We are checking for the latest updates in this case. We will email you when the process is complete.

Nicholas Deraimo V. Kim Lettieri

Case Last Refreshed: 2 years ago

Deraimo, Nicholas, filed a(n) Landlord-Tenant - Property case represented by Riffkin, Mitchell S., against Lettieri, Kim, represented by Petrarca, Christopher, in the jurisdiction of Kent County, RI, . Kent County, RI Superior Courts with Mary E. McCaffrey presiding.

Case Details for Deraimo, Nicholas v. Lettieri, Kim

Judge

Mary E. McCaffrey

Filing Date

May 16, 2019

Category

Eviction - Nine (9) Day

Last Refreshed

February 05, 2022

Practice Area

Property

Filing Location

Kent County, RI

Matter Type

Landlord-Tenant

Case Outcome Type

Non-Trial Disposition

Parties for Deraimo, Nicholas v. Lettieri, Kim

Plaintiffs

Deraimo, Nicholas

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Riffkin, Mitchell S.

Defendants

Lettieri, Kim

Attorneys for Defendants

Petrarca, Christopher

Case Events for Deraimo, Nicholas v. Lettieri, Kim

Type Description
Docket Event Issued as Ordered
Docket Event Requested
Hearing Eviction Hearing
Hearing Concluded

Judge: McCaffrey, Mary E.

Docket Event of Appearance
Docket Event Entered
Docket Event and Counterclaim Filed
Docket Event Returned Served
Docket Event and Five (5) Day Demand Filed
Docket Event Issued
See all events

Related Content in Kent County

Case

Kaufman Associates, Inc. v. 3 Bruddahs LLC et al.
Jul 23, 2024 | Breach of Contract | KC-2024-0709

Case

New England Institute of Technology v. Wendy Palacio
Jul 23, 2024 | Book Account | KC-2024-0711

Case

RHODE ISLAND SHEET METAL, LLC v. BRIDGEVIEW CONSTRUCTION, INC
Jul 24, 2024 | Book Account | KC-2024-0714

Case

PCA ACQUISITIONS V, LLC v. Ronald Galloway
Jul 22, 2024 | Civil Action | KC-2024-0706

Case

Shoreham Bank v. Haris Autos LLC
Jul 17, 2024 | Civil Action | KC-2024-0685

Case

Mattye Dewhirst v. Kent County Mechanical LLC
Jul 24, 2024 | Breach of Contract | KC-2024-0712

Case

Oriana Sampson v. Derek Boucher
Jul 23, 2024 | Kevin F. McHugh | Injunctive Relief | KC-2024-0710

Ruling

Peter Leroy Miller vs Samuel Gabriel Long, III et al
Jul 26, 2024 | Judge Donna D. Geck | 23CV01649
Tentative not yet posted, please check again.

Ruling

Ford vs GreenHorn Golf, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company
Jul 26, 2024 | 23CV47102
23CV47102 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is on calendar for July 26, 2024. Defendant has requested a continuance of thirty days to obtain and analyze the relevant Parcel Map to determine if Plaintiff’s claims in the Reply are correct. The court finds there is good cause for Defendant’s request and grants the same. Accordingly, the matter is continued to August 30, 2024, at 9:00 am in Department 2. PG&E v DKM, LLC

