U.S. Bank National Association, As Trustee, Successor In Interest To Bank Of Ame Vs. Lori Jo Lynch, Et Al.

Case Number: 24STCV00592 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 37 HEARING DATE: Wednesday, July 17, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 24STCV00592 CASE NAME: Daniel Rogosin, et al. v. 9 Silver LLC, et al. MOVING PARTY: Defendants 9 Silver LLC and Nathan Young OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Daniel Rogosin and Elizabeth Rogosin TRIAL DATE: Not Set PROOF OF SERVICE: OK PROCEEDING: Motion to Strike FAC OPPOSITION: 7 July 2024 REPLY: Not filed as of 07/12/24 at 11:28 am. TENTATIVE: D efendants motion to strike is granted with leave to amend. Plaintiff has 10 days leave to amend. The Court sets an OSC Re: Filing of Amended Complaint for July 29, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. Defendants to give notice. Background On January 9, 2024, Daniel and Elizabeth Rogosin (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against 9 Sliver LLC; Nathan Young (collectively Defendants); and Does 1 to 100. The operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleges five causes of action: 1) Breach of Contract 2) Account Stated; 3) Open Book Account; 4) Negligence; and 5) Private Nuisance. Defendants now move to strike punitive damages from the FAC. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The matter is now before the court. Discussion I. Legal Standard A. Motion to Strike ¿ Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); CRC, rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded].) ¿¿¿¿ B. Leave to Amend Where the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question. ( CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) ¿¿¿ II. Motion to Strike [1] A. Summary of Allegations The FAC alleges that on or about January 6, 2022, Plaintiffs entered a residential least (the Lease) with Defendants for a premises located in Los Angeles, CA (the Premises). (FAC, ¶ 1, Ex. 1.) Under the Lease, Defendants would rent the Premises until January 31, 2024, with rent of $18,000 to be paid on the first day of each month. (FAC, ¶ 2.) Defendant Nathan Young (Young) personally guaranteed the Lease. (SAC, ¶ 3.) Defendants have breached the term of the Lease by failing to pay the monthly rent owed for October 2023. (FAC, ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs filed an unlawful detainer action (the UD Action) (LASC Case No. 23STCV26741). FAC, ¶ 5.) Defendants vacated the Premises on November 2023 without paying the rent due for November 2023. (FAC, ¶ 6.) For the months of October and November 2023, Plaintiffs are owed a total of $36,000 for past rent due. (FAC, ¶ 6.) Due to the Lease expiring in January 2024 and costs associated with repairs and legal fees incurred in the UD Action, the FAC alleges Defendants owe a total of $117,260, including credit for a $36,000 security deposit paid by Defendant. (FAC, ¶¶ 7-10, Ex. 2, 3.) B. Defendants Request to Strike Punitive Damages Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages because the FAC fails to allege facts to show malice, oppression, or fraud. (FAC, ¶¶ 33 at p.8:17-19.) To state a claim for punitive damages under Civ. Code § 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. ( Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.)¿ The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. ( Ibid .)¿¿Malice is defined in Civ. Code § 3294 (c)(1) as conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Oppression is defined as despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons rights. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) The term despicable has been defined in the case law as actions that are base, vile, or contemptible. ( Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc . (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 891.) Fraud means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).) Paragraph 44 states: As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of Defendants, Plaintiffs seek the recovery of punitive and exemplary damages against Defendants as set forth above. The court finds that apart from Defendants not paying rent and breaching the lease, the FAC is devoid of facts showing how Defendants acted with malice, fraud, or oppression in not paying rent. Moreover, the FAC fails to explain why Defendants are liable for the repair costs of the Premises and how such conduct was intentional and done with malice, oppression, or fraud. As to the private nuisance claim, Plaintiffs fail to explain how Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs right to use and enjoy the Premises by not paying rent and how such conduct was done with malice, oppression, or fraud. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. ( Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895896.) The motion to strike is granted with leave to amend. Conclusion D efendants motion to strike is granted with leave to amend. Plaintiff has 10 days leave to amend. The Court sets an OSC Re: Filing of Amended Complaint for July 29, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. Defendants to give notice. [1] Pursuant to CCP § 435.5(a), the meet and confer requirement has been met. (Fisher Decl., ¶¶4-6.)

