We are checking for the latest updates in this case. We will email you when the process is complete.

Ruby Elrod Vs. Siegert Water Wells, Inc., And J. Santos Lopez Medoza

Case Last Refreshed: 9 months ago

Elrod, Ruby, filed a(n) Automobile - Torts case represented by Arnold, Kurt Brynilde, Boatright, Micajah Caj, Findley, J. Kyle, against Lopez Medoza, J. Santos, Siegert Water Wells, Inc., represented by Brown, Gregg R., in the jurisdiction of Brazos County, TX, . Brazos County, TX Superior Courts 85th District Court with Hawthorne, Kyle presiding.

Case Details for Elrod, Ruby v. Lopez Medoza, J. Santos , et al.

Judge

Hawthorne, Kyle

Filing Date

December 27, 2018

Category

Injury/Damage - Motor Vehicle

Last Refreshed

September 20, 2023

Practice Area

Torts

Filing Location

Brazos County, TX

Matter Type

Automobile

Filing Court House

85th District Court

Case Outcome Type

Judgment

Parties for Elrod, Ruby v. Lopez Medoza, J. Santos , et al.

Plaintiffs

Elrod, Ruby

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Arnold, Kurt Brynilde

Boatright, Micajah Caj

Findley, J. Kyle

Defendants

Lopez Medoza, J. Santos

Siegert Water Wells, Inc.

Attorneys for Defendants

Brown, Gregg R.

Case Events for Elrod, Ruby v. Lopez Medoza, J. Santos , et al.

Type Description
Docket Event Other
Docket Event RETENTION (DESTROY DATE)
Docket Event NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AS TO RULE 306A
Docket Event Other
Docket Event ANSWER
Docket Event Motion
Docket Event Signed Judgment
Docket Event Other
Docket Event CHARGE OF THE COURT
Docket Event Jury Trial
See all events

Related Content in Brazos County

Case

FRATIS POINTER CS I, dba FLATS ON 12 vs. NAPORSHIA SWEED AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS
Jun 28, 2024 | Hill, Rick | Landlord/Tenant | 3024-00832L

Case

Estate of EDMUND B. JACOBS, JR
Jul 10, 2024 | Matzke, Amanda | Letters of Testamentary | 19594-PC

Case

The County of Brazos,Texas vs Gerardo Ramos AKA Gerardo V. Ramos Et Al
Jul 10, 2024 | Wise, George Jerrell | Tax Cases | 24-001905-CV-472

Case

The Ivy Apartments vs. Justin Smith
Jul 02, 2024 | Nunn, Terrence | Landlord/Tenant | 2024-400731L

Case

In the Estate of Barbara Wilkins Crouch
Jul 10, 2024 | Brantley, Roy | Muniment of Title | 19593-PC

Case

Megan Barber vs. Trdwind Renaissance Park LLC
Apr 26, 2024 | Hill, Rick | Small Claims | 3024-00623S

Case

EX PARTE ESTELA AGUILAR MENDEZ
Jun 12, 2024 | Hawthorne, Kyle | Expunctions | 24-001598-CV-85

Case

Wells Fargo Bank, NA vs. Taylor A. Gonzalez
Jul 08, 2024 | Wise, George Jerrell | Contract - Consumer/Commercial/Debt | 24-001865-CV-472

Case

State of Texas vs. Nicholas Calderon
Jun 25, 2024 | Hill, Rick | Administrative Hearing | 3024-00037A

