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Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 16, 2024 line 3. DEFENDANT CARUZOS ROOFING LLC MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD is GRANTED. No opposition filed. Counsel to prepare an order. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 23LBCV00238 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: S25 Background On February 8, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants Fred Di Bernardo (erroneously sued as Fred Di Bernardo), Kathryn Vance (erroneously sued as Kathryn Vance) (collectively Defendants) and Does 1 through 20, alleging four causes of action: (1) breach of governing documents, (2) nuisance, (3) negligence and (4) declaratory relief. Plaintiffs allege that they, at all relevant times, owned and resided at a condominium at 162nd Place Unit 303, Long Beach, CA 90803 and that Defendant Bernardo has, at all relevant times, owned Unit 403, located directly above Plaintiffs condominium. (Compl., ¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiffs assert Defendant Vance resides at Unit 403 as a Tenant. (Compl., ¶ 4.) The two condominiums are part of the Peninsula Pacifica Homeowners Association (the HOA); Plaintiffs allege the HOA and each of its members, including Plaintiffs and Defendant Dibernardo, are bound by the Declaration of Establishment of Basis Protective Restrictions, Limitations, Conditions, Covenants and Reservations (the CC&Rs) recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on August 23, 1973 as well as the Bylaws of Peninsula Pacifica Homeowners Association (the Bylaws). (Compl., ¶¶ 10-14, Exhs. A-B.) Plaintiffs allege that on or about July 1, 2022, they discovered black mold along the baseboards of their master bathroom. (Compl., ¶ 19, Exh. C.) Plaintiffs contacted All-American Mold Remediation & Consulting LLC (AMR) to investigate, and AMR found extensive water damage in the master bedroom and vanity area, detected high moisture throughout the ceiling and walls, and discovered mold and moisture in other parts of the master bathroom. (Compl., ¶¶ 20-22, Exh. D.) After AMRs first property inspection, Plaintiffs emailed the HOA and Defendant Vance, notifying them of the mold issue; Defendant Vance agreed to have a leak detection service conduct an inspection. (Compl., ¶¶ 23-24, Exh. E.) On July 22, 2022, American Leak Detection (ALD) inspected Unit 403 and determined water was leaking from Unit 403 to Unit 303 through a bathtubs improperly sealed spout and cover plates. (Compl., ¶¶ 26, 27, Exh. F.) Plaintiff also asserts that on July 25, 2022, AMR returned to Unit 303 and confirmed the source of the water damage as a leak from Unit 403s bathtub. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs further allege that while the ceiling in the Unit 303s master bathroom was open, Plaintiffs and ALD observed and recorded water entering Unit 303 from Unit 403 when the Defendant Vance ran water upstairs in Unit 403s bathroom. (Compl., ¶ 29.) On July 28, 2022, Plaintiffs allegedly spoke with Defendant Dibernardo, who disputed the leak in Unit 403 and refused to further communicate with Plaintiffs. Additionally, Plaintiffs claims Defendant Dibernardo will not provide Defendant Vance or the HOA with his insurance information. (Compl., ¶¶ 30-33.) Plaintiffs state Defendant Dibernardo allegedly hired a plumber to fix the leak in Unit 403, but no proof of work completion was provided to the HOA until around December 22, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs claim they were unable to live in Unit 303 as no assurances were made that the leak would not reoccur. (Ibid.) Legal Standard The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Scalfv. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519.) A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1). When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; CCP § 437c(c).) Evidentiary Objections The Court rules as follows on Defendant Dibernardos evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Michele Travis: Nos. 1, 3 and 4 (Overruled) and Nos. 2 and 5 (Sustained). The Court rules as follows on Defendant Dibernardos evidentiary objections to the Declaration of William Idleman. Nos. 1 and 2 (Overruled). Judicial Notice Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice of Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Establishment of Basis Protective Restrictions, Limitations, Conditions, Covenants and Reservations recorded on August 23, 1973, as Instrument No. 3059 in the Official Records of Los Angeles County) is granted pursuant to Evidence Code, §§ 451, 452, subds. (c) and (g). Parties Arguments Plaintiffs move for summary adjudication on the following: (1) 1st Cause of Action (Breach of the Governing Documents); (2) whether Defendants owed a duty to maintain Unit 403 in accordance with the CC&Rs; (3) whether Defendants owed a duty not to commit a nuisance; and (4) whether Defendants owed a duty of care under the negligence cause of action not to damage Plaintiffs property. Defendant Dibernardo opposes arguing that: (1) Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for Breach of the HOA Governing Documents is essentially a breach of contract claim and (2) triable issues of material facts exist. Analysis The existence of an issue of duty may be a proper subject for a motion for summary adjudication. Courts may summarily adjudicate that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. (CCP § 437c(f)(1); Linden Partners v. Wilshire Linden Assocs. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 508, 518. Thus, theoretically, a motion for summary adjudication as to whether Defendant owed a duty under the CC & Rs would be appropriate. Plaintiffs characterize their motion as seeking adjudication as to whether Defendants owed a duty under the CC&Rs. However, the instant motion, as well as Plaintiffs separate statement of facts, it appears that Plaintiffs not only seek the Court to determine whether such a duty exists as a matter of law, but consequently, find that the Defendants breached their alleged duty and are liable for damages as a matter of law. (Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Adjudication, p. 5:7-14, 9:28 10:1-5, 13:22-23.) The instant motion for summary adjudication as the 1st cause of action; Issue of Duty No. 1 - whether Defendants owed a duty to maintain Unit 403 in accordance with the CC&Rs; Issue of Duty No. 2 - whether Defendants owed a duty not to commit a nuisance; and Issue of Duty No. 3 -whether Defendants owed a duty of care under the negligence cause of action not to damage Plaintiffs property are denied to the extent that the motion seeks adjudication of the elements of breach and causation. These are not proper matters for a motion for summary adjudication. (See Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 243 [where damages are an element of a cause of action, such as here in the cause of action for negligence, and the damages amount remains disputed, Plaintiff cannot obtain summary adjudication on the elements pertaining to liability]). Assuming arguendo that the Defendants are bound under the terms of the CR&Rs, which Defendants may not dispute (See DSSUF Nos. 7-9), the Court finds there are triable issues of material facts as to whether Defendants Dibernardo and Vance breach their duty of care under the CC&Rs, whether that breach resulted in the alleged water damage of Unit 303, and/or whether alternative sources within Unit 303s bathroom contributed to the claimed damage. (See DSSUF 2-7, 10; Daly Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6-11; Carpenter Decl., ¶¶ 6-12, 14, 15.)

RG17874853: Tinsley VS Glaude 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment - Deutsche Bank in Department 25 Tentative Ruling - 07/17/2024 Jenna Whitman The hearing on the motion for summary judgment scheduled for 07/18/2024 is continued to 09/05/2024 at 10:00 AM in Department 25 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse.

21CV00921 OLSON v. RYAN DEFENDANT RYAN’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION The motion is denied. Within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, a party may make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. (CCP § 1008.) Defendant has not offered any new facts, law or circumstances warranting reconsideration of the court’s March 25, 2024, Final Judgment. The court also notes that the proceeds from the partition sale have been distributed to the parties. (Referee’s Post-Disposition Report, 5/14/24.) The court orders the check received by the referee for $148.50 distributed to the referee for his unpaid hours in handling the close of escrow. (Referee Declaration, 6/4/24.) The court also discharges the referee. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

Case Number: 23SMCV02555 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER 23SMCV02555 (c/w 23SMCV03059) MOTION Motion for a Preliminary Injunction MOVING PARTY Defendant and Cross-Complainant Elisa Perlman OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Malibu Road Homeowners Association BACKGROUND The consolidated actions arise from a dispute between Defendant and Cross-Complainant Elisa Perlman (Perlman), and her neighbors, Andrea and Gelly Valero (collectively, the Valeros). Cross-Defendant Andrea Valero (Valero) was also the sole member of the board of directors for the Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Malibu Road Homeowners Association (HOA) that governs the property during most of the events giving rise to the consolidated actions. The Valeros and the HOA brought two separate lawsuits against Perlman stemming from the same factual dispute concerning water leaks into the Valeros unit, allegedly caused by Perlman. Perlman filed a Cross-Complaint against the HOA and Valero, alleging nineteen causes of action for breach of the CC&Rs; breach of other governing documents; violations of Civil Code sections 5210; 4950; 4910; 4920; 4765; 5600; 4923; 4930; 5605; 4925; 4935; 5610; 5615; and 4040; two causes of action for breach of fiduciary duties; and declaratory relief. Perlman now move for a preliminary injunction enjoining the HOA from collecting special assessments, including any late fees or interest, by foreclosing on Perlmans home for the duration of the consolidated actions. The HOA opposes the motion and Perlman replies. REQEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Perlman requests Judicial Notice of: 1. Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions for 25366 Malibu Road recorded on July 30, 2018, in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document No. 20180761460 (a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1.) 2. Certificate of Amendment to Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for the Malibu Road Homeowners Association recorded on March 19, 2024, in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document No. 20240180312 (a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 2.) Courts can take judicial notice of the existence and recordation of real property records, including deeds, if authenticity is not reasonably disputed. ( Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264-265.) The official act of recordation and the common use of a notary public in the execution of such documents assure their reliability, and the maintenance of the documents in the recorders office makes their existence and text capable of ready confirmation, thereby placing such documents beyond reasonable dispute. ( Ibid. ) Moreover, courts can take judicial notice not only of the existence and recordation of recorded documents but also matters that can be deduced from the documents, including the parties, dates, and legal consequences of recorded documents relating to real estate transactions. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence, recordation, and legal consequences of Exhibits 1 and 2. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivision (a), [a] preliminary injunction may be granted at any time before judgment upon a verified complaint, or upon affidavits if the complaint in the one case, or the affidavits in the other, show satisfactorily that sufficient grounds exist therefor. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (a).) The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final resolution upon a trial. ( Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316.) The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. ( 14859 Moorpark Homeowners Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.) Preliminary injunctive relief requires the use of competent evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds for relief. (See, e.g., ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016; Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150.) The trial court considers two factors in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its case at trial, and (2) the interim harm the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a); Husain v. McDonalds Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 860, 866-867 (hereafter Husain ).) The balancing of harm between the parties involves consideration of such things as the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo. ( Husain , supra , 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 867.) The decision to grant a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court . . . before the trial court can exercise its discretion the applicant must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to injunctive relief. The applicant must demonstrate a real threat of immediate and irreparable injury. ( Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. State of Cal. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 131, 138.) [A]n injunction is an unusual or extraordinary equitable remedy which will not be granted if the remedy at law (usually damages) will adequately compensate the injured plaintiff, and the party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden to prove its absence. ( Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1564-1565.) ANALYSIS The trial courts consider two interrelated questions in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: 1) are the plaintiffs likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of the injunction than the defendants are likely to suffer from its grant; and 2) is there a reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits. ( Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.) 