Case Number: 23STCV00514 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 39 HEARING DATE July 18, 2024 CASE NUMBER 23STCV00514 MOTION Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint MOVING PARTY Plaintiff 58th St Industrial LLC OPPOSING PARTY Defendant Evanston Insurance Company MOTION Plaintiff 58th St Industrial LLC (Plaintiff) moves for leave to amend its complaint. After Plaintiff filed this motion, Plaintiff stipulated with all other parties in this litigation to continue the motion until after the scheduled August 29, 2024 mediation. (See Joint Stipulation to Stay Litigation, filed July 8, 2024.) Accordingly, the court continues the motion for leave to amend the complaint to October 30, 2024. The parties are to file a joint status report no later than October 23, 2024 to advise the court whether the parties have resolved any issues relating to this motion. The August 6, 2024 trial date is advanced to July 18, 2024 and, along with the July 18, 2024 final status conference date, are vacated. A post-mediation and trial setting conference will be held on October 30, 2024 as well. Plaintiff is to give notice of this order and file proof of service of same.

Case Number: 23GDCV02307 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: E Case No: 23GDCV02307 Hearing Date: 07/18/2024 8:30am Trial Date: UNSET Case Name: JOHN WOOD, as assignee of the Estate of Donald R. Wood; v. MARK G. MCNELIS; and MARK G. MCNELIS & ASSOCIATES, CPAS, INC., and DOES 1-20 [TENTATIVE RULING ON DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE] Moving Party: Defendants, Mark G. Mcnelis and Mark G. Mcnelis & Associates, CPAs, Inc. Responding Party: Plaintiff, John Wood Moving Papers: Notice/Demurrer Opposition Papers: Opposition Reply Papers: No Reply RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants demur to all four causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) filed 5/13/2024 on grounds of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under CCP § 430.10(e). BACKGROUND Plaintiffs initial Complaint was filed on 10/30/2023. An Amended Complaint (AC) was filed on 2/5/2024. On 2/16/2024, Defendants demurrer to the initial Complaint was denied as moot based on the filing of the Amended Complaint. On April 11, 2024, this Court heard Defendants demurrer to the AC. The AC asserted causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Common Counts, and (3) Accounting. On April 11, 2024, this Court overruled the demurrer to the first two causes of action and sustained the demurrer with leave to amend as to the third cause of action. On 05/13/2024, Plaintiff filed the SAC. The SAC alleges four causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Common Counts, (3) Accounting, and (4) Unfair Competition. PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC Rule 3.1300): Ok 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP 1005(b)) : Ok Proper Address (CCP §1013, §1013a, §1013b) :Ok Meet and Confer A party filing a demurrer shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.41, subd. (a).) The parties shall meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.41(a)(4).) Here, Defendants counsel alleges that the parties were unable to resolve the issue presented by this demurrer. (Bates Decl. ¶ 5.) LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRERS Demurrer Sufficiency A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda , (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. ( Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law &. ( Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn , supra , 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. ( Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading & is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action. ( Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp . (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to determine whether or not the & complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. ( Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained. ( Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) Generally it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) ANALYSIS First Cause of Action (Breach of Oral Contract) This action arises from an alleged oral contract that was entered into between John Woods Assignor (the Estate of Donald R. Wood Wood Estate) and Defendants on or about May 20, 2020. Plaintiff alleges that on or about May 20, 2020 an oral agreement was entered between the Wood Estate and Defendants whereby the Wood Estate would transfer client files held by Donald R. Wood prior to his death on April 23, 2020 in exchange for Defendants agreement to pay the Wood Estate twenty-five percent (25%) of all fees, if any, earned by Defendants over a period of four years following the transfer of the aforementioned clients and/or client files. Since neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's assignor could guarantee that any of the clients whose files were transferred to Defendants would agree to utilize the services offered to them by Defendants within the following year, it is possible that Defendants would owe nothing to Plaintiff's assignor if such clients failed or refused to conduct business with Defendants. However, Plaintiff is informed and believes that several of the aforementioned clients whose files had been