Ruling

ATLANTIC MANAGEMENT, LLC VS LOS ANGELES CLINICA MEDICA GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.
Jul 26, 2024 | 23STCV28108
Case Number: 23STCV28108 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 26, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: Atlantic Management LLC v. Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc. CASE NO.: 23STCV28108 MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE MOVING PARTY : Defendant Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiff Atlantic Management, LLC CASE HISTORY : · 11/15/23: Complaint filed. · 05/21/24: Dismissal entered without prejudice as to all parties and all causes of action. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an unlawful detainer action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to timely vacate the premises after failing to exercise an option to renew or extend the commercial lease agreement between the parties. Defendant moves to consolidate this action with three other actions. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion to Consolidate is DENIED. DISCUSSION: Defendant to consolidate this action, Atlantic Management LLC v. Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc ., Case No. 23STCV28108, with two other unlawful detainer actions with the same title, Case Nos. 23STUD14911 and 24STCV11586, and with the civil action entitled Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center Inc. v. Atlantic Management LLC , Case No. 24STCV13007. Legal Standard for Consolidation When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay . (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048(a), bold emphasis added.) Requests for Judicial Notice Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Request for Dismissal in this action and (2) the Request for Dismissal in the identically titled action with Case No. 23STUD14911. Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) (court records). Procedural Requirements A motion to consolidate must satisfy the requirements of California Rules of Court Rule 3.350, which provides, in relevant part: (a) Requirements of motion (1) A notice of motion to consolidate must: (A) List all named parties in each case, the names of those who have appeared, and the names of their respective attorneys of record; (B) Contain the captions of all the cases sought to be consolidated, with the lowest numbered case shown first; and (C) Be filed in each case sought to be consolidated. (2) The motion to consolidate: (A) Is deemed a single motion for the purpose of determining the appropriate filing fee, but memorandums, declarations, and other supporting papers must be filed only in the lowest numbered case; (B) Must be served on all attorneys of record and all nonrepresented parties in all of the cases sought to be consolidated; and (C) Must have a proof of service filed as part of the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.350(a).) Under Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 3.3(g), cases must be related into the same department prior to consolidation. Defendant seeks to consolidate this action, Atlantic Management LLC v. Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center, Inc. , Case No. 23STCV28108, with two other unlawful detainer actions with the same title, Case Nos. 23STUD14911 and 24STCV11586, and with the civil action entitled Los Angeles Clinica Medica General Medical Center Inc. v. Atlantic Management LLC , Case No. 24STCV13007. The moving party has not listed the parties who have appeared in each case in the notice of motion, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(A). Defendant merely recites the abbreviated case names with docket numbers for each of the cases at issue. (See Notice of Motion pp.1-2.) The moving party also has not listed the names of the respective attorneys of record, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(A). The motion does not contain the captions of all the cases sought to be consolidated, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(B), nor has it been filed in any of the other actions as required by Rule 3.350(a)(1)(C). Further, Defendant has neglected to include a proof of service or provide any evidence that the motion was served on all attorneys of record and all nonrepresented parties in all cases, as required by Rule 3.350(a)(2)(B)-(C). Moreover, the other three actions have not been related into this department, as required by Local Rule 3.3(g). While the parties are identical across the three unlawful detainer actions and have retained the same counsel in all three cases, the civil action (Case No. 24STCV13007) names an additional party, Sergio Gutierrez, as a defendant, who is not accounted for in any of the papers. The Court therefore cannot find that Defendant has complied with the procedural requirements for a motion to consolidate. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Consolidate is DENIED. Moving Party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 26, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

Ruling

JENNY SILVA-ROLAND ET AL VS. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK ET AL
Jul 23, 2024 | CGC23607732
Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 23, 2024 line 2. DEFENDANT BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK , AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF CWHEQ REVOLVING HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2007-A, SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, LLC DEMURRER TO 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT is continued to September 13, 2024. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

AHLUWALIA, NIRMAL KUMAR vs KHACHO, ESAM - a)
Jul 24, 2024 | CV-22-003529
CV-22-003529 – AHLUWALIA, NIRMAL KUMAR vs KHACHO, ESAM - a) Plaintiffs’ Motion to be Relieved from Deemed Admissions (CCP 2033.300 (a)) - GRANTED, conditionally; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue or Dismiss Time-Barred Motion for Summary Judgment – MOOT. a) GRANTED, conditionally. The Court finds based on the totality of circumstances that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s cardiac condition, the medications for which Counsel states cause him to suffer drowsiness and severe head pain that adversely affect “his ability to think and reason” and negatively impacted his ability to timely respond to Defendant’s Requests for Admissions support a finding of excusable neglect by the Court in respect of said Request for Admissions. (Code of Civil Proc. § 2033.300; New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, rehearing denied, review denied). Defendant’s Requests for Admissions which were deemed admitted by the Court are accordingly hereby withdrawn. Plaintiffs are hereby granted leave to tender their proposed responses to said discovery instead. Plaintiff’s application is hereby granted subject to Defendant being granted leave to file an attorney fee motion in respect of Defendant’s pending motion for summary judgement. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2033.300 (c); Rhule v. WaveFront Tech., Inc., (2017) 8 Cal. App. 5th 1223). Furthermore, any discovery responses that remain outstanding on Plaintiff’s part shall be submitted to Defendant’s within fourteen 14 days of the date of this order. b) MOOT. In view of the Court’s ruling granting Plaintiffs relief from deemed admissions and granting them leave to file their proposed responses to Defendant’s Request for Admissions, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement, which is founded on said deemed admissions, is hereby rendered moot. Furthermore, the 30-day “cut-off” under CCP § 437c is measured from the trial date in effect when the summary judgment motion is made. Thus, a continuance of the initial trial date “reopens” the time for such motions. (Green v. Bristol Myers Co. (1988) 206 Cal.3d 604, 609; Soderberg v. McKinney (1996) 44 Cal.4th 1760, 1765; Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 10-C) THE COURT’S PHONE SYSTEM MAY BE DOWN. If you desire a hearing, you must email your request to civil.tentatives@stanct.org before 4:00 p.m. today. In addition, your email must list the email addresses of all counsel who will appear at the hearing. Please refer to the Stanislaus Superior Court website for call-in instructions for the hearing. If VCourt is unavailable the website will post Zoom Meeting credentials for Dept. 24. The hearing will proceed via Zoom if VCourt is still unavailable.

