Parkins, Mark V. Center At Northridge Llc

Case Number: 23AHCV01104 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANT PABLO MARTINEZS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT I. INTRODUCTION This negligence action arises from a slip and fall incident on property located at 21 Palmetto Drive in Alhambra, California. Plaintiff Jesus Manuel Guerra (Plaintiff) alleges that Defendant Pablo Martinez (Defendant) owned the property, Defendant Palmetto Villas, Inc. (Palmetto) managed the property and Defendant Complete Landscape & Gardening Services maintained the property. Plaintiff, a resident of 21 Palmetto Drive, Unit D, alleges that on May 20, 2021, he slipped and fell while walking on a pathway at the locations entrance. Plaintiff further alleges that a puddle of water and/or accumulated algae cause this accident. On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint alleging causes of action for (1) general negligence as to all three Defendants and (2) premises liability as to Defendants Palmetto Villas, Inc. and Pablo Martinez. On September 27, 2023, Defendant Martinez filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint because Plaintiff only alleged that Defendant owned unit D, not the site where the slip and fall occurred. On January 17, 2024, the Court sustained Defendants demurrer with leave to amend. (1/17/24 Minute Order) On February 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC). On March 4, 2024, Defendant Pablo Martinez (Defendant) filed the instant Demurrer to Plaintiffs FAC pursuant to CCP § 430.10, concurrently with notice and Declaration of John Fu, Esq., (Fu Decl.). On July 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants Demurrer with the Declaration of Thomas R. Burns, Esq., (Burns Decl.) and attached exhibits. Plaintiff has not filed a reply. A hearing is scheduled for July 18, 2024. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Demurrer Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(e) provides for a demurrer on the basis that a complaint fails to state a cause of action. A demurrer admits, provisionally for purposes of testing the pleading, all material facts properly pleaded. Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1247. A demurrer is treated as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. A ubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967. The general rule on demurrer is that the pleadings are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.4th 593, 604. Questions of plaintiffs ability to prove unlikely allegations are of no concern. Committee on Childrens Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994. A plaintiffs allegations must be accepted as true for purposes of demurrer, no matter how improbable they are. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 ( Del E. Webb ). Allegations need not be accepted as true if they are contradicted by judicially noticeable facts. Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1474. Pleadings are to be broadly construed (Code Civ. Proc. §452) and demurrers are to be overruled where the facts are sufficient to state any cause of action. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38. A demurrer challenges defects appearing on the face of the complaint or in judicially noticeable material but cannot be based on evidence. Speaking demurrers are not permitted. Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023), §7.8. Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(f) provides for a demurrer where a pleading is uncertain. Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are only sustained where a pleading is so incomprehensible a defendant cannot reasonably respond. A.J. Fistes v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695; Khoury v. Malys of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616. III. ANALYSIS A. Demurrer On September 27, 2023, Defendant filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint on the grounds that it was a sham pleading because the original complaint did not identify Defendant as the owner of the entire property. Plaintiffs original complaint states that Plaintiff is informed and believes & Defendant PABLO MARTINEZ was and is & the owner of Unit D located on the Premises. (Compl., ¶ 3, emphasis added.) On January 17, 2024, the Court sustained Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint with leave to amend. (1/17/24 Minute Order) The operative FAC states that Plaintiff is informed and believes & Defendant PABLO MARTINEZ was and is & the owner of the Premises . (Compl., ¶ 3, emphasis added.) On February 27, 2024, Defendant and Plaintiffs counsel met and conferred on the issue of Defendants ownership interest of the premises and did not reach a resolution, necessitating the instant motion. (Fu Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. A; Motion, p. 5.) Based upon this, the Court finds that the meet and confer requirement has been satisfied. On March 4, 2024, Defendant filed another Demurrer, moving the Court to sustain the demurrer based on the argument that Plaintiffs original and amended complaints contain inconsistent factual allegations. Defendants position is that the FAC attempts to plead around the defect and therefore amounts to a sham pleading. (Motion, p. 3.) Defendant argues that when a plaintiff attempts to circumvent factual problems by pleading new inconsistent facts in an amended complaint, the plaintiff must provide explain why such a drastic change has occurred. If Plaintiff is unable to do so, the new pleading will be treated as a sham and be disregarded. ( Del E. Webh Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App.3d 593, 604; Owens v. Kings Supermarket (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 379, 384; and Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 13, cited by 6 Cal. Prac. Guide, Civ. Proc. Bef-Trial, Sec. 7:48.) Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the demurrer because the sham pleading doctrine is inapplicable when the facts change due to information obtained in discovery. (Oppn., p. 2.) Plaintiff argues that the sham pleading doctrine is inapplicable because Co-Defendant Palmetto provided new information during discovery to support Plaintiffs amended allegation that Defendant Martinez owns the entire property, including the incident location. (FAC, ¶¶ 18, 24.) Pursuant to the sham pleading doctrine, any inconsistencies with prior pleadings must be explained; if the pleader fails to do so, the court may disregard the inconsistent allegations. ( Larson v. UHS of Rancho Spring s, Inc . (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 343.) Courts will not close their eyes to situations where a complaint contains allegations of fact inconsistent with attached documents, or allegations contrary to facts that are judicially noticed. ( Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400.) Given the information obtained through discovery, the Court finds that Plaintiff has appropriately explained the change in the allegations of ownership from the original complaint to the FAC. On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff served Special Interrogatories, Set One, on Defendant Palmetto. On October 30, 2023, Palmetto timely responded to the Special Interrogatories as follows: Special Interrogatory No. 1 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who owed the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 1: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 2 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who leased the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 2: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 4 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who controlled the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 4: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 6 : IDENTIFY the PERSON who owned the LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 2: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. (Oppn., Exh. B, pp. 2-3.) Plaintiff did not possess this information at the time he filed his original complaint. Plaintiff received this information on October 30, 2023. After the Court sustained Defendant Martinezs demurrer to the original complaint, Plaintiff relied on this information when filing the FAC. Therefore, the inconsistent facts between the initial complaint and the FAC are sufficiently explained to bypass an application of the sham pleading doctrine. Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Defendants demurrer to the FAC. IV. ORDER Defendant Martinezs Demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant to answer within 15 days. Counsel for Plaintiff to give notice of this order. Dated: July 18, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

Case Number: 21STCV34334 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 18, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 21STCV34334 MOTIONS : Motion to Quash Service of Summons MOVING PARTY: Specially Appearing Defendant Francisco Salas-Corona OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND On September 17, 2021, Plaintiff Gilberto Vera (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Francisco Salas Corona, Alfonso Del Real Montoya, Johnny Lobos, and Does 1 to 10 for injuries related to an alleged motor vehicle accident that occurred on January 31, 2021. On March 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of service of the summons and complaint on Francisco Salas-Corona. The proof of service shows the summons and complaint was personally served to Michele Roach, the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), under Vehicle Code sections 17450 and 17454. Specially Appearing Defendant Francisco Salas-Corona (Defendant) now moves to quash service of the summons and complaint, arguing service was defective and as such, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition to this motion. LEGAL STANDARD A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes:¿ (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10(a).)¿The motion must be filed on or before the last day on which the defendant must plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow. (Id.) [C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.]¿( Dill v. Berquist Construction Co . (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.)¿[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper but only if it complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.¿( Id . at 1441-42.) ¿On a motion to quash service of summons, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the prima facie facts entitling the court to assume jurisdiction, including whether service was in compliance with statutory requirements. ( Lebel v Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160.) A court may rely upon the verified declarations of the parties and other competent witnesses. ( Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362.) A court lacks jurisdiction over a party if there has not been proper service of process.