensure that the hearing is so scheduled. Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 344, 352. In addition, the Court has the discretion to hear an untimely anti-SLAPP motion even if the Defendant failed to request leave of court to file an untimely motion. Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 684. Here, the motion runs afoul of both time measures of CCP § 425.16(f). However, the Court exercises its discretion to hear the motion on the merits. I. Conduct in Furtherance of Right of Petition or Free Speech CCP § 425.16(e) states: As used in this section, act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue includes: . . . (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech. City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4 th 69, 78. The anti-SLAPP's statute focuses, not on the form of cross-complainants causes of action but, rather, cross-defendants underlying activity that gives rise to the asserted liability and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning. See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92. In Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376, the court held that an anti-SLAPP motion may be utilized to strike specific allegations of protected activity without eliminating the entire cause of action or primary right. By referring to a cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the protected rights of petition and speech, the Legislature indicated that particular alleged acts giving rise to a claim for relief may be the object of an anti-SLAPP motion. (§ 425.16(b)(1), italics added.) Thus, in cases involving allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the plaintiff is required to establish a probability of prevailing on any claim for relief based on allegations of protected activity. I d. at 395. A Cross-Complaint may be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. However, [o]nly those cross-complaints alleging a cause of action arising from the plaintiff's act of filing the complaint against the defendant and the subsequent litigation would potentially qualify as a SLAPP action. (§ 425.16, subds. (b) and (d).) For example, a person may attempt to bring a SLAPP suit alleging that libelous allegations or statements were contained in the complaint itself. However, because defendant's allegations are privileged communications under Civil Code section 47, the suit would be merit-less. A compulsory cross-complaint on a related cause of action against the plaintiff (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a)) would rarely, if ever, qualify as a SLAPP suit arising from petition activity. By definition, a related cause of action is a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10, subd. (c), italics added.) The SLAPP suit is not related to the transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint, but arises out of the litigation process itself. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 651(internal citation omitted). Here, a review of the Cross-Complaint and Complaint reveals that the Cross-Complaint arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the Complaint. The Cross-Complaint does not arise from petitioning activity. See, Kajima Engineering and Const., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 934. The gravamen of the Cross-Complaint involves allegations that Cross-Complainant is entitled to statutory damages and other relief based on Cross-Defendants unlawful debt collection activities. The Cross-Complaint does not itself arise from the simple act of filing the Complaint, but, instead upon the underlying factual disputes outlined in the Cross-Complaint. The gravamen of the causes of action and the underlying theory of recovery do not depend on the filing of the Complaint itself but upon the alleged underlying facts and conduct of Cross-Defendant during the debt collection process. However, the Court does note that certain specific allegations of the Cross-Complaint do implicate petitioning activity. Cross-Complainant alleged: In this case, the Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Credit Corp Solutions, Inc. (Cross-Defendant or Credit Corp) sued Mr. Ferrera without providing the disclosures and documents required under state law. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 4.) In addition, paragraphs 42 to 48, 58c, and 84c-f, of the Cross-Complaint, which attempts to outline failures within the Complaint, also implicate petitioning activity. Here, however, the principle delineated in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376 applies because these allegations referenced above do implicate protected conduct of filing litigation. The constitutional right to petition ... includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action. Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 281 . In this situation, it is appropriate to analyze whether to strike the specific allegations of the protected activity without eliminating the entirety of the causes of action. II. Probability of Prevailing on the Merits To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273-74. However, the Court must accept as true the evidence favorable to Plaintiff. See Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291. [Plaintiffs] second-[prong] burden is a limited one. [He] need not prove [his] case to the court [citation]; the bar sits lower at a demonstration of minimal merit [citation]. At this stage, [t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff's evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant's showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. The plaintiff must demonstrate this probability of success with admissible