Bank Of America, N.A. Et Al V. Meussner

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 22, 2024 line 5. DEFENDANT ZACHARY HOWITT NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS ATTENDANCE AT DEPOSITION AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS Hearing Required. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 21STCV37556 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-26-24 Case #21STCV37556, Hamid Reza Mirshojae, et al. vs. 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd LLC, et al. Trial Date: N/A MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Hamid Reza Mirshojae and Woodland Hills Medical Clinic II, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd, LLC and Ahang Mirshojae RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiffs are requesting attorney fees in the amount of $ 619,675 , plus $17,036.01 in costs, from Defendants. RULING : Motion for attorney fees is granted at a reduced amount. No costs will be awarded at this time. SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Hamid) and Defendant Ahang Zarin Mirshojae (Ahang) were formerly married and were engaged in extensive litigation against each other prior to 2017. The assets in dispute were in excess of $20 million. At mediation, Hamid and Ahang entered a complex settlement agreement. Immediately after, Hamid alleges that Ahang breached the settlement agreement, and he was forced to incur attorney fees to enforce various terms of the agreement. Eventually, Hamid filed the current suit to enforce the settlement agreement on October 12, 2021. Ahang accused Hamid and his counsel of inducing her to sign the settlement agreement and sued him for $7 million in damages. This Court eventually struck Ahangs complaint based on Plaintiffs anti-SLAPP motion and determined that Ahang was a vexatious litigant. After this ruling, Ahang attempted to disqualify Hamids lead counsel, though that motion was rejected. Hamid alleges that he has incurred significant legal fees over the course of this litigation. Finally, after two years of litigation, the parties settled via a 998 Offer on November 17, 2023. The 998 Offer required Defendants to pay Plaintiffs $270,000 and reasonable fees and costs as determined by the Court. Plaintiffs are requesting attorney fees pursuant to the part of the 998 Offer that allows for reasonable fees to be paid. Plaintiffs are requesting $619,675 in attorney fees from Defendants. Plaintiffs argue in their motion that the attorney fees and hourly rates are reasonable. Plaintiffs evidence in support of their request for attorney fees included a declaration from their attorney, Christopher Beatty, and billing statements (with some redactions) that show which attorney worked on a task, what the task was, and how much time was spent on the task. (Beatty Decl., Ex. H.) The Beatty Declaration also includes a table which shows the hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on the case and their hourly rates at different times. (Beatty Decl., ¶ 35.) Christopher Beattys hourly rates were $950 (for 2.5 hours in 2021), $975 (for 19.2 hours in 2022), and $1,300 (for 1.5 hours in 2022 and 71.6 hours in 2023). Tami K. Sims hourly rate was $1,115 (for 83.4 hours in 2023). Trevor T. Garneys hourly rate was $955 (for 87.8 hours in 2023). Arron J. Paks hourly rate was $705 (for 277.3 hours in 2023). Minh-Van Dos hourly rates were $795 (for 0.5 hours in 2021) and $840 (for 76.1 hours in 2022). Benjamin Mandels hourly rate was $595 (for 89.6 hours in 2022). Finally, Scarlet Speakmores hourly rate was $350 (for 38.8 hours in 2022). The total lodestar was calculated by multiplying each of these attorneys hourly rate by their hours worked then adding them all together. The total hours worked for the attorneys totaled 748.3. The total lodestar amount, as previously noted, is $619,675. Plaintiffs have also requested costs in the amount $17,036.01. However, costs are awarded pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700. If Plaintiffs wish to request costs, Plaintiffs should file a memorandum of costs at the appropriate time. Defendants Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Keith M. Maziarek: Sustained: Entire Declaration (irrelevant), Paragraph 11 Overruled: None Plaintiffs Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of June D. Coleman and the Declaration of Raffi Kassabian: The individual evidentiary objections presented by Plaintiffs to these two declarations are not consecutively numbered. Typically, when written objections to evidence are filed, the written objection must be number consecutively. (See Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1354 (applies to written objections to evidence for summary judgment motions).) While Plaintiffs listed them by paragraph number from the declarations, this is not necessarily effective, because in some instances Plaintiffs objected to different sentences from the same paragraph and listed them separately with the same paragraph number. The Court will not rule on the individual evidentiary objections based on this procedural deficiency. Plaintiffs have objected to the entire Coleman Declaration on the basis that it is improper expert testimony because Coleman has not shown any special knowledge, skill, etc., related to billing for these types of cases