¿( Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) By driving a car in California, any non-resident (U.S. citizen or foreign national) appoints the Director of the DMV as agent for service of process in any action arising out of an auto accident. ( Litwin v. Estate of Formela (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 607, 613 (citing Vehicle Code § 17451).) [T]he Vehicle Code provides a method whereby persons from outside California, who become involved in litigation as the result of their use of a motor vehicle on the highways of this state, may be sued here and, although they have left the state, may be effectively served with process so that in personam judgments may be rendered. ( Litwin , supra , 186 Cal.App.4th at 613.) Vehicle Code section 17454 contains that method: Service of process shall be made by leaving one copy of the summons and complaint in the hands of the director or in his office at Sacramento or by mailing either by certified or registered mail, addressee only, return receipt requested, the copy of the summons and complaint to the office of the director in Sacramento&such service shall be a sufficient service on the nonresident subject to compliance with Section 17455. Vehicle Code section 17455 requires that: A notice of service and a copy of the summons and complaint shall be forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff or his attorney to the defendant. Personal service of the notice and a copy of the summons and complaint upon the defendant wherever found outside this State shall be the equivalent of service by mail. Vehicle Code section 17456 sets forth the manner of proving service: Proof of compliance with Section 17455 shall be made in the event of service by mail by affidavit of the plaintiff or his attorney showing said mailing, together with the return receipt of the United States post office bearing the signature of the defendant. The affidavit and receipt shall be appended to the original summons which shall be filed with the court from out of which the summons issued within such time as the court may allow for the return of the summons. In short, to serve a defendant through the DMV a plaintiff must both serve a copy of the summons and complaint on the DMV and mail another copy directly to the defendant. Under Section 17456, any proof of service must include a receipt signed by the defendant, indicating that the defendant has actually received the package. In compelling proof of service by a return receipt bearing the signature of [the] defendant the statute requires actual delivery to the defendant by registered mail of a copy of the notice, summons, and complaint. ( Weisfeld v. Superior Court (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 148, 151.) DISCUSSION Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to show that he was a non-resident of California when the accident occurred. Additionally, he argues that the proof of service fails to show under section 17455, that notice of service was sent to Defendant by registered mail. The Court notes that the proof of service filed on March 8, 2024 fails to show that a copy of the summons and complaint was mailed to Defendant. Plaintiff does not oppose this motion and therefore fails to meet his burden to show that Defendant was a non-resident at the time of the accident and that he complied with Vehicle Code section 17455. As a result, the motion to quash is granted. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court GRANTS Specially Appearing Defendant Francisco Salas-Coronas motion to quash service of summons and complaint. Defendant to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.

Case Number: 24NWCV00190 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: C ALDACO v. VAZQUEZ CASE NO.: 24NWCV00190 HEARING: 07/18/24 #10 I. Cross-Defendant ANDREW CRUZ ALDACOs Demurrer to Cross-Complainants RICHARD R. VAZQUEZ and STEPHANIE MONTEZs Cross-Complaint is OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT . II. Cross-Defendant ANDREW CRUZ ALDACOs Motion to Strike Portions of Cross-Complainants RICHARD R. VAZQUEZ and STEPHANIE MONTEZs Cross-Complaint is OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT . Opposing Party to give notice. This action was filed on January 18, 2024 by Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant ANDREW CRUZ ALDACO (Cross-Defendant). On March 12, 2024, Defendants/Cross-Complainants RICHARD R. VASQUEZ and STEPHANIE MONTEZ (collectively Cross-Complainants) filed the subject Cross-Complaint. A party may amend its pleading once without leave of court at any time before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed, or after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the demurrer or motion to strike is heard if the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer or motion to strike . (emphasis added.) (CCP §472.) The hearing on this Demurrer and Motion to Strike is set for July 18, 2024. The Opposition was due no later than July 5, 2024. (CCP §1005(b).) The First Amended Cross-Complaint was timely filed on July 5, 2024the date the Opposition was due. The Demurrer and Motion to Strike are placed OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT.

Case Number: 23SMCV05386 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: I The court is inclined to GRANT the request to be relieved as counsel.

