Moore Vs. Ozuma, Et.Al.

FCS059237 Motion to Compel Arbitration TENTATIVE RULING The Court (Department Seven) self recuses pursuant to CCP Section 170.1(b)(6)(iii). Pursuant to the direction of Judge Stephen Gizzi, Supervising Judge of the Civil Division, the matter is reassigned and continued to August 1, 2024 at 9:30 a.m., Department Three.

20CV01351 CHINA TIANJIU INT’L RESOURCES GRP LTD v. KWAN et al. (UNOPPOSED) DEFENDANT GAN’S MOTION TO FURTHER COMPEL RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE), SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE), AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS (SET ONE), AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS The unopposed motion is granted in part. Defendant Zhenging Gan seeks responses to the following discovery from plaintiff: Page 1 of 2 • Form interrogatories, nos. 1.1, 17.1, and 50.1 through 50.6; • Special interrogatories, nos. 1-84, 86-99, 101-102, 104-105, 107-108, 110-111, 113-114, 116-120, 122-123, 125-129, 131-132, 134-135, 137-138, 140-141, 143-147, 149-156;1 • Request for admission (“RFA”), nos. 7, 8, 10, 12-15, 18, 19, 21, 22-25. The discovery was served on 3/6/24. (Korte Declaration, ¶ 3.) The parties agreed to an extension of time and responses were served on 4/17/24. (Korte Decl., ¶ 8.) The responses were deficient and following meet and confer, the parties agreed that plaintiff would provide further responses, with an extension to 6/10/24. No further responses were provided due to plaintiff’s failure to communicate with its former attorney. (Korte Decl., ¶¶ 9-13.) The court orders plaintiff to provide verified code-compliant responses to the following requests no later than 8/23/24: • Form interrogatories, nos. 1.1, 17.1 (as to RFA nos. 7, 8, 10, 18, 19), and 50.1 through 50.6; • Special interrogatories, nos. 1-84, 86-99, 101-102, 104-105, 107-108, 110-111, 113-114, 116-120, 122-123, 125-129, 131-132, 134-135, 137-138, 140-141, 143-147, and 149-156; • Request for admission, nos. 7, 8, 10, 18, and 19. The court declines to impose monetary sanctions. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. 1 Several special interrogatories are included in defendant’s Separate Statement that do not provide reasons for further responses. Those interrogatories have not been included in this list since they are not supported by the Separate Statement. Page 2 of 2

MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT ON SUPERIOR INTEGRATED COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT/ CVCO2401857 SERVICES VS QUINONEZ WARRANTY OF SUPERIOR INTEGRATED SERVICES BY BRIAN QUINONEZ Tentative Ruling: No tentative at this time, due to lack of notice as required pursuant to Local Rule 3316.

C23-02657 CASE NAME: MARIA GUTIERREZ VS. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO ., INC HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FILED BY: AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO ., INC *TENTATIVE RULING:* Before the Court is a demurrer to the second cause of action in plaintiff’s complaint, filed by defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”), as well as Honda’s motion to strike portions of plaintiffs’ complaint. As discussed below, the demurrer is overruled. The motion to strike is denied. Defendant’s previous answer (filed April 22, 2024) is stricken, and defendant shall file a new answer to the existing complaint by July 29, 2024. I. Factual Background This suit arises out of the purchase of a new Honda Pilot by plaintiff, Maria Sanchez Gutierrez, on or about August 15, 2022. (Complaint, ¶8.) As part of the purchase, defendant Honda and plaintiff entered into an express written contract, referred to as the New Vehicle Limited Warranty (“Warranty”). (Complaint, ¶9.) The vehicle, sold by Honda of El Cerrito, an authorized dealership, was equipped with Honda Sensing. The Complaint describes a defect with plaintiff’s vehicle in the Honda Sensing system, a defect which causes the various subsystems within it to malfunction, including, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/17/2024 “most severely,” the Collision Mitigating Braking System ("CMBS"). (Complaint, ¶ 16; see also ¶¶13- 22, 84-85.) Plaintiff asserts a Song-Beverly breach of warranty cause of action as well as a fraud cause of action. In support of fraud, she asserts that Honda knew or should have known about the safety hazard posed by the Honda Sensing Defect before the sale of vehicles such as hers. (Complaint, ¶23.) She alleges that Honda knew about the defect from pre-market testing, consumer complaints to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), consumer complaints, testing in response to those complaints, high failure rates and replacement part sales data, and other sources which drove Honda to issue Technical Service Bulletins acknowledging this defect. (Complaint, ¶23.) Plaintiff alleges Honda should not have sold, leased, or marketed vehicles equipped with the Sensing Defect without a full and complete disclosure of the defect, and should have voluntarily recalled all vehicles equipped