1. IMMEDIATE AND IRREPARABLE HARM Under Code of Civil Procedure section 526, an injunction may be granted [w]hen it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(2).) The threat of irreparable harm must be imminent as opposed to a mere possibility of harm sometime in the future. An injunction cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents fears about something that may happen in the future. It must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity. ( Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.) Plaintiffs need not wait until they have suffered actual harm before applying for an injunction, however, they may seek injunctive relief against threatened infringement of their rights. ( Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292.) Perlman contends that already during the pendency of this lawsuit, the HOA has twice attempted special assessments against Perlman, and continues to assess late fees thereon, in order to raise money for its legal fees to prosecute the instant lawsuits against Perlman. (Galal Decl. ¶¶ 2-10 and Exs. AA, BB, CC, DD, EE, FF, GG, and HH thereto; Perlman Decl. ¶¶ 11-31 and Exhibits A through P attached thereto.) As a result, the HOA can now record a lien and start foreclosure proceeding whenever it wants. (Perlman Decl. ¶ 30.) Indeed, three days after the Motion was filed, Perlman received a pre-lien notice letter from the HOAs counsel, threatening to record a lien and commence foreclosure proceedings thereafter. (Supp. Galal Decl. ¶ 2-3 and Ex. II thereto.) Thus, Perlman has demonstrated that if the requested injunction does not issue, she will suffer irreparable harm (losing her home to foreclosure) that far exceeds the potential pecuniary harm to the HOA (delay in obtaining the special assessment amounts owed until after the litigation). 2. REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS A preliminary injunction may not issue unless it is reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits. ( San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442; see Costa Mesa City Employees Association v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 309 [no injunction may issue unless there is at least some possibility of success].) The first special assessment appears no longer at issue because the HOA withdrew it. (Perlman Decl. ¶ 16; Opp. at p. 13:16-21.) Plaintiff contends the second assessment is invalid because it is based on an unrecorded amendment to the operative Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&R). Specifically, the CC&Rs requires that modifications or amendments to the CC&Rs can only be effectuated by the affirmative vote or written approval of at (sic) majority of the Owners entitled to vote and Said amendments shall be effective upon recordation in the Office of the Recorder of Los Angeles County. (RJN Ex. 1 at p. 67, Art. XIV, Section 14.2.) At the March 8, 2024 special meeting of members, the membership voted on two changes relevant to this motion: (1) to modify the original uniform rate of assessments to a variable rate of assessment based on percentage interest for each unit; and (2) to issue the second special assessment for $50,000, to be allocated based upon each owners percentage interest in the assessment. (Perlman Decl. ¶ 22-24 and Exs. K-L thereto.) However, because both issues were passed in the same meeting, the first resolution had not yet been recorded, such that the allocation of the second special assessment could not properly be based on that amendment. Further, Perlman argues that the assessment itself is an abuse of the Valeros majority stake in the HOA to improperly shift the Valeros and HOAs legal expenses to Perlman, in violation of their fiduciary duties to her. In support, Perlman provides the various inconsistent and changing grounds the HOA has provided ,for the assessments, including the statement that the second assessment is to pay the HOAs legal expenses. (Perlman Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, 22, 26 and Exs. K & M thereto.) In Opposition, the HOA argues that the Lamden rule (which it contends is akin to the business judgment rule for homeowners associations) requires that the Court defer to the HOAs judgment in assessing the second special assessment. Specifically, Lamden explains: Where a duly constituted community association board, upon reasonable investigation, in good faith and with regard for the best interests of the community association and its members, exercises discretion within the scope of its authority under relevant statutes, covenants and restrictions to select among means for discharging an obligation to maintain and repair a development's common areas, courts should defer to the board's authority and presumed expertise. ( Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 249, 253.) The HOA also argues that it owes its members no fiduciary duties except those required by statute or the CC&Rs, and is not otherwise required to deal fairly with its members in good faith. Here, the Court finds that Perlman has established a probability of establishing that the HOA violated the CC&Rs by issuing the second special assessment allocated according to the unrecorded (and therefore invalid) amendment it had just passed in the same meeting, an issue the Opposition does not squarely address. Similarly, even if it were procedurally proper, the HOAs disproportionate allocation of the second special assessment for legal fees to Perlman appears to violate the American Rule that each party must generally pay its own attorneys fees, unless otherwise provided by statute or agreement. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(10); 1021; 1717.) 