Ruling

JAIME SCHER, ET AL. VS CARLA DALHIENNE STANG, AN INDIVIDUAL, ET AL.
Jul 26, 2024 | 6/18/2022 | 23SMCV01463
Case Number: 23SMCV01463 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: I This is a motion to compel further by plaintiff. There are two more on the proverbial runway. The case is a real property case involving an easement. Plaintiffs contend that they own landlocked property and that they have the legal right to an easement across defendants property for access although the legal description has no easement. Plaintiff propounded written discovery on 11/22/23. Defendant requested a number of continuances and they were granted. Responses were filed, but plaintiff believed that they were not sufficient. During the meet and confer process, defendant requested additional time to respond to plaintiffs demands and supplement the responses. According to plaintiff, the seventh time defendant asked, plaintiff agreed on condition that it would be the last extension. Because defendant did not promise that there would be no further extensions, plaintiffs position is that the request was denied, and the instant motion was filed. Plaintiff raises a number of issues. First, plaintiff says that defendant interposed boilerplate objections, many of which were in bad faith. Further, defendant objected that certain documents were equally available to plaintiff, which is not a valid objection. As to others, defendant states that there will be compliance, but does not say when. As to some requests, there are objections concerning potential privilege, but no log. And as to others, defendant states that defendant is unable to comply but does not say why. Plaintiff seeks sanctions of $3460. Defendant states that supplemental responses have been served with the opposition (or thereabouts) so the motion is moot. Defendant states that the initial responses were fine, but the supplement just makes them better. Defendant also states that the documents that were promised have been produced. The court is not really thrilled with this motion. First, plaintiff is right about the objections: they are boilerplate. The court also generally agrees with plaintiff as to the equally available objection. Where the defense has possession, custody, or control of a document, it ought to be produced. That will eliminate any question of authenticity or whether the document was in fact shared between the parties. While that objection was not over-used here (it seems to have applied to one documenta settlement document), it is still not proper. The court will give the following order. The motion is GRANTED. Defendant will produce responses without objection other than privilege or an objection that is in good faith within 10 court days and the responsive documents as well. By a good faith objection, the court means one where counsel is willing to state under penalty of perjury that she or he has personally considered the objection, believes it has merit, and that it applies to the particular request. That is a step beyond what is usually required because the prior objections were in bad faith. If an objection other than privilege is raised, the response must state with precision what documents are not being produced due to the privilege. For example, if a request is objected to on the basis that it is not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because it is unbounded as to time, defendant must state where the temporal line is being drawn. For example, it would be proper to say Objection: not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence to the extent the request seeks documents created prior to January 1, 1995. Defendant will produce documents created on or after that date, but will not produce documents created prior to that date. Where an inability to comply is asserted, defendant must set forth the reason. The Code lists the reasons that can be listed, but it is improper to lest them all. Rather, defendant must list only those that apply. So if no documents ever existed, then defendant should say that rather than that no documents ever existed and defendant no longer has them and that they were destroyed. As to sanctions, the court will award sanctions for bringing the motion, but not for any reply. The court notes that the sanctions were not excessive. The court also notes that the documents should have been produced by the end of last year. Instead, defendant essentially unilaterally obtained a seven month extension based on poor responses. That is bad faith and an abuse of the discovery process. Sanctions are imposed as prayed against defendant, but not counsel, payable within 30 days. If defendant believes that the responses already given comply with the above, defendant can so state and stand on those objections. But if a further motion is brought and granted, the court will view it as a violation of this order and sanctions other than monetary may be on the table. For the parties aid, the court appends its guidelines on discovery responses, meet and confer, and IDCs. The court hopes that the motions set for August 2, 2024, will be withdrawn. The court notesand appreciatesthat the motion set for August 16, 2024, has been withdrawn, suggesting that the parties were able to work out their differences on that. So there is hope. DISCOVERY RELATED GUIDELINES FOR DEPARTMENT I The guidelines below are not rules and they are not universally applicable in all cases. Rather, they are guidelines as to the courts general views. Each case, of course, will be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and some of the guidelines below may not apply to particular