Ruling

OLLYE G INGRAM, ET AL. VS ANTHONY THOMPSON, ET AL.
Jul 11, 2024 | 21STCV32886
Case Number: 21STCV32886 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT OLLYE G. INGRAM, et al. , Plaintiffs, vs. ANTHONY THOMPSON, et al. , Defendants. CASE NO.: 21STCV32886 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT CENTAURUS FINANCIAL, INC.S FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION (SET ONE), AND FOR SANCTIONS Date: July 11, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Ollye G. Ingram; Holda M. Novelo; Esther Dorothy Farmer; Steven B. Friedman; J. Roger Gorski; Charles Klipp and Margo Klipp; Beatrice Vogel; Nickolas W. Vogel; Joachin D. Reich; and Raymond Jallow (collectively, Plaintiffs) RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Centaurus Financial, Inc. (Centaurus) The Court has considered the moving and opposition papers. BACKGROUND This action stems from an allegedly failed private placement investment in the Spring Gate Plaza Delaware Statutory Trust (Spring Gate DST). Plaintiffs operative Second Amended Complaint, filed on February 25, 2022, asserts causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and various statutory, tort and contract claims against multiple defendants, including Centaurus. On February 17, 2023, Plaintiffs served their Requests for Production, Set One (RFPs) on Centaurus. (Declaration of Marc S. Ehrlich in Support of Plaintiffs Renewed Motion to Compel Further Responses (Ehrlich Decl.), ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs assert that Centaurus served unverified, objection-only responses to Plaintiffs RFPs. ( Id. , ¶ 4.) On July 7, 2023, the parties stipulated to and participated in an Informal Discovery Conference held by the Court, where parties stipulated to the entry of the following order (IDC Order): Defendant Centaurus Financial, Inc. (CFI) will serve further, complete, substantive, Code-compliant and verified responses (Further Reponses) to Plaintiffs Form Interrogatories (Set One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), Requests for Admissions (Set One) and Requests for Production (Set One) (including production of Bates-stamped documents, which shall be identified in the written discovery responses) by close of business August 7, 2023; and Plaintiffs shall serve Further Responses to CFIs Form Interrogatories (Set One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), Requests for Admissions (Set One) and Requests for Production (Set One) (including production of Bates-stamped documents, which shall be identified in the written discovery responses) by close of business August 7, 2023. On October 31, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Compliance with the Courts IDC Order, alleging that Centaurus served unverified supplemental responses to the RFPs that still consisted almost entirely of objections. (Ehrlich Decl., ¶ 9, Exh. F.) Centaurus subsequently served a second supplemental response to the RFPs on November 17, 2023. ( Id. , ¶12, Exh. I.) Plaintiffs filed this Renewed Motion to Compel Further Responses and for Sanctions (the Motion) on April 12, 2024, asserting that Centaurus Second Supplemental Responses do not cure the deficiencies in its previous responses, and are still not Code-compliant. On July 2, 2024, Centaurus filed its opposition to the Motion. Plaintiffs submitted a late reply on July 9, 2024. DISCUSSION Legal Standard A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).) Motions to compel further responses must always be accompanied by a meet-and confer-declaration (per Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040) demonstrating a reasonable and good faith attempt an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. ( Id. , §§ 2030.300(b), 2031.310(b)(2), 2033.290(b).) They must also be accompanied by a separate statement containing the requests and the responses, verbatim, as well as reasons why a further response is warranted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a).) The separate statement must also be complete in itself; no extrinsic materials may be incorporated by reference. ( Id. , rule 3.1345(c).) A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) It is not necessary for the motion to show that the material sought will be admissible in evidence. Good cause may be found to justify discovery where specific facts show that the discovery is necessary for effective trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial. ( Associated Brewers Dist. Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 586-588; CCP §§ 2017.010, 2019.030(a)(1) (Information is discoverable if it is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and it is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.); Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 (noting a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence).) Motion Plaintiffs assert that Centaurus second supplemental responses do not comply with the Code for the following reasons: (1) Centaurus failed to provide complete due diligence files as requested and improperly withheld known/identified responsive documents; (2) Centaurus responses to certain RFPs consisting of N/A do not indicate whether the requested documents do not exist or whether Centaurus is objecting to the requests and is refusing to produce such documents; and (3) Centaurus responses to certain RFPs merely including Bates ranges do not indicate whether Centaurus is producing and/or has produced all or part of the responsive documents currently in its possession, custody, or control; and (4) Centaurus responses also advance meritless and boilerplate objections. Opposition In its opposition, Centaurus claims that it complied with the IDC Order by producing the due diligence file concerning Spring Gate DST consisting of 40,806 pages of documents. Centaurus argues that it identified Bates stamp ranges for documents responsive to Plaintiffs RFPs, in accordance with the IDC Order which expressly indicated for Centaurus to do so. (Declaration of Lucas E. Garcia in Support of Opposition to the Motion (Garcia Decl.), ¶¶ 9-13.) Regarding its N/A responses to certain RFPs, Centaurus explained that its second supplemental response was meant to supplement and not supplant its first supplemental response, and that the two responses should be read in tandem. It clarified that where the second supplemental response stated N/A, it meant that the particular response was not being supplemented beyond the first supplemental response. Centaurus further asserts that the IDC Order did not specify for it to respond to Plaintiffs RFPs without objections, and that it has rightfully objected based on the attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product doctrine, among others. Importantly, Centaurus acknowledged that it withheld certain documents, but that it did so because the withheld documents are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client and attorney-work product privileges, and that it properly disclosed the existence of those privileged materials. Centaurus asserts that the only documents that were withheld are privileged documents. Centaurus responses are not Code-compliant Cal. Code of Civil Proc., (CCP) § 2031.240 provides: a) If only part of an item or category of item in a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is objectionable, the response shall contain a statement of compliance, or a representation of inability to comply with respect to the remainder of that item or category. (b) If the responding party objects to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or category of item, the response shall do both of the following: (1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made. (2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted. (c) (1) If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log. (CCP §2031.240.) Initially, the written responses, including the supplemental responses to the RFPs are not Code-compliant. They not include the statutory language, including instead vague portions of the required language such as Centaurus will produce non-privileged, non-objectionable documents responsive to this request to the extent they can be located within its possession, custody, or control after a reasonably diligent search (Response to RFP 58.) Such language first implies that no such reasonably diligent search (instead of the required diligent search and reasonable inquiry) has in fact been conducted as of the time of the response, but also that only non-objectionable responsive documents (whatever that means) will be produced. This initial inadequate response is then supplemented by lists of documents, without any verified response that the documents being produced constitute all of the documents (diligently searched for) responsive to the RFP. The Court also notes that nowhere do the responses state that all responsive documents are being produced, only that Centaurus will produce non-privilege, non-objectionable documents will be produced. It must be clear from the response that all responsive documents will be produced, except for those identified with specificity and by Bates number in the privilege log discussed below. Moreover, because Centaurus claims that certain withheld documents are privileged, its response must also but does not currently include enough factual information for the other parties to assess the merits of that claim. Centaurus must serve a privilege log on Plaintiffs, and no privilege log was not included in its responses. It is the burden of the party seeking to withhold documents based on the attorney-client or work product privilege to establish the facts establishing the privilege. ( D.I Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 729; Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 123. The privilege log must be sufficiently specific to allow a determination as to whether a withheld document is, in fact, privileged. ( Wellpoint Health Networks, supra, at 130.) The privilege log must provide the identity and capacity of all individuals who authored, sent, or received each allegedly privileged document, the documents date, a brief description of the document and its contents or subject matter sufficient to determine whether the privilege applies, and the precise privilege or protection asserted. ( Catalina Island Yacht Club v Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1130.) Therefore, the entire response (including the supplemental response) is inadequate and not Code-compliant and is hereby ordered to be supplemented with a full, verified, Code-compliant response to each RFP. To the extent that any documents are identified in those supplemental responses as assertedly privileged, they must be identified on a privilege log. All ordered further responses, together with a privilege log and any supplemental produced documents are to be served on Plaintiffs within twenty days of the date of this order. Monetary Sanctions If the court finds that a party has unsuccessfully made or opposed a motion to compel further, the court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP §§ 2030.300, subd. (d), 2031.310, subd. (h).) Since Centaurus responses are not Code-compliant, sanctions are appropriate. Plaintiffs seek monetary sanctions in the total amount of $12,290. (Ehrlich Decl., ¶¶ 17-25.) The Court exercises its discretion and imposes monetary sanctions against Centaurus and its counsel, jointly and severally, in the reasonable amount of $3,100, consisting of 5 hours at $400 plus 2 hours at $550. This amount is due to be paid to Plaintiffs within twenty days of the date of this order. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 11th day of July 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

Darrin Hoover vs Christina Shepherd
Jul 10, 2024 | 23CV02997
23CV02997 HOOVER v. SHEPHERD (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF HOOVER’S MOTION TO BE RELIEVED The unopposed motion to be relieved is granted. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 1 of 1

Ruling

MENDOZA-LOPEZ vs FILICE
Jul 10, 2024 | SCV-273607
SCV-273607, Mendoza-Lopez v. Filice Defendants Ariana Lucia Filice, Charles Filice, and Vanessa Lind’s motion for order compelling Plaintiffs Mendoza-Lopez and Saavedra-Aguilera’s depositions is DENIED as moot because Plaintiffs’ depositions already took place on June 26. However, requested sanctions are awarded in the amount of $1,310.00 as it was only after four months of defense counsel’s efforts to schedule the depositions and the filing of this motion that Plaintiffs agreed to a deposition date. Defendants’ unopposed motion to continue trial is GRANTED. The motion was made on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ depositions were not taken despite over four months of attempts to schedule them with Plaintiffs objecting without offering alternate dates. Though the parties resolved the issues because the depositions already took place, Defendants argue that additional discovery is necessary after Plaintiffs depositions. As this is the first request by any party to continue trial and it does not appear to the Court that any party will be prejudiced by continuing the trial date, the Court will grant the unopposed motion to continue trial per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1337. The trial date currently set for September 13, 2024, is hereby VACATED. A new trial date is now set for February 28, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. 17. Moving party shall submit a written order to the Court consistent with this tentative ruling on the two motions and in compliance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a) and (b).

