Ruling
UNIFUND V HAGSTROM
Jul 10, 2024 |
MCV-231357
MCV-231357, Unifund v. Hagstrom
Judgment Creditor, Unifund CCR, LLC’s, unopposed Application for Order of Sale of Dwelling
is GRANTED. Judgment Debtor, Steve E. Hagstrom, has failed to show cause why the property should
not be sold to satisfy the judgment. A homestead declaration has not been recorded by Judgment Debtor.
By failing to oppose the application and failing to respond to the Court’s order to show cause, Judgment
Debtor has failed to meet his burden of showing that the homestead exemption applies here. (CCP §
704.780.) There is no evidence of any other exemption being applicable here. The property shall be sold
in the manner provided in Article 6 (commencing with Section 701.510) of Chapter 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as required by CCP § 704.780.
Judgment Creditor shall submit a written order consistent with this tentative ruling. The proposed
order currently lodged with the Court does not conform with the Court’s ruling. It does not reference the
correct hearing date. It refers to the Judgement Debtor as “Adam Seller” on the first page. Also, it states
that no minimum bid shall be required, but this does not comply with CCP § 701.620, which states
property shall not be sold without a minimum bid. Judgment Creditor shall submit a written order that
complies with all of the requirements of Article 6 of Chapter 3 and of Article 4 of Chapter 4.
4. 23CV00186, Jooblay, Inc. v. Steven D. Skolnik
The Court awards Defendant $5,545 in fees and costs. Defendant’s counsel shall prepare a written
order consistent with this tentative ruling in compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.
I. Background
On August 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action for (inter alia) wrongful foreclosure and quiet title.
The subject properties are 1551 Laguna Road, Santa Rosa, and 9579 Ross Station Road, Sebastopol. On
September 26, 2023, Plaintiff recorded Notices of Pending Action (“lis pendens”) on both properties. The
notices were filed with the Court on April 16, 2024. On the same day, Pacific Private Money
(“Defendant”) moved to expunge the lis pendens on the Laguna Road property only (the “Motion”). The
Motion included a request for attorney’s fees, but did not specify an amount.
On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a different lawsuit, Jooblay, Inc. v. Sanchez (24CV03100),
concerning the same two properties. The Sanchez complaint alleges causes of action that fundamentally
duplicate six of the causes of action in the instant case, though against slightly different sets of
defendants. The duplicated causes of action include two for quiet title, one related to the Ross Station
property and the other to the Laguna property. On June 13, Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal in the
instant case, dismissing the causes of action that had been duplicated in the Sanchez complaint, including
the two quiet title claims. In summary, Plaintiff moved several causes of action, including two for quiet
title, from the instant case into a different lawsuit. Thus, the instant case no longer has a quiet title
component.
Plaintiff withdrew the lis pendens on the Laguna Road property on June 3. Plaintiff recorded a
new lis pendens on the Laguna Road property, relating to the Sanchez matter, on or about June 6.
At the June 14 hearing, the Court denied the Motion as moot. Defendant argued that the motion is
not moot because it is entitled to attorney’s fees. The Court continued the matter and instructed
Defendant to submit an itemization of its fees and costs. Defendant did so on June 24. This matter comes
on calendar for consideration of Defendant’s requests for fees and costs.
II. Analysis
CCP § 761.010(b) requires that “[i]mmediately upon commencement of [a quiet title] action, the
plaintiff shall file a notice of the pendency of the action in the office of the county recorder of each county
in which any real property described in the complaint is located.”
The complaints in both the instant case and Sanchez allege causes of action for quiet title. In the
instant case, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens just under a month after filing the complaint. In the Sanchez
case, Plaintiff recorded it slightly over a week after filing the complaint. Both timeframes somewhat
stretch the definition of “immediately,” but the point is that Plaintiff was required to record the lis
pendens in both cases. Plaintiff withdrew the lis pendens in the instant case ten days before dismissing
the two quiet-title cause of action that had required it. In other words, as relevant here, Plaintiff has filed
a lawsuit containing quiet-title allegations, recorded a lis pendens as required by statute, moved the quiet-
title allegations to a different lawsuit, withdrawn the lis pendens in the first lawsuit because it was no
longer required by statute, and recorded it in the second one because it was required by statute.