circumstances. That said, the court does take these views seriously. Discovery Responses The court provides the following guidance concerning its general views on some common issues regarding responses to written objections. The court has noticed that many attorneys view objections and the manner of making them in a way different than does the court. To avoid these common pitfalls, the court offers the following in addition to the provisions of the Litigation Guidelines appended to the Los Angeles County Superior Court Local Rules. First , General Objections are not permitted. The Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for them, and therefore they are disregarded by the Court. Any response that incorporates the General Objections is improper by definition. Second , the court often views boilerplate objections as being in bad faith. A bad faith response is no response at all in the courts view. Therefore, making boilerplate objections does not preserve those objections nor does it constitute a good faith response to written discovery. A bad faith response is viewed by the court for what it is: bad faith. The objections will be stricken and deemed waived. In the context of a Request for Admission, such objections may lead to a finding that the request is deemed admitted, although that will depend on the facts of the particular case and the specific discovery at hand. Objections should be tailored to each specific request. If a request truly is overbroad, then an objection to that effect is proper. But such an objection is best accompanied by some reasonable limitation by the responding party that will narrow the request appropriately and (as narrowed) provide a substantive response rather than a mere statement that the request is overbroad. The same is true as to an objection that a request is unduly burdensome. The court also notes that the party asserting that a request is unduly burdensome has the obligation at some point to provide an evidentiary basis for the objection, including evidence as to what the burden of compliance would be. ( West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407.) Often such an objection will include a statement by the responding party as to a narrower request that would not be unduly burdensome and provide substantive responses as so limited. Objections that a request is vague and ambiguous should set forth the vague and ambiguous term as well as the responding partys reasonable interpretation of that term as well as a statement that, so interpreted, the response will provide the discovery requested. If there is no reasonable interpretation possible (which is a rare situation), then the responding party should so state. Objections as to privilege must set forth the basis explaining why the information sought is in fact privileged. Where a privilege is asserted in the context of a document request, a privilege log should accompany the answer or be provided within a short and reasonable time after the answer, and the log will serve as the explanation. Where the objection is made in the context of an interrogatory, it must be clear from the objection the scope of the information being withheld. If there is no log, there should be no privilege objection to a document request (meaning that a prophylactic privilege objection is the equivalent of no objection; it preserves nothing). There are some rare exceptions, such as where the entire point of the discovery is to get allegedly privileged information or where compliance would require a log that is in essence an index of counsels file. In that situation, the log is unnecessary, but the assertion should be made that the request is in that rare context. Third , if an objection is made to the discovery but a response is being given, it must be clear whether information or documents are in fact being withheld on the basis of the objections. If the objections are clear and done in the manner set forth above, with statements in the objection as to a narrowing that will make the request proper, this is usually a simple task. The objections themselves state the limit and the response will be full and complete as limited. But where the objections are not so clear, the response must clearly state whether any information or document is being withheld on the basis of the objection and, if so, the extent of the withholding. Accordingly, in those situations, phrases like Notwithstanding and subject to the foregoing objections, responding party states as follows are generally improper. Those sorts of phrases make the verification useless, as the verifier can always fall back on the objections as the reason why a document was not produced or information was not disclosed. On the other hand, where the line of demarcation is clear, the verification will still serve its purpose. Fourth , for document requests, the substantive response must conform to the Code of Civil Procedure. There are relatively tight rules as to what the response must say, and the response must say it. For example, where a responding party is not producing documents because they are not in the partys possession, custody, or control, the responding party must verify that a diligent search has been made and must further provide the information set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 in such cases. In the case of interrogatories, the responses must also conform to the Code of Civil Procedure and must be made after diligent inquiry. It is not proper to refuse to respond because the responding party has no personal knowledge. If the knowledge is hearsay, it must still be disclosed, although it can be qualified to