Ruling

MARIA RINCON VS EVANGELINA RIVERA
Jul 09, 2024 | 23CHCV02983
Case Number: 23CHCV02983 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: F49 Dept. F49 Date: 7/9/24 Case Name: Maria Rincon v. Evangelina Rivera; and Does 1-50 Case No. 23CHCV02983 LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT DEPARTMENT F49 JULY 9, 2024 MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING PLAINTIFF TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23CHCV02983 Motion filed: 4/12/24 MOVING PARTY: Defendant Evangelina Rivera (Rivera or Plaintiff) RESPONDING PARTY: None NOTICE: OK RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Plaintiff Maria Rincons (Rincon or Plaintiff) responses to Defendants Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, and imposing monetary sanctions, against Plaintiff and her attorney of record, in the amount of $561.65. TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED. The request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED. BACKGROUND This action arises from alleged personal injuries and property damages sustained by Plaintiff as a result of an automotive collision that occurred on October 15, 2021. The Complaint alleges that Defendant ignored a solid red stop light, striking Plaintiff in a t-bone accident. (Compl. ¶¶ 7-8.) On October 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendant and Does 150, alleging the following causes of action: (1) Negligence, and (2) Motor Vehicle Negligence. Subsequently, on January 3, 2024, Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint. On April 12, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production of Documents and Request for Monetary Sanctions (the Motion). No Opposition or Reply papers have been received by the Court. ANALYSIS If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses and for a monetary sanction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (b).) Unlike a motion to compel further responses, a motion to compel responses in not subject to a 45-day time limit, and the propounding party does not have to demonstrate either good cause or that it satisfied a meet and confer requirement. ( Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404 [internal citations omitted].) A. Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One Defendant counsel attests that on January 2, 2024, Defendant propounded the first set of Request for Production of Documents on Plaintiff, to which the responses were due on February 5, 2024. (Cadena Decl. ¶ 3.) However, no responses were received from Plaintiff by the due date. ( Id . ¶ 4.) Subsequently, on March 8, 2024, Defendants counsel sent a meet and confer letter regarding the late discovery responses and requested Plaintiffs counsel to provides responses, without objection, by March 18, 2024. ( Id . ¶ 5.) Despite the effort, no responses were received by March 18, 2024, and no extensions were requested by Plaintiff. ( Id . ¶ 6.) Furthermore, Defendants counsel called and left a voicemail to Plaintiffs counsel on April 12, 2024. ( Id . ¶ 8.) To date, Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. ( Id . ¶ 7.) Based on the records above, and given that no Opposition has been filed by Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to serve a timely response, thereby waiving any objection to the Demand for Inspection and Production of Documents, including those based on privilege or the protection for work product, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300, subdivision (a). Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Defendants Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. B. Request for Monetary Sanctions Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300, subdivision (c) provides, in part, Except as provided in subdivision (d), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. As the Court has previously granted the Motion, it concludes that the mandatory monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300, subdivision (c) are applicable here. Accordingly, in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorneys fees and costs incurred for the work in preparing the Motion is $561.65, calculated at a reasonable hourly rate of $250 for two hours reasonably spent plus $61.65 for filing fees. Therefore, Defendants Request for Monetary Sanctions is GRANTED. CONCLUSION Defendants Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to serve responses to Defendants Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, without objection, within 20 days of this order. Defendants Request for Monetary Sanctions is GRANTED. Plaintiff and her attorney or record are ordered to pay $561.65, jointly and severally to Defendant within 20 days. Moving party to give notice.