The party prevailing on any motion to expunge a lis pendens is entitled to “the reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing the motion.” (CCP § 405.38.) If the Court had granted
Defendant’s motion and ordered Plaintiff to withdraw the lis pendens, there would be no question that
Defendant was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney’s fees. But the Court did not do that; the
Court denied Defendant’s Motion as moot because the lis pendens addressed by the Motion had already
been withdrawn. The question, then, is whether Defendant is still the prevailing party.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not, noting that “California law defines the ‘prevailing party’ to
include ‘the party with a net recovery’ or ‘a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered.’” (Oppo at
p. 6.) Plaintiff cites for this proposition to CCP § 1032(a)(4), which does begin with the passage Plaintiff
quoted, but goes on to add that “[i]f any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other
than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those
circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not . . . .” Thus, CCP § 1032(a)(4), as
applied to the situation presented here, simply says that the court has the discretion to determine which
party is “prevailing,” but provides no guidance on how to make that determination.
Significant guidance is provided by Castro v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1010, which
addresses this exact issue. Castro rejects any inflexible rule that the moving party either is or is not
entitled to attorney’s fees when a lis pendens is withdrawn before the court has an opportunity to rule on a
motion to expunge it. Instead, Castro calls for a “practical approach,” under which “the trial court has the
discretion to award attorney fees based on a determination of which party would have prevailed on the
motion, and whether the lis pendens claimant acted with substantial justification in withdrawing the lis
pendens, or whether, in light of all of the circumstances, the imposition of fees would otherwise be
unjust.” (Id. at pp. 1024-1025.)
A. Defendant would have prevailed on the Motion.
In the Motion, Defendant sets forth a variety of reasons why it should prevail. The reasons fall
into two categories: procedural defects, and reasons Plaintiff cannot establish a likelihood of prevailing on
a real property claim. (CCP § 405.32 [lis pendens to be expunged if claimant does not establish probable
validity of claim].)
In the first category, Defendant notes that the recording, service, and filing of the lis pendens
failed to comply with statutory requirements. First, Defendant points out that the lis pendens bears the
wrong caption in that it lists only Defendant, Pacific Private Money, as a defendant in the pending action,
whereas the complaint in the instant case lists a number of other defendants. The Court does not find this
point significant standing alone, in light of the fact that the actual complaint, with its full caption, was
attached to the Notice of Pending Action. Defendant’s second point in this category is that the lis pendens
was not served on Defendant, and that it should have been because Defendant is “affected by the real
property claim.” (CCP § 405.22.) (Defendant also argues that the lis pendens was not filed with the
Court, but in fact it was, on April 16, 2022, the same day the Motion was filed.)
In the second category, Defendant makes a series of arguments as to the prospective failure of
every cause of action in the complaint. In light of Plaintiff’s contention that its only reason for filing the
lis pendens was to comply with a statutory requirement related to quiet-title actions, the most relevant
cause of action is the eighth, the one to quiet title on the Laguna property. That cause of action states that
the defendants against whom it is alleged have no interest in the Laguna Road property. Defendant argues
that this claim will fail for two reasons: first, because it rests on the allegation that the loan upon which
the defendants foreclosed was usurious, which is not a valid argument because Defendant is a licensed
broker and therefore exempt from the usury laws (Fin. Code § 22002); and second, because Plaintiff
cannot contest the foreclosure because he failed to tender the payment due (Daniels v. Select Portfolio
Servicing (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1184-1185).