Case Number: 23SMCV01089 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: I The demurrer is OVERRULED. While defendants statement of law is correct in that it is hard to see who the individual is that is alleged to be specifically responsible, there is enough here for pleading purposes. The specifics can be fleshed out in discovery and for now there are allegations, albeit general, as to the defendants acting together. In short, these issues are better raised by way of a summary judgment motion or at trial. The court is also having trouble understanding how the demurrer is timely. The court notes three discovery motions on file. That does not bode well this early in the case. The court has not worked up those motions, but for the parties aid, the court appends its guidelines on discovery responses, meet and confers, and IDCs. The court encourages IDCs where both parties would like to resolve the matter informally and in good faith, and often the failure to participate in an IDC can have an impact on the recovery or propriety of any sanctions request. DISCOVERY RELATED GUIDELINES FOR DEPARTMENT I The guidelines below are not rules and they are not universally applicable in all cases. Rather, they are guidelines as to the courts general views. Each case, of course, will be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and some of the guidelines below may not apply to particular circumstances. That said, the court does take these views seriously. Discovery Responses The Court provides the following guidance concerning its general views on some common issues regarding responses to written objections. The Court has noticed that many attorneys view objections and the manner of making them in a way different than does the Court. To avoid these common pitfalls, the Court offers the following in addition to the provisions of the Litigation Guidelines appended to the Los Angeles County Superior Court Local Rules. First , General Objections are not permitted. The Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for them, and therefore they are disregarded by the Court. Any response that incorporates the General Objections is improper by definition. Second , the Court often views boilerplate objections as being in bad faith. A bad faith response is no response at all in the Courts view. Therefore, making boilerplate objections does not preserve those objections nor does it constitute a good faith response to written discovery. A bad faith response is viewed by the Court for what it is: bad faith. The objections will be stricken and deemed waived. In the context of a Request for Admission, such objections may lead to a finding that the request is deemed admitted, although that will depend on the facts of the particular case and the specific discovery at hand. Objections should be tailored to each specific request. If a request truly is overbroad, then an objection to that effect is proper. But such an objection is best accompanied by some reasonable limitation by the responding party that will narrow the request appropriately and (as narrowed) provide a substantive response rather than a mere statement that the request is overbroad. The same is true as to an objection that a request is unduly burdensome. The Court also notes that the party asserting that a request is unduly burdensome has the obligation at some point to provide an evidentiary basis for the objection, including evidence as to what the burden of compliance would be. ( West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407.) Often such an objection will include a statement by the responding party as to a narrower request that would not be unduly burdensome and provide substantive responses as so limited. Objections that a request is vague and ambiguous must set forth the vague and ambiguous term as well as the responding partys reasonable interpretation of that term as well as a statement that, so interpreted, the response will provide the discovery requested. If there is no reasonable interpretation possible (which is a rare situation), then the responding party must so state. Objections as to privilege must set forth the basis explaining why the information sought is in fact privileged. Where a privilege is asserted in the context of a document request, a privilege log must accompany the answer or be provided within a short and reasonable time after the answer. Where the objection is made in the context of an interrogatory, it must be clear from the objection the scope of the information being withheld. If there is no log, there should be no privilege objection to a document request (meaning that a prophylactic privilege objection is the equivalent of no objection; it preserves nothing). There are some rare exceptions, such as where the entire point of the discovery is to get allegedly privileged information or where compliance would require a log that is in essence an index of counsels file. In that situation, the log is unnecessary, but the assertion should be made that the request is in that rare context. Third , if an objection is made to the discovery but a response is being given, it must be clear whether information or documents are in fact being withheld on the basis of the objections. If the objections are clear and done in the manner set forth above, with statements in the objection as to a narrowing that will make the request proper, this is usually a simple task. The objections themselves state the limit and the response will be full and complete as limited. But where the objections are not so clear, the response must clearly state whether any information or document is being withheld on the basis of the objection and, if so, the extent of the withholding. Accordingly, in those situations, phrases like Notwithstanding and subject to the foregoing objections, responding party states as follows are improper. Those sorts of phrases make the verification useless, as