Lvnv Funding Llc Vs Simpson, Laurel

16CV02814 BARTEL v. CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF BARTEL’S MOTION TO TAX COSTS Given the parties representation that they are finalizing a stipulation, no tentative will be posted. Page 3 of 3

Motion For Leave to File Motion for Summary Adjudication by REAL BOBS LLC vs ORANGE COAST ADVANTAGE TITLE INSURANCE CVPS2101103 TITLE COMPANY COMPANY, ORANGE COAST TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling. A hearing will be conducted at 10:00 a.m.

Case Number: 24STCV08602 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING OREN BEN ELISHA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHRISTINA YING DONG, et al., Defendants. Case No: 24STCV08602 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Calendar Number: 5 Defendants Christina Ying Dong (Dong) and Sylmar Calvert LLC (Sylmar) (collectively, Defendants) move to expunge the notice of lis pendens currently recorded on the property located at 14401 Calvert Street, Van Nuys, California 91311 (the Property). Defendants additionally move for an award of attorneys fees. The Court GRANTS Defendants motion and ORDERS the expungement of Plaintiffs lis pendens on the Property. Background This case relates to failed negotiations between Plaintiffs Oren Ben Elisha and Yosef Ben Elisha (Plaintiffs) and Defendant Dong to purchase real property located at 14401 Calvert Street, Van Nuys, California 91311 (the Property) through Defendant Sylmar. On July 27, 2023, Dong entered into a purchase agreement to purchase the Property and opened escrow. (Dong Decl. ¶ 5.) In August of 2023, Dong offered Plaintiffs an opportunity to invest in an entity that would take title to the Property. (Dong Decl. 6.) On August 9, 2023, Dong filed the Articles of Organization for Sylmar for this purpose. (Dong Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. A.) The parties were scheduled to close escrow by February 28, 2024. (Dong Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs filed this action on April 5, 2024, raising claims for (1) resulting trust; (2) constructive trust; (3) specific performance; (4) quiet title; (5) accounting; (6) breach of contract; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; and (8) dissolution of partnership. Request for Judicial Notice The Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits 1 and 3 to Plaintiffs opposition as public records. The Court does not take notice of the truth of their contents. Evidentiary Objections The Court overrules Plaintiffs evidentiary objections. Legal Standard A party to an action who asserts a real property claim may record a notice of pendency of action in which that real property claim is alleged. The notice may be recorded in the office of the recorder of each county in which all or part of the real property is situated. The notice shall contain the names of all parties to the action and a description of the property affected by the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.20.) Except in actions subject to Section 405.6, the claimant shall, prior to recordation of the notice, cause a copy of the notice to be mailed, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to all known addresses of the parties to whom the real property claim is adverse and to all owners of record of the real property affected by the real property claim as shown by the latest county assessment roll. &. Immediately following recordation, a copy of the notice shall also be filed with the court in which the action is pending. Service shall also be made immediately and in the same manner upon each adverse party later joined in the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.22.) At any time after a notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party. . . with an interest in the real property affected thereby, may apply to the court in which the action is pending to expunge the notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §405.30.) A lis pendens may be expunged either (1) if the pleadings do not contain a real property claim, or (2) if the court finds that the party claiming the lis pendens has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 405.31, 405.32.) The party asserting the lis pendens has the burden of proof under Section 405.31 and Section 405.32.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 405.30) The burden is to demonstrate that their pleadings contain a real property claim and that the probable validity of their real property claim can be established by a preponderance of the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., §405.31; see also McKnight v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal. App. 3d 291, 298 [the burden is upon the recording party to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the action was commenced and prosecuted for a proper purpose and in good faith] .) Probable validity exists when it is more likely than not that the claimant will obtain a judgment on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.3.)¿ Any time after a notice of pendency of action has been recorded the court may also upon motion by any person with an interest in the property, require the claimant to give the moving party an undertaking as a condition of maintain the notice in the record title. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.34) Discussion Procedural Defects Any notice of pendency of action shall be void and invalid as to any adverse party or owner of record unless the requirements of Section 405.22 are met for that party or owner and a proof of service in the form and content specified in Section 1013a has been recorded with the notice of pendency of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.23.) Defendants contend that the lis pendens is subject to expungement under Code of Civil Procedure, section 405.23 because Plaintiffs did not immediately serve the notice on Defendants or file it with the Court. (Dong Decl., ¶¶ 20-21.) On July 9, following Defendants filing of this motion, Plaintiffs filed a notice of lis pendens with this Court and served the notice on Plaintiffs counsel. The notice requirement is intended to assure that property owners receive prompt notice of the recording of a lis pendens. ( Biddle v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 135, 137.) However, where a plaintiff substantially complies with the notice statute and promptly conveys actual notice to the affected party, the purpose of the statute is satisfied. ( Ibid .) In Biddle , the plaintiff filed a notice of lis pendens and mailed a copy to the defendant simultaneously, sent it to the wrong location and did not request a return receipt as required. ( Id . at pp. 136-137.) The court found that the plaintiff had substantially complied with the notice statute. ( Id . at p. 137.) Here, the delay was longer. Plaintiffs served the notice roughly three months after filing it. However, Defendants had actual notice, and the method of Plaintiffs eventual service was otherwise proper. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs substantially complied with the notice statute. Substantive Defects A lis pendens may be expunged either (1) if the pleadings do not contain a real property claim, or (2) if the court finds that the party claiming the lis pendens has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 405.31, 405.32.) Defendants contend that Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, accounting, and dissolution of partnership are not real property claims. Plaintiffs do not contest this. Plaintiffs rather contend that their claims for resulting trust, constructive trust, specific performance, and quiet title are real property claims that satisfy the test of probable validity. The Court first notes that Plaintiffs Complaint is exceedingly short, with the factual allegations comprising slightly over one page. The factual allegations themselves only contain general statements that the parties had worked together on real estate opportunities as partners in the past, and that Dong owed Plaintiffs fiduciary duties as a result; that Dong and Plaintiffs agreed to form a partnership to purchase the Property; that Plaintiffs were involved in the negotiation and diligence process; and that Dong then purchased the Property herself under Sylmars name. The Complaint alleges that this purchase breached the parties agreement, as well as Dongs alleged fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs. The Complaint does not expand on the terms of the parties agreement, what performance was obligated of each party, or whether it was oral or in writing. Further, the Complaint does not contain any allegations specific to each of the eight causes of action. Nor have Plaintiffs amended the Complaint in the three months since it was filed to fill out these allegations. Plaintiffs attempt to expand on the allegations of the Complaint in their opposition brief, stating that the reason the Complaint is so threadbare is because Plaintiffs were in a rush to file the lis pendens and thereby prevent Defendants from selling the Property. (Opposition at p. 12:10-12.) While that may be so, Plaintiffs are certainly not still in a rush three months later. Specific Performance To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must be able to establish (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. ( Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) If a breach of contract claim is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference. ( Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) In some circumstances, a plaintiff may also plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language. ( Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) To obtain specific performance after a breach of contract, a plaintiff must generally show: (1) the inadequacy of his legal remedy; (2) an underlying contract that is both reasonable and supported by adequate consideration; (3) the existence of a mutuality of remedies; (4) contractual terms which are sufficiently definite to enable the court to know what it is to enforce; and (5) a substantial similarity of the requested performance to that promised in the contract. ( Real Estate Analytics, LLC v. Vallas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 463, 472 [citation and quotation marks omitted].) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the statute of frauds with respect to the alleged contract. A contract coming within the statute of frauds is invalid unless it is memorialized by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's agent. ( Secrest v. Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2 (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 544, 552, citing Civ. Code, § 1624.) An agreement for the sale of real property or an interest in real property comes within the statute of frauds. ( Ibid , citing Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).) Although the parties dispute whether the alleged agreement was for the purchase of land, the Court assumes for the sake of the statute of frauds analysis that it is because the alternative would render Plaintiffs contract claims inappropriate for a lis pendens in any event. Here, Plaintiffs have not provided evidence of a writing memorializing the contract. Plaintiffs contend that a series of text messages sent between Dong and Yosef Ben Elisha memorialize the contract. Yosef Ben Elisha declares that the text messages state as follows: Dong: Hi Yossi, hope all is well. I made an appointment with Armin today to go to his office at 2pm. Thank you for introducing him and his firm. If you are still interested in the project. You are welcome to join me. Plaintiff Yosef Ben Elisha: Good morning Christina, I can follow up with you around 12pm to try to show up. I do have meeting that I will need to schedule to make it happen. I will let you know around 12pm. Dong: Thanks so much Yossi. Sorry for the late notice. Just decided to meet with him for final DD before closing :) Plaintiff Yosef Ben Elisha: Yes I will be there 2pm (Decl. Yosef Ben Elish ¶ 29 [emphasis in original].) There are two problems with Plaintiffs argument. First, these text messages hardly set forth the key terms of an agreement to purchase the Property. Second, [a]n electronic message of an ephemeral nature that is not designed to be retained or to create a permanent record, including, but not limited to, a text message or instant message format communication, is insufficient under this title to constitute a contract to convey real property, in the absence of a written confirmation& (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (d) [emphasis