Plaintiff did not address any of these arguments in its opposition to the Motion; it rested on the
point that the motion was moot because Plaintiff had withdrawn the lis pendens. Nor does Plaintiff
address them in its opposition to the instant fee motion, with the exception of Plaintiff’s explanation that
the quiet-title causes of action in the complaint are not alleged against Defendant. Plaintiff’s point,
presumably, is that Defendant is not “affected by the real property claim” and therefore service on
Defendant was not required. (CCP § 405.22.) That argument would carry a great deal more weight if
Defendant Pacific Private Money were not the only party mentioned in the caption of the lis pendens
document. The fact that Plaintiff named Pacific Private Money, and no other defendant, in the caption of
the Notice of Pending Action is at odds with the notion that Plaintiff did not consider Pacific Private
Money to be sufficiently “affected by the real property claim” to require the lis pendens document to be
served on them.
“[T]he court shall order that the [lis pendens] notice be expunged if the court finds that the
claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property
claim.” (CCP § 405.32.) In light of Plaintiff’s failure to address Defendant’s contentions about why the
claim will fail, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established validity. Therefore, the court finds that
Defendant would have prevailed on the Motion if it had gone forward.
B. Substantial justification
Plaintiff asserts that it,
“acted in substantial justification in withdrawing the Laguna Road Property lis pendens
when Plaintiff elected, as is its right, to voluntarily dismiss its causes of action for quiet
title. Upon deciding to dismiss the quiet title causes of action – the only cause of action
requiring the recording of a lis pendens, Plaintiff adopted the only practical approach to the
dismissal by withdrawing the lis pendens no longer required because the quiet title cause
of action are no longer part of this case. Plaintiff acted with substantial justification in
withdrawing the lis pendens.”
(Oppo at p. 6.) That is, Plaintiff argues that withdrawing the lis pendens that had been recorded in the
instant case was justified and necessary and done in good faith because there ceased to be any need for it
once the quiet-title causes of action were dismissed.
The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff had the legal right remove several causes of action from the
instant case and re-allege them in a new case. The Court also acknowledges that when Plaintiff did that,
withdrawing the lis pendens he had filed in the instant case was the right thing to do. However, Plaintiff
never addresses the question of why he filed the new case. It is not at all obvious why the same thing
could not have been accomplished more straightforwardly, without the need for a new $435 first-paper
filing fee and without exposing Plaintiff to an additional case’s worth of discovery demands, by moving
to file a First Amended Complaint in the case at bar. Plaintiff cannot have reasonably been concerned
that the Court would deny such a motion at this early stage of the proceedings.
What is obvious is that by taking the action it did, Plaintiff created a basis to oppose the Motion,
which had been filed six weeks before Plaintiff filed Sanchez and which was set for hearing two weeks
later, as moot. Whether or not that was Plaintiff’s motivation for filing the new case and dismissing the
corresponding causes of action in the instant one, the Court finds that doing so does not rise to substantial
justification for withdrawing the lis pendens.
Accordingly, Defendant is the “prevailing party” under the Castro analysis described above.
C. Imposition of the fees is not unjust
The Court sees no reason to conclude that imposition of attorney’s fees would be unjust, and will
therefore impose them.
III. Computation of the fee award
The standard for calculating attorney fee awards under California law “ordinarily begins with the
‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate . . . .
The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to
fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. [Citation.] Such an approach anchors
the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that
the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)
In calculating the lodestar, “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for
similar work.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant
“community” is that where the court is located,’ unless the party claiming fees demonstrates that hiring
local counsel was impracticable or local counsel was not available.” (Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 275, 285-286; see also Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 26,72 [“fee awards generally should be based on reasonable local hourly rates”]; Horsford v.
Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 398-399 [different rule
where plaintiff demonstrated inability to hire local counsel].)
“[T]he trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee.” (PLCM
Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) “The determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is
committed to the discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The experienced trial judge is the best judge of
the value of professional services rendered in his or her court.” (Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1240.)
