Petition For Name Change Of Maria De Las Mercedes Rodriguez Navarro

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: C-60 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Matthew C. Braner CASE NO.: 37-2023-00006930-CU-MM-CTL CASE TITLE: WARD VS KRISTALLIS [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Medical Malpractice EVENT TYPE: Summary Judgment / Summary Adjudication (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Defendants Thanos Kristallis, DDS and San Diego Dental Health Center's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff Earl Ward did not file an opposition to Defendants' motion. Pursuant to this court's local rules, this failure to respond will be regarded as a concession that Defendants' motion has merit. (See San Diego Superior Court Local Rule 2.1.19, subd. (B).) In professional malpractice cases such as this, "expert opinion testimony is required to prove or disprove that the defendant performed in accordance with the prevailing standard of care [citation], except in cases where the negligence is obvious to laymen." (Kelley v. Trunk (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 519, 523; see also Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305.) "When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence." (Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 607.) Here, Defendants presents the expert declaration of Defendant Thanos Kristallis, DDS, to support their motion. Dr. Thanos is a Board-certified Prosthodontist licensed in California since 2017, with over 30 years of experience in the dental field. For purposes of summary judgment, Dr. Kristallis is qualified to offer expert testimony in relation to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants. Dr. Kristallis explains that Plaintiff presented for a consultation on March 15, 2021, had imaging done, and indicated a desire to have his lower teeth removed. He opines that Plaintiff's lower teeth were unsalvageable due to decay and periodontal disease, but his upper teeth showed good prognosis and could be restored with a fixed zirconia bridge. Dr. Kristallis opines the extractions were successfully performed on March 16, 2021, and when he next saw Plaintiff on July 19, 2021, he noted Plaintiff was healing well and showed no signs of inflammation or swelling. From October 26, 2021, to July 27, 2022, when Plaintiff last received treatment, Dr. Kristallis successfully continued the treatment described and agreed to at the consultation, including implants and the zirconia bridge. Thereafter, Dr. Kristallis did not see Plaintiff until October 31, 2022, when he arrived at his dental office without an appointment, complained about perceived looseness in his lower hybrid prosthesis, and demanded a refund. Although Dr. Kristallis offered to take radiographs and tighten the prosthesis, Plaintiff refused. In sum, Dr. Kristallis opines, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, Defendants complied with the standard of care with respect to Plaintiff's treatment from March 15, 2021, through October 31, 2022, when he last saw Plaintiff. Thus, Dr. Kristallis expert opinion is sufficient for Defendants to meet their moving burden on summary judgment. Event ID: 3107867 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 7 Page: 1 CASE TITLE: WARD VS KRISTALLIS [IMAGED] CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00006930-CU-MM-CTL The court will generally grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice case when the defendant's expert renders an unopposed expert opinion. (Jambazian v. Borden (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 836; see also, Willard v. Hagemeister (1981) 121 Cal. App. 3d 406, 409.) Here, Defendants' expert's opinion is unopposed. Accordingly, Defendants' unopposed motion for summary judgment is granted. The minute order is the order of the court with respect to Defendants' motion. Defendants are instructed to submit a revised proposed judgment that reflects the continued hearing date of their motion for summary judgment. Event ID: 3107867 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 7 Page: 2

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 13, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/14/2024 EVENT TIME: 08:30:00 AM DEPT.: C-74 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Blaine K. Bowman CASE NO.: 37-2023-00001430-CU-OE-CTL CASE TITLE: WILLIAMS VS GOLDENHEART ENTERPRISES LLC [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other employment EVENT TYPE: Demurrer / Motion to Strike CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: In light of Plaintiff's dismissal of the ninth cause of action, Defendant Goldenheart Enterprises, LLC dba Visiting Angels' demurrer to the ninth cause of action in Plaintiff's first amended complaint is off calendar. Event ID: 3100003 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 1 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL COURTHOUSE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 14, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/14/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: 1402 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CASE NO.: 37-2022-00051515-CU-CL-CTL CASE TITLE: LVNV FUNDING LLC VS BARTHOLOMEW [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other Collections EVENT TYPE: Discovery Hearing CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice is granted. Event ID: 3112767 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 10 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: C-72 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Marcella O McLaughlin CASE NO.: 37-2021-00043417-CU-PA-CTL CASE TITLE: BARUCH VS WADE [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: PI/PD/WD - Auto EVENT TYPE: Discovery Hearing CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion to Compel Discovery, 05/28/2024 Plaintiff's motions to compel further responses to form interrogatories and requests for production of documents are DENIED. Notice of a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories or requests for production of documents must be given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or a specific later date to which the parties have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300(c), 2031.310(c). The 45-day deadline is extended by 2 court days for electronic service. See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1010.6(a)(4)(B), 2016.050, 1013(g). This time limit is "mandatory and jurisdictional" in that it "renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them." Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410. In this case, defendant Alex Devin Wade served supplemental responses via email on March 5, 2024. (Morse Decl., ¶ 4.) Thus, plaintiff had until April 23, 2024 to file her motions to compel further responses. Plaintiff, however, did not file and serve her motions until May 28 and May 29 – i.e., over than one month later. (See Ohnoki Decl., ¶ 3; Ex. A.) Plaintiff argues that the motions are timely because defendant waived notice at an ex parte hearing held on March 20, 2024. This is not correct. While defendant waived notice of the court's ex parte ruling (ROA 97), there is no evidence that he waived his right to receive statutory notice of the motions to compel. See Code Civ. Proc. § 1019.5(a) ("When a motion is granted or denied, unless the court otherwise orders, notice of the court's decision or order shall be given by the prevailing party to all other parties or their attorneys, in the manner provided in this chapter, unless notice is waived by all parties in open court and is entered in the minutes."). Plaintiff also contends that defendant was provided notice of today's hearing at the March 20 ex parte hearing. The court disagrees. "Notices must be in writing[.]" Code Civ. Proc. § 1010. "Where written notice is required, oral notice will not suffice." In re Marriage of Lugo (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 427, 434. "The fact...that an opposing party has actual knowledge of a pending court proceeding does not excuse the moving party from the requirement of giving the written notice required by statute." Id. Here, because written notice of the motions was given more than 45 days plus two court days after the supplemental responses were served, the motions are untimely. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300(c), 2031.310(c). Plaintiff's request for monetary sanctions is denied in light of this ruling. Event ID: 3102106 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 9 Page: 1 CASE TITLE: BARUCH VS WADE [IMAGED] CASE NUMBER: 37-2021-00043417-CU-PA-CTL Event ID: 3102106 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 9 Page: 2

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 08:30:00 AM DEPT.: C-74 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Blaine K. Bowman CASE NO.: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other employment EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: The court addresses the evidentiary issues. Plaintiff's evidentiary objections are all OVERRULED. The court then rules as follows. Defendants Watkins Environmental, Inc., Pierce F. Barone and William Szymanski's motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Preliminarily, although Defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration, because the petition was filed in an existing lawsuit, the court treats Defendants' petition to compel arbitration as a motion to compel arbitration. See, Mar v. Perkins (2024) 321 Cal.Rptr.3d 268 at fn. 3. As such, there is no basis for Defendants' arguments that Plaintiff's opposition was untimely filed. Defendants seek to compel arbitration pursuant to the "AGREEMENT FOR AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT AND BINDING ARBITRATION" signed by both Plaintiff and Pierce F. Barone, President of WEI. As to the foundational issue Plaintiff raises, the court finds the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.) applies to the Agreement. Under §2 of the FAA: A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. Via the terms of Section 2 of the Agreement the parties expressly agreed that "[t]he FAA applies to this Agreement because WEI's business involves interstate commerce." The court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's arguments or authorities in opposition. Plaintiff fails to address this provision and neither of the authorities Plaintiff relies on involves a similar provision. In this circumstance, the court finds the FAA applies to the Agreement. As Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126 explains, [t]he court's role under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is . . . limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 719–20 (9th Cir.1999); see also Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 477–78 (9th Cir.1991). If the response is affirmative on both counts, then the Act requires the court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms. Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 1 CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] Chiron Corp., 207 F.3d at 1130. Plaintiff first argues that Defendants have not met their burden of establishing the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. "When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944. Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158 sets forth the applicable analysis under California law. The burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence: "Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the [motion or] petition, the [party seeking arbitration] bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061 (Rosenthal).) However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process. First, the moving party bears the burden of producing "prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy." (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061.) The moving party "can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature." (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 (Bannister)) . . . . If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion. If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. (See Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 219, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597.) The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement. (See Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 546, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 [never saw or signed agreement]; Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1065, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 695 (Fabian) [never given or signed contract]; Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1054, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 318 (Espejo) [did not recall seeing or signing document]; Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 781 (Ruiz) [did not recall signing agreement].) If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the moving party. (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061.) Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165-167. In its moving papers Defendants submit a copy of the Agreement with a signature on the line above the handwritten name "Frank Bernal Jr" [Plaintiff]. Under Gamboa, such evidence is sufficient to meet Defendants' burden of producing "prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy." Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to come forward with evidence challenging the authenticity of the agreement. Plaintiff submits evidence in the form of his own declaration wherein he states, in part: 4. I never received an arbitration agreement during my time working for WATKINS, nor did I receive or sign or read the at-will employment and arbitration agreement displayed in Exhibit A at any point during my employment with WATKINS. I was also never provided a copy of any arbitration agreement Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 2 CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] associated with WATKINS until my lawyer sent me the document displayed in Exhibit A. 5. Before I spoke with my counsel, I was not even familiar with the term "arbitration" and did not know what that term meant. 6. No one at WATKINS ever mentioned to me or explained to me the contents or the significance of an arbitration agreement. I also was never told by anyone at WATKINS that I was giving up my rights to bring a lawsuit in court. In fact, the term "arbitration" was never brought up throughout the entirety of my employment with WATKINS. The court finds this evidence sufficient to meet Plaintiff's burden. Thus, the burden shifts back to Defendants to "establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties." Defendants submit the Declaration of Kendall Barone, office administrator and custodian of records for WEI. Kendall Barone states, in part: 3. In my capacity as Office Administrator and custodian of records for WEI, I personally deliver to WEI employees, collect from WEI employees, and maintain employee forms and documents, including the Agreement For At-Will Employment And Binding Arbitration ("Arbitration Agreement") signed on March 18, 2022 by plaintiff, which is the subject of WEI's Petition. A true and correct copy of the Arbitration Agreement is attached as Exhibit l to this declaration. 4. It is WEI's and my regular custom and practice to meet with new and existing WEI employees in person to provide and ask them to read and sign important human resources documents including arbitration agreements. Since prior to 2021, I have done this with WEI employees at the time of their hire, as well as and during their employment when documents are updated. Immediately after WEI employees sign and return any documents to me, including arbitration agreements, it is WEI's and my regular custom and practice to place and maintain all documents signed by employees in their respective WEI personnel files. I performed this process with plaintiff when he was hired by WEI on April 28, 2021, and, again on March 21, 2022. 5. On April 28, 2021, when plaintiff was hired by WEI, I met with him in person at WEI's offices in San Diego. During this meeting, I handed plaintiff paper copies of WEI's new-hire packet documents which included the following forms: - Designation Of Beneficiary - Employee Acknowledgement Of Handbook - General Safety Manual Acknowledgment - Employment Eligibility Verification, Form I-9 - Acknowledgment Of Neubridg Sub Plan - Form W-4 - Employee's Withholding Allowance Certificate - Department of the Local Navy Population ID Card/Base Access Pass Registration - Agreement To Arbitrate Employment Disputes (signed by plaintiff April 28, 2021) 6. During my April 28, 2021 meeting with plaintiff, I provided plaintiff as much time as he needed to review these documents, and he did not indicate he needed more time or that he did not understand what he was reading and signing. He did not ask me any questions about the documents, and he was not pressured in any way to sign any document. At the time, I observed plaintiff review, sign, date, and place his printed name on these documents. He then returned the signed documents to me. True and correct copies of the documents he signed and returned to me on April 28, 2021, are attached to this declaration as Exhibits 2 through 10. 