the verifier can always fall back on the objections as the reason why a document was not produced or information was not disclosed. On the other hand, where the line of demarcation is clear, the verification will still serve its purpose. Fourth , for document requests, the substantive response must conform to the Code. There are relatively tight rules as to what the response must say, and the response must say it. For example, where a responding party is not producing documents because they are not in the partys possession, custody, or control, the responding party must verify that a diligent search has been made and must further provide the information set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure in such cases. In the case of interrogatories, the responses must also conform to the Code of Civil Procedure and must be made after diligent inquiry. It is not proper to refuse to respond because the responding party has no personal knowledge. If the knowledge is hearsay, it must still be disclosed, although it can be qualified to make it clear that it is not based on the verifiers personal knowledge. Fifth , the Court frowns on responses that do not conform to the foregoing rules being served with the view that the responses will moot themselves out in the meet and confer process. That is not how the process works. A good faith response is required before the meet and confer process begins. The meet and confer process will (hopefully) bridge the gaps between the parties respective positions. Further, where a response to a request for documents is made and documents are to be produced subject to certain objections (with the documents withheld properly delineated), the documents should be turned over irrespective of the meet and confer. The documents are to be produced with alacrity to the extent that there is no objection to them. What this means is that the response to a discovery request is not a trivial undertaking. Nabbing the response from the form file is a generally bad idea and can lead to all objections being waived. The point is that the boilerplate often renders the remainder of the response useless. The only exception is where it is clear that the substantive response is not in any way limited by the objections. In that case, the objections do no harm, although they also do no good. Meet and Confer The Code of Civil Procedure requires that before a motion to compel further responses or a motion for a protective order is filed, the parties engage in a good faith attempt to resolve their differences. They are to meet and confer for that purpose. Only if that effort fails can a motion be brought. Sadly, many litigants view the meet and confer process as just another procedural hoop through which they must jump in order to bring the motion, similar to the need to include an actual demurrer with the demurrer papers. The Code requires it, so they do it, but no ones heart is really in it. That is not sufficient. Given that, the Court believes it appropriate to set forth how the Court views the meet and confer requirement. Failure to abide by the guidelines below may well justify denial of the motion or a continuance of it to allow the process to take place. If one party but not the other refuses to participate as set forth, more likely than not the party refusing to participate will find itself on the losing end of the motion. The following quotation fairly sums up the Courts own view. [W]e feel compelled to observe that resort to the courts easily could have been avoided here had both parties actually taken to heart Justice Stone's admonitions in Townsend that the statute requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. ( Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.) Perhaps after 11 years it is necessary to remind trial counsel and the bar once again that [a] rgument is not the same as informal negotiation ( id at p. 1437); that attempting informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent to persuade the objector of the error of his ways ( id. at p. 1435); and that a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel.... Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. ( Id. at p. 1439.) ( Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294, emphasis in original, parallel citations omitted.) In practical terms, it means as follows. It is entirely appropriate to begin the process with a letter or other correspondence. The letter should not include a demand in the form of an ultimatum, but it can certainly include the relief that is being sought with an invitation to meet and confer. It is also entirely appropriate for the other party to respond with a letter or other correspondence to set forth its position on the issues. Such an initial exchange can often be helpful to narrow the dispute. Whether further exchanges make sense will depend on each case and each dispute. However, at some point, before impasse is reached the process must include an actual meet. The letters might well suffice to confer, but an exchange of correspondence is not a meeting. In the COVID-19 era, the meeting can be virtual or telephonic, but a meeting there must be. The meeting must be attended by a person from each side with the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission from anyone, including the client. If only the client can give the needed authority, then the client must be available instantaneously at all times during the meeting. This does not mean that one side or the other must concede, but it does mean that the people meeting have the ability in real and practical terms to strike a deal then and there. The parties should approach the meet and confer process as a problem-solving exercise. The purpose of the meet and confer is not to convince the other side of the bankruptcy of its position; rather the purpose is to reach an agreement by which the party seeking discovery is able to