transferred to Defendants by the Wood Estate agreed to utilize the services offered by Defendants, and did in fact utilize Defendants services. (SAC ¶ 13.) Defendants demur on the basis of the statute of frauds by citing to Civil Code §1624(a)(1) which states, The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the partys agent: (1) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof. (Civil Code §1624(a)(1).) Defendants point out that the allegations in the SAC are for an oral contract over a period of four years; Defendants argue the contract could not be performed within a year from the making thereof and is barred by the Statute of Frauds under Civil Code § 1624. Tentative Ruling First Cause of Action Breach of Oral Contract The fact that it is not probable or likely to be performed within a year from the date it is made does not make it invalid if by its terms it is possible that the contract may be performed within a year after it is made. ( Fisher v. Parsons (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 829, 837.) In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that it was possible that the contract could have been performed within one year. Plaintiff argues: In the instant case it was possible that the contract could have been performed within one year. One such possibility exists if each of those clients whose files were transferred to Defendants demanded the return of their files. Another such possibility exists if each of those clients simply refused to engage Defendants as their tax accountant. The allegations in Paragraph 13 (pg. 3) which are incorporated into each cause of action clearly state that it was possible that the contract could be completed within one year if the clients failed or refused to conduct business with Defendants. Since the contract had the possibility of being performed within year, the defense of the statute of frauds does not apply. (Oppo. p. 4-5.) Here, after further consideration in reading the SAC and reading the Oppositions arguments on how it is possible that the contract could have been performed within one year, the Court fails to understand Plaintiffs argument on how the contract could be performed within one year. The alleged oral agreement is for a term of four years. Plaintiff argues that the contract could be performed within one year if each of those clients whose files were transferred to Defendants demanded the return of their files. The Court fails to understand this argument, because based on the allegations of the oral contract, the contract is still for a term of four years. The allegations of the oral contract alleged that 25% of all fees, if any, earned by Defendants over a period of four years following the transfer of the aforementioned clients and/or client files. The Court is unclear on how returning the files, presumably within the first year, shows that the contract could be performed within a year, because by the very nature of the terms of the alleged oral agreement, whether or not the demand of the files happened within the first year appears to be of no significance because the terms of the oral contract allege that the oral contract applies for a period of four years. Thus, the Court is unclear how Plaintiff is presumably arguing that returning the files within a year terminates the four year contract. Plaintiff also argues that the contract could be performed within a year because [a]nother such possibility exists if each of those clients simply refused to engage Defendants as their tax accountant. The Court also fails to understand Plaintiffs argument here. The terms of the contract say &25% of all fees, if any, earned by Defendants over a period of four years& Therefore, even if the clients refuse to engage them as their accountant, the oral contract already considered that issue by stating 25% of all fees, if any & The exact terms of the oral contract appear to consider the fact that it is possible that there could be no fees earned. Either way, if there were fees earned or not, it appears as if this agreement were to apply for a four year period. Plaintiff also argues that the allegations in Paragraph 13 (pg. 3) which are incorporated into each cause of action clearly state that it was possible that the contract could be completed within one year if the clients failed or refused to conduct business with Defendants. However, the SAC does not in fact state that it was possible that the contract could be completed within one year. The SAC says, Since neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's assignor could guarantee that any of the clients whose files were transferred to Defendants would agree to utilize the services offered to them by Defendants within the following year, it is possible that Defendants would owe nothing to Plaintiff's assignor if such clients failed or refused to conduct business with Defendants. (SAC ¶ 13.) The allegations state that it is possible that Defendants would owe nothing if such clients failed or refused to conduct business with Defendants. The allegations do not state that the contract could be completed within one year. The Opposition also argued that Defendants partially performed the agreement and a contract that might otherwise be subject to the statute of frauds may by entire or partial performance support the contract. Plaintiff cites to Fisher