with the Sensing Defect long ago, but instead Honda sold and leased defective vehicles, and continues to do so. (Complaint, ¶¶23-24.) In purchasing the vehicle, plaintiff relied on the reputation and representations by Honda and its agents, none of whom disclosed the defects. (Complaint, ¶¶87-88.) Shortly after purchase, she began to experience problems which led her to bring the vehicle back for repairs covered under the Warranty. Still, even after multiple attempts, the defendant did not bring the vehicle into conformity. (Complaint, ¶¶88-104.) Plaintiff initially filed this suit in San Francisco in May 2023, but it was transferred to this Court in October of 2023. Defendant filed this demurrer in 2023. It was not opposed by plaintiff and the Court issued a tentative ruling in February based on the lack of any opposition brief, sustaining the demurrer with leave to amend. No one contested the tentative ruling, and no amended complaint was filed. Honda then proceeded to file its answer (a general denial) on April 22, 2024. Pursuant to stipulation, and because it appears the lack of opposition was due to plaintiff’s lack of notice, the ruling on the demurrer was vacated on May 15, 2024. Nothing in the stipulation addressed the previously filed answer and no moving papers were re-filed. However, because that answer responded to the complaint to which the demurrer was sustained, the answer is no longer valid. In light of this background, the Court strikes the answer previously filed to enable the present motions to proceed. Honda’s demurrer is directed at the second cause of action (inducement – concealment) on the basis that plaintiff fails to state sufficient facts, as well as uncertainty. Honda also moves to strike punitive damages. Plaintiff opposed both motions on July 3, 2024. Plaintiff requests leave to amend in the event the demurrer or motion to strike is granted. II. Meet and Confer Defendant’s counsel states a meet and confer was held by telephone on November 14, 2023, pursuant to statutory requirements. (See Declaration of Monica Y. Hernandez, attached to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer). Plaintiff does not dispute this contention and the Court finds it is sufficient. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/17/2024 III. Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiff has requested judicial notice of the second amended complaint filed in Dhital v Nissan North America, Inc., No. RG19009260 in Alameda County. This was the pleading at issue in the appellate court’s decision to reverse the trial court’s sustaining of a demurrer. Defendant does not oppose the request which is granted. IV. Demurrer A. Standard The limited role of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A complaint will be upheld if it provides the defendant with “notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 549-550.) For purposes of a demurrer, all properly pleaded facts are admitted as true. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Only the face of the pleading attacked and matters subject to judicial notice are considered in ruling on a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.30(a).) The Court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in context. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The trial court exercises its discretion in declining to grant leave to amend, but such discretion is abused where such leave is denied, and it is reasonably possible the pleading can be cured by amendment. (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) B. Discussion Defendant specially demurs to the second cause of action based on uncertainty and generally demurs to the second cause of action based on plaintiff’s purported failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. i. Uncertainty Honda’s demurrer for uncertainty is essentially unsupported by any argument. The Court construes this as an admission on Honda’s part that uncertainty is not a ground for the Court to sustain its demurrer. (See Rule of Court 3.1113.) In any event, uncertainty is a disfavored ground for sustaining a demurrer, and a demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only when the pleading is such that the responding party cannot even discern to what it must respond. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139.) The pleading here meets that low bar. The Court expects that any lingering issues can be illuminated through discovery. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 [“demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures”].) On this ground, the demurrer is overruled. ii. General Demurrer Based on Preemption Defendant argues that federal law preempts the second cause of action for fraudulent SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/17/2024 inducement – concealment. The type of preemption asserted by Honda appears to be conflict preemption (which is implied preemption rather than express), though this is not particularly clear in Honda’s brief. (See Memorandum in Support of Demurrer, 7:14-18.) Still, while Honda’s bolding and italics suggest conflict preemption, Honda also suggests field preemption since it asserts the lack of any California statute on the disclosures at issue here. Plaintiff’s response to the preemption argument is that it is inappropriate for demurrer. The Court does not find the demurrer persuasive in this respect. Neither form of preemption (conflict or field) is thoroughly explained or demonstrated. While federal regulation may exist concerning what information must be disclosed to the government, it does not follow that the information required to be disclosed is necessarily sufficient for consumers. Nor does compliance with that regulatory scheme provide manufacturers license to commit fraud when a disclosure is not covered by the scheme. Honda contends application of the common law here would “directly conflict with and stand as an obstacle to accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of NHTSA, in a field which California has NOT traditionally occupied” (See Memorandum in Support of Demurrer pages 23 & 24.) First, the Court observes that this statement is not about a particular federal statute, but an argument broadly invoking the universe of purposes served by a particular federal agency, NHTSA. This suggests a sort of field preemption argument that is undermined by Honda’s concession that California has regulated in the general area (such as in its passage of a Car Buyer Bill of Rights). Additionally, states such as California have traditionally occupied the area of tortious fraud claims. Honda fails to cite any legal authority in which a state law claim for fraud in the sale of a motor vehicle has been found to be preempted by federal law regulating vehicle safety standards. Further, Honda does not explain why it cannot comply with both the federal disclosure requirements and avoid tort liability through refraining from active concealment. This would be a necessary condition for conflict preemption to apply. Plaintiff alleges that Honda knew its cars contained defects and actively concealed this information. (Complaint, ¶¶23-25, 37, 43.) To the extent that Honda’s knowledge included the vehicle plaintiff purchased, and to the extent Honda actively concealed the issue, the Court agrees with the opposition argument that these are fact-intensive inquiries not subject to determination on demurrer. Also, fact-intensive would be whether any of the information plaintiff contends should have been disclosed could be subject to the “confidential business information” protections applicable to government disclosure regulations. The intent of the NTHSA regulatory scheme does not appear to have been to immunize manufacturers from consumer fraud claims. Defendant also asserts NHTSA is in a better position to provide the information to plaintiff. This bears little relevance as to whether Honda had a duty of disclosure and this argument does not defeat, as a matter of law, a fraud claim. NHTSA is not a defendant here. Honda does not satisfy its own (acknowledged) burden. (See Memorandum in Support of Demurrer, 6:14-17.) The demurrer is overruled on the basis that federal law preempts this cause of action. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/17/2024 iii. General Demurrer Based on Purported Failure to Allege a “Transaction” Honda argues plaintiff has not alleged a transaction because she does not allege she purchased the vehicle from Honda directly. In response, plaintiff argues it was Honda’s superior knowledge and active concealment that made it responsible for disclosure. Plaintiff further argues this case is distinguishable from the authorities Honda cites, such as Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, at least in part because Honda’s dealer here was acting as its agent. There are “four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 311, citations omitted.) Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, though not binding currently, is persuasive as to this transaction point. That court stated: At the pleading stage […], we conclude plaintiffs‘ allegations are sufficient. Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan's authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold plaintiffs’ claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects. (Id. at 844.) As pointed out by the plaintiff, her allegations mirror that case. She alleges a contractual relationship with Honda directly via the express warranty provided to her, and she alleged that the authorized dealer from which she purchased the vehicle was an agent of defendant. The fraudulent concealment claim is not barred by any lack of a transactional relationship. iv. General Demurrer Based on Economic Loss Doctrine Defendant attempts to invoke the economic loss rule to demonstrate plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud is barred as a matter of law. This Court is persuaded by the discussion in Dhital, wherein the appellate court stated unambiguously that “fraudulent inducement by concealment is not subject to demurrer on the ground it is barred by the