Wally Berger, Et Al. Vs. Alliance Management Group, Llc

S-CV-0052459 JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. vs. Cooper, Jay B. No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/21/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Default packet received, but not yet reviewed.

TRUIST BANK VS. STOCK, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0203124 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions issued on May 28, 2024 to Plaintiff Truist Bank and counsel, Gurstel Law Firm, P.C., for failure to timely serve pleadings on Defendant Chris Stock pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.110(b) and Local Rule of Court 3.03 and failure to timely seek default on Defendant Bright Nichols Stock pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.110(g). “The complaint must be served on all named defendants and proofs of service on those defendants must be filed with the court within 60 days after the filing of the complaint.” CRC 3.110(b). Local Rule 3.03 mandates that Plaintiff serve Defendant with Local Form LF-CIV-100 and file a proof of service within the same timeframe. The Complaint in this matter was filed on September 1, 2023 and no proof of service has been filed for defendant Chris Stock. Plaintiff did not address defendant Chris Stock in the written response to the Order to Show Cause. CRC 3.110(g) requires Plaintiff to file a request for entry of default within 10 days after the time for service of the responsive pleading has elapsed. Defendant Bright Nichols Stock was served on October 7, 2023. The time for filing a responsive pleading expired November 6, 2023. No extension was requested or granted. No default was requested. On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Declaration that asserts that a default packet “is pending to be drafted.” No explanation is given for the noncompliance with CRC 3.110. No default judgment has been requested. With no sufficient excuse for the delay, sanctions are imposed in the amount of $250.00 against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order of Sanctions. The Court will issue an Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal pursuant to Gov’t Code Section 68608(b) for Plaintiff’s failure to timely serve the complaint and LF-CIV-100, failure to timely seek default judgment, and failure to timely prosecute. The hearing on the Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal is set for Monday, September 9, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 63. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal. This matter is also calendared on Monday, September 9, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 63 for review regarding status of service. ****************************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings ******************************************************************************************

CAVALRY SPV I, LLC AS Motion for Order to Deem Matters Admitted CVPS2305706 ASSIGNEE OF CITIBANK, N.A. by CAVALRY SPV I, LLC AS ASSIGNEE vs WISE OF CITIBANK, N.A. Tentative Ruling: The unopposed Motion of Plaintiff, Cavalry SPCV I, LLC, for Order Deeming Admissions Admitted is GRANTED. Requests for Admissions 1 through 5, inclusive, are deemed admitted for all purposes in this litigation.

MOTION FOR ORDER TO DEEM BANK OF AMERICA N.A. vs MATTERS ADMITTED TO DEEM RFAS CVMV2401467 CHAVEZ ADMITTED BY BANK OF AMERICA N.A. Tentative Ruling: Motions are granted.

Case Number: 23TRCV04042 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Wednesday, July 17, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 8 PROCEEDINGS Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc. v. Mark Ferrera, et al. 23TRCV04042 1. Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc.s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike TENTATIVE RULING Credit Corp. Solutions, Inc.s Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike is denied. Background Plaintiff filed the Complaint on December 4, 2023. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Defendant owes a balance due from a loan provided to Defendant by Plaintiffs assignor. On February 5, 2024, Defendant filed a Cross-Complaint. Cross-Complainant alleges the following facts. Cross-Defendant maintains and practices a policy of attempting to collect on student loans without providing the mandated information, and without possessing and providing the mandated documentation. Cross-Defendant employs unfair and deceptive practices in their loan collection process. Cross-Complainant alleges the following causes of action for violations of: 1. California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act; 2. Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; 3. Private Student Loan Collections Reform Act; 4. Unfair Competition Law. Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike Cross-Defendant filed a special motion to strike the Cross-Complaint under CCP § 425.16, also known as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The anti-SLAPP procedures are designed to shield a defendants constitutionally protected conduct from the undue burden of frivolous litigation. Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376, 393. The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity. Id. at 384. Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. Baral, 1 Cal.5 th at 384 (citation omitted). The California Supreme Court has described this second step as a summary-judgment-like procedure. The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiffs evidence as true, and evaluates the defendants showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiffs claim as a matter of law. [C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed. Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted). The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper. The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing. Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16(f). Subdivision (f) does not require the moving party to ensure that the hearing is so scheduled. Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 344, 352. In addition, the Court has the discretion to hear an untimely anti-SLAPP motion even if the Defendant failed to request leave of court to file an untimely motion. Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 684. Here, the motion runs afoul of both time measures of CCP § 425.16(f). However, the Court exercises its discretion to hear the motion on the merits. I. Conduct in Furtherance of Right of Petition or Free Speech CCP § 425.16(e) states: As used in this section, act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue includes: . . . (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech. City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4 th 69, 78. The anti-SLAPP's statute focuses, not on the form of cross-complainants causes of action but, rather, cross-defendants underlying activity that gives rise to the asserted liability and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning. See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92. In Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376, the court held that an anti-SLAPP motion may be utilized to strike specific allegations of protected activity without eliminating the entire cause of action or primary right. By referring to a cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the protected rights of petition and speech, the Legislature indicated that particular alleged acts giving rise to a claim for relief may be the object of an anti-SLAPP motion. (§ 425.16(b)(1), italics added.) Thus, in cases involving allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the plaintiff is required to establish a probability of prevailing on any claim for relief based on allegations of protected activity. I d. at 395. A Cross-Complaint may be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. However, [o]nly those cross-complaints alleging a cause of action arising from the plaintiff's act of filing the complaint against the defendant and the subsequent litigation would potentially qualify as a SLAPP action. (§ 425.16, subds. (b) and (d).) For example, a person may attempt to bring a SLAPP suit alleging that libelous allegations or statements were contained in the complaint itself. However, because defendant's allegations are privileged communications under Civil Code section 47, the suit would be merit-less. A compulsory cross-complaint on a related cause of action against the plaintiff (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a)) would rarely, if ever, qualify as a SLAPP suit arising from petition activity. By definition, a related cause of action is a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.10, subd. (c), italics added.) The SLAPP suit is not related to the transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint, but arises out of the litigation process itself. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 651(internal citation omitted). Here, a review of the Cross-Complaint and Complaint reveals that the Cross-Complaint arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the Complaint. The Cross-Complaint does not arise from petitioning activity. See, Kajima Engineering and Const., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 934. The gravamen of the Cross-Complaint involves allegations that Cross-Complainant is entitled to statutory damages and other relief based on Cross-Defendants unlawful debt collection activities. The Cross-Complaint does not itself arise from the simple act of filing the Complaint, but, instead upon the underlying factual disputes outlined in the Cross-Complaint. The gravamen of the causes of action and the underlying theory of recovery do not depend on the filing of the Complaint itself but upon the alleged underlying facts and conduct of Cross-Defendant during the debt collection process. However, the Court does note that certain specific allegations of the Cross-Complaint do implicate petitioning activity. Cross-Complainant alleged: In this case, the Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Credit Corp Solutions, Inc. (Cross-Defendant or Credit Corp) sued Mr. Ferrera without providing the disclosures and documents required under state law. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 4.) In addition, paragraphs 42 to 48, 58c, and 84c-f, of the Cross-Complaint, which attempts to outline failures within the Complaint, also implicate petitioning activity. Here, however, the principle delineated in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376 applies because these allegations referenced above do implicate protected conduct of filing litigation. The constitutional right to petition ... includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action. Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 281 . In this situation, it is appropriate to analyze whether to strike the specific allegations of the protected activity without eliminating the entirety of the causes of action. II. Probability of Prevailing on the Merits To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273-74. However, the Court must accept as true the evidence favorable to Plaintiff. See Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291. [Plaintiffs] second-[prong] burden is a limited one. [He] need not prove [his] case to the court [citation]; the bar sits lower at a demonstration of minimal merit [citation]. At this stage, [t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff's evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant's showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. The plaintiff must demonstrate this probability of success with admissible evidence. The plaintiff may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence. Kieu Hoang v. Phong Minh Tran (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 513, 531 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Since