3. UNDERTAKING Section 529 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, On granting an injunction, the court or judge must require an undertaking on the part of the applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the party enjoined any damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified , the party may sustain by reason of the injunction , if the court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction. (Emphases added.) However, an undertaking is not required if the party to be enjoined either waives or forfeits the right to an undertaking. ( Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 739.) Here, neither party has specified what the amount of the undertaking should be, and it is unclear what, if any damages the HOA will incur by reason of the injunction, which merely delays the HOAs ability to collect on Perlmans special assessment by foreclosing on Perlmans home during the pendency of this lawsuit. Should the HOA ultimately prevail in the lawsuit, it may simply foreclose on Perlmans property at that point to collect the assessment Perlman owes. Thus, there is no indication that the HOA will suffer any damages by reason of this delay, and the HOA has not specified any. As such, the Court finds that the HOA has forfeited its right to an undertaking by failing to specify what damages it would incur by reason of the injunctions delay. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court grants Perlmans motion for a preliminary injunction, in part, and enjoins the HOA from foreclosing on Perlmans property to collect special assessments during the pendency of the consolidated actions. Further, because the Court cannot discern any damages that the HOA will suffer by reason of the delay, and the HOA has not specified any, the Court finds the HOA has forfeited its right to an undertaking. Perlman shall prepare and lodge a proposed Order in conformance with the Courts ruling on or before July 30, 2024. Further, the Court orders Perlman to provide notice of the Courts ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 16, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 21STCV39199 Hearing Date: July 22, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 22, 2024 Case Name: Nolasco, et al. v. Farnad, et al. Case No.: 21STCV39199 Matter: Motions to be Relieved as Counsel (2x) Moving Party: Jeffrey A. Asidi, counsel for Plaintiffs Juan Manuel Quiroz Canchola and Marco Solis Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Motions are granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Jeffrey A. Asidi seeks to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiffs Juan Manuel Quiroz Canchola and Marco Solis. The Motions are granted because they meet all requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1362. Moving party to give notice. Attorney is relieved as counsel of record for client effective upon the filing of the proof of service for the Court order (form MC-053) upon the client. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

21CV02330 DECKER, MICHAEL P ET AL V. SIERRA PACIFIC LAND & TIMBER COMPANY ET AL EVENT: Motion of Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc. to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set No. One; to Compel Compliance with Plaintiff’s Agreement to Produce Documents; and Request for Monetary Sanctions The Motion is GRANTED in its entirety. The Court finds that although the parties may be in the process of negotiating a settlement agreement in which Plaintiffs would agree to withdraw some or all of their claims in this action, and Plaintiffs intend to narrow their complaint should settlement fail, neither of these events has occurred and thus the requested discovery remains viable and good cause exists to seek the relief requested by this Motion. The Court further finds that the meet and confer efforts in relation to this Motion were sufficient and in good faith. 1 In regard to the substantive objection to Request Nos. 1-3, 5, 7-9, 11, 13-17, 19, 22-24, 26, 28-29, the Court finds that the Requests mirror the allegations in the Third Amended Complaint, are not overbroad, and are made with reasonable particularity. The Motion is thus granted, and Plaintiffs shall provide further Code-compliant responses to Request Nos. 1-3, 5, 7-9, 11, 13-17, 19, 22-24, 26, 28-29 within 10 days’ notice of this ruling. In regard to Request Nos. 12, 21, 25, 27, 30 and 31, the Court finds that a Separate Statement is not required where a party is seeking to compel the production of promised documents and is not seeking to compel a further response to a discovery request, which is the case here. The Motion is thus granted, and Plaintiffs shall produce the responsive documents to Request Nos. 12, 21, 25, 27, 30 and 31 within 10 days’ notice of this ruling. Sanctions are awarded against Plaintiff Michael Decker in the amount of $5,000 to be paid within 30 days’ notice of this ruling. The Court will utilize the form of order submitted by counsel with modification to the deadline to provide further responses and the sanctions awarded.