added].) The Court therefore concludes that the text messages that Plaintiff provides do not satisfy the statute of frauds. [F]ull performance takes a contract out of the statute of frauds has been limited to the situation where performance consisted of conveying property, rendering personal services, or doing something other than payment of money. ( Secrest , supra , 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 556.) Plaintiffs argue that the contract does not fall under the statute of frauds because they substantially performed. (Opposition at p. 14:5-10.) Plaintiffs contend that this substantial performance consisted of completing due diligence, meeting and communicating with the prior agent of the Property, communicating with the Propertys prior owner, communicating with the contamination specialist, communicating with prospective investors, retaining an architect, putting together cost estimates, and putting together a timeline of development. The problem with Plaintiffs argument is that full performance, not substantial performance, is required. Plaintiffs do not provide any allegations in the Complaint or arguments in their brief indicating what performance was actually required of them. The Court is not prepared to jump to the conclusion that the list of actions Plaintiffs provide constituted the full performance of Plaintiffs obligations under the alleged contract. The Court therefore finds that the statute of frauds is not satisfied. As a result, there Plaintiffs have not shown the probable validity of their claims for specific performance or breach of contract. Resulting Trust There are two problems with Plaintiffs resulting trust claim. First, [a] resulting trust does not arise from any oral agreement between the parties, but only as a result of the advancement of at least part of the consideration by the one claiming to be the beneficiary. ( Laing v. Laubach (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 511, 517.) Plaintiffs have failed to allege or provide a written agreement. Second, [a] resulting trust cannot be enforced in favor of a person who has paid part of the consideration for the transfer of property unless it is possible to clearly establish the amount of money contributed by him [or her] or the proportion of his [or her] contribution to the whole purchase price &. One who claims a resulting trust in land must establish clearly, convincingly and unambiguously, the precise amount or proportion of the consideration furnished by him [or her] &. If the claimant does not, then the presumption of ownership arising from the legal title is not overcome and a resulting trust will not be declared. ( Lloyds Bank California v. Wells Fargo Bank (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1038, 10441045 [citations and quotation marks omitted].) Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that they paid any of the consideration for the Property, let alone part of it. For both of these reasons, Plaintiffs have not shown the probable validity of their claim for resulting trust. Constructive Trust [A] constructive trust may only be imposed where the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the existence of a res (property or some interest in property); (2) the right of a complaining party to that res; and (3) some wrongful acquisition or detention of the res by another party who is not entitled to it. ( Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 980, 990.) As discussed above, Plaintiffs have not provided evidence of a contract giving them a right to the Property. Plaintiffs have not pled or argued a different basis for such a right, either. As a result, Plaintiffs have not shown that they can satisfy the second element, and therefore have not shown the probable validity of this claim. Quiet Title Code of Civil Procedure, section 761.020 sets forth the requirements for an action for quiet title: The complaint shall be verified and shall include all of the following: (a) A description of the property that is the subject of the action. In the case of tangible personal property, the description shall include its usual location. In the case of real property, the description shall include both its legal description and its street address or common designation, if any. (b) The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title. If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession. (c) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought. (d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought. (e) A prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) There are several problems. First, the Complaint is not verified. Second, at its most generous reading, the Complaint alleges that the parties formed a contract to purchase the Property together but as discussed above, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the statute of frauds with respect to this contract, and therefore cannot show the basis for their title to the Property. For both of these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established the probable validity of their quiet title claim. Conclusion Plaintiffs have failed to show the probable validity of any of their claims sounding in real property. The Court therefore grants Defendants motion and orders the expungement of Plaintiffs lis pendens on the Property.

Case Number: 19SMCV00535 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 EDWIN SOLORZANO, an individual and in the right of and for the benefit of WHOLESALE DIRECT METALS, a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. WHOLESALE DIRECT METALS, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 19SMCV00535 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT EDWIN SOLORZANOS MOTION TO USE A SETTLED STATEMENT BACKGROUND This case arises from a dispute among shareholders of a closely held corporation called Wholesale Direct Metals (WDM). Damon Geller (Mr. Geller) formed WDM. Defendant Niloofar Maashfegh Geller (Mrs. Geller) is Damons wife. WDM sells precious metals in coins and bullion form to the public. It advertises its offerings primarily on the Internet. WDMs orders are typically paid for with wire transfers, checks, or other form of payment by the customers, after which WDM either dropships metals from a distributor directly to the customer or takes possession