Ruling

FRANSES RODRIGUEZ VS CITY OF PASADENA, A GOVERNMENT ENTITY
Jul 11, 2024 | 22AHCV01198
Case Number: 22AHCV01198 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: P [TENANTIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CITY OF PASADENAS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT I. INTRODUCTION On December 1, 2022, Plaintiff Franses Rodriguez (Plaintiff) filed this lawsuit against Defendant the City of Pasadena (Defendant), asserting a single cause of action for Dangerous Condition of Public Property, under Government Code § 835. Plaintiff alleges that on November 15, 2021, around 8:30 a.m., she was riding her Ninebot Kick electric scooter (the e-scooter) and wearing a helmet, when she encountered a 1.25-inch uneven section of the Marengo Avenue roadway in Pasadena, CA, causing her to lose control of the e-scooter and sustain injuries. Defendant now moves the Court for summary judgment on the basis that a vertical displacement of 1.25 inches is trivial and that Defendant did not have notice of the alleged dangerous condition. Plaintiff argues that courts are reluctant to rule a roadway defect as not dangerous and that industry standards require public entities to remove or warn of such defects. (Oppn., p. 2.) Plaintiff also argues that Defendant had both actual and constructive notice of the Marengo Avenue defect by their own admissions. (Oppn., pp. 2-3.) Procedural History On April 5, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff served and filed an opposition. On July 8, 2024, Defendant served and filed a reply. The hearing on this motion for summary judgment was initially scheduled for July 19, 2024, and has since been advanced to July 11, 2024. The jury trial is scheduled for July 23, 2024. II. EVIDENTIARY Objections Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants Evidence: Objections as to Plaintiff's claim of Dangerous Condition to Public Property · The following objections are overruled: 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 26, and 29 Objections as to whether Defendant had actual or constructive notice · The following objections are overruled: 26, 29 Objections as to whether the uneven roadway caused Plaintiffs fall · The following objections are overruled: 32, 34, 35, 36 III. JUDICIAL NOTICE Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. ( Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp . (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-14.) That means that when judicial notice is taken of a document&the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable. ( Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct . (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 569. Evidence Code section 452 provides for taking judicial notice of [o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States as well as [f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. ( Id . at subds. (c) & (h) Defendant requests judicial notice of the following documents and facts: (1) the City of Pasadena is a public entity, (Motion, Exh. 6, ¶ 1; Evidence Code §§ 452(g),(h)), (2) the Courts files and records in this matter (Motion, Exh. 6, ¶ 2; Evidence Code § 452(d)), and (3) Defendants Exhibits 7 and 8 to the motion for summary, where Exhibit 7 is Defendants Agenda Report dated October 28, 2013, on the matter of Contract Award to Hardy & Harper, Inc. for Preventative Maintenance of Streets 2013, for an amount not to exceed $1,630,000; and Exhibit 8 is Notice of Completion and Contract No. 21,586. (Motion, Exh. 6, ¶ 3; Evidence Code §§ 452, 459.) The Court notes that judicial notice of its own records related to this case is unnecessary and redundant. Nonetheless, Defendants request is granted. As to Exhibits 7 and 8, the City of Pasadenas website at issue is properly subjected to judicial notice as the Citys road maintenance publications are official acts. (See People v. Moral es (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 502, 512, fn. 7 [taking judicial notice of materials on an official government website, which discussed official acts].) Therefore, the request for judicial notice is granted and the Court also takes judicial notice of Exhibits 7 and 8 for the purposes of consideration on this motion for summary judgment. IV. LEGAL STANDARD The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties pleadings in order to determine whether, despite its allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve its dispute. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co . (2001); 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp . (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.¿¿¿¿ A defendant moving for summary judgment must show the plaintiffs causes of action have¿no merit . ( Aguilar , 849, emphasis added.) In other words, summary judgment is not to be granted simply because a case is weak or because a weak showing was made in opposition. ( Hagen v. Hickenbottom¿ (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 168, 187-188, superseded by statute on another point as recognized in¿Rice v. Clark¿(2002) 28 Cal.4th 89, 96; ¿Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc .¿(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 589, 722. [to avoid summary judgment a showing need not be strong; it need only be sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.].)¿¿¿ On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, In c. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. CCP § 437c(p)(2). Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. CCP § 437c(p)(2).¿¿ A. Government Code Section 835 ¿ Government Code section 835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property.¿ ( Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129, citing Brown v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist . (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829; see also Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112.)¿ Per Government Code section 835, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: [¶] (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or [¶] (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition . . . a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.¿ (Gov. Code, § 835.)¿¿¿ A dangerous condition is a condition of public property that create[s] a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used. (Gov. Code, § 830.2.)¿¿¿ The outcome of this Motion turns on the determination of whether the defect at issue is trivial. B. The Trivial Defect Doctrine ¿ In Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc . (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, the Court explained the trivial defect doctrine as follows: In summary, persons who maintain walkways, whether public or private, are not required to maintain them in an absolutely perfect condition.¿ The duty of care imposed on a property owner with actual notice, does not require the repair of minor defects.¿ Although sometimes referred to as the trivial defect defense, the trivial defect doctrine is not an affirmative defense but rather an aspect of duty ... plaintiff must plead and prove.¿¿ The trivial defect doctrine originated to shield public entities from liability where conditions on public property create a risk of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances ... no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used. This doctrine permits a court to determine triviality as a matter of law rather than always submitting the issue to a jury [and] provides a check valve for the elimination from the court system of unwarranted litigation which attempts to impose upon a property owner what amounts to absolute liability for injury to persons who come upon the property. The trivial defect doctrine has been expanded to embrace actions against private landowners.¿ When a court determines whether a given defect is trivial, as a matter of law, the court should not rely merely upon the size of the depression. While size may be one of the most relevant factors to the decision, it is not always the sole criteria. Instead, the court should determine whether there existed any circumstances surrounding the accident which might have rendered the defect more dangerous than its mere abstract depth would indicate. As such, the court should view the intrinsic nature and quality of the defect to see if, for example, it consists of the mere nonalignment of two horizontal slabs or whether it consists of a jagged and deep hole. The court should also look at other factors such as whether the accident occurred at night in an unlighted area. Furthermore, the court should see if there is any evidence that other persons have been injured on this same defect.¿ If the court determines ... sufficient evidence has been presented so that reasonable minds may differ as to whether the defect is dangerous, the court may not rule ... the defect is not dangerous as a matter of law. Conversely, where the only evidence available on the issue of dangerousness does not lead to the conclusion ... reasonable minds may differ, then it is proper for the court to find ... the defect was trivial as a matter of law.