pursuant to Evidence Code § 720. The Court has determined that Coleman has sufficiently demonstrated her special knowledge as a fee expert with this declaration and her recently submitted supplemental declaration. Plaintiffs objection to the entire Coleman Declaration is overruled. On April 9, 2024, a hearing was held on Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees. That same day, the Court issued a ruling on the submitted matter requesting that the parties submit additional briefing and that Plaintiffs submit invoices that do not redact the lawyers hourly rates or the amounts billed, along with supplemental points and authorities supporting their fee requests in light of that information. On May 24, 2024, Plaintiffs submitted their supplemental brief. In their brief, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should award standard hourly rates and that the fees sought for all tasks are reasonable. Plaintiffs submitted new billing records that still contain some redactions, but they do not redact the lawyers hourly rates or the amounts billed. On June 25, 2024, Defendants submitted their supplemental opposition brief. Defendants argue that the Court should significantly reduce the fees requested by Plaintiffs. Defendants also argue that the Court should consider Defendants expert declaration. Defendants also acknowledge that Plaintiffs conceded that the actual hourly rates and amounts billed are not privileged. ANALYSIS A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorneys fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a).) A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorneys fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit. ( Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.) Plaintiffs are the prevailing party by virtue of the fact that the parties settled in Plaintiffs favor via the 998 Offer. Plaintiffs have requested a total of $619,675 in attorney fees. Defendants previously opposed Plaintiffs motion on the basis that Plaintiffs agreed only to recover fees actually incurred and according to proof in the 998 Offer, and Defendants argued that Plaintiffs have not provided this proof. However, this argument was resolved with Plaintiffs supplemental brief, as Plaintiffs have now provided unredacted hourly rates and amounts billed. Plaintiffs attorney Christopher D. Beatty acknowledges in his supplemental declaration that the actual amount charged to the client was $543,156. (Beatty Supp. Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendants argue in their supplemental opposition that this should be the baseline from which any reductions in the requested amount should be made. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should only be able to recover fees actually incurred because that is what the 998 Offer between the parties allowed. (See San Dieguito Pship, L.P. v. San Dieguito River Valley Regl Open Spake Park Joint Powers Auth. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 910, disapproved on other grounds by PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084.) The Court agrees. Plaintiffs should only recover the fees actually incurred, which in this case is, at a maximum, $543,156. Next, Defendants contest the reasonableness of the fees incurred by Plaintiffs. In determining the reasonableness of fees, courts look to the factors from Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, disapproved on other grounds by Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68 n.5. The factors from Wollersheim are (1) the amount of money involved in the litigation; (2) the nature of the litigation and its difficulty and the intricacies and importance of the litigation; (3) the skill required and employed in handling the litigation, the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the case, and counsels education and experience in the particular type of work involved; (4) the attention given to the case; (5) the success of the attorneys efforts; and (6) the time consumed by the litigation. ( Id. ) Plaintiffs argued in the initial motion that they met all of these factors. First, Plaintiffs argue that large amounts of money were involved in this litigation because of Ahangs cross-complaint for $7 million and the fact that the original settlement agreement divided the parties assets that were valued in excess of $20 million. Next, for the second factor, Plaintiffs argue that the nature of this case was an emotional case between two ex-spouses and business partners with significant assets at issue, and Ahang had been determined by the Court to have engaged in fraud. For the third factor, Plaintiffs argued that this was a complex case that required an experienced legal team to handle it, and Beattys team were the logical ones to handle it because Beatty had handled the cases that led to the settlement agreement. For the fourth factor, Plaintiffs argued that their counsel had to devote significant attention to this case. For the fifth factor, Plaintiffs argued that their counsel had success throughout the case in prevailing on the anti-SLAPP motion and defeating the attempt to disqualify Beatty, as well as being the prevailing party for the 998 Offer. Finally, for the sixth factor, Plaintiffs argued that this case consumed considerable time and went on for two years and would have gone on much longer if Hamid had not accepted the 998 Offer. Defendants argue that the attorney fee award should be reduced as the hours billed are excessively unreasonable. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether. ( Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 990-991(citing Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635).) This Court previously acknowledged in its tentative ruling the apparent excessive billing for several of Plaintiffs motions: the Anti-SLAPP Motion (160.5 hours), Opposition to Motion to Disqualify (96.5 hours), Demurrer (90.2 hours), Motion for Attorney fees re Anti-SLAPP Motion (49 hours), and Motion to Quash Summons (38.6 hours). This Court also suggested reducing the time spent on those motions by 25%. Defendants argue that they should be reduced by at least 60% because they are beyond excessive. Other specific tasks that Defendants argue were excessively billed were the 4.0 hours for a half-page notice of continuance; 12.1 hours for a subpoena with 8 document requests; 14.7 hours spent on two identical subpoenas with 6 document requests; 22.3 hours spent on 3 page ex parte application and 2 page declaration to advance a hearing date; 18.3 hours preparing for and drafting a mediation brief; and 10.3 hours on generic case analysis over 48 entries. Defendants argue that the Court should also take into account all of these minor issues in awarding the attorney fees. Defendants also argue that the at least 209.5 hours spent in relation to the Anti-SLAPP motion was beyond excessive and should be reduced by more than 25%. Defendants cite a case where the Court of Appeal affirmed a reduction in attorney fees and costs related to an Anti-SLAPP motion from $112,288.63 to just $23,000, with the Court of Appeal stating that claiming 200 hours of work & seems excessive and that such a motion should not have been such a monumental undertaking. ( Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1248-1252.) Defendant Finally, Defendants argue that the Court should consider Defendants expert declaration because it would be admissible because the experts declaration included descriptions of her experience as a fee expert. (See Coleman Decl., ¶¶ 3-10, 14, and 15.) The Court previously sustained Plaintiffs objections to the Coleman Declaration, but in light of Defendants arguments and Colemans supplemental declaration, the Court will consider Colemans declaration. In light of all of the foregoing, the Court believes that some reduction of the requested fees is necessary. Both the previously indicated major issues and the minor issues that Defendants have brought to the attention of the Court should be reduced. The amount that the Court will start with is $543,156 in fees actually incurred. The Court previously considered reducing certain fees by 25%. Defendants request an across the board reduction of 60%, which would be $217,262 in fees awarded. Alternatively, Defendants request that the Court do an across the board reduction of 25%, since that percentage is what the Court previously found was appropriate. Based on both the major and minor issues with the billing records, the Court agrees that an across the board reduction is appropriate. The Court also finds that an across the board reduction of 25% is reasonable. That would make the fee award $407,367. The Court will award this amount. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that their attorneys hourly rates are rates are reasonable. Furthermore, this was a complex class requiring a lot of motion practice, particularly where the Anti-SLAPP motion is concerned. Plaintiffs have provided proof of the amount of time spent on the case through the now-unredacted billing statements. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees is granted in the amount of $407,367.00. Costs should be requested in a memorandum of costs. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 23STCV25637 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 29, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby, et al. CASE NO.: 23STCV25637 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendant Linda J. Maultsby, in pro per RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiff Mural Media LLC 401k Plan CASE HISTORY : · 10/20/23: Complaint filed. · 06/11/24: First Amended Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an unlawful detainer action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant refused to permit an inspection of her rental unit which was necessary for Plaintiff to complete a sale of the property to a third party. Defendant Linda J. Maultsby demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(c). The Court enters an interlocutory judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 597 that no trial of any other issues in this matter shall be had until final determination of the action titled Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby LASC Case No. 23STCV21301. // // DISCUSSION: Defendant Linda J. Maultsby demurs to the First Amended Complaint in its entirety. Legal Standard A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. ( Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. ( SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn, supra , 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. ( Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, [o]n demurrer, pleadings are read liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true].) This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant. ( Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) There is no meet and confer requirement for a demurrer in an action for unlawful detainer. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(d).) Requests for Judicial Notice Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) the Complaint in the action entitled Mural Media LLC 401k Plan v. Maultsby , LASC Case No. 23STCV21301 filed September 1, 2023 (hereafter, the First Action); (2) the First Amended Complaint in that same action filed March 14, 2024; (3) Defendants Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint in that action; (4) Defendants Request for Judicial Notice in support of her demurrer to that action; and (5) the Courts May 13, 2024 Ruling sustaining Defendants demurrer without leave to amend. Defendant also requests, in support of her reply, that the Court take judicial notice of this demurrer. Defendants requests are GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) (court records). Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Notice of Appeal filed on July 16, 2024 in the First Action. Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d) (court records). // Res Judicata & Abatement Defendant demurs to the First Amended Complaint on the grounds that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar any unlawful detainer claims grounded in the two Notices attached to the First Amended Complaint. However, although Defendant references the doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, her arguments only address claim preclusion, also known as res judicata. The Court therefore refuses to consider Defendants collateral estoppel contention and will confine its analysis to res judicata. In determining the validity of a res judicata plea, the questions to be resolved are (1) whether the claim decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one in the current action; (2) whether there was a final judgment on the merits in the previous adjudication; and (3) whether the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. ( Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Assn (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 813.) The First Action, filed on September 1, 2023, originally alleged a single cause of action for unlawful detainer premised on a Three-Day Notice to Quit allegedly served on August 24, 2023. Plaintiff then amended the complaint in the First Action to allege unlawful detainer based on (1) an August 24, 2023 Notice to Quit for failure to permit inspection of Defendants unit; and (2) a February 29, 2024 Three Day Notice to Quit following a foreclosure sale. The Court sustained Defendants Demurrer in the First Action without leave to amend on May 13, 2024, on the grounds that the August 24, 2023 notice was defective and could not be cured by the second notice. (Defendants RJN Exh. E.) In the meantime, Plaintiff filed this action on October 20, 2023, alleging a claim for unlawful detainer premised on an August 11, 2023 Three Day Notice to Quit and an August 24, 2023 Three Day Notice to Quit, both for failure to permit inspection of Defendants Unit. (Complaint ¶ 17, Exh. 2.) Only the August 24, 2023 Notice was attached to the original Complaint. ( Id. ) Thereafter, Plaintiff amended the Complaint to allege unlawful detainer based on (1) an August 24, 2023 Notice to Quit for failure to permit inspection of Defendants unit; and (2) a February 29, 2024 Three Day Notice to Quit following a foreclosure sale, though the text of the Amended Complaint states that the Three-Day Notice was actually given on March 1, 2024. (FAC ¶¶ 24, 28, Exhs. 2, 4.) Defendant forcefully argues that the First Amended Complaint in this action is asserting the same claims that were asserted in the First Action filed in September 2023, as both Amended Complaints assert two causes of unlawful detainer premised on the same Notices to Quit. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that res judicata cannot apply to bar Plaintiffs claims in this action for two reasons: (1) the judge in the First Action did not rule that the second February 29, 2024 Notice to Quit was deficient, instead ruling that the action could not be pursued for procedural reasons; and (2) the judgment in the First Action is not final, as Plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the ruling sustaining Defendants demurrer in that case. (Plaintiffs RJN Exh. 1.) Neither argument saves Plaintiffs action from demurrer. Contrary to Plaintiffs contentions, the Court in the First Action made a ruling on the merits of that action, sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissing the action. (Exh E, Minute Order in Case No. 23STCV21301, entered May 13, 2024, p. 3.) The bases for the Order were twofold. First, the Court held the first August 24, 2023 Notice to Quit constituted invalid notice because it failed to identify the real party in interest and could not provide a legally valid foundation for the unlawful detainer action. Second, the Court in the First Action found that the unlawful detainer action was fatally flawed in that it could not be grounded on