v. Parsons (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 829, 836 to support their argument. Plaintiffs also argue that Plaintiff has alleged partial performance, and Defendants reaffirmed the existence of the contract and the obligation to pay the Wood Estate at all times prior to September 30, 2023 when Mark G. McNelis told Plaintiff that no more accountings would be provided, or payments made. (Oppo. p. 5.) An issue with the Plaintiffs argument here is that Fisher does not state what Plaintiff alleges it to state. The citation to Fisher at 836 is cited entirely out of context. In the partial performance portion of the ruling, the Fisher court was not discussing the statute of frauds. The portion of the ruling in Fisher on partial performance occurred before the Fisher court even addressed the statute of frauds. The portion on partial performance was in a section generally discussing contract formation and law pertaining to requirements contracts. The Court will hear argument, but based on Plaintiffs Opposition and allegations in the SAC, the Court fails to see how the instant contract could be performed within a year. Defendants demurrer to the first cause of action for breach of oral contract is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED. Second Cause of Action Common Counts The Court will hear from both parties on the cause of action titled Common Counts. It is unclear to the Court what this cause of action is. It is not for accounting, because the third cause of action is for accounting. The Movant simply argues that the first through third causes of action fail to comply with Civil Code § 1624, but Movant does not explicitly address the second cause of action titled Common Counts. Notably, the Opposition does not appear to address this cause of action. Tentative Ruling Second Cause of Action Common Counts The Court will hear argument. Tentative Ruling Third Cause of Action Accounting The Court will hear argument. TENTATIVE RULING Fourth Cause of Action Unfair Competition Defendants filed a motion to strike as to the fourth cause of action arguing that leave to amend was not granted to file a fourth cause of action. Here, the Defendants are correct to note that at the previous demurrer hearing leave to amend was not granted as to filing a fourth cause of action. In Opposition to the motion to strike, Plaintiff appears to concede that the fourth cause of action should be stricken. Plaintiff states, Plaintiff's opposition is limited to requesting that should Plaintiff desire to pursue a cause of action for unfair competition, or any other cause of action that Plaintiff may assert as a viable cause of action, that the instant motion be granted without prejudice to Plaintiff asserting such causes of action as may be ascertained during the course of this litigation following Plaintiffs n a motion to amend the complaint. Based on the fact that Plaintiff did not oppose Defendants motion to strike the fourth cause of action, Defendants motion to strike as to the fourth cause of action is GRANTED without prejudice. The Reply to the motion to strike noted that the Opposition to the motion to strike was untimely. The Court notes that it still considered the untimely opposition to the motion to strike. The Reply argues that any other causes of action must be filed now, and not in a motion to amend the complaint at a later time. The Replys argument on this point is unavailing. If Plaintiff wanted to file a motion for leave to amend, whether or not leave to amend would be granted would be determined at the resultant hearing. The Replys argument is not before this Court. The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is overruled as moot in light of the ruling on the motion to strike. The Court considered the motion to strike, the limited opposition to the motion to strike, and the reply in ruling on the motion to strike. The Court notes that a reply was not submitted to the demurrer. The Court notes that the ruling on the motion to strike is included within this tentative ruling on the fourth cause of action because the motion to strike only sought to strike the fourth cause of action for unfair competition.

Case Number: 23NWCV03491 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: C GUTTALU v. PYE CASE NO.: 23NWCV03491 HEARING: 07/18/24 #4 I. Defendant MARISELA YANETH DIAZ PACHECOs Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT . II. Defendant MARISELA YANETH DIAZ PACHECOs Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Complaint is OFF-CALENDAR . Although reserved, no Motion to Strike has been filed/lodged with this Court. Plaintiffs to give notice. A party may amend its pleading once without leave of court at any time before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed, or after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the demurrer or motion to strike is heard if the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer or motion to strike . (emphasis added.) (CCP §472.) The subject Demurrer was filed on January 30, 2023, and the hearing is set for July 18, 2024. Plaintiffs Opposition was due on July 5, 2024. (CCP §1005(b).) Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint was timely filed on February 22, 2024, before the date the Opposition was due. The Demurrer and Motion to Strike are placed OFF-CALENDAR as MOOT.