¿ Moreover, [a]s to what constitutes a dangerous or defective condition no hard and fast rule can be laid down, but each case must depend upon its own facts. (Citation.)¿ ( Kasparian , 56 Cal.App.4th at 26-28 (citations omitted)).¿¿¿ In Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104, the Court of Appeal, in affirming summary judgment for the city, stated in part: [a] condition is not dangerous, if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property ... was used with due care ... in a reasonably foreseeable manner.¿ (Citation omitted & emphasis added.)¿ The Huckey court explained: In determining whether a given walkway defect is trivial as a matter of law, the court should not rely solely upon the size of the defectin this case, on the depth or height of the walkway depression or elevationalthough the defect's size may be one of the most relevant factors to the court's decision.¿ The court should consider other circumstances which might have rendered the defect a dangerous condition at the time of the accident.¿¿ These other circumstances or factors include whether there were any broken pieces or jagged edges in the area of the defect, whether any dirt, debris or other material obscured a pedestrian's view of the defect, the plaintiff's knowledge of the area, whether the accident occurred at night or in an unlighted area, the weather at the time of the accident, and whether the defect has caused any other accidents. In sum, [a] court should decide whether a defect may be dangerous only after considering all of the circumstances surrounding the accident that might make the defect more dangerous than its size alone would suggest.¿ The court's analysis of whether a walkway defect is trivial involves as a matter of law two essential steps. First, the court reviews evidence regarding type and size of the defect. If that preliminary analysis reveals a trivial defect, the court considers evidence of any additional factors [bearing on whether the defect presented a substantial risk of injury]. If these additional factors do not indicate the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonably careful person, the court should deem the defect trivial as a matter of law .... ( Huckey , 37 Cal.App.5th at 1105 (citations omitted). More recently, in Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102, 110, the Court of Appeal read Government Code section 830.2 to require a more holistic approach, stating, [a]lthough we agree with the premise that the size of the defect is the primary determinant of triviality, as discussed below, we modify the prevailing two-step framework into a holistic, multi-factor analysis. That holistic approach involves considering the size of the defect and surrounding circumstances, including the nature and quality of the defect (including whether it has jagged breaks or cracks); whether anything was obstructing or concealing the defect (such as an object, debris, or other substance); the lighting and weather conditions at the time of the incident; and whether the defect has caused other accidents. V. DISCUSSION If there is no triable issue of material fact, the party must show that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the court must dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or claims for damages, or issues of duty. (CCP § 437c) Defendant argues that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and moves the Court to dispose of Plaintiffs only cause of action for dangerous condition under Government Code § 835 because (1) the alleged defect is trivial as a matter of law and (2) Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect. (Notice of Motion, p. 2.) A. Procedural Matters Generally, a motion for summary judgment must be heard at least 30 days before trial. Code of Civil Procedure, §437c(a). It is error for the Court to rule on the motion absent an express order. Robinson v. Woods (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1268 (Defendants noticed their motion for hearing within 30 days of the trial date without first obtaining a determination of good cause from the trial court. (See § 437c, subd. (a).) Unless and until the trial court found good cause, the notice of the hearing was invalid.) Plaintiff urges the court to deny the instant motion without addressing its merits because Defendant did not file its motion early enough to obtain a hearing date sooner than 30 days before trial. (Oppn., p. 10.) Plaintiff opposes on the grounds that Defendant has not offered showing of good cause or reached any stipulation for the July 11, 2024, hearing on the instant motion to occurring just 12 days before the scheduled jury trial. (Oppn., p. 10.) In reply, Defendant cites Sentry Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 207 Cal.App.3d 526, 528-529 ( Sentry ) to argue that good cause exists for the Court to hear a summary judgment motion, notwithstanding the problems the trial court may experience in calendaring and hearing such motions. (Reply, p. 3.) According to Defendant, like the Sentry petitioner, it was unable to reserve a hearing outside the 30-day period. (Reply, p. 3.) New evidence cannot be introduced in reply. (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (2002) 102CA4th 308, 316.) However, the court has discretion to consider new evidence in reply papers in ruling on a summary judgment motion, provided the other party had notice and an opportunity to respond. Here, the Court exercises its discretion in considering Defendant's scheduling for the hearing on the instant motion because Plaintiff was notified of the instant motion on April 5, 2024. Notice of the motion and supporting papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 75 days before the time appointed for hearing. Code of Civil Procedure, §437c(a). Here, Defendants filed notice of the motion on April 5, 2024, 97 days before the July 11, 2024, hearing date. Initially, the motion was set to be heard on July 19, 2024. In opposition, Plaintiffs state Defendants filed an ex parte motion to have the Motion heard sooner on May 31, 2024, which the Court denied and advanced the motion hearing to July 11, 2024. The Court finds that the procedural requirements have been satisfied. B. Premises Liability The Trivial Defect Doctrine 1. Size of Defect The initial step in the analysis established by Huckey involves the size of the defect. When the size of the depression begins to stretch beyond one inch, courts have been reluctant to find that the defect is not dangerous as a matter of law." ( Fielder v. City of Glendale , (1977), 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 726.) Courts have been more likely to consider the defect to be trivial when it is under 1⁄2 inch. (See, e.g., Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 927 [elevation difference of under half an inch]; Fielder , supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 724, fn. 4 [same]. However, courts have found trivial defects at above 1⁄2 inch. (See Whiting v. City of National City (1937) 9 Cal.2d 163, 165-166 [ 69 P.2d 990] [elevation difference of a maximum of three-fourths of an inch]; Nunez v. City of Redondo Beach (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 749, 753 [elevation difference of 3/4 of an inch to 11/16 of an inch]. A more accurate encapsulation of the law, according to Stack , is that when the size of the depression begins to stretch beyond one inch the courts have been reluctant to find that the defect is not dangerous as a matter of law, i.e., that it is minor or trivial.¿ ( Stack , supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 112.)¿ That said, there is no firmly fixed arbitrary measurement in inches below which a defect is trivial as a matter of law and above which it becomes a question of fact whether or not the defect is dangerous.¿ This is because a court should not rely solely upon the size of the defect ... although the defects size may be one of the most relevant factors to the courts decision.¿ ( Id . at pp. 112113.) 2. Aggravating Factors The Court next considers additional factors.