a subsequent notice to quit served as a substitute for the prior defective notice. (Exh E, May 13, 2024 Minute Order in Case No. 23STCV21301, p. 3.) These are rulings invalidating the First Action on the merits because of its improper reliance on the two attached Notices to Quit. As these are the same Notices to Quit attached to the Complaint in this action, the prior ruling acts as a bar to re-litigation of these claims in this case. The Court finds greater force in Plaintiffs argument that finality is lacking. A judgment is not final for res judicata purposes until appeals have been exhausted or the time to appeal has expired. ( Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1171.) In reply, Defendant concedes that the judgment was not final, but argues that, in any event, the Court should abate this action pending resolution of that appeal because the First Action concerns the same issues. The Court concurs. A plea in abatement, without disputing the justness of plaintiff's claim, objects to the place, mode, or time of asserting it and requires pro hac vice that the judgment be given for the defendant, leaving it open to renew the suit in another place, or form, or at another time. ( V & P Trading Co. v. United Charter, LLC (2012) 212 Cal. App. 4th 126, 133 [citation omitted].) The proper mode of abatement in such a case is a stay of the action that may be lifted if and when the reason for abatement dissipates. ( People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 771 [Where abatement is required, the second action should be stayed, not dismissed.]; see also County of Santa Clara v. Escobar (2016) 244 Cal. App. 4th 555, 565 -568 [discussing supporting authorities].) Because the First Amended Complaint in this action raises the same issues regarding identical claims as the First Action, which remains pending, the Court will sustain Defendants demurrer without leave to amend pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(c) and enter an interlocutory judgment abating this case until final determination of the First Action. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(c). The Court enters an interlocutory judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 597 that no trial of any other issues in this matter shall be had until final determination of the action titled Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan v. Linda J. Maultsby LASC Case No. 23STCV21301. Moving Party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 29, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

CV-22-005039 – COUNTY OF STANISLAUS vs SHAIBI, YEHIA AHMED QASSEM – Plaintiff’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions and Monetary Sanctions Against Defendants Yehia Ahmed Qassem Shaibi, Trustee, and Fatima Kassim, Trustee, and/or their Counsel for Failure to Comply with Court Orders – MOOT, as settled by the parties. THE COURT’S PHONE SYSTEM MAY BE DOWN. If you desire a hearing, you must email your request to civil.tentatives@stanct.org before 4:00 p.m. today. In addition, your email must list the email addresses of all counsel who will appear at the hearing. Please refer to the Stanislaus Superior Court website for call-in instructions for the hearing. If VCourt is unavailable the website will post Zoom Meeting credentials for Dept. 24. The hearing will proceed via Zoom if VCourt is still unavailable.

HULL, ET AL. VS. THE CADLE COMPANY, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0200159 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions (“OSC”) issued on May 17, 2024, to Plaintiffs James Hull and Shirley Hull for failure to abide by California Rule of Court 3.110. Defendant Tri Counties Bank was amended into the Complaint on January 24, 2024. There has been no summons issued for Tri Counties Bank, and they have not been served. The matter is not at issue. No response to the OSC has been filed. Plaintiff remains in violation of CRC 3.110. Sanctions will be imposed in the amount of $250. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order of Sanctions. The Court confirms today’s review hearing set for 9:00 a.m.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 24, 2024 line 3. PLAINTIFF 1167 MISSION STREET, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND TO STRIKE IMAGE INTERIORS LLC'S ANSWER DUE TO SUSPENDED CORPORATE STATUS is OFF CALENDAR, moot. See July 10, 2023 Lee Declaration. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

S-CV-0050523 Patel, Ragini vs. Kaur, Manjit et al ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged Appearance required.

HULL, ET AL. VS. THE CADLE COMPANY, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0200159 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions (“OSC”) issued on May 17, 2024, to Plaintiffs James Hull and Shirley Hull for failure to abide by California Rule of Court 3.110. Defendant Tri Counties Bank was amended into the Complaint on January 24, 2024. There has been no summons issued for Tri Counties Bank, and they have not been served. The matter is not at issue. No response to the OSC has been filed. Plaintiff remains in violation of CRC 3.110. Sanctions will be imposed in the amount of $250. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order of Sanctions. The Court confirms today’s review hearing set for 9:00 a.m.