of gold and silver from customers at the office. In March 2018, Plaintiff Edwin Solorzano invested $100,000 in exchange for 125 shares of WDM, becoming a minority shareholder. Plaintiff became a director of WDM and the President. Plaintiff continues to hold these positions today. Plaintiff (and other WDM shareholders) had a history of disputes with Mr. Geller about his alleged mismanagement of WDM, including the setting and payment of Mr. Gellers compensation. On April 24, 2018, Plaintiff and WDM entered into a Redemption Agreement whereby: (1) Mr. Geller sold all of his shares back to WDM, (2) Mr. Geller paid WDM $170,000 to resolve the disputes regarding his management of WDM and in exchange for the releases granted to him by WDM, and (3) Plaintiff and WDM broadly and fully released Mr. Geller, Mrs. Geller, and their heirs, beneficiaries, and assigns (the Geller Releasors) from any and all claims, whether or not concealed or hidden, from the beginning of time through April 2018. The Redemption Agreement included a waiver under Code Civ. Proc. § 1542. Less than a year after the Redemption Agreement was signed, in March 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Mrs. Geller and others, alleging they embezzled at least $9.65 million. Plaintiff alleges they did so by buying metals for non-existent customers, billing the cost of those metals to the company as promotional, and then physically stealing the metal. Plaintiff also alleges the theft included the payment of unauthorized salaries, unauthorized sham loans, payment of personal expenses with company funds, and other payments to defendants for no ascertainable reason. Based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff sought and received a writ of possession, allowing him to enter Mrs. Gellers home and seize gold from her safe. Plaintiff seized 60 one-ounce Canadian Maple Leaf gold coins. The Court ultimately granted a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Redemption Agreement. On September 14, 2023, the Court confirmed the arbitrators Final Award in favor of Adam Gruen, Amanda Gruen, and Mrs. Geller on all claims made against them by Plaintiff and WDM. On October 6, 2023, Mrs. Geller filed a Motion for an Order for Release and Redelivery of Seized Property, for Damages and Interest, and for Attorneys Fees and Costs (the Release Motion). Mrs. Geller argued she was entitled to a release and redelivery and for damages sustained as a result of the seizure because Plaintiff did not recover a judgment against her. Mrs. Geller also sought to recover attorneys fees and costs associated with this motion and her prior motion to quash the writ of possession pursuant to the attorneys fees provision in the Redemption Agreement and Cal. Civ. Code § 1717. Plaintiff filed an opposition to that motion on October 23, 2023, and Mrs. Geller filed a reply on October 27, 2023. On November 3, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Release Motion. The same day, on November 3, 2023, Plaintiff appealed the Courts order on the Release Motion. On December 14, 2023, the Court entered judgment based on the final arbitration award. On December 18, 2023, Plaintiff appealed the judgment. On May 20, 2024, the clerk filed a Notice to Appellant of Proceedings Not Reported or Recorded, notifying the parties that Plaintiffs choice of oral record (i.e., a court reporters transcript) of the hearing on the Release Motion on November 3, 2023, was not available because the Minute Order from that hearing stated that a court reporter was not present at the hearing or trial. Therefore, the Civil Appeals Unit will not notify any court reporter(s) to prepare transcripts for that hearing. On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Appellants Motion to Use a Settled Statement only for the Release Motion hearing on November 3, 2023. On June 14, 2024, the Court issued a Nunc Pro Tunc Order Re: Minute Order dated 03/05/2020. On March 5, 2020, the Court entered a minute order stating that no Certified Shorthand Reporter (CSR) was present. The nunc pro tunc order corrected that minute order by striking CSR: None and adding (among other things) CSR: Marie L. Strickland, CSR #4645. However, the Court has not issued any nunc pro tunc order changing its statement that there was no CSR at the Release Motion hearing on November 3, 2023. On July 2, 2024, Mrs. Geller filed her opposition to the motion to use a settled statement for the Release Motion hearing. On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed his reply. MOTION TO USE SETTLED STATEMENT Except as otherwise provided in the California Rules of Court, the record on an appeal in a civil case must contain a record of written documents (rule 8.120(a)) and a record of the oral proceedings (rule 8.120(b)). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120.) If an appellant intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court, the record on appeal must include a record of these oral proceedings in the form of one of the following: (1) A reporters transcript under rule 8.130; (2) An agreed statement under rule 8.134; or (3) A settled statement under rule 8.137. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.120(b); 8.137(a) [A settled statement is a summary of the superior court proceedings approved by the superior court].) If any portion of the designated proceedings cannot be transcribed, the superior court clerk must so notify the designating party in writing; the notice must show the date it was sent. The party may then substitute an agreed or settled statement for that portion of the designated proceedings by complying with either (A) or (B): (A) Within 10 days after the notice is sent, the party may file in superior court, under rule 8.134, an agreed statement or a stipulation that the parties are attempting to agree on a statement. If the party files a stipulation, within 30 days thereafter the party must file the agreed statement, move to use a settled statement under rule 8.137, or proceed without such a statement; or (B) Within 10 days after the notice is sent, the party may move in superior court to use a settled statement . If the court grants the motion, the statement must be served, filed, and settled as rule 8.137 provides, but the order granting the motion must fix the times for doing so. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.130(h)(1) [emphasis added].) Here, Plaintiff moves to use a settled statement for the Release Motion hearing on November 3, 2023. In opposition, Mrs. Geller argues the motion is procedurally defective because Plaintiff did not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.137. According to Mrs. Geller, that rule required Plaintiff to, among other things, elect in his notice his intent to use a settled statement as the superior courts proceedings. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(b)(1) [An appellant may elect in his or her notice designating the record on appeal under rule 8.121 to use a settled statement as the record of the oral proceedings in the superior court without filing a motion under (2) if: ¶ (A) The designated oral proceedings in the superior court were not reported by a court reporter; or ¶ (B) The appellant has an order waiving his or her court fees and costs].) Mrs. Geller further argues that even if Plaintiff had elected to use a settled statement at the time, they were required to serve and file a proposed statement within 30 days of filing the Notices (i.e. by March 28, 2024). (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.137(c)(1) [If the respondent does not file a notice under (b)(4)(A) electing to provide a reporters transcript in lieu of proceeding with a settled statement, the appellant must serve and file a proposed statement in superior court within 30 days after filing its notice under (b)(1) or within 30 days after the superior court clerk sends, or a party serves, an order granting a motion under (b)(2)].) Mrs. Geller is technically correct to suggest that to the extent Plaintiff knew there was no court reporter at the hearing on the Release Motion on November 3, 2023, Plaintiff was required to elect in his notice of appeal his intent to use a settled statement pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.137(b)(1). Plaintiff did not. Instead, he requested a court reporters transcript of the hearing even though the Courts minute order for that hearing stated: CSR: None. Nevertheless, as Plaintiff argues in their reply, California Rules of Court, rule 8.130(h)(1) (see above) states that (1) if a superior court clerk notifies a party that a portion of a proceeding cannot be transcribed, (2) the clerk must notify the designating party in writing, and (3) within 10 days after that notice is sent, the designating party may move the trial court for an order to use a settled statement. Here, the clerk notified the parties on May 20, 2024, that the hearing on the Release Motion (which took place on November 3, 2023) could not be transcribed because a court reporter was not present at the hearing. Within 10 days of that notice, on May 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to use a settled statement for the Release Motion hearing. Therefore, the motion is timely and proper under rule 8.130(h)(1). Accordingly, the Court finds it proper to grant the motion pursuant to rule 8.130(h)(1). If the court grants the motion, the statement must be served, filed, and settled as rule 8.137 provides, but the order granting the motion must fix the times for doing so. ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.130(h)(1)(B).) Accordingly, the Court shall set a time frame for filing the proposed statement and other related documents pursuant to rule 8.137. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Use a Settled Statement. Plaintiff / Appellant Edwin Solorzano shall file a proposed statement within 30 days of this ruling. The contents of the proposed statement must adhere to California Rules of Court, rule 8.137(d). Defendant/Respondent Niloofar Maashfegh Geller shall file her response to the proposed statement within 20 days after service of the proposed statement in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.137(e). All subsequent procedures shall follow California Rules of Court, rule 8.137. DATED: July 18, 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: BC665850 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING CARLOS FELIX , vs. JOSE SOMARRIBA . Case No.: BC665850 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Plaintiffs Carlos Felixs unopposed motion to vacate the entry of dismissal entered by this Court on May 21, 2018, and enter the Stipulated Judgment executed by parties on April 16, 2018, is granted. Plaintiff is entitled to an order entering Judgment against Defendant Jose Somarriba in the amount of $90,00.000 with credit for any sums paid to Plaintiff pursuant to the Settlement Agreement dated April 16, 2018. This Court retains jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to C.C.P. §664.6. Plaintiff Carlos Felix (Felix) (Plaintiff) moves unopposed for this Court to vacate the dismissal entered on May 21, 2018, and enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the Stipulated Judgment executed between Plaintiff and Defendant Jose Somarriba (Somarriba) (Defendant) in April 2018. (Notice of Motion, pg. 1.) Background On June 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendant seeking damages for breach of contract and common counts. The parties settled pursuant to a Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Judgment executed on April 16, 2018, and a request for dismissal was filed on May 21, 2018, which provided for monthly payments of $500, with a balloon payment to conclude the matter. (Decl. of Ciaccio ¶¶3-4, Exhs. A, B.) The Settlement Agreement, Stipulated Judgment, and Request for Dismissal indicated this Court would retain jurisdiction pursuant to C.C.P. §664.6. (Decl. of Ciaccio ¶4, Exh. B.) Defendant made payments pursuant to the settlement agreement until June 2023, when he began making payments which were returned for insufficient funds and in July 2023 he stopped making payments altogether. (Decl. of Felix ¶1.) On February 23, 2024, a demand was made on Defendant to bring his account current or otherwise judgment would be entered in the amount of $90,000 pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Judgment without offset payments received. (Decl. of Ciaccio ¶7, Exh. D.) Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Defendant was given 10 days to cure the default, which he has failed to do. ( See Decl. of Ciaccio ¶¶3, 7, Exhs. A, D.) Plaintiff filed the instant motion on May 16, 2024. As of the date of this hearing no opposition has been filed. Motion to Enforce Settlement C.C.P. §664.6 provides, as follows: If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. Plaintiff submitted evidence Plaintiff and Defendant entered into the Settlement Agreement , which was signed by both parties on April 16, 2018, and provided for this Court to retain jurisdiction pursuant to C.C.P. §664.6. (Decl. of Ciaccio ¶3 , Exh. A.) Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, In the event that either (a) the past due Deferred Payment is not paid within the ten (10) business day Cure Period, or (b) FELIX has to resort to the Notice Procedure on three (3) or more occasions by virtue of three (3) or more Defaults, then an Uncured Default shall exist and FELIX shall be entitled to file the stipulation to entry of judgment in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A (the Stipulation to Entry of Judgment), and to enter judgment in the form attached as Exhibit B (the Judgment), in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation for Judgment set forth below in paragraph 4 of this Agreement. (Decl. of Ciaccio ¶3 , Exh. A at §3.) Defendant failed to cure his default during the ten-day cure period; no payment has been received as of March 11, 2024. (Decl. of Ciaccio ¶7.) Accordingly, the request for dismissal entered by this Court on May 21, 2018, is vacated. Plaintiff is entitled to an order entering the Stipulated Judgment in the amount of $90,000.00 against Defendant, with credit for any sums paid to Plaintiff pursuant to the Settlement Agreement dated April 16, 2018. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs unopposed motion to vacate the entry of dismissal entered by this Court on May 21, 2018, and enter the Stipulated Judgment executed by parties on April 16, 2018, is granted. Conclusion Plaintiffs unopposed motion to vacate the entry of dismissal entered by this Court on May 21, 2018, and enter the Stipulated Judgment executed by parties on April 16, 2018, is granted. Plaintiff is entitled to an order entering Judgment against Defendant in the amount of $90,00.000 with credit for any sums paid to Plaintiff pursuant to the Settlement Agreement dated April 16, 2018. This Court retains jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to C.C.P. §664.6. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24TRCV00223 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B TONY BARBARINI, Plaintiff, Case No.: 24TRCV00223 vs. [Tentative] RULING AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Defendant. Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Responding Party: Plaintiff Tony Barbarini (1) Demurrer to First Amended Complaint (2) Motion to Strike The Court considered the moving and opposition papers. RULING The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fifth cause of action in the FAC. The motion to strike is DENIED. Defendant is ordered to file an answer within twenty days. BACKGROUND On January 23, 2024, Tony Barbarini filed a complaint against American Honda Motor Co., Inc. for (1) violation of Civil Code §1793.2(d), (2) violation of Civil Code §1793.2(b); (3) violation of Civil Code §1793.2(a)(3); (4) breach of implied warranty of merchantability; and (5) fraudulent inducement concealment. On April 24, 2024, plaintiff filed a FAC. LEGAL AUTHORITY Demurrer When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228. A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747. Strike The court may, upon a motion . . . , or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP §436(b). CCP §431.10 states: (a) A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense. (b) An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following: (1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense. (2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense. (3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint. (c) An immaterial allegation means irrelevant matter as that term is used in Section 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP §437. DISCUSSION Demurrer Defendant American Honda demurs to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment in the FAC on the ground that it fails to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. The FAC alleges that on March 5, 2022, plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with defendant Honda regarding a 2022 Honda Accord. FAC, ¶6. The warranty contract contained various warranties, including bumper-to-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty, emission warranty. Id., ¶7. 5 th cause of action for fraudulent inducement - concealment The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of fact. Hambridge v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162 (citation omitted). [T]o establish fraud through nondisclosure or concealment of facts, it is necessary to show the defendant was under a legal duty to disclose them. OCM Principal Opportunities Fund v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal. App. 4th 835, 845. Nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud when: (1) there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties; (2) the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal. App. 4th 803, 831. Rules of specifically pleading how, when, where, to whom, and by what means, misrepresentations were communicated, is intended to apply to affirmative misrepresentations, and not to concealment. See Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1384. Under this cause of action, the FAC alleges that the subject vehicle contains a defective computerized driver-assisting safety system, which includes adaptive cruise control, lane departure warnings and steering inputs, and autonomous braking (meant to avoid front-end collisions by detecting vehicle speed and the speed of other vehicles and objects on the road and can automatically deploy the brakes to avoid a front-end collision). Honda calls this computerized driver-assisting safety system, Honda Sensing. It relies on a radar sensor, an interior camera, along with computers and other technology. The autonomous braking system within Honda Sensing is called Collision Mitigation Braking System (or CMBS). FAC, ¶64. The Sensing system suffers from a defect that causes the various subsystems within it to malfunction dangerously while the vehicles are driven. This defect impedes the systems ability to reliably and accurately detect and appropriately respond to conditions on the roadway, causing malfunctions of the adaptive cruise control, the lane-departure system, and CMBS. Id., ¶65. As a result of the Sensing defect, Honda vehicles brake abruptly even though there is nothing around that risks a collision, warning lights display without explanation, brakes deploy seemingly randomly, and parts of the system malfunction. These malfunctions pose a safety risk. Additionally, the speed of the vehicle may abruptly change and warnings may distract the driver. Id., ¶66. Hondas response has been that no repairs are available. Id., ¶67. Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to plead that it concealed or suppressed a material fact regarding the Sensing Defect that plaintiff relied on in purchasing the subject vehicle. Also, defendant argues, plaintiff failed to establish a duty to disclose, as no fiduciary relationship exists, and defendant did not have exclusive knowledge nor engage in active concealment. Defendant further argues that plaintiff fails to plead defendants intent to deceive plaintiff. Also, defendant contends, plaintiff cannot plausibly claim to be unaware of the concealed fact as the operative facts underlying the alleged sensing defect were publicly available through multiple sources. Defendant further asserts that the claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine. In opposition, plaintiff argues that they have pled all the elements sufficiently. They also argue, citing to Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. , that the economic loss rule does not bar the claim and arises from conduct wholly distinct from Song-Beverly Act violations. Plaintiffs further contend that the Sensing defect is a material fact, which poses safety risks. Also, plaintiffs assert, defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts. Plaintiffs further argue that a transactional relationship is not required under California law for the manufacturer to have a duty to disclose. The Court rules as follows: The Court finds that the allegations are sufficient to support the elements at the pleading stage for fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff alleges that defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact. See FAC, ¶¶72, 75, 82, 83. Plaintiff alleges that defendant had a duty to disclose the fact. See FAC, ¶81. See OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal. App. 4 th 835, 859 (Under California law, a vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers, but also to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold.); see also Khan v. Shiley Inc. (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 848, 858 ([A] manufacturer of a product may be liable for fraud when it conceals material product information from potential users.). Plaintiff alleges that defendant intentionally concealed the fact with an intent to defraud. See FAC, ¶82. The Court can infer that defendant placed the vehicle into the stream of commerce, presumably for profit. Plaintiff was unaware of the fact and he would not have purchased the vehicle, had he known of such defects and sustained damages. See FAC, ¶84. The Court also finds that the economic loss rule does not bar the cause of action. [W]here a purchasers expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he bought is not working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he has suffered only 'economic' losses.' This doctrine hinges on a distinction drawn between transactions involving the sale of goods for commercial purposes where economic expectations are protected by commercial and contract law, and those involving the sale of defective products to individual consumers who are injured in a manner which has traditionally been remedied by resort to the law of torts. The economic loss rule requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise. Quite simply, the economic loss rule 'prevent[s] the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988 (citations omitted). [W]hen one party commits a fraud during the contract formation or performance, the injured party may recover in both contract and tort. Harris v. Atlantic Richfield (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4 th 70, 78 (citation omitted). See also Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal. 4 th 543, 552 (Tort damages have been permitted in contract cases where . . . the contract was fraudulently induced. . . . The duty that gives rise to tort liability is either completely independent of the contract or arises from conduct which is both intentional and intended to harm.) (citations omitted) and Fassberg Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4 th 720, 757 (A plaintiff seeking to recover damages for economic loss caused by fraud must show that the plaintiff actually relied on the defendants misrepresentation or nondisclosure, that the reliance was reasonable, and that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result.) (citations omitted). Thus, tort damages are permitted in contract cases where the contract has been fraudulently induced, which is what plaintiff alleges. Plaintiff alleges that had the true facts been disclosed, he would not have entered into the contract at all, which is not the same as a mere breach of contract. Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED. Motion to Strike Defendant requests that the Court strike prayer for punitive damages. The motion is DENIED in light of the ruling on the demurrer to the fraudulent concealment cause of action. ORDER The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent concealment in the FAC. The motion to strike is DENIED. The Court orders Plaintiff to keep time records that correctly note time spend on non-Song-Beverly claims, such as this demurrer that attacks only the non Song Beverly claim, as potential attorneys fees may not be awarded for claims for which there is no right to an award of attorneys fees. Therefore, the Court expects that the time records shall be kept so that such time may b properly identified. Defendant is ordered to file an answer within twenty days. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of ruling.