¿Beyond size, additional factors courts typically consider in assessing a sidewalk conditions triviality as a matter of law are: the nature and quality of the defect (including whether it has jagged breaks or cracks); whether anything was obstructing or concealing the defect (for instance, an object, debris, or other substance); the lighting and weather conditions at the time of the incident; whether the defect has caused other accidents; and plaintiff's familiarity with the area. ( Stack , supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 115.) Plaintiff presents evidence showing that the Marengo Avenue defect at issue was a permanent defect in asphalt pavement caused by shoving, creating an offset measuring 1.25 inches. (Declaration of Dr. Shakir Shatnawi, P.E., (Shatnawi Decl.) ¶¶ 6-11.) Asphalt pavement shoving occurs when small mounds can form in pavement, and typically close to intersections where traffic starts and stops. (Declaration of Brad P. Avrit, P.E., (Avrit Decl.) ¶ 12; Fig. 3-4.) Plaintiff has provided evidence that the defect remains just above 1 inch, which is the height differential at which courts have been reluctant to find that the defect is not dangerous as a matter of law. Defendant disputes the suggested size of the defect as shown on the photographs taken by Plaintiffs husband, Joshua Bark, featuring measuring tape next to the uneven pavement. Defendant argues that in her two depositions, Plaintiff did not provide a measurement or estimate of the offset height. (Deposition of Plaintiff Franses Rodriguez, Volume 1, 2 (Pl. Dep., V. 1) at 52:7-14.) However, Plaintiff recounted that her husband took the measurements, and she approximated the height to be probably a couple of inches. ( Id. at 69: 1-4; Pl. Dep., V. 2. At 92:8-15, 19-24.) Plaintiff returned to the site of the crash on three occasions following the accident and recognized the portion of the road that caused her fall. (Declaration of Joshua Bark, Bark Decl., ¶¶ 3-6 (Ex. S.) After examining all the evidence, the Court finds the displacement in question to be trivial as a matter of law. First, the 1.25-inch displacement is just above the threshold where the Court would hesitate to find it trivial. ( Stack , supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 112) Courts have routinely found height differentials of up to one and one-half inches trivial as a matter of law. (See, e.g., Barrett v. City of Claremont (1953) 41 Cal.2d 70, 74 [in the absence of aggravating conditions, differential of less than half an inch deemed trivial]; Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922 927 [elevation difference of under half an inch]; Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 724, fn. 4 [same]; Nicholson v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 5 Cal.2d 361, 367 [one and one-half inch elevation difference]; Whiting v. City of National City (1937) 9 Cal.2d 163, 165-166 [ 69 P.2d 990] [elevation difference of a maximum of three-fourths of an inch].) Second, there is no evidence of aggravating factors. Plaintiff presented no evidence of any prior accident or fall at the location. Defendant never received any claim for damages nor legal complaints related to any incident involving the alleged condition or involving the sidewalk located at or near the location of the displacement since 2012. (Decl. of Mandy Templeton, ¶¶ 1-9.) The various photographs of the location do not depict any jagged breaks or cracks. Defendant points out that Plaintiff has stated that the day was clear and sunny, that the road conditions were dry, there were no weather conditions, or shadows that would have prevented Plaintiff from seeing the uneven section of the roadway. (Pl. Dep., V. 1 at 39:3-4, 39: 13-15, 39:13-15, 39: 40:23-1, 51-52:22-2.) Plaintiff argues that as the operator of an e-scooter, she had much less opportunity than a pedestrian to identify hazards on the roads surface given the speed and requirement to remain balanced upright while traveling. (Oppn., p. 13.) Plaintiff argues that the 1.25-inch defect is not distinct because it is the same color as the rest of the asphalt and was covered by a shadow extending across Plaintiffs travel lane. ( Id. ) Plaintiff presented a photograph taken approximately 3 days after the incident, displaying the elevated transition between asphalt pavement and concrete. (Bark Decl., ¶ 2; Exh. H.) However, even in the photograph, the elevated asphalt pavement is visible. The evidence presented does not establish that the elevated transition was obstructed or concealed. Thus, the lack of aggravating factors weigh in favor of finding that the alleged defect here is trivial. In concert with the size of the defect, which is 1.25 inches, the Court finds the defect to be trivial. Notice Plaintiff argues that Defendant had either actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect. Even assuming the defect on the road is not trivial, the Court finds that Defendant was not put on actual or constructive notice of the defect. For liability under Gov. Code § 835(b), a plaintiff must establish either actual or constructive notice on the part of the public entity. Failure to establish notice is fatal to recovery. ( Van Kempen v. Hayward Area Park, Recreation & Park Dist . (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 822, 827.) To establish actual notice, there must be evidence of the public entitys actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and that the entity knew or should have known of its dangerous character. (Gov. Code § 835.2.) There are several factors to consider when determining if constructive notice existed, including whether the dangerous condition was obvious and whether it existed for a sufficient period of time ((Gov. Code § 835.2(b); State v. Superior Court of San Mateo County (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 396, 400) to put the municipality on notice. Prior accidents may also establish constructive notice. ( Higgins v. State (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 177, 188, abrogated on other grounds Cornette v. Dept. of Trans . (2002) 26 Cal.4th 63 [plaintiff in dangerous condition roadway case must show that the accident rate was statistically aberrant, otherwise no triable issue on notice exists].) Defendant has presented undisputed evidence from its Citizen Service Center, which helps the public request service on roads and report injuries and incidents, stating that between 2012 to November 15, 2021, (the accident date), no work orders or roadway conditions were reported to Defendant. ( Id., at ¶¶ 3- 9.) A search of tort claims of where Plaintiff fell, dating back to 1979, also did not reveal any injuries claimed at that location. (Declaration of Razmik Serkisian (Serkisian Decl.), ¶¶ 4-5, 8.) Pasadena Police Department phone calls and reports between January 2011 and December 31, 2021, also failed to yield any relevant results. (Declaration of Melissa Trujillo (Trujillo Decl.), at ¶¶ 4-6.) In 2017, the most relevant request to the accident site was submitted to Defendant by a cyclist, asking Defendant to mark the pavement as SLM or sharrow to show cyclists and drivers the lane is shared. (Declaration of Alexander Timblin, (Timblin Decl., ¶ 4.) Defendant argues that city employees must report potential hazards on either the roadway or sidewalk if one is observed. (Pl. Response to Defendants Special Interrogatories, Set One, at Response to SROG No. 9.) Plaintiff argues that actual notice of the dangerous defect occurred when Defendants employee, Alexander Timblin, visited the accident site to fulfill the cyclist request to mark the pavement and observed that the defect was already present (Oppn., p. 14; Timblin Decl. ¶. 3,5-8). In her opposition, Plaintiff states: Here, there is evidence that the defect was already present when Mr. Timblin observed the area in 2017. There is also evidence that other City employees visited the scene in or prior to April of 2019 and the defect was likewise present at that time. From this evidence a reasonable jury could find that the City had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character. However, in paragraph 9 of his declaration, Mr. Timblin states: I went to Marengo Avenue, just south of Green Street to take measurements for the work order to place additional sharrow markings in 2017. When I was at the location of Marengo Avenue at or near Green Street, I did not observe a gap or bump in the roadway. The alleged uplift or alleged condition that Plaintiff claims caused her fall was not present at the time I was at the location. This evidence was uncontradicted and undermines Plaintiff's argument that the City had actual notice. This Court concludes that there is no evidence of actual notice. Plaintiff argues that the nature and appearance of the defect gave the City constructive notice of its existence. Plaintiff further argues that constructive notice may also be established by evidence that a public entity failed to undertake adequate precautions despite having reason to anticipate that an as-yet-nonexistent dangerous condition would develop. In response, Defendant cites Plaintiffs deposition testimony in which Plaintiff confirmed that she did not see the uneven portion of the roadway that caused her fall. (UMF No. 5.) and did not observe the change in material from concrete to asphalt. (UMF No. 27.) In addition to this evidence, the parties have submitted numerous photographs of the accident location. The Court agrees that the undisputable facts establish that the alleged condition was not sufficiently obvious to give the City constructive notice, as a matter of law. The Court finds there are no triable issues of material fact as to the Citys lack of constructive or actual notice of the alleged dangerous condition. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of the City. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendants motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this order. DATED: July 11, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