23CV046068: JOHNSON, et al. vs THOMAS 07/15/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Discovery (not "Further Discovery") filed by Matthew Thomas (Defendant) in Department 19 Tentative Ruling - 07/09/2024 Joscelyn Jones The Motion to Compel Discovery (not Further Discovery) - | moving party, | motion filed by Matthew Thomas on 05/16/2024 is Withdrawn. Defendant's Motion to Compel Responses to Discovery is DROPPED from the July 15, 2024 calendar by the moving party. (See Notice of Taking Motion Off Calendar filed June 21, 2024.)

GLADSTONE, ET AL. VS. MEISSNER, ET AL. Case Number: CVCV21-0197823 This matter is on calendar for review regarding trial setting. The previous trial date was vacated by the Court’s order dated April 18, 2024. The Court previously designated this matter exempt from case disposition time standards. It appears that neither side has posted jury fees, which as previously noted in the Court’s October 23, 2023 Order, is deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to appear to provide the Court with available trial dates. J.D. VS. THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF

Case Number: 23AHCV02835 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 17, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: Aida Hernandez, et al. v. Stephen S. Young, et al. CASE NO.: 23AHCV02835 DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendants Stephen S. Young and Betty Young, individually and as trustees of the Stephen S. Young and Betty Young Trust RESPONDING PARTY : Plaintiffs Aida Hernandez and Ruben Hernandez SERVICE: OK / Unopposed OPPOSITION: OK / Unopposed REPLY: OK / Unopposed RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants demur to four of Plaintiffs seven causes of action and move to strike Plaintiffs prayers for punitive damages. BACKGROUND This is a habitability case. Plaintiffs Aida Hernandez and Ruben Hernandez sued defendants Stephen S. Young and Betty Young, individually and as trustees of the Stephen S. Young and Betty Young Trust, on December 7, 2023, asserting causes of action for: 1. Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability, 2. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, 3. Nuisance (Negligence), 4. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 5. Negligent Maintenance of the Premises, 6. Nuisance (Intentional Tort), and 7. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. As alleged in the complaint and accepted as true for a demurrer and motion to strike: Defendants own the property located at 2190 S. Oak Knoll Ave., San Marino 91108 (the Property). (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs have rented the Property from Defendants since around October 2015. ( Id. , ¶¶ 12-13.) Throughout Plaintiffs tenancy, the Property has suffered from uninhabitable conditions including severe vermin infestations, faulty plumbing and electrical systems, deteriorating structural integrity, and lack of maintenance of landscaping and foliage. ( Id. , ¶ 14.) On March 27, 2024, Defendants demurred to and moved to strike portions of Plaintiffs complaint. On July 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On July 7, 2024, Defendants replied. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants demurrers to the first and seventh causes of action are SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Defendants demurrers to the second and sixth causes of action are OVERRULED. Defendants motion to strike is denied as MOOT. LEGAL STANDARD Demurrer Where pleadings are defective, a party may raise the defect by way of a demurrer. ( Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10; Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.) When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Put differently: for purposes of demurrer, the court treats all facts alleged but only the facts alleged in the complaint as true. ( Picton v. Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) Motion to Strike The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. ( Id. § 436 (a).) Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. ( Id. , § 431.10.) The court may also [s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. ( Id. § 436 (b).) Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435, 436, and 437.) DISCUSSION (Demurrer) Defendants demur to Plaintiffs first, second, sixth, and seventh causes of action, on the grounds that none states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 1. First Cause of Action for Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability Breach of the implied warranty of habitability, as any breach of contract, may be regarded as a tortious breach where an injured party demonstrates the defendants intentional, malicious, and outrageous conduct. ( Smith v. David (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 101, 112, fn.3; Jones v. Kelly (1929) 208 Cal. 251, 255-256. ) California law defines malice as either (1) conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or (2) despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. ( Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 330.) Plaintiffs have stated a claim for breach of warranty, but they have not stated a claim for tortious breach. The complaint refers solely to the conditions on the Property. It alleges no facts that suggest Defendants possessed any state of mind, malicious or otherwise. Plaintiffs rely on the assertion that (1) Defendants had actual and constructive notice of the poor conditions on the Property and (2) the poor conditions caused Plaintiffs substantial distress. The former allegation is insufficient to show malice, and the latter is irrelevant. The demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained with leave to amend. 