Bank Of America V Stephen Smith

DEMURRER ON 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT/WARRANTY (OVER ALVARADO VS ONE STOP $25,000) OF JESSICA L. ALVARADO CVRI2305186 REAL ESTATE, LLC BY VICTORIA GARDENS ESCROW, INC., CARINA GOMEZ-RIZO, TERRI ARIAS, MARK MASKOWITZ, DAVID SKOLNICK Tentative Ruling: Defendants CARINA GOMEZ-RIZO, Terri Arias, Mark Moskowitz, Keller Williams Home Realty, Victoria Gardens Escrow and David Skolnick’s Demurrer to the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Causes of Action in the First Amended Complaint is sustained with leave to amend within 20 days.

Re: Kristol Serna v. Hudson Insurance Company Superior Court Case No. 24CECG02276 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 (Dept. 502) Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Oral Argument, if timely requested, will be heard on Thursday, July 18, 2024 at 3:30 PM in Department 502. Tentative Ruling: To deny plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, in its entirety. Explanation: While plaintiff has not explained in her notice of motion what the exact basis for her request for attorney’s fees is, it appears from her points and authorities brief that she is relying on several statutes to support her claim, as well as the attorney’s fees clause in the sales contract. She notes that, under Civil Code section 1717, “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).) However, section 1717, subdivision (b)(2) also states that, “[w]here an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(2).) Here, plaintiff dismissed her first amended complaint after she and Freeway Funding reached a settlement of their claims against each other. Therefore, she cannot recover her attorney’s fees under section 1717 based on the attorney’s fees clause in the contract, as she dismissed her complaint pursuant to a settlement, and as a result she is not the prevailing party on the contract as a matter of law. Plaintiff also relies on the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civil Code section 1750, et seq.) and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civil Code section 1788, et seq.). Plaintiff points out that both the CLRA and the Rosenthal Act provide for an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing consumer plaintiff in an action under those statutes. (Civil Code, §§ 1780, subd. (e); 1788.30, subd. (c).) However, under the CLRA the consumer is required to give the person alleged to have committed the wrongful acts written notice of their claim and an opportunity to repair, replace, or otherwise rectify the goods or services at least 30 days before filing suit. (Civil Code, § 1782, subd. (a)(1), (2).) Thus, if the consumer fails to give notice 30 days before filing suit, or the merchant offers to repair or replace the defective item within the 30-day period, the consumer is barred from recovering damages or attorney’s fees against the merchant in a subsequent CLRA suit. (Benson v. Southern California Auto Sales, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1212.) In the present case, plaintiff’s counsel sent a demand letter under the CLRA to Freeway on September 15, 2023. (Barry decl., ¶ 15, and Exhibit 6 thereto.) However, instead of waiting at least 30 days for Freeway to respond to the demand, plaintiff filed her complaint asserting a claim under the CLRA and other causes of action on September 18, 2023, only three days after sending the demand letter. Therefore, plaintiff failed to comply with the CLRA’s requirement to give Freeway 30 days’ notice and an opportunity to repair, replace, or otherwise rectify the problem. As a result, plaintiff is now barred from seeking damages or attorney’s fees under her CLRA claim. (Benson, supra, at p. 1212.) Indeed, her complaint does not even seek money damages under the CLRA, so she was apparently aware of the fact that her claim might have been filed prematurely. Nevertheless, her failure to give Freeway 30 days to cure the problem means that she cannot seek attorney’s fees based on the CLRA. Plaintiff also relies on the Rosenthal Act’s fees provision to support her request for attorney’s fees. Under Civil Code section 1788.30, subdivision (c), “[i]n the case of any action to enforce any liability under this title, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs of the action. Reasonable attorney's fees, which shall be based on time necessarily expended to enforce the liability, shall be awarded to a prevailing debtor; reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing creditor upon a finding by the court that the debtor's prosecution or defense of the action was not in good faith.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.30, subd. (c).) Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot recover her fees under the Rosenthal Act because she did not give notice of a violation of the Act within 15 days of filing her lawsuit. Defendant cites to section 1788.30, subdivision (d), which states that, “[a] debt collector shall have no civil liability under this title if, within 15 days either after discovering a violation which is able to be cured, or after the receipt of a written notice of such violation, the debt collector notifies the debtor of the violation, and makes whatever adjustments or corrections are necessary to cure the violation with respect to the debtor.” (Civil Code, § 1788.30, subd. (d).) Defendant argues that this provision means that plaintiff had to give 15 days’ notice before filing her action under the Rosenthal Act, and that because plaintiff did not give such notice, she is barred from recovering her attorney’s fees. However, section 1788.30(d) does not require the debtor to give 15 days’ notice before filing suit. It only provides that, if written notice of a violation is given and the debt collector takes action to correct the violation, then the debt collector is not liable under the Act. Defendant cites to no cases or other authorities that provide that the debtor must always give written notice of a violation at least 15 days before filing suit under the Act, or that failure to give notice results in the waiver of the right to recover attorney’s fees under the Act. Defendant cites to Benson v. Southern California Auto Sales, supra, in support of its position, but Benson only dealt with the issue of whether attorney’s fees are recoverable under the CLRA, not the Rosenthal Act. Since the Rosenthal Act contains different language that does not expressly require the debtor to give 15 days’ notice to the debt collector before filing suit, defendant has not shown that the lack of notice bars plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees. As a result, the court will not deny the motion based on the alleged lack of statutory support for her prayer for attorney’s fees. On the other hand, plaintiff still needs to show that she is the prevailing party in order to obtain her attorney’s fees under the Rosenthal Act. (Civ. Code, § 1788.30, subd. (c).) The Rosenthal Act does not define what the term “prevailing party” means. However, other courts have analyzed the concept of “prevailing party” in the context of similar fee provisions in statutes such as the CLRA and Civil Code section 1717. In Kim v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 170, the Court of Appeal discussed the standards for determining whether a party had “prevailed” for the purpose of obtaining attorney’s fees under the CLRA. “In Reveles, supra, the court applied the general definition of ‘prevailing party’ found in Code of Civil Procedure section 1032.5. It concluded that a plaintiff is the prevailing party under section 1780(d) ‘if he obtained a “net monetary recovery” on his [CLRA] claim.’ More recently, the court in Graciano, supra, held that, in deciding prevailing party status under the CLRA, ‘the court should adopt a pragmatic approach, determining prevailing party status based on which party succeeded on a practical level. Under that approach, the court exercises its discretion to determine “the prevailing party by analyzing which party realized its litigation objectives.”’” (Kim v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, supra, at p. 179, citations omitted.) The Kim court also cited to Elster v. Friedman (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1439, wherein the court stated that, “[a] plaintiff prevails, in essence, when he gets most or all of what he wanted by filing the action.” (Elster, supra, at pp. 1443–1444.) “In Elster, the plaintiffs were the prevailing party because ‘what they wanted’ was to enjoin the defendant from harassing them and that is the relief they obtained.” (Kim, supra, at pp. 179–180.) “In Coltrain v. Shewalter, the court held that the critical issue for the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c) (the anti-SLAPP statute) ‘is which party realized its objectives in the litigation.’ In cases concluding by way of dismissal, that is usually the defendant. ‘Since the defendant's goal is to make the plaintiff go away with its tail between its legs, ordinarily the prevailing party will be the defendant. The plaintiff, however, may try to show it actually dismissed because it had substantially achieved its goals through a settlement or other means....’” (Id. at p. 180, citations omitted.) “[A] number of courts have elected to take a more ‘pragmatic’ and less restrictive approach to assess whether a buyer has prevailed. Under that approach, it is not enough for a buyer to show that she ‘obtained a net monetary recovery.’ Instead, courts ask: To what extent did the buyer achieve her litigation objectives? By and large, litigation objectives are measured by what the party sought to obtain by filing suit.” (Duff v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 491, 502, citations omitted.) “As one Court of Appeal has explained, ‘[t]ypically, a determination of no prevailing party results when both parties seek relief, but neither prevails, or when the ostensibly prevailing party receives only a part of the relief sought.’ By contrast, when the results of the litigation on the contract claims are not mixed—that is, when the decision on the litigated contract claims is purely good news for one party and bad news for the other—the Courts of Appeal have recognized that a trial court has no discretion to deny attorney fees to the successful litigant.” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 875–876, citations omitted, italics in original [interpreting the concept of “prevailing party” for the purpose of awarding fees under Civil Code section 1717].) “Accordingly, we hold that in deciding whether there is a ‘party prevailing on the contract,’ the trial court is to compare the relief awarded on the contract claim or claims with the parties' demands on those same claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources. The prevailing party determination is to be made only upon final resolution of the contract claims and only by ‘a comparison of the extent to which each party ha[s] succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions.’” (Id. at p. 876, citation omitted.) In the present case, plaintiff was not the “prevailing party” for the purpose of the Rosenthal Act or any other fee shifting statute. Plaintiff argues that she achieved her litigation objectives because she obtained a settlement that rescinded the sales contract, waived the unpaid balance due on the contract, and removed the negative references on her credit report. However, as defendant points out, plaintiff’s complaint sought more than simply to rescind the contract, waive the unpaid balance due, and remove the negative credit history. She also sought actual damages, restitution of the amounts she paid under the contract, incidental and consequential damages, punitive damages, civil penalties, equitable and injunctive relief, prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees and costs, and other relief under Business and Professions Code section 17200 as provided by law. (Complaint, p. 12, Prayer for Relief, see also First Amended Complaint, pp. 12-13, Prayer for Relief.) Also, in her demands to defendant, plaintiff sought not only to rescind the contract, cancel any outstanding debt owed on the contract, and remove the poor credit report, but also emotional distress and unfair debt collection practice damages, restitution of the amounts she paid to defendant, and attorney’s fees. (Barry decl., ¶¶ 16, 19, and Exhibits 6 and 7 thereto.) Yet the settlement did not grant most of the relief plaintiff sought, as it did not give her any restitution of payments she had made, money damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief, civil penalties, or prejudgment interest. (Exhibit 8 to Barry decl.) While plaintiff did receive part of the relief she sought, as she did not have to pay off the remaining amount of the loan and the negative report was removed from her credit history, she had to give up the vehicle to Freeway Funding and she received no damages, penalties, or restitution payments. In fact, she received no money from the settlement at all. Also, Freeway received some benefit from the settlement, as it was able to retain the vehicle and plaintiff agreed to sign any paperwork necessary to transfer her interest in the vehicle to Freeway. Freeway could then resell the vehicle to offset some of its losses from plaintiff’s failure to pay off the sale contract. Freeway also obtained a dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against it, so it did not have to worry about the potential for any future liability to plaintiff. In addition, Freeway claims that it only settled its cross-claims against plaintiff because plaintiff was claiming to be homeless and insolvent, and therefore she was judgment proof and there was no point in attempting to prosecute the cross-claims against her. (Barry decl., ¶ 20 and Exhibit 9 thereto.) “[I]t seems inaccurate to characterize the defendant as the ‘prevailing party’… if the plaintiff dismissed for reasons, such as the defendant's insolvency, that have nothing to do with the probability of success on the merits.” (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 621.) Here, the defendant’s dismissal of its cross-claims against plaintiff was apparently based on the fact that plaintiff was insolvent and judgment proof, and thus it would have been a waste of time and money to continue litigating its claims against her. Consequently, the fact that defendant dismissed its cross-complaint against plaintiff does not mean that plaintiff was the prevailing party here. In summary, both parties obtained some of the relief that they sought by settling their claims against each other, even though neither side recovered any money damages or payments. The overall effect of the settlement was to allow the parties to walk away from the dispute with a “clean slate.” Under the circumstances, then, there was no “prevailing party” for the purpose of the Rosenthal Act or any other fee-shifting statute, and plaintiff is not entitled to an award of her attorney’s fees or costs. As a result, the court intends to deny the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.1 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: KCK on 07/15/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date) 1Since plaintiff was not the prevailing party, there is no need for the court to consider whether the requested amount of fees and costs is reasonable or whether a lodestar multiplier is warranted.