obtain the information that it reasonably needs and the party providing discovery is not put to an undue burden or forced to provide unnecessary information that might infringe on a privacy interest or disclose a competitive trade secret or the like. At the conclusion of the meet and confer, the parties should have an agreed statement as to the outcome. If the outcome is a total impasse, then they should agree on that. If they have resolved some or all of their differences, then they should statein writingwhat that agreement is so that there will be no confusion later. Often, an agreement will be without prejudice to a further request by the propounding party for more information after that party receives the responses. If a motion is still required, the declaration in support should describe with some detail the meet and confer process. While the Court is not interested in the back and forth, the court is interested in when the meeting took place, who was there, and how long it lasted. All communicationsin writing or oralmust be civil, polite, and professional. Name-calling and accusations are devices that undermine the process; they do not further it. A party engaging in such activity generally is not acting in a good faith effort to reach an agreement. Informal Discovery Conferences The court generally will encourage an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) before any party files a motion to compel further responses. The goal of the IDC is to get to yes. To achieve that goal, the court adopts the following. Five Court days before the IDC, the parties will submit a JOINT statement no more than eight pages total (on pleading paper) setting forth their respective positions. Where a similar issue is raised that will resolve many requests, it can be dealt with as a single issue. The IDC follows the good faith meet and confer. It is not a substitute for the meet and confer. The courts time is to be spent only on issues after the parties have tried to narrow the dispute as much as possible. As stated above, the goal is to get to yes. This means a few things. One is that each party must be represented by a person who has the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission. It need not be lead counsel and that authority need not be exercised. But the people at the conference must have that authority. If only the client has that authority, then the client will be present physically with counsel in an adjacent room without distraction after initial introductions are made. All IDCs are off the record. That means that whatever anyone says at the IDC will not be binding or quoted back at the party unless an agreement is struck. It is very bad form to quote the courts comments at an IDC during a later hearing unless the comments were part of a stipulated order. All parties have the right to change position if no deal is reached. The court, for example, might strongly indicate that it believes one side or the other has the better position but rule in a completely different way if there is a formal motion. Partial agreements that are contingent upon a full resolution are not binding unless a full resolution is reached. Partial resolutions that are not contingent on a full resolution are binding. Parties who are suggesting a resolution should make it clear whether their proposal depends upon other resolutions. Parties should be especially willing to give up sanctions at an IDC if it will resolve the dispute. That is not a requirement, but the courts experience is such that if a party is really going to insist on a sanction, the likelihood of a resolution is very low. It is likely that no party will get everything that it wants. The goal is to abide the Code, but at the same time make sure that the party seeking discovery is not creating busy-work or demanding a lot of work for no benefit (or virtually no benefit). The responding party might well have the right (should it come to motion practice) to avoid some aspect of the discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the responding partys interest to be willing to offer something. Conversely, the propounding party might have the right (should it come to motion practice) to get some aspect of discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the propounding partys interest to forego aspects of the discovery that are not really needed, perhaps reserving the right to seek that information at a later time should it prove necessary. The point is not to have the Court simply hammer away at the opponent. That might happen at a motion, but it is not the goal of the IDC. No orders will be made except on stipulation. However, if there is an agreement, the court may well want to make an appropriate order or ask the parties to confirm it in writing. Parties should take careful notes on any agreements. Because there are no Court Reporters, it is hard to put an agreement on the record. However, unless the agreement is confirmed quickly, people have a tendency to forget or to have buyers remorse. Therefore, it is best to have one party send an immediate confirming email to the other and obtain an agreement. The court would prefer not to get into the specific wording of the agreement during the IDC unless absolutely necessary. The IDC process does not work if people view it as just a necessary step to filing a motion. The court does not see it that wayif it did, then the court would abandon the IDC as a waste of time. Rather, this is an off-ramp to avoid motion practice and the attendant costs and time. Hopefully, it is also a way to get discovery more quickly than through formal motion practice. At the IDC, no matter how hot tempers have run in the past, the court expects all counsel to be polite and civil in tone to one another. The court will not tolerate rudeness or unnecessary accusations. They do not move the ball forward and they make it nigh impossible to reach an agreement.