make it clear that it is not based on the verifiers personal knowledge. Fifth , the court frowns on responses that do not conform to the foregoing rules being served with the view that the responses will moot themselves out in the meet and confer process. That is not how the process works. A good faith response is required before the meet and confer process begins. The meet and confer process will (hopefully) bridge the gaps between the parties respective positions. Further, where a response to a request for documents is made and documents are to be produced subject to certain objections (with the documents withheld properly delineated), the documents should be turned over irrespective of the meet and confer. The documents are to be produced with alacrity to the extent that there is no objection to them, but the court recognizes that there is often a lag between the date responses are served and the date that the documents are produced. What this means is that the response to a discovery request is not a trivial undertaking. Nabbing the response from the form file is a generally bad idea and can lead to all objections being waived. The point is that the boilerplate often renders the remainder of the response useless. The only exception is where it is clear that the substantive response is not in any way limited by the objections. In that case, the objections do no harm, although they also do no good. Meet and Confer The Code of Civil Procedure requires that before a motion to compel further responses or a motion for a protective order is filed, the parties engage in a good faith attempt to resolve their differences. They are to meet and confer for that purpose. Only if that effort fails can a motion be brought. Sadly, many litigants view the meet and confer process as just another procedural hoop through which they must jump in order to bring the motion, similar to the need to include an actual demurrer with the demurrer papers. The Code of Civil Procedure requires it, so they do it, but no ones heart is really in it. That is not sufficient. Given that, the court believes it appropriate to set forth how the court views the meet and confer requirement. Failure to abide by the guidelines below may well justify denial of the motion or a continuance of it to allow the process to take place. If one party but not the other refuses to participate as set forth, more likely than not the party refusing to participate will find itself on the losing end of the motion. The following quotation fairly sums up the courts own view. [W]e feel compelled to observe that resort to the courts easily could have been avoided here had both parties actually taken to heart Justice Stone's admonitions in Townsend that the statute requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. ( Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.) Perhaps after 11 years it is necessary to remind trial counsel and the bar once again that [a] rgument is not the same as informal negotiation ( id at p. 1437); that attempting informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent to persuade the objector of the error of his ways ( id. at p. 1435); and that a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel. . . . Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. ( Id. at p. 1439.) ( Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294, emphasis in original, parallel citations omitted.) In practical terms, it means as follows. It is entirely appropriate to begin the process with a letter or other correspondence. The letter should not include a demand in the form of an ultimatum, but it can certainly include the relief that is being sought with an invitation to meet and confer. It is also entirely appropriate for the other party to respond with a letter or other correspondence to set forth its position on the issues. Such an initial exchange can often be helpful to narrow the dispute or at least articulate plainly the boundaries. Whether further exchanges make sense will depend on each case and each dispute. However, at some point before impasse is reached the process must generally include an actual meet. The letters might well suffice to confer, but an exchange of correspondence is not a meeting. In the COVID-19 era, the meeting can be virtual or telephonic, but a meeting there should be. The meeting must be attended by a person from each side with the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission from anyone, including the client. If only the client can give the needed authority, then the client must be available instantaneously at all times during the meeting. This does not mean that one side or the other must concede, but it does mean that the people meeting have the ability in real and practical terms to strike a deal. The parties should approach the meet and confer process as a problem-solving exercise. The purpose of the meet and confer is not to convince the other side of the bankruptcy of its position; rather the purpose is to reach an agreement by which the party seeking discovery is able to obtain the information that it reasonably needs and the party providing discovery is not put to an undue burden or forced to provide unnecessary information that might infringe on a privacy interest or disclose a competitive trade secret or the like. At the conclusion of the meet and confer, the parties should have an agreed statement as to the outcome. If the outcome is a total impasse, then they should agree on that. If they have resolved some or all of their differences, then they should statein writingwhat that agreement is so that there will be no confusion later. Often, an