A. Defendant’s request
In the Supplemental Declaration of Brianna Milligan accompanying the request for attorney’s
fees, Defendant requests fees as follows, as well as $60 for the filing fee for the Motion:
Jacoby Perez
Researching and evaluating grounds for Motion: 5 hours
Preparing and finalizing Motion: 5 hours
Reviewing and revising reply: 1.2 hours
Total: 11.2 hours @ $525/hour
Brianna Milligan
Reviewing opposition and preparing reply and declaration: 4.2 hours
Reviewing billing charges and preparing declaration re. fees: 1.5 hours
Preparing supplemental brief re. fees: 2 hours
Anticipated time at hearing: 1 hour
Total: 8.7 hours @ $455/hour
B. Defendant’s arithmetic is in error
Defendant requests a total of $17,773.35 in fees and costs. That figure is the sum of $13,755.00
for Mr. Perez’s time, $3,503.35 for 7.7 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time attributable to preparing the Reply
and the fee request, an additional $455 for Ms. Milligan’s anticipated time at the hearing on the fee
request, and the $60 filing fee. Those figures do add up to $17,773.35.
However, there are two problems with the calculation. The first is very small: 7.7 hours at
$455/hour is $3,503.50, not $3,503.35. Thus, Defendant presumably intends to request a total of
$3,958.50 for 8.7 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time, not $3,958.35.
The second is considerably larger. Mr. Perez, according to Ms. Milligan’s declaration, has “spent
5 hours researching and evaluating the grounds for the Motion to Expunge the Lis Pendens, and an
additional 5 hours preparing and finalizing the Motion to Expunge the Lis Pendens. Mr. Perez also
reviewed and revised Defendant’s Reply Brief to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion to Expunge the Lis
Pendens and spent 1.2 hours doing so.” (Milligan Dec., ¶ 6.) That is a total of 11.2 hours. Mr. Perez’s
billing rate is $525/hour. (Milligan Dec., ¶ 7.) 11.2 hours at $525/hour is $5,880. It is not $13,755, the
amount claimed for Mr. Perez’s time. $13,775 divided by $525 is 26.2. The claimed amount, therefore,
appears to be based on an additional 15 hours of Mr. Perez’s time that are not accounted for in the
declaration.
The Court will interpret Defendant’s request as being for 11.2 hours of Mr. Perez’s time at
$525/hour ($5,880), 8.7 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time at $455/hour ($3,958.50), and $60 in filing fees, for
a total of $9,898.50.
D. Time
1. Motion to expunge
Defendant claims a total of 10 hours of Mr. Perez’s time in connection with the researching and
drafting the Motion. The memorandum of points and authority is detailed and fact-intensive, and includes
extensive citation to authority. Its complexity is tied to the complexity of the complaint in this matter: it
argues, inter alia, that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on eight separate causes of action. However, the
Court notes that in his declaration accompanying the Reply, Mr. Perez declares that he spent only 6.5
hours on the motion: “2 hours doing preliminary research to form the basis for this expungement motion,”
and “4.5 hours preparing the motion to expunge.” Mr. Perez was clearly referring to the motion itself, not
to the reply memorandum, as he claims an additional 4.3 hours for that.
Ms. Milligan’s declaration does not explain why Mr. Perez now appears to have spent 10 hours
researching and drafting the motion. The Court will take Mr. Perez at his word, and award attorney’s fees
for 6.5 hours for preparing the Motion.
2. Reply
Defendant claims a total of 5.4 hours in connection with drafting the Reply: 4.2 hours of Ms.
Milligan’s time and 1.2 of Mr. Perez’s. The Reply was a well-justified response to Plaintiff’s contention
that the Motion was moot. The Court finds the 4.2 hours claimed by Ms. Milligan for preparing the reply
to be reasonable. However, the Court will not award the 1.2 hours for Mr. Perez’s time on the reply
because 4.2 hours should have been sufficient to prepare the memorandum and no review should have
been necessary.
As noted above, Mr. Perez states in his declaration accompanying the Reply that he “spent 4.3
hours reviewing and researching Plaintiff’s Opposition and in preparing Defendant’s Reply Brief and in
making this Declaration.” The Court finds the 4.3 hour figure unreasonable. The Opposition
fundamentally says no more than that the motion is moot because the lis pendens was withdrawn; that
takes no significant time to review. The declaration is one page long (exclusive of the jurat), much of
which consists of the list of defendants; it also cannot have taken significant time. 4.3 hours is no less
reasonable than the 4.2 hours claimed by Ms. Milligan for preparing the reply, but if Ms. Milligan spent
4.2 hours preparing it, it is unreasonable to award Mr. Perez an additional 4.3 hours for doing the same
thing.