economic loss rule.” (Dhital, supra, at 840- 841.) If the California Supreme Court reaches the opposite conclusion during the pendency of this action, defendant may raise its economic loss rule argument again. For now, the demurrer to the second cause of action is overruled on the grounds that it is barred by the economic loss rule. v. General Demurrer Based on Lack of Specificity in Pleading Fraud The elements of fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/17/2024 justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) Honda argues the fraud allegations lack the requisite specificity. It is true that “[i]n California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. […] This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Id. at 645.) Honda does not engage, however, with the allegations of the complaint in making this argument, possibly because the allegations are sufficiently specific. Plaintiff has asserted that the Sensing defect is what was concealed and should have been disclosed (see, e.g., Complaint ¶16), that Honda had knowledge about the defect (Complaint, ¶112) and an intent to deceive plaintiff through concealment in order to sell the vehicle (see, e.g., Complaint, ¶119). Plaintiff further pleads her reliance and that it was justifiable, and that she was damaged as a result of the concealment. (Complaint ¶¶124-125.) Nothing more is required. The demurrer is overruled on the basis that the fraud cause of action lacks specificity. V. Motion to Strike A. Standard The Court may, in its discretion and upon a motion to strike by defendant: (a) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, or (b) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 435-436.) The matter must appear on the face of the complaint or be subject to judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) B. Discussion Honda challenges plaintiff’s request for punitive damages based on her failure to allege a cause of action for fraud. As noted in the motion, Civil Code § 3294 provides: “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) Given the above discussion regarding the sufficiency of the fraud claim, the motion to strike is denied. A valid cause of action for fraud has been asserted and, accordingly, plaintiff may include a claim for punitive damages.

24CV00800 BURDGE v. AIRSTREAM INC. AIRSTREAM’S MOTION TO STAY The motion to stay is denied. I. BACKGROUND Kathryn Burdge’s (“Burdge’) amended complaint, filed on March 26, 2024, alleges a violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act in relation to her purchase of a 2023 Airstream Atlas RV. She purchased the Airstream in Temecula, California and she resided in Page 6 of 9 Santa Cruz County at the time of the purchase. Burdge asserts various deficiencies/defects with the RV. In connection with the purchase of the Airstream, Burdge signed a Limited Warranty which stated, in part, the following: “LEGAL REMEDIES: EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION FOR DECIDING LEGAL DISPUTES RELATING TO THE ALLEGED BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARISING BY OPERATION OF LAW AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY NATURE RESTS IN THE COURTS WITHIN THE STATE OF MANUFACTURE, WHICH IS OHIO.” (Ex. B to Dec. of March.) This language is found on the second page of the Limited Warranty and is the second paragraph before the signature line for the purchaser. The sales contract is 6 pages long and signatures were required on each page and, on some pages, multiple signatures on each page. II. MOTION Airstream seeks to stay this action to allow Burdge to re-file the case in Ohio, the forum selection state. Airstream bases its motion on the above-referenced forum selection clause contained in the signed limited warranty. Airstream contends a motion to enforce a forum selection clause is a motion to stay (or dismiss) the action to allow a plaintiff to file in the proper court. Airstream argues the forum selection provision is mandatory and reasonable. Further, Airstream acknowledges Burdge cannot be compelled to waive her rights under Song-Beverly, and thus, it will stipulate to have the Ohio courts apply Song-Beverly in this case. Airstream contends a stay would allow for time to determine if the Ohio courts would apply Song-Beverly. If they will not, then Burdge could bring the case back to Santa Cruz. Burdge opposes the stay. She argues Airstream failed to provide evidence demonstrating she freely and voluntarily agreed to the forum selection clause. Even though Burdge signed the limited warranty “she had to sign the document even if she did not understand the importance of the forum selection clause.” (Opp at pg. 3.) That is, Burdge was required to sign the acknowledgment of document and that does not prove she waived her rights under Song-Beverly freely and voluntarily. Burdge asserts Airstream failed to provide evidence that the designated forum will not diminish her rights afforded under California law. Specifically, she argues, even if the court finds she freely and voluntarily agreed to the forum