evidence. The plaintiff may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence. Kieu Hoang v. Phong Minh Tran (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 513, 531 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Since Cross-Defendant established the first prong (solely as to the specific allegations referenced above), Cross-Complainant must establish a probability of prevailing on the merits with respect to those allegations. See, Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273-74. To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. See, Id. Here, as to the specific allegations of protected speech noted above, Cross-Complainant has met his burden to establish a probability of prevailing. Cross-Complainant submitted competent evidence supporting the alleged violations outlined within the allegations. (Decl., Mark Ferrera, ¶¶ 4-10.) Cross-Defendant did not submit any substantive evidence in connection with the motion. The only declaration that was submitted simply outlined attempts in service of documents. (Decl., Abril Saglio-Ruiz.) Instead, it appears that Cross-Defendant primarily relies upon the litigation privilege of Civ. Code § 47(b). However, the litigation privilege does not bar claims for violations of debt collection laws that regulate conduct in litigation. Moten v. Transworld Systems Inc . (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 691, 706; Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc . (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 340. Therefore, Cross-Complainant has met his burden to show a probability of prevailing on the merits of the allegations. Thus, Cross-Defendants anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entirety of Cross-Complaint is denied. The anti-SLAPP motion to strike the allegations noted above that do implicate protected activity is also denied. Cross-Complainant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 24STCP00598 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 25 Hearing Date: Tuesday, July 16, 2024 Case Name: Juan Recalde v. Adolfo Landeros Case No.: 24STCP00598 Motion: Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment Moving Party: Defendant Adolfo Landeros Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: IMPROPER as the Labor Commissioners Office was not served with the instant motion Tentative Ruling: The Hearing on Defendants Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment Entered on 02/26/2024 is CONTINUED to AUGUST 21, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 25 of the Spring Street Courthouse. Defendant is ordered to electronically file proper proof of service of the Motion upon the Labor Commissioner, as well as proof of service of the continued hearing date at least 10 court days prior to the continued hearing date. BACKGROUND On July 25, 2022, the Labor Commissioners Office heard claim number WC-CM-816672 (the Claim) regarding the alleged employment of Plaintiff Juan Recalde (Plaintiff). (Landeros Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff sought to recover 57.75 hours of unpaid wages from August 5, 2020 to September 2, 2020, at the rate of $50.00 per hour from 3-D Engineering & Manufacturing Inc. (3-D Engineering) and Adolfo Landeros (Defendant). (Landeros Decl., ¶ 2.) After the hearing, the Labor Commissioner ordered 3-D Engineering and Defendant to pay Plaintiff the total amount of $15,231.14. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. A.) According to the Order, Defendant was ordered to pay Plaintiff the sum of $11,255.85 of the total amount awarded. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 4; Ex. A.) In March of 2023, Defendant caused his attorney to communicate with Plaintiff regarding settlement of the Claim and a settlement was reached. (Landeros Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; Exs. B and C.) Plaintiff agreed to release the Claim with prejudice in consideration of payment of $15,231.14 from Defendant and 3-D Engineering. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 6; Ex. C.) A cashiers check was sent to Plaintiff by Defendants former counsel on March 16, 2023, for direct payment to Plaintiff in the amount of the Labor Commissioners award. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 7; Ex. D.) Plaintiff received and cashed the check and Defendant understood that the Claim was fully resolved and dismissed between the parties pursuant to the settlement. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 8.) Defendant states that his former counsel made a mistake in not delivering the actual cashiers check directly to the Office of the Labor Commissioner and instead delivered the payment directly to Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the release. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 9.) Defendant contends that the Labor Commissioner requesting that judgment for the full amount of the award plus post-hearing interest and filing fees was based on mistake as this matter should have long been dismissed. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 10.) Defendant states that the subject judgment was obtained through mistake, excusable neglect, and inadvertence of his prior counsel as the payment was not mailed directly to the Labor Commissioners Office. (Landeros Decl., ¶ 11.) On February 26, 2024, the Labor Commissioner of the State of California (the Labor Commissioner) filed a Request That the Clerk Enter Judgment and Judgment on Final Order, Decision or Award of the Labor Commissioner. The Labor Commissioner sought a total judgment of $11,776.40 against Defendant. On February 26, 2024, the Court entered judgment for Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $11,776.40. On May 22, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment. Defendant seeks an order setting aside and vacating the judgment entered against him on February 26, 2024. Plaintiff did not oppose the instant motion; however, the Labor Commissioner was not served with the motion. Given that the Labor Commissioner requested entry of judgment and judgment was entered pursuant to such request, the Labor Commissioner should have been given notice of the instant motion. MOVING PARTY POSITION Defendant argues that he entered into a settlement agreement and release with Plaintiff but sent payment of the award, by mistake, directly to Plaintiff instead of to the Labor Commissioner. OPPOSITION No opposition has been filed as of July 12, 2024. REPLY No reply has been filed as of July 12, 2024. ANALYSIS I. Setting Aside the Judgment A. Legal Standard The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Relief under CCP § 473(b) is mandatory when based on an attorney affidavit of fault; otherwise, it is discretionary. Ibid . B. Discussion The Court references its recitation of the Declaration of Defendant from above and incorporates it herein. Defendants counsel declares that he sent a demand for satisfaction of judgment to Plaintiff on behalf of 3-D Engineering in LASC Case No. 24STCP00522 and Plaintiff informed counsel that he would submit an acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment in such case. (Yurcich Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; Ex. B.) Initially, the Court fails to see the relevance of Defendants counsel demanding satisfaction of judgment in a separate action to which Defendant is not a party. The Court finds that Defendant has shown a basis to set aside the judgment on grounds of mistake and inadvertence. However, as stated above, although the motion is unopposed, the Labor Commissioner should have been given notice of the motion. While the Labor Commissioner is not a party to this action, given that it did request judgment against Defendant and judgment was entered pursuant to such request, the Labor Commissioner should have been afforded the opportunity to oppose the instant motion. II. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court CONTINUES the hearing on Defendants AMENDED Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment Entered on 02/26/2024 to Wednesday, August 21, 2024, at 10:00 AM in this department, so that the Labor Commissioner can be served with the motion. Defendant is ordered to electronically file proper proof of service of the Motion upon the Labor Commissioner, as well as proof of service of the continued hearing date at least 10 court days prior to the continued hearing date. The Moving party is ordered to give notice of this Courts Ruling and to attach a copy of the Court's Tentative Ruling, as exhibit A to said notice.

S-CV-0051866 Grassy Sprain Group, Inc. vs. Brock, Brian ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged Appearance required. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Brock, Brian; Brock, William Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Brock, Brian; Brock, William

TRUIST BANK VS. STOCK, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0203124 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions issued on May 28, 2024 to Plaintiff Truist Bank and counsel, Gurstel Law Firm, P.C., for failure to timely serve pleadings on Defendant Chris Stock pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.110(b) and Local Rule of Court 3.03 and failure to timely seek default on Defendant Bright Nichols Stock pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.110(g). “The complaint must be served on all named defendants and proofs of service on those defendants must be filed with the court within 60 days after the filing of the complaint.” CRC 3.110(b). Local Rule 3.03 mandates that Plaintiff serve Defendant with Local Form LF-CIV-100 and file a proof of service within the same timeframe. The Complaint in this matter was filed on September 1, 2023 and no proof of service has been filed for defendant Chris Stock. Plaintiff did not address defendant Chris Stock in the written response to the Order to Show Cause. CRC 3.110(g) requires Plaintiff to file a request for entry of default within 10 days after the time for service of the responsive pleading has elapsed. Defendant Bright Nichols Stock was served on October 7, 2023. The time for filing a responsive pleading expired November 6, 2023. No extension was requested or granted. No default was requested. On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Declaration that asserts that a default packet “is pending to be drafted.” No explanation is given for the noncompliance with CRC 3.110. No default judgment has been requested. With no sufficient excuse for the delay, sanctions are imposed in the amount of $250.00 against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order of Sanctions. The Court will issue an Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal pursuant to Gov’t Code Section 68608(b) for Plaintiff’s failure to timely serve the complaint and LF-CIV-100, failure to timely seek default judgment, and failure to timely prosecute. The hearing on the Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal is set for Monday, September 9, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 63. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal. This matter is also calendared on Monday, September 9, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 63 for review regarding status of service. ****************************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings ******************************************************************************************

