Airmont Trust V. Docs Medical Group, Rejeev Sindhwani

Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Monday, July 15, 2024, Line 8. PLAINTIFF JANE KANTER AND BRYON COOPER's APPLICATION AND HEARING FOR RIGHT TO ATTACH ORDER. Plaintiffs Jane Kanter and Byron Cooper's application for right to attach is granted and denied in part. The application is denied as to Jane Kanter. The evidence indicates that she acted as counsel for defendant Grail Partners LLC, failed to comply with CRPC 1.8.1 and the restated promissory note is voidable as to her. Plaintiff may be able to pursue a restitution claim. The application is granted as to Byron Cooper. Byron Cooper's claim is one upon which attachment may be issued, the amount owed is readily ascertainable, he establishes the probable validity of the claim, and the application is sought for a proper purpose. Fergus v. Songer (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 552, 574 indicates that he has an independent right to enforce the agreement notwithstanding co-plaintiff's alleged violation of CRPC 1.8.1. None of defendants' other affirmative defenses has merit. Plaintiff Cooper to provide a judicial council form of order and email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing. The order shall provide for attachment for $1,260,920. Plaintiff Cooper shall also post an undertaking of $10,000. Plaintiff shall also prepare an additional proposed order setting out the above and email it to contestdept302tr@sftc. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RBU)

Case Number: 24TRCV00223 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B TONY BARBARINI, Plaintiff, Case No.: 24TRCV00223 vs. [Tentative] RULING AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Defendant. Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Responding Party: Plaintiff Tony Barbarini (1) Demurrer to First Amended Complaint (2) Motion to Strike The Court considered the moving and opposition papers. RULING The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fifth cause of action in the FAC. The motion to strike is DENIED. Defendant is ordered to file an answer within twenty days. BACKGROUND On January 23, 2024, Tony Barbarini filed a complaint against American Honda Motor Co., Inc. for (1) violation of Civil Code §1793.2(d), (2) violation of Civil Code §1793.2(b); (3) violation of Civil Code §1793.2(a)(3); (4) breach of implied warranty of merchantability; and (5) fraudulent inducement concealment. On April 24, 2024, plaintiff filed a FAC. LEGAL AUTHORITY Demurrer When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228. A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747. Strike The court may, upon a motion . . . , or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP §436(b). CCP §431.10 states: (a) A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense. (b) An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following: (1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense. (2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense. (3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint. (c) An immaterial allegation means irrelevant matter as that term is used in Section 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP §437. DISCUSSION Demurrer Defendant American Honda demurs to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment in the FAC on the ground that it fails to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. The FAC alleges that on March 5, 2022, plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with defendant Honda regarding a 2022 Honda Accord. FAC, ¶6. The warranty contract contained various warranties, including bumper-to-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty, emission warranty. Id., ¶7. 5 th cause of action for fraudulent inducement - concealment The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of fact. Hambridge v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162 (citation omitted). [T]o establish fraud through nondisclosure or concealment of facts, it is necessary to show the defendant was under a legal duty to disclose them. OCM Principal Opportunities Fund v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal. App. 4th 835, 845. Nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud when: (1) there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties; (2) the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal. App. 4th 803, 831. Rules of specifically pleading how, when, where, to whom, and by what means, misrepresentations were communicated, is intended to apply to affirmative misrepresentations, and not to concealment. See Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1384. Under this cause of action, the FAC alleges that the subject vehicle contains a defective computerized driver-assisting safety system, which includes adaptive cruise control, lane departure warnings and steering inputs, and autonomous braking (meant to avoid front-end collisions by detecting vehicle speed and the speed of other vehicles and objects on the road and can automatically deploy the brakes to avoid a front-end collision). Honda calls this computerized driver-assisting safety system, Honda Sensing. It relies on a radar sensor, an interior camera, along with computers and other technology. The autonomous braking system within Honda Sensing is called Collision Mitigation Braking System (or CMBS). FAC, ¶64. The Sensing system suffers from a defect that causes the various subsystems within it to malfunction dangerously while the vehicles are driven. This defect impedes the systems ability to reliably and accurately detect and appropriately respond to conditions on the roadway, causing malfunctions of the adaptive cruise control, the lane-departure system, and CMBS. Id., ¶65. As a result of the Sensing defect, Honda vehicles brake abruptly even though there is nothing around that risks a collision, warning lights display without explanation, brakes deploy seemingly randomly, and parts of the system malfunction. These malfunctions pose a safety risk. Additionally, the speed of the vehicle may abruptly change and warnings may distract the driver. Id., ¶66. Hondas response has been that no repairs are available. Id., ¶67. Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to plead that it concealed or suppressed a material fact regarding the Sensing Defect that plaintiff relied on in purchasing the subject vehicle. Also, defendant argues, plaintiff failed to establish a duty to disclose, as no fiduciary relationship exists, and defendant did not have exclusive knowledge nor engage in active concealment. Defendant further argues that plaintiff fails to plead defendants intent to deceive plaintiff. Also, defendant contends, plaintiff cannot plausibly claim to be unaware of the concealed fact as the operative facts underlying the alleged sensing defect were publicly available through multiple sources. Defendant further asserts that the claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine. In opposition, plaintiff argues that they have pled all the elements sufficiently. They also argue, citing to Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. , that the economic loss rule does not bar the claim and arises from conduct wholly distinct from Song-Beverly Act violations. Plaintiffs further contend that the Sensing defect is a material fact, which poses safety risks. Also, plaintiffs assert, defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts. Plaintiffs further argue that a transactional relationship is not required under California law for the manufacturer to have a duty to disclose. The Court rules as follows: The Court finds that the allegations are sufficient to support the elements at the pleading stage for fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff alleges that defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact. See FAC, ¶¶72, 75, 82, 83. Plaintiff alleges that defendant had a duty to disclose the fact. See FAC, ¶81. See OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal. App. 4 th 835, 859 (Under California law, a vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers, but also to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold.); see also Khan v. Shiley Inc. (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 848, 858 ([A] manufacturer of a product may be liable for fraud when it conceals material product information from potential users.). Plaintiff alleges that defendant intentionally concealed the fact with an intent to defraud. See FAC, ¶82. The Court can infer that defendant placed the vehicle into the stream of commerce, presumably for profit. Plaintiff was unaware of the fact and he would not have purchased the vehicle, had he known of such defects and sustained damages. See FAC, ¶84. The Court also finds that the economic loss rule does not bar the cause of action. [W]here a purchasers expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he bought is not working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he has suffered only 'economic' losses.' This doctrine hinges on a distinction drawn between transactions involving the sale of goods for commercial purposes where economic expectations are protected by commercial and contract law, and those involving the sale of defective products to individual consumers who are injured in a manner which has traditionally been remedied by resort to the law of torts. The economic loss rule requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise. Quite simply, the economic loss rule 'prevent[s] the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988 (citations omitted). [W]hen one party commits a fraud during the contract formation or performance, the injured party may recover in both contract and tort. Harris v. Atlantic Richfield (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4 th 70, 78 (citation omitted). See also Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal. 4 th 543, 552 (Tort damages have been permitted in contract cases where . . . the contract was fraudulently induced. . . . The duty that gives rise to tort liability is either completely independent of the contract or arises from conduct which is both intentional and intended to harm.) (citations omitted) and Fassberg Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2007) 152 Cal. App. 4 th 720, 757 (A plaintiff seeking to recover damages for economic loss caused by fraud must show that the plaintiff actually relied on the defendants misrepresentation or nondisclosure, that the reliance was reasonable, and that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result.) (citations omitted). Thus, tort damages are permitted in contract cases where the contract has been fraudulently induced, which is what plaintiff alleges. Plaintiff alleges that had the true facts been disclosed, he would not have entered into the contract at all, which is not the same as a mere breach of contract. Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED. Motion to Strike Defendant requests that the Court strike prayer for punitive damages. The motion is DENIED in light of the ruling on the demurrer to the fraudulent concealment cause of action. ORDER The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent concealment in the FAC. The motion to strike is DENIED. The Court orders Plaintiff to keep time records that correctly note time spend on non-Song-Beverly claims, such as this demurrer that attacks only the non Song Beverly claim, as potential attorneys fees may not be awarded for claims for which there is no right to an award of attorneys fees. Therefore, the Court expects that the time records shall be kept so that such time may b properly identified. Defendant is ordered to file an answer within twenty days. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of ruling.