Cross-Defendant established the first prong (solely as to the specific allegations referenced above), Cross-Complainant must establish a probability of prevailing on the merits with respect to those allegations. See, Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 273-74. To establish a probability of prevailing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. For purposes of this inquiry, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2)); though the court does not weigh the credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant's evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff's attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim. See, Id. Here, as to the specific allegations of protected speech noted above, Cross-Complainant has met his burden to establish a probability of prevailing. Cross-Complainant submitted competent evidence supporting the alleged violations outlined within the allegations. (Decl., Mark Ferrera, ¶¶ 4-10.) Cross-Defendant did not submit any substantive evidence in connection with the motion. The only declaration that was submitted simply outlined attempts in service of documents. (Decl., Abril Saglio-Ruiz.) Instead, it appears that Cross-Defendant primarily relies upon the litigation privilege of Civ. Code § 47(b). However, the litigation privilege does not bar claims for violations of debt collection laws that regulate conduct in litigation. Moten v. Transworld Systems Inc . (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 691, 706; Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc . (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 340. Therefore, Cross-Complainant has met his burden to show a probability of prevailing on the merits of the allegations. Thus, Cross-Defendants anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entirety of Cross-Complaint is denied. The anti-SLAPP motion to strike the allegations noted above that do implicate protected activity is also denied. Cross-Complainant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: EC063728 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 18, 2024 TRIAL DATE: Disposed (8/16/21) CASE: Soni v. Cartograph, Inc. CASE NO.: EC063728 MOTION TO SET ASIDE/VACATE JUDGMENT AND STAY OF EXECUTION AND PROCEEDINGS MOVING PARTY : Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm RESPONDING PARTY : Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. SERVICE: Filed on June 14, 2024 OPPOSITION: Filed on July 3, 2024 REPLY: Filed on July 11, 2024 RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm seeks an order setting aside and vacating the August 16, 2021 Judgment in this case and all orders issued by Judge Ralph C. Hofer since November 25, 2020. Plaintiff also requests a stay of execution on the judgment in this case until this motion is ruled upon. BACKGROUND On March 18, 2015, Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Cartograph, Inc., Simplelayers, Inc., Timothy Tierney, and DOES 1-10. The Complaint asserted eight causes of action for: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Quantum Meruit 3. Money Had and Received 4. Book Account 5. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 6. Negligent Misrepresentation 7. Fraudulent Inducement to Enter into Contract 8. Breach of Guaranty On August 16, 2021, this Court entered Judgment in favor of Defendants and awarded attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $334,458.41. On October 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed an appeal as to the August 16, 2021 Judgment. The matter was finally disposed on August 2, 2023, wherein the Court of Appeal affirmed the August 16, 2021 Judgment. On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to set aside/vacate judgment and stay of execution and proceedings. On July 3, 2024, Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. (Defendants) filed an opposition. On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firms Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment and Stay of Execution and Proceedings is DENIED. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 663a, subdivision (a), A party intending to make a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment, as described in Section 663, shall file with the clerk and serve upon the adverse party a notice of his or her intention, designating the grounds upon which the motion will be made, and specifying the particulars in which the legal basis for the decision is not consistent with or supported by the facts, or in which the judgment or decree is not consistent with the special verdict, either: (1) After the decision is rendered and before the entry of judgment&(2) Within 15 days of the date of mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5, or service upon him or her by any party of written notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days after the entry of judgment, whichever is earliest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 663a(a).) A judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court, or the special verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and entitling the party to a different judgment: [¶](1) Incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the statement of decision shall be amended and corrected. [¶] (2) A judgment or decree not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict. (Code Civ. Proc., § 663.