Case Number: 22TRCV00276 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Tuesday, July 16, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 13 PROCEEDINGS Wendy Newton v. Clay Claudino, et al. 22TRCV00276 1. Clay Claudino, et al.s Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint 2. Clay Claudino, et al.s Motion to Strike Portions of Third Amended Complaint TENTATIVE RULING Clay Claudino, et al.s Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint is overruled, in part, and sustained with 20 days leave to amend, in part. Clay Claudino, et al.s Motion to Strike Portions of Third Amended Complaint is denied, in part, and deemed moot, in part. Background Plaintiffs Complaint was filed on April 11, 2022, and the Third Amended Complaint (TAC) was filed on April 4, 2024. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff was a tenant of a property located at 509 Longfellow Avenue, Hermosa Beach, California 90254. The property suffered from numerous habitability problems. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: 1. Negligence 2. Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability 3. Statutory Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability 4. Breach of Contract 5. Nuisance 6. Fraud 7. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 8. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Use and Enjoyment 9. Trespass 10. Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress 11. Violation of Civil Code Section 827 12. Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.2 13. Retaliatory Eviction 14. Constructive Eviction 15. Conversion. Meet and Confer Defendants set forth meet and confer declarations in sufficient compliance with CCP § 430.41 and CCP § 435.5. (Decls. Rudolf Petrosyan.) Request for Judicial Notice Defendants request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code Section 452(d). Demurrer A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. ( Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. ( Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th 634, 638.) Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. ( Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. (C.C.P., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.) Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. ( Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) "Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer." ( Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609610.) Under Code Civil Procedure § 430.10(f), a demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is uncertain. Uncertainty exists where a complaints factual allegations are so confusing they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. ( Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) Defendants demur to the entire TAC and each cause of action pursuant to CCP § 430.10(a)(e) and (f) on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter, that the causes of action fail to state sufficient facts, and that the TAC is uncertain. First, Defendants again demur to the entire TAC on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction because a prior unlawful detainer judgment acts as collateral estoppel to bar the causes of action of the TAC. The Court has again taken judicial notice of the Complaint, Answer, and Judgment in Case No. 20IWUD00738. In ruling to the demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint, the Court already determined that the demurrer based on lack of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. It is not clear why Defendants again demurred on these same grounds. Defendants are instructed in the future to read the Courts minutes and rulings prior to filing documents or making appearances in this Court. For Defendants benefit the Court will repeat what was written in the Courts prior ruling: An unlawful detainer action is a special limited summary proceeding limited to the issue of the right to possession. As such, the parties cannot raise extrinsic issues and are generally limited in the issues that they can litigate. Thus, usually, the judgment in the unlawful detainer action does not have a res judicata effect on any issue other than one that was necessarily litigated to determine the right of possession. [T]he critical question is whether or not the unlawful detainer defendant has had adequate opportunity to present his case. Gonzales v. Gem Properties, Inc. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1036. In some circumstances, the unlawful detainer judgment does bar a subsequent action by the parties. Any issue that was necessarily litigated in the unlawful detainer to resolve the issue of the right to possession cannot be raised in any subsequent action between the parties. The party asserting issue preclusion bears the burden of establishing these requirements. Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 757. The unlawful detainer judgment may be barred by res judicata on issues that were not necessary to the issue of possession when the issue is raised in the proceedings without objection and fully litigated by the parties. Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal. 3d 251, 25657. Here, a review of the UD Complaint, Answer, and Judgment does not reveal, at least for purposes of the instant demurrer, a complete bar to the causes of action based on principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata. First, the Court notes that the UD Judgment was entered only in favor of Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007. Defendants have failed to establish, at this time, that the other two Defendants named in the Complaint can utilize the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata in their favor. Second, a review of the UD Judgment only reflects a discussion of issues involving Newtons alleged maintenance of a nuisance by placing undue restrictions on the asbestos abatement efforts. As the parties are probably aware, there are a multitude of issues that are alleged in the instant Complaint which are not addressed at all in the UD Judgment. The Court declines to dismiss the action or sustain the demurrer, at this time, based on principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata. The Court notes that the prior demurrer was sustained based solely on uncertainty grounds based on the failure to differentiate the parties that committed certain acts. The Court will review the TAC to determine if the TAC has now rectified those uncertainty issues. As to the demurrer of Clay Claudino, individually, the demurrer is overruled. Plaintiff states sufficient facts to state the causes of action and the Third Amended Complaint is not uncertain. Numerous factual allegations have been alleged against this Defendant to support the elements of the cause of action and Clay Claudino is specifically named