Accordingly, the Court will award attorney’s fees for 4.2 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time in
connection with the reply.
3. Fee request
Defendant claims a total of 3.5 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time in connection with the fee request,
consisting of 1.5 hours for reviewing billing charges and preparing the declaration, and 2 hours for
drafting the motion. The Court finds the 1.5 hour figure excessive. The Court again notes that Mr. Perez
described the time he spent on the original motion in his declaration accompanying the reply; no further
review was necessary to determine that figure. Ms. Milligan cannot reasonably have spent an hour and a
half determining her own time in connection with the reply, and her time spent preparing the fee request
cannot even have been entered into anything she could review while she was engaged in that exact task.
The Court will award 2.2 hours of attorney’s fees in connection with the fee request, consisting of
two hours to draft the memorandum and .2 hours to review billing records.
4. Anticipated time for hearing
The Court will not award attorney’s fees for appearance at the hearing set for July 10 at this time.
If the tentative ruling is contested and the hearing takes place, the Court will be amenable to a request to
increase the fee award to cover the time spent by Defendant’s counsel.
5. Total time
Thus, the Court will award attorney’s fees for 6.5 hours of Mr. Perez’s time and 6.4 hours of Ms.
Milligan’s time.
E. Hourly rates
As noted above, “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”
(PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) As noted above, the relevant “community” is the “forum
district,” here Sonoma county. (Nishiki, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 898.) Fees are limited to local
hourly rates unless the party seeking fees has made a good-faith but unsuccessful effort to find local
counsel. (Horsford, sura, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 398-399.)
Defendant’s counsel is located in Irvine. Defendant has not suggested that it has attempted to hire
local counsel instead. Therefore, the Court will adjust the hourly rates requested by counsel to reflect
Sonoma County rates. Defendant has also not provided any information about Mr. Perez’s and Ms.
Milligan’s level of skill and experience or their positions within the firm, but the Court takes judicial
notice that the State Bar website indicates that Mr. Perez has seven years’ practice experience and Ms.
Milligan has three. On that basis, the Court will set Mr. Perez’s rate, based on the reasonable rates
generally awarded to counsel of similar skill and experience in Sonoma County, to $450/hour, and Ms.
Milligan’s to $400/hour.
IV. Conclusion
The Court awards Defendant $5,545 in fees and costs, consisting of $2,925 for 6.5 hours of Mr.
Perez’s time at $450/hour, $2,560 for 6.4 hours of Ms. Milligan’s time at $400/hour, and the $60 filing
fee.
Ruling
BANK OF AMERICA N.A. VS SOO S CHO
Jul 10, 2024 |
23STCV25173
Case Number:
23STCV25173
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE RULING
BANK OF AMERICA N.A.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOO S CHO,
Defendants.
Case No:
23STCV25173
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Calendar Number:
10
Plaintiff Bank of America N.A. (Plaintiff) seeks default judgment against Defendant Soo S Cho (Defendant).
Plaintiff requests:
(1) money judgment in the amount of $86,498.84, consisting of:
(a) damages in the amount of $85,995.34;
(b) costs in the amount of $503.50.
The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs request for default judgment.
Background
Plaintiff is a subsidiary of Bank of America Corporation.
Defendant opened a credit account with Plaintiff and obtained credit from Plaintiff. Plaintiff is currently indebted to Defendant in the amount of $85,995.34. Plaintiff failed to make periodic payments as required by the agreement covering use of the credit account. The last payment occurred on February 24, 2023.
Plaintiff filed this action October 16, 2023, raising one claim for common counts.
On December 22, 2023, the Court entered default against Defendant.
Legal Standard
CCP § 585 permits entry of a judgment after a Defendant has failed to timely answer after being properly served.