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff moves for an order setting aside and vacating the August 16, 2021 Judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 663a(a)(2). Plaintiff contends all orders issued by Judge Hofer after November 25, 2020 are void and should be vacated pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.4, subdivision (c)(1) because Judge Hofer took inconsistent positions with respect to his relationship with Attorney Jeffrey G. Sheldon in sworn declarations and it impacted his impartiality in this present case. Furthermore, Plaintiff contends Judge Hofer refused to recuse himself from this case when Plaintiff brought a Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.6 Preemptory Challenge and Motion to Disqualify in 2020 on the basis that Judge Hofer was presiding over case involving someone who had extensive litigation against his close and personal friend. Moreover, Plaintiff contends only after appeal and affirmance of his rulings on attorney fee and costs motions did Judge Hofer voluntarily recuse himself in the interest of justice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(i). As such, Plaintiff argues Judge Hofer must be deemed disqualified pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.6. Lastly, Plaintiff argues Judge Hofer should not have ruled on the sufficiency of his Statement of Disqualification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.3, subdivision (5)(c)(5). By contrast, Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to disclose the dispute between him and Attorney Sheldon occurred thirteen (13) years ago. Defendants also argue there is no evidence that Judge Hofer ever discussed Plaintiff with his friend. Similarly, Defendants contend in Judge Hofers order striking Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application seeking disqualification, he stated he had a past and casual relationship with Attorney Sheldon. On the other hand, Defendants contend Judge Hofers minute order recusing himself from the case, Siguo Su v. Sherry Lin, et. al. (Case No. 19GDCV00656) on July 28, 2020, states he was a close and personal friend of Jeffrey G. Sheridan and his family, so he appears to be discussing a different person than Attorney Sheldon. Likewise, Defendants assert there is no basis other than pure speculation to assume Judge Hofer recused himself due to a relationship with Attorney Sheldon, let alone create doubt as to his impartiality in handling this case. Moreover, Defendants argue Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application for disqualification raised no grounds for disqualification and was untimely, thus Judge Hofers order striking the application were proper under Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.4, subdivision (b). Additionally, Defendants contend the instant motion is untimely because it was filed outside the fifteen (15) day deadline. Finally, Defendants argue to the extent Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of Judge Hofers 2020 order striking the Ex Parte Application, it fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008. Here, the Court finds that the instant motion fails on both procedural and substantive grounds discussed more thoroughly below. First, Plaintiff seeks to set aside and vacate the August 16, 2021 Judgement. However, the Notice of Entry of Judgment was served on Plaintiffs counsel of record on August 25, 2021. (Soni Decl., ¶19n, 19r, Exs. 14, 18.) Thus, Plaintiff had until September 16, 2021 to seek to set aside or vacate the August 16, 2021 Judgment because it would have been fifteen (15) days from the service of the notice of entry. Further, the Court had until December 15, 2021 to move to set aside or vacate the judgment on its own pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 663a, subdivision (b). Next, the instant motion does not raise any arguments to suggest the August 16, 2021 is based on an incorrect legal conclusion or erroneous judgment inconsistent with the facts of this case. Neither does the motion raise any arguments indicating the judgment is inconsistent with a special verdict. Although Defendants do not make this argument, the case law supporting a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 663a stand for the proposition that such motion may only be brought on the grounds set forth in Code of Civil Procedure Section 663. In Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470, the court held A motion to vacate under section 663 may only be brought when the trial judge draws an incorrect legal conclusion or renders an erroneous judgment upon the facts found by it to exist. ( Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470, 477.) However, [i]n ruling on a motion to vacate the judgment the court cannot in any way change any finding of fact. ( Id. ) Moreover, Plaintiff cites to no other legal authority that would allow this Court to set aside or vacate the August 16, 2021 and other orders issued by Judge Hofer, let alone on the basis raised in the present motion, i.e., Judge Hofers alleged inconsistent statements concerning his relationship Attorney Sheldon and his voluntarily recusal due to purported impartiality. Code of Civil Procedure 170.4, subdivision (c)(1), states in pertinent part, If a statement of disqualification is filed after a trial or hearing has commenced by the start of voir dire, by the swearing of the first witness or by the submission of a motion for decision, the judge whose impartiality has been questioned may order the trial or hearing to continue, notwithstanding the filing of the statement of disqualification. The issue of disqualification shall be referred to another judge for decision as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 170.3, and if it is determined that the judge is disqualified, all orders and rulings of the judge found to be disqualified made after the filing of the statement shall be vacated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.4(c)(1).) Even though Plaintiff cites this statute in support of his contention that Judge Hofers Judgment and orders are void, there is no indication that Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application was filed under the circumstances set forth in Code of Civil Procedure 170.4, subdivision (c)(1). Last, assuming arguendo that Plaintiff was seeking reconsideration of the order to strike his Ex Parte Application for Disqualification on the basis that Judge Hofers inconsistent statements regarding his relationship with Attorney Sheldon warrants disqualification, the motion does not meet the requirements set forth in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008, subdivision (a), [w]hen an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008(a).)