Case Number: 19STCV45113 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 78 Superior Court of California ¿ County of Los Angeles ¿ Department 78 ¿ ¿ PURUSHOTTAM PATEL , Plaintiff (s) , vs. PAYROLL SERVICES, INC. , et al., Defendant ( s ) . Case No.:¿ 19STCV45113 Hearing Date:¿ July 1 6 , 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION Plaintiff Purushottam Patel (Plaintiff) filed a Fifth Amended Complaint against defendants Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, Travelers Property Casualty Agency, Auto Data Processing, Inc., ADP Payroll Services, Inc., Automatic Data Processing Insurance Agency, Inc., Automatic Data Processing, Inc., ADP, Inc. and Does 1 to 1000 breach of contract arising from the cancellation from an insurance policy. On January 12, 2024, trial was continued to May 6, 2024, subject to the following : All discovery and motion cutoff dates remain based on the 3/18/2024 trial date except as follows the cutoff dates for which shall be based on the new trial date: (1) expert discovery; (2) motions regarding expert discovery; (3) fact discovery based upon information learned as a result of discovery obtained through timely filed motions to compel based on the 3/18/2024 trial date; (4) motions to compel discovery related to items covered by #3; and (5) motions in limine . (Min. Order, Jan. 12, 2024.) On March 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel the deposition of the Person Most Qualified (PMQ) of Automatic Data Processing Insurance Agency, Inc . and filed an application ex parte on April 2, 2024 to shorten time to advance the hearing date. On April 4, 2024, the Court denied Plaintiffs ex parte application , while also noting that Plaintiffs motions to compel filed on March 26, 2024 were not timely filed per the January 12, 2024 Order. (Min. Order, April 4, 2024.) Defendants ADP, Inc. f/k/a ADP, LLC and Automatic Data Processing Insurance Agency, Inc . s joint opposition provide that their counsel called Plaintiffs counsel requesting the motions be taken off-calendar, and that Plaintiffs counsel stated he would look into it . (Rojas Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff has not taken the instant motion off-calendar. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion to compel deposition and production of documents is DENIED . The Court further notes that aside from the instant motion, there are two other motions to compel set for July 18, 2024 and July 22, 2024. Plaintiff is to review the Courts prior orders, and to promptly take these motions off-calendar , unless it falls within one of the specific exceptions outlined in the January 12, 2024 Order . Moving Party is ordered to give notice . DATED: July 1 5 , 2024 __________________________ Hon. Michelle C. Kim Judge of the Superior Court PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: " Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. " If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line SUBMIT followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsels contact information, and the identity of the party submitting . " Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. " If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.

Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Friday, July 19, 2024, line 3, DEFENDANT MSASA PROPERTIES, LLC'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING PROPERTIES OWNED PROPERTIES BOUGHT AND SOLD AND PROPERTIES OWNED AND RENOVATED REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS (TENTATIVE RULING PART 3 OF 4) In support of the three special interrogatories, plaintiffs allege that defendant is and has acted as a "developer" of properties which it then renovates/remodels for purposes of (hopefully profitable) resale, a business model colloquially referred to as "property flipping" - a real estate investing tactic that involves buying a home, fixing it up and reselling it quickly. Although defendant has denied this allegation, for purposes of pretrial discovery plaintiffs have no obligation to prove it up or support it with a good cause showing. Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th 531, 550 (2017). The evident purpose of the three interrogatories at issue is to determine just how often over time defendant has purchased properties in need of renovation, arranged/contracted for such renovations and then resold the properties to willing third parties such as Ms. Ongpin, the purchaser from whom plaintiffs bought the Alvarado Street home. The sought-after information would purportedly be used to establish customs and practices employed by defendant in so conducting its business, including for example how often (and close) defendant has worked with defendant AMC Builders, Inc., the contractor hired by defendant to perform the allegedly bungled and defective renovations and to which defendant not so subtly points in its summary judgment motion. The requested information could well show whether and how often defendant has been accused of below-standard renovations in the past and the relationships (if any) defendant and AMC Builders have developed with the San Francisco Department of Building Inspection, the municipal agency issuing the permits and conducting the inspections upon which defendant relies heavily in its summary judgment motion (see, e.g., Mohammed Nuru, Inspector Bernard Curren). All of this information would potentially lead to admissible evidence as to the standard of care defendant should be subject to as an allegedly experienced and knowledgeable residential developer/renovator. In sum, the Court finds that the three special interrogatories are indeed relevant to the subject matter of this action and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at trial. Nor are they vague and overbroad. As for defendant's financial privacy interests, both sides cite to the dispositive holding in SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court, 243 Cal.App.4th 741, 755-756 (2015) for the principle that companies have limited privacy interests that need to be balanced against whether the sought-after information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Here, as outlined above, there are certainly reasonable and relevant purposes for which the identification of properties called for in the three interrogatories (by address, when purchased and when sold) would be useful. As such, this information could well lead to admissible evidence at trial. (end part 3, see part 4 tentative ruling) = (302/JPT)