Ruling

Duffert, Raymond vs. Oakmont Junior Vikings Football and Cheer et al
Jul 22, 2024 | S-CV-0052327
S-CV-0052327 Duffert, Raymond vs. Oakmont Junior Vikings Football and Cheer No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/14/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Geravis, Robert; Oakmont Junior Vikings Football and Cheer; Rodriguez, Raphael Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Geravis, Robert; Oakmont Junior Vikings Football and Cheer

Ruling

GLORIA CALDWELL VS DRIFTWOOD HEALTHCARE CENTER, LLC, ET AL.
Jul 10, 2024 | 23TRCV03630
Case Number: 23TRCV03630 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B GLORIA CALDWELL, by and through her power of attorney, TERRIE BAIRD, Plaintiff, Case No.: 23TRCV03630 vs. [TENTATIVE] RULING DRIFTWOOD HEALTHCARE CENTER, LLC, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendant Driftwood Healthcare Center, LLC Responding Party: None (1) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One (2) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Demand for Production of Documents, Set One The Court considered the moving papers. No opposition was filed. RULING The motions are GRANTED. Plaintiff Gloria Caldwell is ordered to serve further responses to defendant Driftwood Healthcare Center, LLCs Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. Nos. 1-8, 10, and 12-30 and Demand for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. Nos. 1-5, 7-8, 10-18, 21-22, 24, 27-29, and 31-47, within twenty days. Plaintiff is ordered to pay a monetary sanction to defendant in the amount of $1,120.50, within thirty days. BACKGROUND On October 31, 2023, plaintiff Gloria Caldwell by and through her power of attorney Terrie Baird filed a complaint against Driftwood Healthcare Center, LLC dba Driftwood Healthcare Center, Citrus Wellness Center, LLC, Ensemble Healthcare, LLC, and Rechnitz Citrus, GP for (1) negligence, (2) violations of Elder Abuse Act, and (3) violations of Resident Rights. On July 3, 2023, the Court granted defendants motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories, set one and ordered plaintiff to pay sanctions in the amount of $766.50. LEGAL AUTHORITY 45-Day Rule : This motion must be served within 45 days after service of the response in question (extended if served by mail, overnight delivery, or fax; see CCP §1013); otherwise, the demanding party waives the right to compel any further response to the CCP §2031.010 demand. CCP §§2031.310(c), 2016.050; see Sperber v. Robinson (1994) 26 Cal. App. 4th 736, 745. The 45-day time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional. Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 1410. The parties, however, can also agree in writing on a specific later date by which to file the motion to compel. CCP §2031.310(c). Meet-and-Confer Requirement : The motion to compel further responses must be accompanied by a declaration showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve the issues outside of court (so-called meet and confer). CCP §§2016.040, 2031.310(b)(2). Separate Statement : Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request shall be accompanied by a separate statement. This includes a motion to compel further responses to demand for inspection of documents or tangible things. CRC Rule 3.1020(a)(3). Interrogatories CCP §2030.300 states: (a) On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. . . . (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories. . . . CCP §2030.220 states: (a) Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. (b) If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible. (c) If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party. CCP §2030.230 states: If the answer to an interrogatory would necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from the documents of the party to whom the interrogatory is directed, and if the burden or expense of preparing or making it would be substantially the same for the party propounding the interrogatory as for the responding party, it is a sufficient answer to that interrogatory to refer to this section and to specify the writings from which the answer may be derived or ascertained. . . . CCP §2030.010(b) provides: An interrogatory may relate to whether another party is making a certain contention, or to the facts, witnesses, and writings on which a contention is based. An interrogatory is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial. Request for Production of Documents On receipt of a response to an inspection demand, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete; (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. CCP § 2031.310(a). A statement of compliance shall state that the production, inspection, and related activity demanded will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production. CCP § 2031.220. A representation of inability to comply with [a] particular demand for inspection . . . shall affirm that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. This statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item. CCP § 2031.230. A motion to compel further response to requests for production shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. CCP § 2031.310(b)(1). To establish good cause, the burden is on the moving party to show both: [1] Relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the documents would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case); and [2] Specific facts justifying discovery (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). The fact that there is no alternative source for the information sought is an important factor in establishing good cause for inspection. But it is not essential in every case. Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial , 8:1495.6 (citations omitted). Declarations are generally used to show the requisite good cause for an order to compel inspection. The declarations must contain specific facts rather than mere conclusions. Id. at 8:1495.7 (citation omitted). The declarations may be on information and belief, if necessary. However, in such cases, the specific facts supporting such information and belief (the sources of the information) must also be alleged. Id. at 8:1495.8 (citation omitted). Most declarations are made by the attorney for the moving party, who is usually more familiar with the relevancy and specific facts constituting good cause for inspection. Id. at 8:1495.9. If good cause is shown by the moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure (the same as on motions to compel answers to interrogatories or deposition questions. . . ). Id. at 8:1496 (citation omitted). DISCUSSION Defendant Driftwood requests that the Court compel plaintiff to respond further to Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 1-8, 10, and 12-30 and Demand for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 1-5, 7-8, 10-18, 21-22, 24, 27-29, and 31-47. The complaint alleges that plaintiff Gloria Caldwell was a resident at defendants skilled nursing facility, Driftwood, from September 10, 2022. Complaint, ¶23. At that time, she was admitted for multiple medical conditions including history of dementia, type 2 diabetes mellitus, hypothyroidism, osteoarthritis, and an unspecified fracture of upper end of left humerus subsequent encounter for fracture with routine healing. Due to her comorbidities, Caldwell required assistance with all her activities for daily living. Id., ¶24. The totality of these illnesses indicate and should have indicated to defendants that Caldwell was a person with low mobility. Consequently, Driftwoods staff knew or should have known that Caldwell was at high risk for developing skin breakdowns to her person. Id., ¶25. Further, she was incontinent of bowel and bladder. Id., ¶26. Additionally, she required assistance of Driftwoods staff for nutrition and hydration. Id., ¶27. Despite knowledge of these risks, plaintiff developed a fungal infection to the skin of her perineal area, cellulitis of buttock, sepsis, urinary tract infections, E. coli, severe malnutrition, and dehydration. Defendants staff thus had a further obligation to treat and contain these illnesses. Id., ¶29. Specifically, while a resident of Driftwood, plaintiff was left in her soiled diapers by Driftwood nursing staff. As a result, the skin degraded, causing infection, cellulitis, dermatitis and she developed urinary tract infections. Id., ¶30. Further, she was overmedicated and not provided the proper physical therapy services. Id., ¶32. Defendant explains that it served discovery requests on plaintiff on December 1, 2023. Responses were due by January 3, 2024. On April 5, 2024, plaintiff served responses. On May 7, 2024, defense counsel sent a meet and confer letter to plaintiffs counsel regarding plaintiffs deficient responses and requested supplemental responses by May 14, 2014. On May 11, 2024, plaintiffs counsel sought an extension to May 21, 2021, which defense counsel granted. Counsel also agreed to extend the date to file motions to compel further responses. As of the date of the filing of the motion, defense counsel has not received supplemental responses. Special interrogatories As to the special interrogatories, defendant asserts that plaintiffs responses to Nos. 1, 3, 5, 7, 12, 24, 25, 27, 29, and 30 are deficient because she failed to provide a full and complete response in compliance with CCP §2030.220. As to Nos. 10, 14-17, and 28, defendant contends that plaintiff failed to respond with particularity, as the interrogatories require information regarding the dates, times and places of the events complained of; as well as the identity of any persons involved therein. As to Nos. 2, 4, 6, 8, 13, and 18-23, defendant asserts that plaintiff failed to provide full and complete responses as she failed to respond with particularity as they incorporated boilerplate allegations from her unverified complaint. There is no opposition. The Court finds that plaintiffs responses are deficient as they do not comply with CCP §2030.220. The motion is thus GRANTED. Demand for production of documents As to the demand for documents, plaintiff responded: Plaintiff refers Defendant to Plaintiffs Bates labeled production, which includes . . . medical chart . . . , notes taken by Plaintiffs Husband, and Plaintiffs complaints substantiated by the California Department of Health that resulted in Deficiencies issued to Driftwood Healthcare Center. Additionally, Plaintiff refers Defendant to Defendants production, which contains Gloria Caldwells medical chart, Medicaid Cost Reports from Defendants facility, Defendants Clinical Nursing and Operational Policies and Procedures, and Defendants Job Descriptions. Defendant argues that the response is ambiguous and evasive and fails to comply with CCP §§2031.210, 2031.220, and 2031.230. Defendant also argues that to the extent that plaintiff produced documents, she failed to label them in compliance with CCP §2031.280, and thus it is unclear what categories plaintiff produced documents in response to and/or whether there are documents being withheld. Defendant asserts that plaintiff omitted evidence of her certification and/or admission into hospice. There is no opposition. The Court finds that plaintiffs responses are deficient as they do not comply with CCP §§2031.220 and 2031.230 and that plaintiffs production does not comply with CCP §2031.280. The motion is thus GRANTED. Sanctions Under CCP § 2023.030(a), [t]he court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. . . . If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Under CCP § 2023.010, an example of the misuse of the discovery process is (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. Sanctions are mandatory in connection with motions to compel further responses against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. CCP § §2030.300(d), 2031.310(h). Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348(a) states: The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. Defendant requests monetary sanctions against plaintiff in the amount of $2,964 for both motions. The Court finds that $1,600 plus the $158 filing and remote appearance fees) is a reasonable amount to be imposed against plaintiff. ORDER The motions are GRANTED. Plaintiff Gloria Caldwell is ordered to serve further responses to defendant Driftwood Healthcare Center, LLCs Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. Nos. 1-8, 10, and 12-30 and Demand for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. Nos. 1-5, 7-8, 10-18, 21-22, 24, 27-29, and 31-47, within twenty days. Plaintiff is ordered to pay a monetary sanction to defendant in the amount of $1,758 plus the remote appearance fee, within thirty days. Defendant is ordered to give notice of ruling.