¿As it relates to new or different facts, circumstances, or law under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008, subdivision (a), the moving party must provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time.¿ ( Shiffer v. CBS Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 246, 255.) Furthermore, facts of which the party seeking reconsideration was aware at the time of the original ruling are not new or different. ( In re Marriage of Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468.)¿ In this instant case, Plaintiff does not appear to set forth new or different facts, or arguing that theres been a change in the law, and such motion would be untimely as it would not have been filed within the ten (10) days required under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firms Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment and Stay of Execution and Proceedings is DENIED. MOTION TO CORRECT THE JUDGMENT MOVING PARTY: Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY : Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm SERVICE: Filed on June 20, 2024 OPPOSITION: Filed on July 3, 2024 REPLY: Filed on July 9, 2024 RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. seek an order correcting the spelling of Plaintiff Surjit P. Sonis name in the final judgment. BACKGROUND On March 18, 2015, Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Cartograph, Inc., Simplelayers, Inc., Timothy Tierney, and DOES 1-10. The Complaint asserted eight causes of action for: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Quantum Meruit 3. Money Had and Received 4. Book Account 5. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 6. Negligent Misrepresentation 7. Fraudulent Inducement to Enter into Contract 8. Breach of Guaranty On August 16, 2021, this Court entered Judgment in favor of Defendants and awarded attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $334,458.41. On October 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed an appeal as to the August 16, 2021 Judgment. The matter was finally disposed on August 2, 2023, wherein the Court of Appeal affirmed the August 16, 2021 Judgment. On June 20, 2024, Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. (Defendants) filed the instant motion to correct the judgment. On July 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On July 9, 2024, Defendants filed a reply. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc.s Motion to Correct the Judgment is GRANTED. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, subdivision (a)(1), The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party , or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars ; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(a)(1).) Similarly, The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(d).) Essentially, [a] court of general jurisdiction has the power, after final judgment, and regardless of lapse of time, to correct clerical errors or misprisions in its records, whether made by the clerk, counsel or the court itself , so that the records will conform to and speak the truth. [Citations.] ( Ames v. Paley (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 668, 672.) DISCUSSION Here, Defendants contend there is a clerical error in the Final Judgment entered on August 16, 2021. Specifically, Defendants assert the Final Judgment contains a misspelling of Plaintiff Surjit P. Sonis name in the fourth paragraph on line 17. The fourth paragraph, line 17 spells Plaintiffs first name as Surgit, instead of Surjit. (Weisel Decl., ¶2, Ex. A.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues correction of the Final Judgment is both unnecessary and a wasted exercise because the judgment is void or voidable as a result of Judge Hofers voluntary self-recusal in the interests of justice. As addressed in the tentative for Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Judgment, Plaintiff fails to raise arguments pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 663 that supports setting aside or vacating the Final Judgment. Furthermore, Plaintiffs contention that Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, subdivision (d) only relates to errors made by the clerk or the Court is incorrect. As cited in the legal standard section of the tentative, California courts have interpreted Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, subdivision (d) to include errors by legal counsel. Thus, Defendants properly seek relief under Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, subdivision (d) in the instant motion. Lastly, Plaintiff does not refute that his first name is misspelled in the Final Judgment. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc.s Motion to Correct the Judgment is GRANTED. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES MOVING PARTY: Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY : Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm SERVICE: Filed on September 8, 2023 OPPOSITION: Filed on December 29, 2023 REPLY: Filed on January 5, 2024 RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. seek an order awarding the reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred on appeal and post-appeal in the amount of $109,021.00. BACKGROUND On March 18, 2015, Plaintiff Surjit P. Soni dba The Soni Law Firm (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Cartograph, Inc., Simplelayers, Inc., Timothy Tierney, and DOES 1-10. The Complaint asserted eight causes of action for: 1. Breach of Contract 2. Quantum Meruit 3. Money Had and Received 4. Book Account 5. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 6. Negligent Misrepresentation 7. Fraudulent Inducement to Enter into Contract 8. Breach of Guaranty On August 16, 2021, this Court entered Judgment in favor of Defendants and awarded attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $334,458.41. On October 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed an appeal as to the August 16, 2021 Judgment. The matter was finally disposed on August 2, 2023, wherein the Court of Appeal affirmed the August 16, 2021 Judgment. On September 8, 2023, Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. (Defendants) filed the instant motion for attorneys fees. On December 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On January 5, 2024, Defendants filed a reply. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc.s Motion for Attorneys Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $109,021.00. OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE The Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs objections to the declaration of Jessica Weisel. LEGAL STANDARD Neither party to the arbitration may recover costs or attorney's fees incurred in preparation for or in the course of the fee arbitration proceeding with the exception of the filing fee paid pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section. However, a court confirming, correcting, or vacating an award under this section may award to the prevailing party reasonable fees and costs incurred in obtaining confirmation, correction, or vacation of the award including, if applicable, fees and costs on appeal . (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6203(c).) DISCUSSION Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc. (Defendants) seek $109,021.00 in attorneys fees consisting of $86,946 in fees for litigation or collection efforts, $13,705.00 in fees for preparing the instant motion, and $9,000.00 in additional fees for filing a reply to the opposition. Here, the parties do not dispute Defendants were the prevailing parties on appeal and are entitled to attorneys fees and costs. However, Plaintiff contends the Court of Appeal only awarded Defendants costs on appeal. This argument is irrelevant because Defendants may also recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs associated with having to obtain confirmation of the arbitration award including appellate costs and fees. Defendants done just that by opposing Plaintiffs appeal of the August 16, 2021 Judgment that confirmed the arbitration award. Next, Plaintiff contends Defendants cannot recover attorneys fees because they were represented by pro bono counsel. The California case law does not support such contention. In Aerotek, Inc. v. Johnson Group Staffing Company, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 670, the court reiterated even attorneys who perform services pro bono may obtain reasonable attorney fees under a fee-shifting statute. ( Aerotek, Inc. v. Johnson Group Staffing Company, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 670, 683.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts Defendants are seeking recovery at excessive billing rates where the motion fails to provide adequate descriptions of the work performed and contain time entries that are blocked billed. As such, Plaintiff argues a negative lodestar of at least 30 percent should be placed on the billing rates requested. However, Defendants advance the declaration of their attorney Jessica Weisel, which attests to the prevailing market rates for appellate lawyers involving complex litigation issues. (Weisel Decl., ¶¶37-46.) Additionally, Weisel attests to the number of hours expended by each attorney and paralegal in this matter in connection to the preparing the response brief to the second appeal, holding a moot court, preparing for oral argument, and even engaging in settlement talks. ( Id. at ¶¶27-35.) Thus, Defendants describe the type of work that was performed and the associated hours expended to complete these tasks including preparing the present motion. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Defendants Timothy Tierney and Simplelayers, Inc. f/k/a Cartograph, Inc.s Motion for Attorneys Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $109,021.00. Dated: July 18, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23SMCV05222 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 18, 2024 CASE NUMBER 23SMCV05222 MOTION Motion for Summary Judgment MOVING PARTY Plaintiff American Express National Bank OPPOSING PARTY none MOVING PAPERS: Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment Memorandum of Points and Authorities Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Plaintiffs Evidence in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment BACKGROUND On November 3, 2023, Plaintiff American Express National Bank (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendant Vivian Flesch (Defendant) alleging the common counts of open book account and account stated. Defendant filed an answer to the complaint on December 4, 2023. Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment. Plaintiffs motion is unopposed. LEGAL STANDARD MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.] There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) [T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact . ( Ibid .) On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial. ( Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co . (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839 [cleaned up].) Further, the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court's evaluation of credibility. ( Id . at p. 840 [cleaned up]; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party].) DISCUSSION A. Open Book Account The elements of a common count are (1) statement of indebtedness in a certain sum; (2) consideration; and (3) nonpayment. ( Allen v. Powell (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 502, 510.) The term book account means a detailed statement which constitutes the principal record of one or more transactions between a debtor and a creditor arising out of a contract or some fiduciary relation, and