2. Second Cause of Action for Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment A tenant suffering breach of quiet enjoyment may remain in place and sue their landlord for breach of the implied covenant, which is a breach of a promise contained in their lease. ( Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588-590) The elements track with a breach of contract or covenant case: (1) a lease; (2) the tenants performance or excuse; (3) the landlords substantial interference with the tenants beneficial use and enjoyment; and (4) some injury to the tenants rights under the lease generally, the failure to obtain the full value bargained for when the tenant paid rent to occupy the premises without disturbance. ( Ibid. ) [T]he implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is similar to, and sometimes overlapping with, the warranty of habitability. [Citation.] [T]he line between the landlord's interference with the tenants quiet enjoyment and the landlords failure to maintain the leased premises in a tenantable condition can be blurred. [Citation.] ( Fairchild v. Park (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 919, 923, fn. 1.) A claim can be stated for one or the other on the same basic facts. (See Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1165 [bedbug infestation and/or raw sewage on the property may violate the warranty of habitability or the covenant of quiet enjoyment].) Plaintiffs have stated a claim for breach of the warranty of habitability. They have also alleged the violations were severe and their landlords had notice of the poor conditions, which is sufficient to allege Defendants affirmatively substantially interfered with Plaintiffs use of the Property. These allegations state a claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 3. Sixth Cause of Action for Nuisance (Intentional Tort) Although Defendants included Plaintiffs sixth cause of action for nuisance in their Notice of Demurrer, they did not discuss the nuisance claim in their moving papers. The Court disregards this portion of their demurrer because they failed to argue the point. 4. Seventh Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) defendants outrageous conduct; (2) defendant's intent to cause distress or reckless disregard for its likelihood; (3) plaintiff's severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) causation. (See Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.) Conduct, to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society. [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) Similarly, [s]evere emotional distress means emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it. ( Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.) The facts in Plaintiffs complaint do not describe conduct that exceeds all bounds of what might ordinarily be tolerated. In fact, the sorts of wrongs Plaintiffs allege are (regrettably) relatively commonplace. A tenant may recover against her landlord for intentional infliction of emotional distress in extreme cases, such as direct threats of violence against tenants ( Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 288) or knowing permission for severe habitability problems to persist across many buildings and units ( McNairy v. C.K. Realty (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504). But no facts of that sort are alleged here. Plaintiffs have not stated a claim. DISCUSSION (Motion to Strike) Because the Court sustains Defendants demurrer with leave to amend, the motion to strike is denied as moot. But in the interest of avoiding unnecessary motion practice, the Court offers the following observation: A motion to strike is the procedure to attack a purportedly improper remedy such as unjustified punitive damages. ( Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561-1562.) But a complaint including a request for punitive damages must also include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such an award. ( Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud and malice toward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages. ( Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages. ( Ibid. ) CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendants demurrers to the first and seventh causes of action are SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. Defendants demurrers to the second and sixth causes of action are OVERRULED. Defendants motion to strike is denied as MOOT. Moving party to give notice. Dated: July 17, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org

The court, on its own motion, hereby continues the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Interlocutory Judgment to October 17, 2024 at 9:00 AM. No further briefing is permitted without leave of court.