A party seeking judgment on the default by the Court must file a Form CIV-100 Request for Court Judgment, and:
(1) Proof of service of the complaint and summons;
(2) A dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought (including Doe defendants) or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(7));
(3) A declaration of non-military status as to the defendant (typically included in Form CIV-100) (CRC 3.1800(a)(5));
(4) A brief summary of the case (CRC 3.1800(a)(1));
(5) Admissible evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief requested (
Johnson v. Stanhiser
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362);
(6) Interest computations as necessary (CRC 3.1800(a)(3));
(7) A memorandum of costs and disbursements (typically included in Form CIV-100 (CRC 3.1800(a)(4));
(8) A request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties (CRC 3.1800(a)(9)), accompanied by a declaration stating that the fees were calculated in accordance with the fee schedule as per Local Rule 3.214.
Where a request for attorney fees is based on a contractual provision the specific provision must be cited; (Local Rule 3.207); and
(9) A proposed form of judgment (CRC 3.1800(a)(6));
(10) Where an application for default judgment is based upon a written obligation to pay money, the original written agreement should be submitted for cancellation (CRC 3.1806). A trial court may exercise its discretion to accept a copy where the original document was lost or destroyed by ordering the clerk to cancel the copy instead (
Kahn v. Lasorda's Dugout, Inc.
(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1124);
(11) Where the plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury or wrongful death, they must serve a statement of damages on the defendant in the same manner as a summons (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.11, subd. (c), (d)).
(California Rules of Court rule 3.1800.)
Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(1), items are allowable as costs under Section 1032 if they are filing, motion, and jury fees.
A party who defaults only admits facts that are well-pleaded in the complaint or cross-complaint. (
Molen v. Friedman
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153-1154.) Thus, the complaint must state a claim for the requested relief.
Discussion
Service of the Complaint and Summons
According to the proof of service filed on October 31, 2023, Defendant was served on October 26, 2023 at 1718 N Las Palmas Avenue, Apartment 617, Los Angeles, California 90028, via personal service.
Non-Military Status
Alexander Baizer Carr avers to Defendants non-military status.
Summary of the Case
Plaintiff provides a brief summary of the case in the declaration of Roberta Galbreath. Plaintiff adequately pleads its cause of action in the Complaint.
Evidence of Damages
Code of Civil Procedure section 580 prohibits the entry of a default judgment in an amount in excess of that demanded in the complaint.
(
Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc.
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 286.) Moreover, a statement of damages cannot be relied upon to establish a plaintiff's monetary damages, except in cases of personal injury or wrongful death. (
Ibid
.) In all other cases, when recovering damages in a default judgment, the plaintiff is limited to the damages specified in the complaint. (
Ibid
.) Moreover, a plaintiff must submit admissible evidence supporting a prima facie case for the damages or other relief requested (
Johnson v. Stanhiser
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361-362.)
Roberta Galbreath is a custodian of records for Plaintiff. Galbreath avers that the submitted records showing the amount due on Defendants account with Plaintiff are contemporaneously recorded by a person with actual knowledge of the information in question and are true and accurate copies of Plaintiffs business records.
Interest
Plaintiff does not seek interest.
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements
Plaintiff includes a memorandum of costs in the submitted Form CIV-100. Alexander Baizer Carr avers that Plaintiff expended $503.50 in costs.
Attorneys Fees
Plaintiff does not seek attorneys fees.
Proposed Form of Judgment
Plaintiff has submitted a proposed form of judgment consistent with the foregoing.
Submission of the Written Agreement
California Rule of Court 3.1806 states that unless otherwise ordered judgment upon a written obligation to pay money requires a clerks note across the face of the writing that there has been a judgment. Here, Plaintiff has not submitted the original documents. The Court does not discern any practical need for such a clerks note on the written obligation in the current case and therefore orders that it need not be included. If this causes any issues for any party or non-party, they are authorized to bring the matter to the Courts attention.
Statement of Damages
Plaintiff does not need to submit a statement of damages because this is not a personal injury or wrongful death case.
