Sam, Benjamin Vs Herring, Joey; Jr

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Monday, July 22, 2024, Line 9. 2 - DEFENDANT COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION's MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT. Granted in part. (The Court's complete tentative ruling has been emailed to the parties.) For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/CK)

MARQUEZ VS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CVSW2310812 TUTTOILMONDO SANCTIONS Tentative Ruling: The Motion is DENIED. There are no new facts or law since plaintiff’s motion fails to set forth a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that she was not served with the motion to compel further responses.

GONZALEZ vs DESERT SANDS PSC2004645 Motion to Set Aside Dismissal UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT Tentative Ruling: Denied. Matter previously settled in October 2022. OSC re RFD was previously continued in June 2023. Counsel filed a declaration prior to that hearing requesting brief continuance to allow minor compromise hearing to be held in different department. December 2023 no declaration was filed. Current declaration of counsel does not state why additional time is needed now for minor compromise hearing.

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Thursday, July 25, 2024, Line 12. 1 - DEFENDANT APOGEE WAUSAU GROUP, INC.'s MOTION TO ADMIT COUNSEL PRO HAC VICE. Devon Holstadt's unopposed pro hac vice application is granted. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)

22CV016505: WARD, et al. vs GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al. 07/19/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Mary Kay, Inc.’s Combined Discovery Motion for Protective Order and to Compel Further Written Discovery Responses; filed by Mary Kay Inc. (Defendant) in Department 18 Tentative Ruling - 07/18/2024 Patrick McKinney The Motion re: Defendant Mary Kay Inc.'s Notice of Combined Discovery Motion for Protective Order and to Compel Further Written Discovery Responses filed by Mary Kay Inc. on 07/12/2024 is Granted in Part. Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to special interrogatory 17 and document request 28 is DENIED. The motion for a protective order is GRANTED. I. Mary Kay’s Motion to Compel Further Responses A. Background Mary Kay’s special interrogatory 17 requested that the Wards “state each asbestos-related claim you have signed in anticipation of submission to a bankruptcy trust.” (Pls.’ Resp. to Separate Stmt. 2:4–5, July 15, 2024 (capitalization removed).) The Wards objected on grounds that the response called for work product, noting that, “All claims which have been submitted have been served on all counsel, and all claims which will be submitted will likewise be produced consistent with the Court’s trial setting order.” (Id. 2:7–9 (capitalization removed).) Mary Kay’s document request 28 asked that the Wards produce “[a]ll documents, including but not limited to claim forms, applications, sworn statements, filings and supporting documentation, relating to claims made by you to any product liability bankruptcy trust for alleged asbestos- related injuries of Deborah Ward.” (Id. 3:21–23 (capitalization removed).) The Wards response stated they “w[ould] produce all proof of claims forms submitted to date.” (Id. 4:1 (emphasis added, capitalization removed).) Mary Kay, Inc. moved to compel further responses to these discovery requests. (Mot. 2:7–3:24, July 12, 2024.) Mary Kay argued that signed but submitted claim forms were not protected as attorney work product under Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal. App. 4th 1481; and that even if these claim forms were entitled to qualified protection as witness statements, disclosure is merited because Mary Kay would be unfairly prejudiced. (Mem. Supp. Mot. 4:24–7:4, July 12, 2024.) Deborah and Douglas Ward opposed. (Opp’n Mem., July 15, 2024.) The Wards argued that Volkswagen does not support Mary Kay’s position. (Id. 2:10–3:4.) The Wards further argued Mary Kay did not carry its burden of showing that the unsubmitted claim forms should be disclosed because the witness—Deborah Ward—is available and she was deposed. (Id. 3:4–17.) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 22CV016505: WARD, et al. vs GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al. 07/19/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Mary Kay, Inc.’s Combined Discovery Motion for Protective Order and to Compel Further Written Discovery Responses; filed by Mary Kay Inc. (Defendant) in Department 18 B. Discussion The Court denies the motion to compel further responses from the Wards to these discovery requests. The Court finds that any signed but unsubmitted bankruptcy trust claim forms are protected as attorney work product. Mary Kay’s reliance on Volkswagen is misplaced. Volkswagen only considers whether materials submitted to bankruptcy trusts are discoverable. (See, e.g., 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1458 (“Are documents submitted to bankruptcy trusts by a plaintiff’s attorney in support of claims for compensation for alleged asbestos-related injuries discoverable in similar litigation against another entity? We conclude that most such documents normally are . . . .”).) Even in the Court of Appeal’s discussion of the broad right to discovery relied upon by Mary Kay, the direction to trial courts is clear that production is limited to discovery “of the materials submitted to the bankruptcy trusts.” (Id. at 1497.) The Court also finds that Mary Kay will not be unfairly prejudiced by protecting the confidentiality of these unsubmitted claim forms. II. Mary Kay’s Motion for Protective Order A. Background The Wards’ document request 2 requested that Mary Kay produce “[a]ll documents that reflect the talc content of each and every product reflected in the documents produced in response to Request No. 1. [¶] Request 1 refers to all documents that reflect Debbie Ward’s purchase of Mary Kay cosmetics and body powder between 1993 and 2015.” (Pls.’ Resp. to Separate Stmt. 5:7–10.) The Wards’ document request 25 asked that Mary Kay “[p]roduce all formula sheets for mineral eye-color Quad 2 manufactured between 1994 and 2017.” (Id. 7:14.) To both, Mary Kay objected on grounds that the requests sought confidential or proprietary trade information and noting it “w[ould] produce responsive documents, once the parties enter into and per the terms of the stipulated protective order, a proposed stipulated protective order is attached.” (Accord id. 5:12–18; id. 7:16–21.) Mary Kay moved for a protective order to prevent disclosure of the formulas of certain products outside of this case. (Mot. 4:3–5:3.) Mary Kay argued that the requested formulas were trade secrets and part of its ongoing business for sale of cosmetic products, and that unprotected disclosure could allow its competitors to undercut its business. (Mem. Supp. Mot. 7:6–12:4.) The Wards opposed, arguing that Mary Kay did prove that the formulas of certain products are still undisclosed or proprietary, or that the products using these formulas are still manufactured. (Opp’n Mem. 3:20–4:22.) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 22CV016505: WARD, et al. vs GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al. 07/19/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other Mary Kay, Inc.’s Combined Discovery Motion for Protective Order and to Compel Further Written Discovery Responses; filed by Mary Kay Inc. (Defendant) in Department 18 B. Discussion The Court grants the motion for a protective order. The Court finds that the product formulas requested are trade secrets. The Court also finds that Mary Kay’s proposed terms of a protective order are fair and adequate. (See Proposed Protective Order, July 12, 2024.) The Court is unpersuaded by the Wards’ argument that these formulas are not entitled to protection as the formulas are stale: The Wards request formulas for products that were manufactured at least until 2017. III. Orders The motion to compel further responses to special interrogatory 17 and document request 28 is DENIED. The motion for a protective order is GRANTED. Mary Kay must re-submit its proposed protective order (excluding the text on page 1, line 23 through page 2, line 8) no later than five days after the Clerk of the Court serves notice of entry of this order. CONTESTING TENTATIVE ORDERS Notify the Court and all other parties no later than 4:00 p.m. on the day before the scheduled hearing and identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal - https://eportal.alameda.courts.ca.gov 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select Search 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select Click to Contest this Ruling 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select Proceed.