Case Number: 23PSCV00745 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 6 CASE NAME: Wilhelmina Quismundo v. Son The Van Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production TENTATIVE RULING The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production without prejudice. Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order. BACKGROUND This is an auto accident case. On March 14, 2023, plaintiff Wilhelmina Quismundo (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Son B Van (erroneously sued as Son The Van) (Defendant) and Does 1 through 26, alleging one cause of action for negligence. On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff moved to compel responses to written discovery. The motion is unopposed. LEGAL STANDARD When a party fails to serve a timely response to interrogatories, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling a response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. ( Id. , § 2030.290, subd. (a).) The court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. ( Id. , § 2030.290, subd. (c).) When a party fails to serve a timely response to an inspection demand, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling a response to the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (a).) [T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. ( Id ., § 2031.300, subd. (c).) DISCUSSION Meet and Confer Although meeting and conferring is not required before bringing motions to compel, ( Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404), the Court appreciates Plaintiffs meet-and-confer efforts. (Nahorai Decl., ¶¶ 4-13.) Analysis Plaintiff indicates having served Form Interrogatories, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Production, Set One, on Defendant on November 15, 2023. (Nahorai Decl., ¶ 3.) Despite having been granted multiple extensions, Defendant failed to respond. (Nahorai Decl., ¶¶ 4-13.) Defendant has not responded as of the filing of the motion. (Nahorai Decl., ¶ 13.) The Court finds Plaintiff has shown it is entitled to responses from Defendant. However, the Court notes that Plaintiffs motion contains no proof of service, nor is any proof of service on file with the Court evidencing that Plaintiff served this motion on Defendant. Such proof of service should have been filed by July 11, 2024, per Rule 3.1300, subdivision (c), of the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300, subd. (c) [Proof of service of the moving papers must be filed no later than five court days before the time appointed for the hearing.]) Accordingly, it is unclear to the Court if Defendant was ever properly served with this motion. The Court also notes that Plaintiff combined all three sets of discovery requests into one motion. Each set of discovery requests requires its own motion and a separate filing fee. There is nothing here indicating that Plaintiff paid three separate motion filing fees. Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion without prejudice. The Court also denies Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to compel discovery responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production without prejudice. Defendant is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order.

Case Number: 22SMCV01360 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Pollard v. Barlow Respiratory Hospital CASE NO.: 22SMCV01360 MOTION: Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication HEARING DATE: 07/18/2024 Legal Standard A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP, § 437c(a).) The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co . (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in¿Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.¿(CCP,¿§ 437c(f)(1).)¿If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. ( Gonzales v. Superior Court ¿(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)¿ [A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to subdivision (t). (CCP,¿§ 437c(t).)¿ To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP, §¿437c(c).)¿The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. ( Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc . (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, [a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment& ( Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true. ( Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion may not be denied on grounds of credibility, except when¿a material fact is the witnesss¿state of mind and that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witnesss] affirmation thereof. (CCP, § 437c(e).)¿ Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (CCP § 437c(p)(1).) [T]here¿is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.¿( Consumer Cause, Inc. v.¿SmileCare ¿(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿ ¿ The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to¿frame¿the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding. ( Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. ¿ (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability¿ as alleged in the complaint ; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings. ( Ibid .)¿ Analysis Defendant Barlow Respiratory Hospital moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of each cause of action. Defendant fails to meet its burden of production on any noticed issue. As an initial matter, Defendant failed to file the principal evidence in the motion: the Medical Records (Exhibits A, B and C). The Medical Records were instead lodged with Department M via a flash-drive. The records on file, however, omit the Medical Records entirely. Defendant cannot meet their burden without presenting these exhibits filed with the Court and not simply lodged. Defendant contends that these records demonstrate that no abuse/neglect occurred, no breach of the standard of care occurred, and that no act or omission caused any injury to Plaintiff. Critically, Defendant proffers the declaration of expert nurse Lisa Gildred, BSN, RN-BC, CWCA, in support of such conclusions. (Exhibit D.) Gildred extensively (and almost exclusively) relies on the Medical Records to come to her conclusions on neglect, the standard of care and causation. Without the Medical Records being properly filed, the Court cannot consider the material evidence, and cannot conclude that Defendant has submitted evidence showing that there is no triable issue of fact as to the noticed issues. Second, Defendants memorandum and separate statement make impermissibly vague citations to the entirety of Plaintiffs medical records from a given facility, without directing the Court to the relevant pages of the exhibits. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(3) requires that Citation to the evidence in support of each material fact must include reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers. The instant separate statement violates this rule with every citation to Exhibits A-C. For example, in support of UMF 1, Defendant cites the entirety of Exhibit A Medical records from Barlow Respiratory Hospital and Exhibit B Medical records from Providence St. Joseph Medical Center without even noting a page number. The same can be said of every other citation to Exhibits A-C. Exhibit A is a collection of over 27,000 pages. Exhibits B and C are likewise thousands of pages. Defendant cannot reasonably expect the Court or Plaintiff to sort through the voluminous exhibits to guess which documents support the motion. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