shows the debits and credits in connection therewith, and against whom and in favor of whom entries are made, is entered in the regular course of business as conducted by such creditor or fiduciary, and is kept in a reasonably permanent form and manner and is (1) in a bound book, or (2) on a sheet or sheets fastened in a book or to backing but detachable therefrom, or (3) on a card or cards of a permanent character, or is kept in any other reasonably permanent form and manner. (Code Civ. Proc., § 337a, subd. (a).) A book account is open where a balance remains due on the account. ( Eloquence Corporation v. Home Consignment Center (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 655, 664665.) However, [t]he mere recording in a book of transactions or the incidental keeping of accounts under an express contract does not of itself create a book account. ( Id. at p. 666.) Further, [a]n open account results where the parties intend that the individual items of the account shall not be considered independently, but as a connected series of transactions, and that the account shall be kept open and subject to a shifting balance as additional related entries of debits and credits are made, until it shall suit the convenience of either party to settle and close the account, and where, pursuant to the original express or implied intention, there is but one single and indivisible liability arising from such series of related and reciprocal debits and credits. ( R.N.C. Inc. v. Tsegeletos (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 967, 972.) The essential elements of an account stated are: (1) previous transactions between the parties establishing the relationship of debtor and creditor; (2) an agreement between the parties, express or implied, on the amount due from the debtor to the creditor; (3) a promise by the debtor, express or implied, to pay the amount due. ( Leighton v. Forster (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 467, 491.) Plaintiff has provided evidence that on June 1, 1993, Defendant opened an American Express Gold Card Account number ending in x90000. (UMF Nos. 1, 13.) The Account is governed by the Cardmember Agreement, a physical copy of which Plaintiff transmitted to Defendant with the card. (UMF Nos. 2-3; 14-15.) By keeping and using the Account, Defendant agreed to be bound by the terms of the Cardmember Agreement. (UMF Nos. 4; 16.) Defendant used the Account to pay for various goods and services and/or obtain cash advances. (UMF Nos. 5; 17.) Further, pursuant to the Cardmember Agreement, Defendant is personally responsible for repaying Plaintiff for all charges, advances, fees and interest on the Account by making regular monthly payments. (UMF Nos. 6; 18.) Defendant failed to make the required monthly payments on the Account. (UMF Nos. 7; 19.) Plaintiff maintains an accounting of all credits and debits on the Account, which it sent to Defendant every month. (UMF Nos. 8; 20.) Defendants outstanding balance on the account is $29,227.51. (UMF Nos. 11; 23.) Therefore, Plaintiff has met its burden of establishing the prima facie elements of its cause of action for common counts open book account and account stated. Because Defendant has not opposed the Motion, Defendant has not met her burden of production to raise a triable issue of material fact. CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs unopposed motion for summary judgment. Further, the Court will enter the Order lodged on April 22, 2024, and orders Plaintiff to lodge a proposed Judgment in conformity with the Courts ruling on or before August 1, 2024. Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 18, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., VS. CASTRO Case Number: 23CVG-00362 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Terminating Sanctions: Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. moves for terminating sanctions by striking Defendant Vincent Castro’s answer. Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of $1,572.75 for each motion. Procedural Defect: As a procedural matter, this motion was served both via mail and email on May 9, 2024, and set for a hearing date of June 7, 2024. CCP § 1005(b) requires all moving papers be served 16 court days before the hearing. This notice period is extended by five calendar days if the motion is served by mail. Id. For service by email, the notice period is extended by two court days. CCP § 1010.6(a)(3). This timeframe is calculated by counting backwards from the hearing date but excluding the hearing date. CCP § 12c. Starting with the June 7, 2024, hearing date and counting backwards 16 court days (excluding the Court holiday of May 27, 2024) then five calendar days for out of state mailing this matter should have been served by mail no later than, May 4, 2024. For email the last day to serve the motion was April 24, 2024. The motion was served on May 7, 2024, and was untimely under either calculation. Based on insufficient statutory notice, the motion is denied. Merits of Motion: Even if the motion had been timely noticed, terminating sanctions are not warranted. Terminating sanctions are a “drastic penalty and should be used sparingly.” Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604. A terminating sanction should not generally be imposed by the court until less severe sanctions have been attempted and were unsuccessful. Id. No justification has been provided as to why terminating sanctions are appropriate in this context instead of lesser evidentiary or issue sanctions. Without additional evidence, terminating sanctions would be premature. The motion is DENIED. A proposed order was lodged with the Court which will be modified to reflect the denial. Review Hearing: This matter is also on calendar for review regarding trial re-setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends on setting it for trial no later than October 15, 2024. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discuss available trial dates.