7. Thereafter, on March 18, 2022, I again met with plaintiff in person at WEI's offices to provide him paper copies of other and updated employment documents including the following: Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 3 CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] - Agreement For At-Will Employment And Binding Arbitration (Exhibit 1) - Acknowledgment Of Neubridg Sub Plan - Employee Acknowledgment Of General Safety Manual - Employee Acknowledgement Of Agreement For At-Will Employment And Binding Arbitration - Employee Acknowledgement Of Handbook 8. During my meeting with plaintiff on March 18, 2022, he was provided as much time as he needed to review these documents, including the Arbitration Agreement attached as Exhibit 1. He did not indicate he needed more time or that he did not understand what he was reading and signing. He did not ask me any questions about the Arbitration Agreement and he did not say he was unfamiliar with the term "arbitration." He was never pressured in any way to sign any of these documents. The signatures and printed writing on these documents, other than my signature, title, and dates at the bottom of the I-9 Form, are all plaintiffs. During this meeting, I observed plaintiff sign, date, and place his printed name on the documents attached as Exhibits 11 through 14, as well as the Arbitration Agreement attached as Exhibit 1. He returned these documents to me and I placed them in his WEI personnel file. The court considers Plaintiff's statement that he did not receive or sign the Agreement. The court considers the detailed nature of the Kendall Barone declaration regarding the WEI process applicable to the signing of human resource documents, including arbitration agreements, and that Kendall Barone expressly states that she observed Plaintiff sign documents on April 20, 2021, and also observed Plaintiff sign documents on March 18, 2021, which documents included the Agreement. The court also considers that Plaintiff does not expressly deny that the signature on the Agreement is that of Plaintiff. In these circumstances, the court finds Defendants meet their burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The court is not persuaded by the arguments Plaintiff raises or by the authorities Plaintiff relies on. The court overrules Plaintiff's evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Pierce F. Barone. The Declaration of Kendall Barone sufficiently sets forth the circumstances surrounding the signing of the Agreement. Plaintiff's reliance on the results in Ruiz and Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062 is misplaced because both involved circumstances unique to electronic signatures. In contrast, Kendall Barone expressly states that she witnessed Plaintiff sign the Agreement. Plaintiff's reliance on the result in Gamboa is also misplaced because in Gamboa, the employer "presented no evidence that Gamboa [the plaintiff] saw or signed the arbitration agreement because the court sustained Gamboa's objections to the Clinic's proffered evidence." Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 168. In contrast, Defendants submit evidence that Kendall Barone observed Plaintiff signing the Agreement and Plaintiff does not expressly dispute that it is Plaintiff's signature on the Agreement. Although Plaintiff requests an evidentiary hearing on this issue, Plaintiff provides no authority requiring such a hearing. Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394 holds to the contrary. Also, to the extent Plaintiff may raise arguments as to the propriety of Defendants submitting the Declaration of Kendall Barone, Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047 specifically allows for Defendants to submit this declaration in reply. Plaintiff next argues that the Agreement is unconscionable and unenforceable as a result. Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223 explains, [u]nconscionability consists of both procedural and substantive elements. The procedural element addresses the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. (See Armendariz, at p. 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669; Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1071, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 63 P.3d 979 [procedural unconscionability "generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion"].) Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement's actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided. (Armendariz, at p. 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669; Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates v. Beta Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 330.) A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be "so one-sided as to 'shock the conscience.' " (24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 4 CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] Court, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1213, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 533.) The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 972, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 938 P.2d 903; Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates v. Beta Healthcare Group, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 330.) Both procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability must be shown, but "they need not be present in the same degree" and are evaluated on " 'a sliding scale.' " (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745, 6 P.3d 669.) "[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa." (Ibid.) As indicated, procedural unconscionability requires oppression or surprise. " 'Oppression occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, surprise where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form.' " Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005). Pinnacle, 