Case Number: 24NWCV00138 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: C Alliant Credit Union vs. Tong V. Tran, et al. Case No.: 24NWCV00138 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 @ 10:30 AM #9 Plaintiffs Application for Pre-Trial Writ of Possession is GRANTED. The Court will hear from counsel regarding the amount of the undertaking. Plaintiff to give notice. Background This action was filed on May 17, 2024, by Plaintiff Alliant Credit Union (Plaintiff) against Defendant Tong v. Tran (Defendant). The Complaint alleges: (1) Claim and Delivery of Personal Property, for pre-trial writ of possession, and order directing transfer of personal property and restraining order, and (2) Money Due on a Contract. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant purchased a Thor Motor Coach, but defaulted on June 27, 2023, such that there is now a total of $113,439.62 due on the contract. Plaintiff has filed the instant application for a pre-trial writ of possession. The application is unopposed as of July 12, 2024. Legal Standard Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to this chapter for a writ of possession by filing a written application for the writ with the court in which the action is brought. (CCP § 512.010(a).) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 512.010(b), the application must be submitted under oath and include: (1) A showing of the basis of the plaintiff's claim and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property claimed. If the basis of the plaintiff's claim is a written instrument, a copy of the instrument shall be attached. (2) A showing that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, of the manner in which the defendant came into possession of the property, and, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the reason for the detention. (3) A particular description of the property and a statement of its value. (4) A statement, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the location of the property and, if the property, or some part of it, is within a private place which may have to be entered to take possession, a showing that there is probable cause to believe that such property is located there. (5) A statement that the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to a statute; or seized under an execution against the property of the plaintiff; or, if so seized, that it is by statute exempt from such seizure. Before the hearing on the Writ of Possession, the Defendant must be served with (1) a copy of the summons and complaint; (2) a Notice of Application and Hearing; and (3) a copy of the application and any affidavit in support thereof. (CCP § 512.030.) The writ will be issued if the court finds that the plaintiff's claim is probably valid and the other requirements for issuing the writ are established. (CCP § 512.040(b).) A claim has probable validity where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim. (CCP § 511.090.) Prior to the issuance of a writ of possession, the Plaintiff must file an undertaking in an amount not less than twice the value of the defendant's interest in the property or in a greater amount. (CCP § 515.010(a).) Discussion Here, Plaintiff has stated the basis for its claim and entitlement to possession of the Thor Motor Coach: pursuant to a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. (Chism Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff includes a copy of the retail installment sales contract, which states in the third section: We may take the vehicle from you. If you default, we may take (repossess) the vehicle from you . . . ( Id. at Ex. A [PDF p. 7].) Indeed, Plaintiff attests that Decedent defaulted on June 27, 2023, and currently owes $113,439.62 under the contract. ( Chism Decl., ¶ 12.) The contract in Exhibit A constitutes a copy of the written instrument that the claim is based on. Plaintiff recounts that demand was made upon defendant Tong Tran for surrender of possession of the motor vehicle to plaintiff, but defendant has failed, refused or neglected to return possession of such property, or any part thereof, to plaintiff. (Chism Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. C.) Thus, the Motor Coach is being wrongfully detained. Defendant entered into a contract to purchase the Motor Coach on May 13, 2023. (Chism Decl, Ex. A.) Plaintiff has described the property: it is a 2023 Thor Motor Coach Sequence motor vehicle, Vehicle Identification No. 3C6MRVUG2NE129083. (Chism Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff states that the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine nor seized under an execution against the property of Plaintiff. (Chism Decl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff states that the current location of the property is 10182 Roselee Dr., Garden Grove, CA 92840. This is the address where Defendant Tong Tran resides. (Chism Decl., ¶ 10.) Accordingly, the Application for Pre-Trial Writ of Possession is GRANTED. Undertaking Code of Civil Procedure section 515.010 requires an undertaking to be filed before the writ issues in the amount of not less than twice the value of the defendants interest in the property. The Court will hear from Counsel regarding the amount of the undertaking.

CAVALRY SPV I, LLC AS Motion for Order to Deem Matters Admitted CVPS2305706 ASSIGNEE OF CITIBANK, N.A. by CAVALRY SPV I, LLC AS ASSIGNEE vs WISE OF CITIBANK, N.A. Tentative Ruling: The unopposed Motion of Plaintiff, Cavalry SPCV I, LLC, for Order Deeming Admissions Admitted is GRANTED. Requests for Admissions 1 through 5, inclusive, are deemed admitted for all purposes in this litigation.