Case Number: 23STCV25671 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 26 07/16/24 Dept. 26 Rolf Treu, Judge presiding DTLB LOFTS ASSOCIATION V. TERRANCE LAWRENCE, et al. ( 23STCV25671 ) Counsel for Plaintiff/moving party: Steven A. Roseman, Sean D. Allen, and Andrew M. Jun (Roseman Law, APC) Counsel for Defendant/opposing party: N/A REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT ( filed 05/07/24) TENTATIVE RULING The Court grants entry of default judgment. Discussion On October 20, 2023, Plaintiff DTLB Lofts Association (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Terrance Lawrence (Lawrence) and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, alleging causes of action for: (1) Foreclosure of Lien; (2) Breach of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, and (3) Common CountsAccount Stated. This action arises from Defendants failure to pay homeowners association assessments and related charges as to real property located at 433 Pine Avenue, Unit 304, Long Beach, CA 90802. On March 27, 2024, default was entered against Defendant. Now, Plaintiff moves for entry of default judgment against Defendant. ANALYSIS I. CRC 3.1800 1. Use of JC Form CIV-100 YES 2. Dismissal or judgment of non-parties to the judgment YES 3. Declaration of non-military status for each defendant YES 4. Summary of the case YES 5. 585(d) declarations/admissible evidence in support YES 6. Exhibits (as necessary) YES 7. Interest computation (as necessary) YES 8. Cost memorandum YES 9. Request for attorney fees (Local Rule 3.214) YES 10. Proposed Judgment YES DAMAGES REQUESTED: $17,877.17 (Consistent with complaint.) INTEREST: $0.00 ATTORNEY FEES: $9,700.50 COSTS: $2,159.79 TOTAL: $29,737.46 Plaintiff has complied with all CRC requirements. The court grants the request for entry of default judgment against Defendant Terrance Lawrence.

23CV042138: GRANADOS vs KAPOOR 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) in Department 15 Tentative Ruling - 07/17/2024 Peter Borkon The Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and / or Default Judgment filed by Sanjeev Kapoor on 06/25/2024 is Denied. Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment is DENIED. This case was filed on August 29, 2023. Plaintiff purportedly served Defendant with the summons and complaint, via substitute service, on September 30, 2023. Plaintiff had Defendant’s default entered on January 31, 2024 and obtained default judgment against Defendant on April 8, 2024. Defendant filed this motion on June 25, 2024. Defendant denies that he was served with the summons and complaint via substitute service. However, Defendant fails to demonstrate that the default and default judgment were taken against him as a result of his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. As evidenced by Defendant’s declaration, he was aware of this lawsuit on January 16, 2024, and he received a complete copy of the Complaint from the court clerk’s office on January 22, 2024. That was nine days prior to entry of his default. However, Defendant apparently believed, based on his prior experience in small claims court, that he did not need to file any response to the Complaint, but instead could simply appear at the next scheduled hearing date. Defendant didn’t consult an attorney about this case until May 22, nearly a month after he received notice of the entry of default judgment on April 26. (See Defendant’s declaration at paragraphs 21 and 42.) Before a party can obtain relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), he must show that in arranging for his defense, he exercised such reasonable diligence as a man of ordinary prudence would. (See Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413.) One who voluntarily represents himself is not entitled to “turn back the clock if the experiment yields an adverse result.” (Id.) Instead, when a litigant accepts the risk of proceeding without counsel, he or she is stuck with the outcome and has no greater opportunity to cast off an unfavorable judgment that he or she would if represented by counsel. (Id.) The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the default judgment is void based on Plaintiff’s failure to serve Defendant with a damages statement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11. This case does not seek damages for a personal injury or wrongful death. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege or seek any such damages, nor did the default judgment award any. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the default judgment did NOT award any damages for emotional distress damages; instead, it found any such claims “not supported by law or evidence” and declined to award those damages. Finally, Defendant fails to provide legal authority that Plaintiff’s failure to serve the January 23, 2024 Case Management Order on him is a basis to vacate the default or default judgment. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV042138: GRANADOS vs KAPOOR 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) in Department 15