55 Cal.4th at 246-247. Plaintiff claims procedural unconscionability based on the same arguments raised as to the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. The court finds, at best, such circumstances establish a low level of procedural unconscionability. On the issue of substantive unconscionability Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is one-sided because it excludes claims from arbitration that Defendants are more likely to bring against Plaintiff but requires Plaintiff to arbitrate virtually all claims. The provision Plaintiff relies on is section 3(b)(ii) of the Agreement. The pertinent text of section 3 reads: 3. Claims Subject to Arbitration. a. Covered Claims. . . . b. Uncovered Claims. The only exceptions to the requirement for mediation and binding arbitration are: (i) Claims by Employee alleging sexual harassment and/or sexual assault; claims arising under the National Labor Relations Act brought before the National Labor Relations Board; claims for benefits under the California Workers' Compensation Act; claims for unemployment or disability benefits with the California Employment Development Department; and any other claims that may not be compelled to arbitration under applicable state or federal law. (ii) Claims by WEI for injunctive or other equitable relief, including without limitation claims for unfair competition and the use or unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information, for which WEI may seek and obtain relief from a court of competent jurisdiction. The court finds, by its terms, Section 3 excludes from arbitration both claims more likely to be brought by Plaintiff as well as claims more likely to be brought by Defendants. Such circumstances do not support a finding that the Agreement is so one-sided as to shock the conscience. Also on the issue of substantively unconscionability, Plaintiff argues the Agreement impermissibly includes a class/collective action waiver. Plaintiff provides no authority to support this argument and such argument is contrary to Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1612, which upholds the validity of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. The court finds Plaintiff fails to establish any substantive unconscionability. Under Pinnacle and the authorities set forth above, Plaintiff must show both procedural and substantive unconscionability to defeat enforcement of the Agreement. Because Plaintiff fails to establish any substantive Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 5 CASE TITLE: BERNAL VS WATKINS CASE NUMBER: 37-2023-00033831-CU-OE-CTL ENVIRONMENTAL, INC [IMAGED] unconscionability, the court finds Plaintiff fails to meet Plaintiff's burden of proving unconscionability. See also, Bigler v. Harker School (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 727, 736. The parties both raise issues as to the arbitration of Plaintiff's Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) claims. Plaintiff does not dispute that Plaintiff's individual PAGA claims are subject to arbitration. See, Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639; Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104. The court is not persuaded by Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's representative PAGA claims should be dismissed. Such result is directly contrary to Adolph. Instead, the court exercises its discretion in favor of staying Plaintiff's representative PAGA claims pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiff's individual PAGA claims. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is GRANTED as to the first through eighth causes of action and the court stays this case as to these causes of action pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiff's individual PAGA claims. 9 U.S.C. § 3. As to the remaining causes of action, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff's ninth cause of action for "SEXUAL HARASSMENT, DISCRIMINATION, HOSTILE ENFIRONMENT, AND CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF FEHA" tenth cause of action for "CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY" and eleventh cause of action for "ASSAULT AND BATTERY" are expressly excluded from arbitration pursuant to Section 2(b)(i) of the Agreement (set forth above). Defendants offer no argument in reply on this issue. The court finds Plaintiff establishes that these three sexual harassment/assault-based causes of action are excluded from arbitration pursuant to Section 2(b)(i). Accordingly, Defendants' motion is DENIED as to the ninth, tenth and eleventh causes of action. In light this ruling the court does not reach the parties' arguments as to the applicability of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA). As Defendants' motion is DENIED as to the ninth, tenth and eleventh causes of action, this matter shall proceed as to these causes of action only. If this tentative ruling is confirmed the Minute Order will be the final order of the court and the parties shall not submit any further order on this motion. Unless the ruling(s) above indicate that an appearance is necessary, parties who wish to submit, who are satisfied with the above tentative ruling(s), and/or who do not otherwise wish to argue the motion(s) are encouraged to give notice to the Court and each other of their intention not to appear. Event ID: 3100354 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 3 Page: 6