selection clause, Airstream cannot show that Ohio law will not diminish her substantive rights. Burdge contends Airstream’s offer to stipulate to have the Song-Beverly apply in Ohio is insufficient because the choice of law in the Limited Page 7 of 9 Warranty states that Ohio law will govern procedural issues and how the express warranty is construed and interpreted. III. DISCUSSION “Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489; see also Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376-79; CCP § 128(a)(3) [“Every court shall have the power to do all of the following: To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its officers.”].) "The procedure for enforcing a forum selection clause is a motion to stay or dismiss for forum non conveniens." (Olinick v. BMG Entertainment (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1294.) “California law is ‘in accord with the modern trend which favors enforceability of such [mandatory] forum selection clauses. [Citations.] No satisfying reason of public policy has been suggested why enforcement should be denied a forum selection clause appearing in a contract entered into freely and voluntarily by parties who have negotiated at arm's length. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect, in the court's discretion and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of such a clause would be unreasonable.’ [Citation.]” (Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Communications Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 438, 444-445.) “‘California courts will refuse to defer to the selected forum if to do so would substantially diminish the rights of California residents in a way that violates our state's public policy.’ [Citation.]” (Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 141, 147.) “The party opposing enforcement of a forum selection clause ordinarily ‘bears the substantial burden of proving why it should not be enforced.’ [Citations.] That burden, however, is reversed when the claims at issue are based on unwaivable rights created by California statutes. In that situation, the party seeking to enforce the forum selection clause bears the burden to show litigating the claims in the contractually designated forum ‘will not diminish in any way the substantive rights afforded … under California law.’ [Citations.]” (Id.) (Emphasis added.) In this case, while she did sign the limited warranty, the court agrees with Burdge that the warranty was not signed knowingly as to the forum selection clause and that application of the clause would be unreasonable and/or unfair. The clause is buried in the second to the last paragraph and is written in legalese such that a reasonable consumer could not be expected to understand they were acquiescing to file a lawsuit in Ohio. The exclusive jurisdiction section does not adequately inform the consumer that they would need to file suit in Ohio for warranty issues, especially given that Burdge lives in California and purchased the Airstream in Page 8 of 9 California. The court also notes the length of the sales contract and number of signatures required as factors which balance in Burdge’s favor. The court does not find Airstream has carried its burden in demonstrating that Burdge’s substantive rights will not be diminished in any way if the case is brought in Ohio. Despite the offer of Airstream’s counsel to stipulate to apply California law in Ohio, there is no guarantee the Ohio courts will agree to this arrangement; that is, what is the effect of the stipulation in the Ohio courts? Second, Airstream’s proposal would create two pending actions, which does not promote judicial economy. Third, having California courts apply California law simply makes more sense in terms of protecting Burdge’s rights under the Song-Beverly Act and for efficient case management. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 9 of 9

Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Friday, Jul-26-2024, Line 9, 2-PLAINTIFFS JAIRO CANCHOLA AN INDIVIDUAL, and ANDREA RODRIGUEZ' Motion To Compel Responses, Without Objections, To Plaintiffs' Requests For Production Of Documents (Set One). Continued on the court's motion to August 21, 2024. (D302)

20CV01351 CHINA TIANJIU INT’L RESOURCES GRP LTD v. KWAN et al. (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO BE RELIEVED The unopposed motion to be relieved is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to immediately secure successor counsel, since a business entity party cannot proceed in pro per. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

HUDSON INSURANCE Motion for Attorney's Fees by HUDSON COMPANY, A CVRI2300335 INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION vs CORPORATION MAKSOUD Tentative Ruling: Award Attorneys fees in the amount of 8,768.89, Award costs in the amount of 1,316.82. No opposition or motion to tax costs having been filed, the court awards fees and cost in the amount requested by the prevailing party. Plaintiff to prepare, circulate and submit an order consistent with the courts ruling.