Case Number: 24STCV04359 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 39 HEARING DATE : July 18, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 24STCV04359 MOTION : Demurrer to Complaint Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint MOVING PARTY: Defendant National Community Renaissance of California OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiffs Delmy Yadira Vargas Hernandez, Sebastian Gonzalez, Delmy S. Gonzalez, Babie J. Gonzalez MOTION Plaintiffs Delmy Yadira Vargas Hernandez, Sebastian Gonzalez, Delmy S. Gonzalez, and Babie J. Gonzalez (Plaintiffs) sued Defendant National Community Renaissance of California (Defendant) for habitability violations. Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. ANALYSIS [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) In ruling on a demurrer, the court must liberally construe[] the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant. ( Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) Plaintiffs first cause of action is for breach of contract. Plaintiffs allege Defendant breached the terms of the lease with Plaintiffs by failing to provide a habitable unit. (Complaint, ¶ 19.) For pleading purposes, these allegations suffice. Plaintiffs attach a lease addendum to the complaint and allege this is the operative agreement between the parties. ( Id. , ¶ 16, Exhibit B.) Defendant argues this agreement is not a lease, but rather an addendum to a lease. That is immaterial. Plaintiffs allege Defendant breached the agreement Plaintiff attached to the complaint. Plaintiffs are entitled to plead breach of contract in general terms. (See Ochs v. PacifiCare of California. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 782, 795 [In an action based on a written contract, the plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language].) Defendant may obtain further information regarding Plaintiffs claims through discovery. The demurrer to the first cause of action is overruled. Likewise, Defendants argument Plaintiffs fifth cause of action for nuisance is duplicative fails. Plaintiffs are entitled to plead in the alternative. (See Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co . (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402 [modern practice allows . . . party to plead in the alternative and make inconsistent allegations].) The demurrer to the fifth cause of action is overruled. Defendant argues Plaintiffs seventh cause of action for violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 45.30 fails because Plaintiffs apartment is not within the city limits of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs concede this point. Accordingly, the court sustains the demurrer to the seventh cause of action. In opposition, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to assert a claim under the Los Angeles County Code, asserting they were under the mistaken understanding the subject property was located in the City of Los Angeles. [U]nder this states liberal rules of pleading, the right of a party to amend to correct inadvertent misstatements of facts or erroneous allegations of terms cannot be denied. [Citation.]. ( Berman v. Bromberg (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945.) Therefore, the court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend the seventh cause of action. Defendant moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages. In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. ( Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294. ( College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721 ( College Hospital ).) Therefore, a plaintiff must allege the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) Malice is defined as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. [Citation.] ( College Hospital , supra , 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. ( Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, internal citations and footnotes omitted.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant failed to maintain the apartment Plaintiffs leased from Defendant in a habitable condition, and Defendant did not remedy such conditions even though Plaintiffs informed Defendant of the issues. (See, e.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 10-12.) However, Plaintiffs do not allege any specific facts to show Defendant acted with malice, rather than negligently. As such, Plaintiffs have not alleged a claim for punitive damages against Defendant. The court grants the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages with leave to amend. Defendant also moves to strike the prayer for attorney fees. Plaintiffs allege they are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the terms of their lease with Defendant. However, the lease Plaintiffs attach to the complaint does not contain an attorney fees provision. Plaintiffs concede as much. If facts appearing in the exhibits contradict those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence. ( Holland v. Morse Diesel Intern., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1447.) Accordingly, the motion to strike the prayer for attorney fees is granted without leave to amend. Should Plaintiffs obtain evidence of an applicable contractual attorney fees provision in discovery or determine there is any other bases for an award of attorney fees, Plaintiffs may file a motion for leave to amend their complaint, accordingly. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs seventh cause of action is sustained with leave to amend. Defendants demurrer is otherwise overruled. Defendants motion to strike the punitive damages allegations is granted with leave to amend. Defendants motion to strike the prayer for attorney fees is granted without leave to amend at this time. Plaintiffs are to file an amended complaint within 10 days. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this order and file proof of service of same.