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL COURTHOUSE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 14, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/14/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: 1402 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CASE NO.: 37-2024-00005982-CL-CL-CTL CASE TITLE: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA VS KASHOU [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Limited CASE TYPE: Rule 3.740 Collections EVENT TYPE: Discovery Hearing CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Plaintiff's Motion to Deem Facts Admitted is granted. The Court will sign the proposed judgment consistent with this ruling. Event ID: 3120293 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 2 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL COURTHOUSE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 14, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/14/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: 1402 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CASE NO.: 37-2023-00038621-CL-CL-CTL CASE TITLE: CAPITAL ONE NA VS MORRIS [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Limited CASE TYPE: Rule 3.740 Collections EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Plaintiff's request for Judicial Notice is granted. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted. The Court will sign the proposed judgment consistent with this ruling. Event ID: 3114344 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 6 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL COURTHOUSE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: 1402 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CASE NO.: 37-2010-00088694-CL-CL-CTL CASE TITLE: CHRYSLER FINANCIAL SERVICES AMERICAS LLC VS. ROMERO-MARTINEZ [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Limited CASE TYPE: Rule 3.740 Collections EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Judgment is granted. The Court will sign the proposed amended judgment consistent with this ruling. Event ID: 3117169 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 18 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL COURTHOUSE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:00:00 AM DEPT.: 1402 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CASE NO.: 37-2023-00049192-CU-CL-CTL CASE TITLE: KURTIN PROPERTIES INC VS TRUAX [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other Collections EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Application of Bradley J. Dixon to appear Pro Hac Vice for Defendants is granted. Event ID: 3125557 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 11 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 10:30:00 AM DEPT.: C-68 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Richard S. Whitney CASE NO.: 37-2022-00022203-CU-OE-CTL CASE TITLE: WEASON VS PLASTIC EXPRESS [E-FILE] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Other employment EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: TENTATIVE RULINGS: (1) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT and (2) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS are GRANTED. The Court will adopt as its own the proposed order filed on May 24, 2024. A copy of the executed order will be available for counsel to pick-up after Wednesday, June 26, 2024. Event ID: 3074409 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 26 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 20, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/21/2024 EVENT TIME: 08:30:00 AM DEPT.: C-74 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Blaine K. Bowman CASE NO.: 37-2022-00032064-CU-PA-CTL CASE TITLE: LEFEBVRE VS H&S TRANSPORT SERVICES LLC [IMAGED] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: PI/PD/WD - Auto EVENT TYPE: Motion Hearing (Civil) CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Plaintiffs' motion to compel the deposition of Defendant Shelley Renae Littlejohn is GRANTED. CCP § 2025.450(a). The court orders Defendant Shelley Renae Littlejohn to appear for deposition, either in person or virtually, at a mutually agreeable time and place, within 20 days of this ruling. Plaintiffs' request for sanctions is GRANTED IN PART as against Defendant Shelley Renae Littlejohn. CCP § 2025.450(g)(1). The court reduces the sanctions sought by $700.00 ($350.00/hour x 2 hours) because Littlejohn disputes only the imposition of sanctions. The court finds sanctions of $2,489.20 reasonable and awards sanctions in this amount. Defendant Shelley Renae Littlejohn shall pay sanctions of $2,489.20 to Plaintiffs within 20 days of this ruling. The court is not persuaded by Littlejohn's arguments against the imposition of sanctions. It is undisputed that Littlejohn did not attend the deposition as noticed. California Rule of Court, rule 3.1348 specifically allows for the imposition of sanctions even though no opposition was filed. Plaintiffs' request for sanctions as against the Law Offices of Brian P. Smith & Associates and Christopher D. Anderson is DENIED. If this tentative ruling is confirmed the Minute Order will be the final order of the court and the parties shall not submit any further order on this motion. Unless the ruling(s) above indicate that an appearance is necessary, parties who wish to submit, who are satisfied with the above tentative ruling(s), and/or who do not otherwise wish to argue the motion(s) are encouraged to give notice to the Court and each other of their intention not to appear. Event ID: 3141867 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 2 Page: 1

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HALL OF JUSTICE TENTATIVE RULINGS - June 19, 2024 EVENT DATE: 06/20/2024 EVENT TIME: 09:30:00 AM DEPT.: C-71 JUDICIAL OFFICER:Gregory W Pollack CASE NO.: 37-2022-00032225-CU-CR-CTL CASE TITLE: CRUZ VS AMERICAN RUGBY INVESTMENTS LLC [E-FILE] CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Civil Rights EVENT TYPE: Demurrer / Motion to Strike CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Demurrer, 06/09/2023 The matter shall be heard at oral argument. No tentative ruling will be issued. Event ID: 3099500 TENTATIVE RULINGS Calendar No.: 7 Page: 1