agreement will be without prejudice to a further request by the propounding party for more information after that party receives the further responses. If a motion is still required, the declaration in support should describe with some detail the meet and confer process. While the court is not interested in the back and forth (and indeed describing it can be counter-productive), the court is interested in when the meeting took place, who was there, and how long it lasted. All communicationsin writing or oralmust be civil, polite, and professional. Name-calling and accusations are devices that undermine the process; they do not further it. A party engaging in such activity generally is not acting in a good faith effort to reach an agreement. Informal Discovery Conferences The court generally prefers an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) before any party files a motion to compel further responses, and the failure to use this avenue of resolution can greatly affect the amount of sanctions that might be awarded because sanctions are limited to fees that are reasonable and necessary. The goal of the IDC is to get to yes. To achieve that goal, the court adopts the following. Five court days before the IDC, the parties will submit a JOINT statement no more than eight pages total (on pleading paper, but excluding the caption page) setting forth their respective positions. Where a similar issue is raised that will resolve many requests, it can be dealt with as a single issue. The IDC follows the good faith meet and confer. It is not a substitute for the meet and confer. The courts time is to be spent only on issues after the parties have tried to narrow the dispute as much as possible. As stated above, the goal is to get to yes. This means a few things. One is that each party must be represented by a person who has the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission. It need not be lead counsel and that authority need not be exercised. But the people at the conference must have that authority. If only the client has that authority, then the client will be present physically with counsel in a adjacent room without distraction after initial introductions are made. All IDCs are off the record. That means that whatever anyone says at the IDC will not be binding or quoted back at the party unless an agreement is struck. It is very bad form to quote the courts comments at an IDC during a later hearing unless the comments were part of a stipulated order. All parties have the right to change position if no deal is reached. The court, for example, might strongly indicate that it believes one side or the other has the better position but rule in a completely different way if there is a formal motion. Partial agreements that are contingent upon a full resolution are not binding unless a full resolution is reached. Partial resolutions that are not contingent on a full resolution are binding. Parties who are suggesting a resolution should make it clear whether their proposal depends upon other resolutions. Parties should be especially willing to give up sanctions at an IDC if it will resolve the dispute. That is not a requirement, but the courts experience is such that if a party is really going to insist on a sanction, the likelihood of a resolution is very low. It is likely that no party will get everything that it wants. The goal is to abide the Code of Civil Procedure, but at the same time make sure that the party seeking discovery is not creating busy-work or demanding a lot of work for no benefit (or virtually no benefit). The responding party might well have the right (should it come to motion practice) to avoid some aspect of the discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the responding partys interest to be willing to offer something. Conversely, the propounding party might have the right (should it come to motion practice) to get some aspect of discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the propounding partys interest to forego aspects of the discovery that are not really needed, perhaps reserving the right to seek that information at a later time should it prove necessary. The point is not to have the court simply hammer away at the opponent. That might happen at a motion, but it is not the goal of the IDC. No orders will be made except on stipulation. However, if there is an agreement, the court may well want to make an appropriate order or ask the parties to confirm it in writing. Parties should take careful notes on any agreements. Because there are no Court Reporters, it is hard to put an agreement on the record. However, unless the agreement is confirmed quickly, people have a tendency to forget or to have buyers remorse. Therefore, it is best to have one party send an immediate confirming email to the other and obtain an agreement. The court would prefer not to get into the specific wording of the agreement during the IDC unless absolutely necessary. The IDC process does not work if people view it as just a necessary step to filing a motion. The court does not see it that wayif it did, then the court would abandon the IDC as a waste of time. Rather, this is an off-ramp to avoid motion practice and the attendant costs and time. Hopefully, it is also a way to get discovery more quickly than through formal motion practice. At the IDC, no matter how hot tempers have run in the past, the court expects all counsel to be polite and civil in tone to one another. The court will not tolerate rudeness or unnecessary accusations. They do not move the ball forward and they make it nigh impossible to reach an agreement.