Ruling

TRAVELERS COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY VS GARY L LUCKENBACHER
Jul 11, 2024 | 23SMCV05929
Case Number: 23SMCV05929 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: P Tentative Ruling Travelers Commercial Insurance Co. v. Luckenbacher, Case No. 23SMCV05929 Hearing date July 11, 2024 Travelers Motions for Orders Compelling Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatives, and Demand for Production of Documents and Request for Monetary Sanctions In this uninsured motorist case, plaintiff moves to compel defendants responses to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and demand for production of documents and requests sanctions. No opposition, which would have been due nine court days prior to the hearing (Code Civ. Proc. §1005(b)) was filed. If a party to whom interrogatories or an inspection demand were directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses without objections. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(b), 2031.300(b). Moreover, failure to timely serve responses waives objections to the requests. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(a), 2031.300(a). Failure to verify a response is equivalent to no response at all. Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636. If a party unsuccessfully made or opposed such a motion, the court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(c), 2031.300(c). Sanctions may be awarded even though no opposition was filed or the requested discovery was provided after the motion was filed. CRC Rule 3.1348(a). Defendant failed to respond. See generally Volk decls. All objections to the requests are waived. Monetary sanctions are warranted. Plaintiffs counsel requests $841.65 for each motion, representing 4 hours of work (2 hours to draft and 2 hours to prepare for and attend the hearing) at counsels hourly rate of $195, plus filing fee of $61.65. The request for sanctions is granted in a reduced amount because the three motions are virtually identical and are unopposed. The court awards a total of 6 hours (5 hours to draft, 1 hour for hearing) at $195/hour, plus filing fees of $184.95 for three motions. GRANTED. Defendant to serve complete, verified responses, without objection, within 20 days of this order. The request for sanctions is GRANTED in the total amount of $1,365, plus $184.95 in filing fees, payable within 30 days.

Document

Gabriella Flores, Claudia Flores, A.R. F., A. R., M.D . VS. Fanny Silva, Noe Moreno
Oct 20, 2023 | Injury or Damage - Motor Vehicle (OCA) | CL-23-4291-J

Document

Jorge Luis Estrada VS. Rene Estrada
Mar 09, 2023 | Injury or Damage - Motor Vehicle (OCA) | CL-23-1085-I

Document

GEICO INSURANCE GROUP vs. LIVELY, RICHARD LEE
Jul 12, 2024 | URSULA A. HALL | Motor Vehicle Accident | Motor Vehicle Accident | 202443783

Document

ROBERT PAUL CLEDERA vs. JAMES ANTHONY ROBINSON, et al
Oct 17, 2023 | TILLERY, DALE | MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT | DC-23-17796

Document

BARBARA DALBY vs. HUNT OIL COMPANY, et al
Aug 23, 2021 | PARKER, TONYA | MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT | DC-21-11344

Document

Jose Justiniano Caraballo VS. Walmart Stores, Inc.
Jul 12, 2024 | Injury or Damage - Motor Vehicle (OCA) | C-3245-24-B

Document

LINDA MOLINA CASTRO vs. SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY, et al
Dec 04, 2023 | SLAUGHTER, GENA | MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT | DC-23-20043

Document

JUAN RUBIO vs. RYAN JACKSON-COLEGROVE
Sep 05, 2023 | TILLERY, DALE | MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT | DC-23-13988