22CV006750: JAMJOUM vs AFC CAL, LLC, et al. 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default (CCP 473.5) filed by Vahid Farahani (Defendant) in Department 20 Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2024 Karin Schwartz The Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default filed by Vahid Farahani on 05/30/2024 is Granted. Defendant Farahani’s (Farahani) California Civil Code (CCP) § 473.5 Motion to Set Aside Default and for Leave to Defend is GRANTED based on the evidence that he did not receive actual notice in time to defend against the action. The Court does not reach the alternative grounds set forth in Farahani’s motion. FACTS On February 9, 2022, Plaintiff Numan Saleh Jamjoum (Jamjoum) filed the present lawsuit. The Proof of Service in the Court’s file, of which the Court takes judicial notice, purports to reflect “substitute service” on a “Jane Doe” at Cherry Street address in Visalia on or about March 17, 2022 by a registered process server. The Request for Entry of Default, filed on or about July 14, 2023, of which the Court takes judicial notice, reflects service by first class mail on Farahani at the Cherry Street address by Plaintiff himself. Farahani submitted a declaration asserting, inter alia, that he has never lived at the Cherry Street address, which is the address for his sister. (Farahani Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) Farahani’s sister forwarded the summons to Farahani, but he does not remember receiving the complaint, or notice of the case management conference, among other documents. (Farahani Decl., ¶ 6.) Farahani thought the dispute concerned his previous employer. (Farahani Decl., ¶ 7.) Farahani made some efforts, including going to the Hayward courthouse, to learn more about the case, but ultimately concluded that he did not need to take action to avoid jeopardy. (Farahani Decl., ¶¶ 8- 9.) He did not receive notice that default had been entered against him. (Farahani Decl., ¶ 11.) However, when he continued to receive notices about the case, he consulted an attorney, leading to the present motion. (Farahani Decl., ¶ 12). ANALYSIS Default must be set aside where when service of summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action. (CCP § 473.5.) Actual notice requires the “genuine knowledge of the party litigant.” (Rosenthal v. Garner (1983) 142 Cal. App. 3d 891, 895.) Farhani’s declaration establishes an entitlement to relief under CCP § 473.5. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED and the default shall be set aside. Farhani shall file his response to the complaint within 10 days of this order. The Court is setting a Case Management Conference at the date and time below. The prove-up hearing is vacated. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 22CV006750: JAMJOUM vs AFC CAL, LLC, et al. 07/16/2024 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default (CCP 473.5) filed by Vahid Farahani (Defendant) in Department 20 The Default Prove Up Hearing scheduled for 07/23/2024 is vacated . Case Management Conference is scheduled for 09/12/2024 at 3:00 PM in Department 20 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse. Updated Case Management Statements must be filed in compliance with Rule of Court 3.725 on Judicial Council Form CM-110. Unless ordered otherwise, remote appearances by Zoom (videoconference) are permitted for all law and motion, case management hearings, and pretrial hearings in Dept. 20. Trials are held in person unless all parties agree to be remote.

MEMBERS 1ST VS. ESTATE OF SMITH, ET AL. Case Number: CVG21-0000494 This matter is on calendar for review of the case. The Court notes that the matter is on calendar on Monday, July 22, 2024 at 1:30 p.m. in Department 23 for hearing on a Motion to Approve Stipulation for Judgment Entered in Civil Case and Approval of Motion to Affix Attorney’s Fees as an Element of Costs in Civil Judgment. The July 22, 2024 hearing is confirmed. A future review hearing will be calendared on July 22, 2024. Today’s review hearing is dropped from calendar. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

JONES, ET AL. VS. TAYLOR Case Number: 22CV-0201290 This matter is on calendar trial setting. The Court designates this matter as a Plan III case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than December 16, 2024. Plaintiffs have posted jury fees but Defendant has not. Defendant is granted 10 days leave to post jury fees. A failure to post jury fees in that time will be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 22STCV02754 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 19 After full consideration of the papers filed and oral argument at the hearing, Prospective Interveners Kyun Kyu Jung aka Brian K. Jung, Bongyong Song, and Sung Eun Lees unopposed Motion for Leave to File Complaint in Intervention is GRANTED. The Court signs the proposed order filed on June 18, 2024 after indicating that Prospective Interveners Kyun Kyu Jung aka Brian K. Jung, Bongyong Song, and Sung Eun Lee must formally file the Verified Complaint in Intervention within 5 court days. On the Court's own motion, the Case Management Conference is CONTINUED TO September 17, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. Counsel for Moving Parties to give notice. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is a fraud action. In the verified First Amended Complaint (FAC), Plaintiff Cynthia D. Brown-Lee (Plaintiff) brings suit against Defendant Guy Gary (Defendant) alleging the following causes of action: 1. Intentional Misrepresentation Deceit; 2. Fraud; and 3. False Personation and Cheats. The FAC alleges that Defendant fraudulently induced Plaintiff to execute a quitclaim deed transferring to Defendant real property with APN 5116-016-013 (the Subject Property). Prospective Interveners Kyun Kyu Jung aka Brian K. Jung, Bongyong Song, and Sung Eun Lee (hereafter, Prospective Intervenors) filed the instant Motion for Leave to File Complaint in Intervention (the Motion). GROUNDS FOR MOTION Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 387, subdivision (b), Prospective Intervenors move to intervene on the ground that they are the owners of the real property at issue and seek to expunge the lis pendens recorded by Plaintiff. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE The Court GRANTS Prospective Intervenors unopposed request to take judicial notice of Exhibits 1-3. (See Evid. Code, § 452(h); see Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A . (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264, disapproved of on other grounds in Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264 [pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (h), courts have taken judicial notice of the existence and recordation of real property records, including deeds of trust, when the authenticity of the documents is not challenged, because [t]he official act of recordation and the common use of a notary public in the execution of such documents assure their reliability, and the maintenance of the documents in the recorder's office makes their existence and text capable of ready confirmation, thereby placing such documents beyond reasonable dispute.].) The Court notes that the fact a court may take judicial notice of a recorded deed, or similar document, does not mean it may take judicial notice of factual matters stated therein. ( Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106.) In Poseidon , the Court of Appeal held that, although& it would have been improper to take judicial notice of the truth of statements of fact recited within the documents, the trial court did not err in taking judicial notice of the effect of the recorded document when the validity of the document was not in dispute and the effect being judicially noticed could not be clearer and was not reasonably subject to dispute. ( Id. at 1117-1118.) DISCUSSION As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not oppose the instant Motion, effectively consenting to the Court granting it. (See Cal. R. Ct., 8.54(c) [A failure to oppose a motion may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion.].) Code of Civil Procedure section 387 provides, in part, that: (b) An intervention takes place when a nonparty, deemed an intervenor, becomes a party to an action or proceeding between other persons by doing any of the following: (1) Joining a plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint. (2) Uniting with a defendant in resisting the claims of a plaintiff. (3) Demanding anything adverse to both a plaintiff and a defendant. (c) A nonparty shall petition the court for leave to intervene by noticed motion or ex parte application. The petition shall include a copy of the proposed complaint in intervention or answer in intervention and set forth the grounds upon which intervention rests. (d) (1) The court shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if either of the following conditions is satisfied: (A) A provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene. (B) The person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that persons ability to protect that interest, unless that persons interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties. (2) The court may, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both. (e) If leave to intervene is granted by the court, the intervenor shall do both of the following: (1) Separately file the complaint in intervention, answer in intervention, or both. (2) Serve a copy of the order, or notice of the courts decision or order, granting leave to intervene and the pleadings in intervention as follows: (A) A party to the action or proceeding who has not yet appeared shall be served in the same manner for service of summons pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 415.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part 2. (B) A party who has appeared in the action or proceeding, whether represented by an attorney or not represented by an attorney, shall be served in the same manner for service of summons pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 415.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part 2, or in the manner provided by Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1010) of Title 14 of Part 2. (Code Civ. Proc., § 387(b)-(d).) Code of Civil Procedure section 405.30 provides, in relevant part: At any time after notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party, or any nonparty with an interest in the real property affected thereby, may apply to the court in which the action is pending to expunge the notice. However, a person who is not a party to the action shall obtain leave to intervene from the court at or before the time the party brings the motion to expunge the notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.30.) Here, the Court finds that Prospective Intervenors may intervene as a matter of right. In the [Proposed] Verified Complaint In Intervention, (Dina A. Ariza Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. A), Prospective Intervenors allege that they have ownership interests in the real property that is the subject of the action. (See, e.g ., [Proposed] Verified Complaint In Intervention, ¶¶ 1-3, 5, 7-13.) Given the allegations and relief sought in the FAC, the Court finds that Prospective Intervenors are so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede their ability to protect their ownership interests. Thus, the Court GRANTS the Motion.