Case Number: 23CMCV00339 Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 Dept: A 23CMCV00339 Levivian Beatrice Valencia individually and as Successor-in-Interest to Cuca Bry Anna Mona Perryman v. State of California, et al. Thursday, July 25, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND This action arises from the alleged wrongful death of Cuca Bry Anna Mona Perryman (Decedent), who was struck by a vehicle driven by Lakila Marie Young. Decedents mother, Levivian Beatrice Valencia (Valencia), alleges claims against Defendants on her own behalf and as successor-in-interest to Decedents estate. Plaintiff alleges claims for negligence, a survival action on behalf of decedent, and for wrongful death. On January 9, 2024, the court granted Plaintiffs counsels motion to be relieved. (M.O. 1/9/24.) The order became effective on January 10, 2024, when counsel served the client with the order. On March 5, 2024, the court heard and granted Defendant, City of Los Angeles (City), demurrer to the complaint with 30 days leave to amend. The courts file does not reflect that Plaintiff amended the complaint. Defendant, People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation (Caltrans) now demurs to the entire complaint on grounds of uncertainty, failure to state a cause of action, and lack of jurisdiction as Plaintiff has not alleged a statutory basis for liability against a public entity. The demurrer was timely served on Plaintiff, who did not file an opposition. The bases for demurrer are limited by statute and may be sustained for reasons including failure to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action and uncertainty. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10 .) A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. ( Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) The court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. ( Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.) Defense counsel attempted to meet and confer in good faith with Plaintiff, who did not respond. (Andrea S. Maehara decl., ¶¶ 2-5.) A public entity is not liable for an injury except as provided by statute. ( Gov. Code § 815 .) Plaintiff must allege sufficiently detailed facts to support an inference that each of the statutory elements of liability is satisfied. General allegations are regarded as inadequate. ( Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 5 .) Moreover, [s]ince the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or enactment, the statute or enactment claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified." ( Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802 .) The basis for liability against Caltrans is its alleged negligence in designing and constructing the subject roadway and in failing to maintain traffic controls and lighting where the accident occurred. (Complaint, ¶ 17, 31.) Plaintiff invokes Civil Code § 1714(a) which generally requires everyone to be responsible for injury caused to another because of a lack of ordinary care or skill in the management of property. (Complaint, ¶ 32.) However, "section 1714 is an insufficient statutory basis for imposing direct liability on public agencies." ( Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1180 .) Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is SUSTAINED. Plaintiff has 30 days to file an amended complaint. (McDonald v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 297, 303 [leave to amend is liberally granted irrespective of whether the plaintiff requested it].)

Case Number: 24TRCV00170 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling ¿¿ ¿¿¿ HEARING DATE: July 26, 2024 ¿¿¿ CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV00170 ¿¿¿ CASE NAME: Karin Friedman v. Anthony Cavuoti, LMFT, et al. ¿ MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Carelon Behavioral Health of California, Inc. ¿ RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Karin Friedman TRIAL DATE: Not Set. ¿¿¿ MOTION:¿ (1) Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint, 3 rd cause of action for negligent hiring ¿¿ Tentative Rulings: (1) SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. I. BACKGROUND ¿¿¿ ¿¿¿ A. Factual ¿¿¿ ¿¿¿ On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff, Karin Friedman (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Anthony Cavuoti, LMFT, Carellon Behavioral Health of CA, Inc., and DOES 1 through 100. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Hiring. On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. The SAC is based on Plaintiffs allegation that on August 18, 2023, Plaintiff called Defendant, Carelon and spoke to a therapist regarding issues of depression and anxiety for forty-five minutes. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff contends that Carelon then emailed her on August 21, 2023 the information of two therapists, both of whom said they were a good match for her, and both of whom were men. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff notes that she called back and asked for female therapists, and they said that none were available in her area. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Thus, Plaintiff indicates that she contacted Defendant Cavuoti to set up an initial meeting because he was the closest therapist to her location. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff notes that a few days after, she spoke with Defendant Cavuoti to explain to him that she requires consistent therapy due to her psychological disorder of depression and anxiety (among other issues). (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further notes that she told him she was adopted and suffered abuse from her mother. (SAC, ¶ 10.) After informing him of this, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Cavuoti stated he was also adopted, was the same age as her, and stated that they had a lot in common, and that he could not wait to meet her. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that on August 30, 2023, she had her first appointment with Defendant Cavuoti. During this initial appointment Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Cavuoti spoke with her about his previous weekend in Vegas and brought the conversation back to himself when he informed Plaintiff about his own history of abuse. (SAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff contends that she was upset by this information as she was also abused as a child. (SAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff notes that the conversation continuously came back to Defendant Cavuoti, and she did not get a lot of time to speak with him about her own issues. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Cavuoti abruptly and stated, our time is over. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff notes that he then opened the door and said, I know I am not supposed to do this, and proceeded to hug her while pressing her close to him while making audible, strange noises which sounded like oh, oh. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that after she left, she had her partner pull over on the side of the road and she vomited. (SAC, ¶ 15.) As soon as she got home, Plaintiff notes she took a shower and called her psychiatrists office and told him what had happened. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also notes that she called Defendant Carelon and told them what happened. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Carelon apologized profusely and said they would send her more referrals, to which they subsequently sent five (5) women. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff notes that she proceeded to speak with her psychiatrist weekly due to the incident, who prescribed her mediation to address her nerves in the wake of the incident. (SAC, ¶ 16.) Subsequently, Plaintiff notes that she unintentionally left her files at Defendant Cavuotis office, and he forced her into further communications to retrieve her paperwork, which caused her additional stress, anxiety, and sleeplessness. (SAC, ¶ 16.) Defendant, Carelon Behavioral Health of California, Inc. (Carelon) now files a demurrer to the SAC. B. Procedural¿ ¿¿ ¿¿ On June 14, 2024, Carelon filed a demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC. On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On July 23, 2024, Carelon filed a reply brief. ¿ II. ANALYSIS ¿¿ A. Legal Standard Leave to amend is permitted under the Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a) and section 576. The policy favoring amendment and resolving all matters in the same dispute is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified. . .. Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [citations], this policy should be applied only where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party . . .. [citation]. A different result is indicated where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. [Citation]. ( Magpali v. Farmers Group ( 1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) A motion for leave to amend a pleading must also comply with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, which requires a supporting declaration to set forth explicitly what allegations are to be added and where, and explicitly stating what new evidence was discovered warranting the amendment and why the amendment was not made earlier. The motion must also include (1) a copy of the proposed and numbered amendment, (2) specifications by reference to pages and lines the allegations that would be deleted and added, and (3) a declaration specifying the effect, necessity and propriety of the amendments, date of discovery and reasons for delay. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subds. (a), (b).) B. Discussion Defendant Carelon demurs to Plaintiffs SAC on the grounds that it argues Plaintiffs third cause of action for Negligent Selection of An Independent Contractor fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. i. Meet and Confer Requirement The declaration of Kelsey A. Hill is offered in support of Carelons counsels compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. Hill declares that on April 2, 2024, she sent Plaintiffs counsel an email identifying the defects in the FAC and asking to meet and confer. (Declaration of Kelsey A. Hill (Hill Decl.), ¶ 2.) On April 10, 2024, Hill indicates that she and her colleague, Junga Kim, met and conferred with Plaintiffs counsel and that subsequently, the FAC was amended. On June 6, 2024, Hill indicates that she sent Plaintiffs counsel an email identifying and outlining the legal arguments and bases of Carelons anticipated demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC and asking Hill to meet and confer. (Hill Decl., ¶ 7.) Hill asserts that after receiving no response to her initial email, she sent a follow-up email to Plaintiffs counsel on June 10, 2024, after which Hill and Plaintiffs counsel exchanged emails regarding the anticipated demurrer. (Hill Decl., ¶ 9.) Hill further notes that in her June 13, 2024 email, she explained that Carelons demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC is based on the same grounds as previously articulated with respect to the FAC. (Hill Decl., ¶ 10.) However, despite efforts, Hill notes that the parties were unable to reach an agreement resolving the objections. (Hill Decl., ¶ 11.) Thus, this Court finds that the parties have met and conferred in good faith prior to filing the demurrer, and the meet and confer requirements have been met. ii. Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor Carelon argues that Plaintiffs third cause of action for Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor fails as a matter of law. Carelon argues that Plaintiffs cause of action is defective for three reasons: (1) first, Plaintiff fails to plead that at the time of hiring or prior to , Carelon knew or should have known Defendant Cavuoti presented an undue risk of the particular harm to which Plaintiff was allegedly exposed; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege that Carelon owed her any duty of care in selecting (and recommending and referring) Cavuoti as a potential therapist; and (3) even if Carelon owed a duty of care to Plaintiff, she has not alleged that Carelon breached that duty by selecting Defendant Cavuoti as a participating provide, or that any such breach was a substantial factor in causing her injury. Generally, a hirer of an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the contractor or its employees. ( American States Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co . (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 18, 28.) However, [o]ver time, the courts have, for policy reasons, created so many exceptions to this general rule of nonliability that the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions. ( Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 693.) One of these exceptions is referred to as the peculiar risk doctrine. ( Ibid .) California recognizes a cause of action that an employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee. ( Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054, citing Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 836.) The basis for such a claim is that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes. ( Capital Cities , supra , at p. 1054; Evan F ., supra, at pp. 836-837.) In Capital Cities , the Second District determined that the demurrer to the plaintiffs pleading was properly sustained because of a lack of specific factual allegations that the casting director, who allegedly drugged, beat, and then facilitated the gang rape of the aspiring actor, was previously known by the employer to act in such a fashion. Plaintiff there had only alleged that the employer knew that the casting director used his position to gain sexual favors, that the director personally used drugs, and that the use of a casting couch is common in the entertainment industry. From Capital Cities the Court finds that when a claim such as negligent hiring or negligent selection of an independent contractor is asserted, greater specificity in pleading the prior knowledge of the employer or hirer is required. In the Second Districts analysis of the demurrer there, the panel stated: knowledge that [casting director] Marshall used his position of authority to extract or to coerce sexual favors is not knowledge that he would first drug and then attack a potential employee. ( Capital Cities, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 10541055.) Applying that reasoning here, plaintiff would need to allege that Carelon knew or should have known from some prior incident, screening process, a prior claim, or otherwise that Cavuoti would discuss his own personal history of childhood abuse with a new patient, that he would make veiled romantic overtures to female therapy patients, and that he would hug, embrace, or make inappropriate physical contact with therapy patients. No allegatison of those sort are contained in the SAC. Carelon cites to CACI No. 426 (Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention of Employee), noting that in order to sufficiently state a claim for negligent selection of an independent contractor, a plaintiff must show among other things that the hiring defendant knew or should have known that the contractor was unfit or incompetent and that the contractors unfitness or incompetence created a particular risk of harm to other people. ( See CACI No. 426 element 2.) While Plaintiff has alleged each element of CACI 426 in conclusory fashion, more factual detail is required. For example, was Carelon aware of inappropriate behavior of Defendant Cavuoti prior to hiring him? Did other patients of Defendant Cavuoti make similar complaints to Defendant Carelon prior to him being recommended as a therapist to Plaintiff? Without more detailed facts and allegations, Plaintiff may not maintain a cause of action for Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. As such, this Court SUSTAINS demurrer with leave to amend. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Carelons demurrer is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. Carelon is ordered to give notice.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ON COMPLAINT FOR OTHER PERSONAL RAMIREZ VS CORONA CVRI2200458 INJURY/PROPERTY PEREZ DAMAGE/WRONGFUL DEATH TORT (OVER $25,000) OF REGINA RAMINEZ BY GC PALLETS, INC. Tentative Ruling: Grant request for judicial notice and grant the unopposed motion.