Case Number: 24SMCV00801 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 17, 2024 CASE NUMBER 24SMCV00801 MOTION Demurrer MOVING PARTY Defendant Discover Bank OPPOSING PARTY none MOTION On February 22, 2024, Plaintiff Elham Patavani filed a verified complaint against Defendants Discover, Synchorny Bank, and AmEx, alleging one cause of action for violation of statutory duties. Defendant Discover Bank (Defendant) now demurs to the complaint on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), respectively. The demurrer is unopposed. ANALYSIS As a threshold matter, Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 requires that written notice of the motion and supporting papers be filed and served at least 16 court days prior to the hearing. Here, although the body of the notice indicates the hearing is scheduled for July 17, the caption page of the notice of demurrer indicates to the contrary that the hearing is scheduled for July 27, which is a court holiday (Saturday). (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 10, 135.) On May 2, 2024, Defendant filed a notice of errata, the caption page of which also indicates the hearing is scheduled for July 27. Attached as Exhibit A to the notice of errata is a corrected demurrer, to which a table of contents and table of authorities were added. The caption page of the corrected demurrer also indicates the hearing is scheduled for July 27. This conflicting information about when the hearing date is scheduled is objectively unclear and confusing, and especially in light of the fact that Plaintiff is proceeding as a self-represented litigant, the Court finds that Defendant has not provided Plaintiff adequate notice of the hearing date. [W]hen a litigant is self-represented, a judge has the discretion to take reasonable steps, appropriate under the circumstances and consistent with the law and the canons, to enable the litigant to be heard. ( Holloway v. Quetel (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1434.) The judge cannot rely on the pro per litigants to know each of the procedural steps, to raise objections, to ask all the relevant questions of witnesses, and to otherwise protect their due process rights. ( Ross v. Figueroa (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 856, 861.) Providing access to justice for self-represented litigants is a priority for California courts. (California Rules of Court, rule 10.960(b).) CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court overrules Defendants demurrer for failure to provide Plaintiff adequate notice of the hearing. Further, the Court orders Defendant to file and serve an Answer to the Complaint on or before July 31, 2024. Defendant shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 17, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

S-CV-0050755 Fields, Leslie Carol vs. Rich, Tom Robert ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged Appearance required.

SCV-259837, London v. Citibank, N.A. The parties are ORDERED TO APPEAR.

BLACK VS GENERAL CVSW2301545 MOTION TO COMPEL MOTORS, LLC. Tentative Ruling: The hearing is continued to 7/23/24. Unfortunately, the M&C declaration was filed on time but not available for review due to the court’s fault until it could not be considered. In light of the impending MSJ and JT, the parties should start to talk about continuance stipulations on those.

Case Number: 23STCV04112 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT WALTER GEE, Plaintiff, vs. LAGUNA CREEK CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23STCV04112 [TENTATIVE] ORDER CONTINUING MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES; GRANTING MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 16, 2024 On October 6, 2023, Plaintiff Walter Gee filed a first amended complaint (FAC) against Defendants Laguna Creek Construction Inc., Mohammadali Kalantari, and others. On April 4, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 28, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint (SAC). On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed his SAC. On June 20, 2024, the parties filed a joint stipulation to keep the motion for summary judgment on calendar as a motion for summary adjudication. Now pending before the Court is the motion for summary judgment, along with a motion for attorney fees and a motion to quash subpoena. MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Defendants 80-page separate statement consists of 61 undisputed material facts. Plaintiffs response to Defendants separate statement, including his own additional disputed material facts, is 466 pages long. Separate statements are required not to satisfy a sadistic urge to torment lawyers, but rather to afford due process to opposing parties and to permit trial courts to expeditiously review complex motions for [summary adjudication] and summary judgment to determine quickly and efficiently whether material facts are undisputed. ( United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 335 ( United Community Church ).) The separate statement provides a convenient and expeditious vehicle permitting the trial court to hone in on the truly disputed facts. [Citation.] ( Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 ( Nazir ).) [I]t is no answer to say the facts set out in the supporting evidence and memorandum of points and authorities are sufficient. Such an argument does not aid the trial court at all since it then has to cull through often discursive argument to determine what is admitted, what is contested, and where the evidence on each side of the issue is located. ( United Community Church, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 335.) The due process aspect of the separate statement requirement is self-evidentto inform the opposing party of the evidence to be disputed to defeat the motion. ( Id. at p. 337.) The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion. (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2).) Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865 is illustrative of this widespread problem: Defendants filed three separate statements of undisputed material facts (separate statement or statements) in support of each of the three motions for summary judgment filed in this case. Each separate statement includes over 600 paragraphs of purportedly material facts and runs over 100 pages. After reviewing the Defendants separate statements and Beltran's responses to them, as well as recent separate statements in other recent cases before us, we can only conclude that a document that was intended to be helpful to the court and provide due process to the parties ( Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1210, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 411) is, in many cases, no longer serving either purpose. We write on this issue to remind both litigants and trial courts about the appropriate scope of the separate statement. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1), requires each motion for summary judgment to be accompanied by a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence. (Italics added.) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2) states: The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion. Under the Rules of Court, Material facts are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion. (Rule 3.1350(a)(2).) What neither the rule nor the statute states is that the moving party must include in the separate statement every fact they intend to include in their motion, regardless of its materiality. For example, HRH's very first material fact in its separate statement is: The Hard Rock brand is known worldwide for its connection to music, fashion, and entertainment. Under no interpretation of material does this qualify it is merely background information that has no relevance to any cause of action or defense. This is far from the only paragraph in the three separate statements that make absolutely no difference in the disposition of the motion. The paragraphs in a separate statement should be limited to facts that address the elements of a cause of action or an affirmative defense. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1); rule 3.1350(a)(2), (d)(2).) The statute and Rules of Court do not preclude litigants from including background, nonmaterial information in their papers as long as they include a cite to the evidence, but nonmaterial facts should not be included in the separate statement. The point of the separate statement is not to craft a narrative, but to be a concise list of the material facts and the evidence that supports them. The separate statement serves two important functions in a summary judgment proceeding: It notifies the parties which material facts are at issue, and it provides a convenient and expeditious vehicle permitting the trial court to hone in on the truly disputed facts. ( Collins v. Hertz Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 64, 74, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 149.) There is nothing convenient or expeditious about the separate statements submitted in this case. The duty to comply with the law regarding separate statements applies to both sides of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. The opposing party's responses to the separate statement must be in good faith, responsive, and material. Responses should directly address the fact stated, and if that fact is not in dispute, the opposing party must so admit. It is completely unhelpful to evade the stated fact in an attempt to create a dispute where none exists. For example, HRH's separate statement included paragraph 14: When Shepherd began working at the Hotel, Plaintiff Stephanie Beltran (Plaintiff) worked as a server in different parts of the Hotel, but primarily in the Hotel's nightclub called the Club. Beltran claimed this benign and indisputable fact was disputed: Disputed . Although Plaintiff was already working at Hard Rock when Defendant Shepherd was hired, Plaintiff's hire date was on or around February 10, 2017, as that's when her Labor Code § 2810.5 Notice was filled out. This response did not, in fact, dispute HRH's statement, and the response should have been undisputed. If Beltran's hire date was a material fact (and we do not see why it was at best, it was background information) it should be listed under the opposing party's additional facts with supporting evidence. The quoted paragraph is far from the only example of this problem in Beltran's responses. As we mentioned, one of the purposes of the Separate Statement is to permit the trial court to focus on whether [the material] facts are truly undisputed. ( Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , supra , 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 411.) This can only be accomplished by both parties preparing the Separate Statement according to the statute and Rules of Court and acting in good faith. The moving party must include only material statements of fact, not incidental and background facts. The opposing party must concede facts that are truly undisputed and only add facts that are material. It is difficult to conceive of a properly drafted Separate Statement that includes over 600 paragraphs of undisputed material facts. Trial courts should not hesitate to deny summary judgment motions when the moving party fails to draft a compliant separate statement and an inappropriate separate statement includes an overly long document that includes multiple nonmaterial facts in violation of the Rules of Court. Courts should also not hesitate to disregard attempts to game the system by the opposing party claiming facts are disputed when the uncontroverted evidence clearly shows otherwise. ( Id. at pp. 874-876, footnotes omitted.) [A] document that was intended to be helpful to the court and provide due process to the parties [citation] is, in many cases, no longer serving either purpose. ( Id. at p. 874.) The separate statements here do not serve their intended purposes. Despite the parties lengthy separate statements, is not clear to the Court what material facts are undisputed or disputed. The parties frequently set forth evidentiary facts rather than ultimate facts, which bury the actual undisputed (or disputed) issues that are material to this motion. The separate statements must be revised to include only material facts pertinent to the disposition of the motion. The parties may keep the same numbering for each fact in order to maintain accurate references within the briefing, but they must omit non-material facts. The Court expects the revised separate statements to be significantly shorter and more focused. Defendants are ordered to send their revised separate statement to Plaintiff no later than September 12, 2024. Plaintiff is ordered to send his response to Defendants separate statement, along with Plaintiffs revised separate statement of additional disputed facts, to Defendants no later than September 19, 2024. The parties are ordered to jointly file the revised separate statements and responses no later than September 26, 