Ruling

KURT GRIMES VS. RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC ET AL
Jul 25, 2024 | CGC23609026
Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 25, 2024 line 3. DEFENDANT U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, BUT SOLELEY AS TRUSTEE OF CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2018-B, RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT DEMURRER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT. SUSTAINED. The Court notes that Plaintiff's opposition brief is again oversized. This is the last time the Court will review any filings by the Plaintiff's or Plaintiff's counsel that violate procedural requirements. The Court further notes that this oversized opposition again fails to address or recognize multiple arguments and authorities raised in the moving papers. The Court striking Plaintiff's oversized opposition on March 12, 2024 did not result in Plaintiff complying with the rules or addressing the demurrer on the merits. The Court orders Plaintiff's counsel to prepare and present hard copies for execution at the hearing: (1) an Order reflecting the Court's ruling of March 12, 2024; and (2) an order reflecting the Court's ruling on this demurrer. Plaintiff is ordered to serve copies of these orders to the California State Bar forthwith and file a declaration of service with the Court no later than August 1, 2024. Demurrer to causes of action for Violation of CC 2923.6(c); Violation of 2923.7 and Violation of 2924.10 is sustained without leave to amend. CC 2920.5(c)(2)(C). Demurrer to the cause of action for violation of CC 2923.5 is sustained with final leave to amend for Plaintiff to allege an actionable claim arising out of failure to comply with CC 2923.5 in conjunction with the recordation of June 16, 2022 NOD on September 20, 2022. Plaintiff must clearly set forth a legally available remedy sought for such violation within the body of this cause of action. Demurrer to the cause of action for violation of CC2924.9 is sustained with leave to amend for Plaintiff to allege an actionable violation of CC 2924.9 in light of Foote v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Plaintiff must clearly set forth a legally available remedy sought for such violation within the body of this cause of action. Demurrer to the cause of action for negligence is sustained without leave to amend. Plaintiff fails to cite any valid authority to support this cause of action and fails to address Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 948. Demurrer to the causes of action for UCL violation and cancellation of instruments is sustained with leave to amend for Plaintiff to allege facts in support of each element of these causes of action. Defendant's request for judicial Notice is granted. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

VERONICA CHILDS VS ERICA ORTIZ, ET AL.
Jul 30, 2024 | 24CMCV00412
Case Number: 24CMCV00412 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: A 24CMCV00412 Veronica Childs v. Erica Ortiz, et al. Tuesday, July 30, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER TAKING OFF HEARING ON DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT Defendants filed their demurrer to the unlawful detainer complaint on April 5, 2024. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on July 9, 2024. The amended pleading supersedes the original complaint rendering the demurrer moot. ( Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1035 ["An amended pleading supplants (i.e., entirely replaces) the prior pleading and it, standing alone, contains all the plaintiff's allegations and requests for relief.].) Accordingly, the hearing on demurrer to the original complaint is taken off calendar.

Document

Regency East Apartments LLC vs Tasha Murrell, John Doe; Jane Doe
Jul 23, 2024 | Open | Eviction (UD) | Eviction (UD) | 05-CV-24-1269

Document

FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION V JOSEPH B CUMBERLAND
Apr 01, 2024 | 1ST CIRCUIT DIVISION 4 | LANDLORD/TENANT OTHER | LANDLORD/TENANT OTHER | 54CV-24-90

Document

CHRISTIAN PITTMAN V CECILEY NEAL
Apr 28, 2021 | HON. LATONYA HONORABLE - 5TH DIVISION 6TH CIRCUIT | LANDLORD/TENANT OTHER | LANDLORD/TENANT OTHER | 60CV-21-2636

Document

FLT Summit Park Apartments, LLC vs Heverth Grande Hernandez, Maria Mendoza Cuatro, John Doe, Mary Roe
Jul 25, 2024 | Open | Eviction (UD) | Eviction (UD) | 19AV-CV-24-2003

Document

Sartell MHP vs Joseph Campbell, Jessica Bengtson, Any known and unknown occupants, John Doe and Mary Roe
Jul 23, 2024 | Open | Eviction (UD) | Eviction (UD) | 73-CV-24-5721

Document

Ramsgate Apartments, LLC vs Britton Ormsby, John Doe, Mary Roe
Jul 24, 2024 | Open | Eviction (UD) | Eviction (UD) | 27-CV-HC-24-4995

Document

TCJ Storage Solutions and Commercial Suites, LLC vs Steven Swiatek
Jul 05, 2024 | Open | Eviction (UD) | Eviction (UD) | 05-CV-24-1286

Document

BANK OZK, ET AL V SABRINA MOQUETT, ET AL
Dec 10, 2021 | 12TH CIRCUIT DIVISION 6 | LANDLORD/TENANT OTHER | LANDLORD/TENANT OTHER | 66FCV-21-943