as the landlord/lessor in the lease agreement attached to the TAC. However, as to the demurrer of Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, as Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007, the demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. As to these Defendants, the Court again sustains the demurrer based on uncertainty. The Court again notes that the attached lease reflects the parties to the lease as Plaintiff and Defendant Clay Claudino only. Most of the causes of action alleged against Defendants would only be applicable to the landlord - Clay Claudino. Despite Plaintiffs constant reference to the other Defendants as also being landlords, the only lessor named in the lease agreement is Clay Claudino. There are several causes of action that may be applicable to a Defendant solely based on ownership of the property. However, the allegation of ownership is completely uncertain. Plaintiff appears to allege that the owners are all of the following: Clay Claudino, individually, Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007. This allegation is uncertain because generally when a trust is the title owner of the property it would not hold joint ownership with individuals. Typically, ownership of property would be held by individuals or a Trust, but usually not co-owned by individuals and a Trust. Curiously, Defendants made specific arguments in this regard only related to the Fraud and IIED causes of action. However, the uncertainty in the allegation of ownership of the property permeates every cause of action. As to the Fraud and IIED causes of action, the Court notes that there does not appear to be any factual allegations within these causes of action directed against Defendants Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007 and Lee Marie Claudino. The factual allegations are directed solely to Clay Claudino, individually. Thus, the demurrer of Clay Claudino, individually, is overruled. The demurrer of Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, as Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007 is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Motion to Strike The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. CCP § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. CCP § 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP § 437. Defendants move to strike the following: 1. Page 2. line 4, which states, "Ms. Newton is a single, approximately 59-year old woman." 2. Page 4, lines 3-5, which states, "Plaintiff, believing that her sister and her very young niece would be moving into the residence with her as a result of her brother-in-law dying from asbestos exposure&" 3. Page 29, lines 14-15, which state "Defendants engaged in conduct, which was malicious, oppressive, and fraudulent, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages." 4. Page 29, lines 23-26, which state "Defendants' conduct in breaching the implied warranty of habitability has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 5. Page 31, lines 10-11, which state "Civil Code § 3294 allows for punitive damages where a defendant's actions were done with malice, oppression, or fraud." 6. Page 35, lines 19-21, which state "Defendants' conduct in breaching the covenant of quiet enjoyment has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 7. Page 37, lines 19-21, which state "Defendants' conduct in breaching the covenant of quiet enjoyment has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 8. Page 38, lines 23-24, which state "Plaintiffs are thus entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial." 9. Page 44, lines 18-19, which state "Plaintiff is thus entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial." 10. Page 49, lines 1-4, which state "Any lessor or agent of lessor who violates §1942.5, shall be liable to the lessee in a civil action for all of the following 1) The actual damages sustained by the lessee; (2) Punitive damages in an amount of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) no more than two thousand ($2000) for each retaliatory act where the lessor or agent has been guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice with respect to that act." 11. Page 49, lines 17-20, which state "Defendants have individually, and in concert, acted with reckless and conscious disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff Defendants' conduct has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 12. Page 51, lines 8-10, which state "Plaintiffs are thus entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial." 13. Page 52, lines 23-28, which state "Defendants unauthorized acts of conversion were done with the intent o [sic] depriving Plaintiff of their property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury, and were despicable, malicious, oppressive, and/or fraudulent conduct that subjected Plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive damages to Plaintiff in an amount not yet ascertained but which amount is within the jurisdictional requirements of this Court and will be proven at time of trial." 14. Prayer for relief items 6, which state "For treble damages according to proof at time of trial" 15. Prayer for relief items 7, which state "For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof at time of trial" (Notice of Motion, pages 2-3). As to Defendant Clay Claudino, the motion to strike is denied. Civ. Code, § 3294 states, in relevant part: (a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. (b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. [I]t is clear that the availability of a remedy for breach of implied warranty of habitability does not preclude a tenant from suing his landlord for intentional infliction of mental distress if the landlord's acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress. Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921. Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. Id. [I]f the tenant wrongfully evicted elects to sue in tort, damages may be awarded for mental anguish and pain or physical injury; exemplary damages may also be recovered when the landlord's conduct justifies the award[.] Id. at 926. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient specific facts that Defendant Clay Claudino acted with malice, oppression, and/or fraud to support the allegations and prayer for punitive damages. In addition, Plaintiff has alleged facts to support the request for statutory penalties. Finally, the allegations are not false, irrelevant, or improper on their face. As to Defendants Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, as Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007, the motion to strike is deemed moot pursuant to the Courts ruling sustaining the demurrer to the entire TAC. Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.