2024. The Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication is CONTINUED to October 8, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES In the Courts order granting Plaintiff leave to file a SAC, the Court condition[ed] the amended pleading on the Plaintiff reimbursing Defendants costs incurred in preparing the Motion for Summary Judgment that will now be rendered moot by the SAC. The Court vacated the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and scheduled a hearing on a motion for attorney fees. On June 21, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for attorney fees incurred in connection with its motion for summary judgment on calendar. However, the day before, the parties filed a joint stipulation to keep the motion for summary judgment on calendar as a motion for summary adjudication. Defendants contend that even though ALFA was able to convert its MSJ to a Motion for Summary Adjudication, the fact remains that this will not completely dispose of the matter against ALFA and since GEEs additional claims have no merit, ALFA will have to bear the expense of filing a second Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication. (Motion at p. 4.) That may be true, but that is still speculative. Fees on a second motion may be attributed to the amendments and additions in the SAC, but at this time, Defendants have not been prejudiced by the filing of the SAC. The motion for which Defendants seek attorney fees is no longer moot, and Defendants will receive a ruling on their motion. The motion for attorney fees is DENIED. MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA On March 26, 2024, Plaintiff served Defendants with a Notice to Consumer or Employee and Objection, along with a Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records, seeking documents from Mirhosseini Law Group APC (MLG). (Starr Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 1.) The subpoena specifically requested (1) Any and all DOCUMENTS reflecting, referring, or relating to any and all communications between YOU and YANG from January 2022 through March 2024; (2) Any and all DOCUMENTS reflecting, referring, or relating to the declaration executed by YANG on March 13, 2023, including any drafts of the declaration and communication and memoranda related to the declaration; (3) Any and all DOCUMENTS YOU received from YANG; and (4) Any and all DOCUMENTS YOU gave to YANG. On April 22, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to quash the subpoena as to Request No. 2 on the grounds of attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product. The attorney-client privilege is an absolute privilege that prevents disclosure, no matter how necessary or relevant to the lawsuit. ( DP Pham, LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653, 659.) Once the proponent makes a prima facie showing of a confidential attorney-client communication, it is presumed the communication is privileged and the burden shifts to the opponent to establish waiver, an exception, or that the privilege does not for some other reason apply. The opponent may not rely on the communications content to make that showing. ( Id. at pp. 659-660.) Additionally, [a] writing that reflects an attorneys impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories is not discoverable under any circumstances. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.030, subd. (a).) Plaintiff argues that Defendants waived the privilege with respect to Yangs declaration. According to Plaintiff, it is apparent that someone from MLG drafted the Yang declaration on the firms caption without any input on the content from Yang and without any comments from Kalantari. (Opposition at p. 4.) Plaintiff cites some of Kalantaris deposition testimony where he stated that he saw no previous drafts of the declaration before Yang signed it, did not know who drafted the declaration, and knew that Yang had not communicated with Kalantaris attorneys regarding the content of the declaration. ( Ibid. ) Kalantari physically brought the declaration to Yang for him to sign, and he just gave Yang the declaration and asked him to sign it. ( Ibid. ) According to Plaintiff, [t]he content of the declaration generated solely by attorney-client communications was shared with Yang when Kalantari asked him to sign the declaration and shared with Gee when it was produced in discovery, and [t]he content came entirely from Kalantari and MLG and was disclosed to all the parties in this litigation, waiving any alleged privilege previously covering the communications of the content of the declaration. ( Id. at pp. 6-7.) A request for all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to Yangs declaration is overbroad and facially requests documents that may be privileged communications or attorney work product. Specifically, drafts of the declaration and writings related to the declaration are not discoverable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.030, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs argument would mean that virtually all parties waive all privilege about all material issues of their cases because the communications related to the drafting of any declaration would be discoverable. Plaintiff also argues that the privilege does not apply to an attempted fraud on the Court. Plaintiff cites Yangs testimony that he did not read the declaration, he signed it because Kalantari made him, and the material statements in the declaration are false. (Opposition at pp. 7-8.) This alone is insufficient for the Court to find that Defendants are engaging in a crime or fraud that waives the privilege under Evidence Code section 956. The motion to quash subpoena is GRANTED as to Request No. 2. Clerk to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 16th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Matter on the Law and Motion Calendar for Friday, July 19, 2024, Line 13. PLAINTIFF DAJANI CONSTRUCTION INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION's DEMURRER to ANSWER to COMPLAINT. Off calendar. The moving party failed to provide courtesy copies per SF Local Rule 2.7B. In addition, the defendants are ordered to comply with the meet and confer requirements of CCP 430.41. Friday's Law & Motion Calendar will be called out of Dept. 301. Anyone intending to appear in person should report to Dept. 301. However, anyone intending to appear remotely should use the regular Zoom information for Dept. 302's Law & Motion Calendar for 9:30 a.m. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RCE)