Maria Sloane V. Juan Naranjo Rodas, Mark Zakharov

C22-00633 CASE NAME: TOM JONG VS. JOHN MUIR HEALTH *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: TO AMEND COMPLAINT FILED BY: JONG, TOM *TENTATIVE RULING:* Plaintiffs move under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.13 for leave to amend their first amended complaint to add prayers for punitive damages. The motion is denied. This case arises from the tragic death of plaintiffs’ daughter during liver resection surgery. The case started as a broadside attack alleging murder, manslaughter, wrongful death, medical malpractice, fraud, and other such causes of action. After a number of demurrers and motions to strike, plaintiffs’ case now stands pared down to a single theory of liability – namely fraud, based on allegations that defendants misrepresented the suitability of John Muir Hospital and the personnel involved for this class of surgery, in general and more specifically in comparison to alternative facilities such as SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 07/11/2024 Stanford. Despite this severely constricted substantive scope of the lawsuit, plaintiffs’ several thousand pages of supporting evidence are rife with the kinds of accusations and allegations one would expect if this were still a broad-scope medical malpractice and wrongful death case. Seeking to build on that, defendants renew their arguments that the fraud case is “really” just a negligence/malpractice case in fraud dressing, and hence subject to dismissal on the basis of limitations (as occurred with most of plaintiffs’ claims). That bridge has already been crossed, however, when the Court overruled defendants’ demurrers to plaintiffs’ misrepresentation and fraud claims, holding that the first amended complaint adequately alleged actionable fraud. If plaintiffs should not now be trying to make more of this case than it is, neither should defendants be trying now to make less of it than it is. What there is of it, however, is unimpressive. Without going into fine detail, at base plaintiffs’ fraud case comes down to a difference in judgment as to the suitability of John Muir and its involved medical staff for this particular surgery on this particular patient, and the information that was or wasn’t communicated to plaintiffs in that connection. Even if plaintiffs can end up showing significant misrepresentations and their reliance on them, there is nothing in the case they are presenting that could plausibly rise to the level of gross culpability that could suffice to support claims for punitive damages here. (And plaintiffs also face the daunting, perhaps insuperable, challenge of proving that the surgery would have had a successful outcome if performed at a different facility. Without proof of that causation element, there won’t be any liability, and hence no consideration of punitive damages.) The Court finds it unnecessary to go through the numerous detailed objections to plaintiffs’ and defendants’ very voluminous evidence. Even if all of plaintiffs’ proffered evidence is admitted and considered, it cannot support the level of wrongdoing required for this proposed amendment.

Case Number: 22STCV21184 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: C Rankie Anthony Villaescusa vs City of Bellflower, et al. Case No.: 22STCV21184 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 @ 9:30 a.m. #4 Tentative Ruling Defendant County of Los Angeles Motion for Judgment on the Pleading is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend. Defendant to give notice. Defendant County of Los Angeles moves for an order granting judgment on the pleadings as to the second cause of action for negligence and the third cause of action for negligent hiring, training, and supervision on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to meet the heightened pleading standard in actions involving public entities under the Tort Claims Act. Background The operative Complaint by Plaintiff FRANKIE ANTHONY VILLAESCUSA (Plaintiff) was filed on June 29, 2022. Plaintiff alleges that [t]his Complaint concerns an officer and/or deputy-involved incident&. On or about May 25, 2021, Plaintiff& was approached, questioned, detained and escorted by Defendant JOHN DOE&. Defendant JOHN DOE negligently assessed the circumstances presented to him, and violently confronted and unjustifiably detained Plaintiff without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff had committed a crime or would commit a crime. Without warning, the Defendant JOHN DOE detained and escorted Plaintiff with such force that Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a direct and proximate result of being detained and/or escorted. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs Complaint asserts the following causes of action: (1) Battery Civil Code §43; (2) Negligence Cal. Gov. Code §§850.2(a), 820(a); (3) Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision (Cal. Gov. Code §§815.2(a), 820(a); and (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. On February 23, 2023, this Court SUSTAINED a demurrer as to the first and fourth causes of action with 30 days leave to amend. (See February 23, 2023 Minute Order.) Plaintiff did not amend the complaint within the time allowed and failed to provide an adequate explanation for the failure to do so; therefore, the first and fourth causes of action were dismissed on Defendants motion. (See November 9, 2023 Minute Order.) Legal Standard A defendant may bring a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings where the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint or the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (C.C.P. § 438(c)(1)(B).) A non-statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made any time before or during trial. ( Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) Such motion may be made on the same ground as those supporting a general demurrer, i.e., that the pleading at issue fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a legally cognizable claim or defense. ( Id .) In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action. ( Gami v. Mullikin Medical Ctr. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 870, 876.) Public entities cannot be liable for common law theories of general negligence. ( Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 [section 815 abolishes common law tort liability for public entities].) Therefore, liability against a public entity must be authorized by statute. ( Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179; Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a) [A public entity is not liable for an injury . . . except as otherwise provided by statute].) Ordinarily, negligence may be pleaded in general terms and the plaintiff need not specify the precise act or omission alleged to constitute the breach of duty. [Citation]. However, because under the Tort Claims Act all governmental tort liability is based on statute, the general rule that statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity is applicable. Thus, to state a cause of action against a public entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity. ( Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795.) Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a) provides that a public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) Meet and Confer Plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied because Defendant failed to meet and confer before filing the motion as required by statute. (CCP § 439, subd. (a).) The Court will exercise its discretion to adjudicate the motion on the merits. Discussion The second and third causes of action suffer from the same infirmities as the first and fourth causes of action which have been dismissed. The conclusory allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to establish specific conduct by any County employees to meet the heightened pleading requirements that are required for claims against a public entity. The Complaint fails to allege what Defendant John Doe did to cause Plaintiffs injuries. The Complaint alleges Defendant JOHN DOE detained and escorted Plaintiff with such force that Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a direct and proximate result of being detained and/or escorted. (Complaint, ¶ 11.) Police detain many people each day throughout Los Angeles County. Plaintiff fails to allege why this particular detention should give rise to liability. As pled, the allegations are insufficient to impose liability against the County pursuant to Gov. Code §815.2. Accordingly, Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the second and third causes of action is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.

Case Number: 23NWCV02588 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: C TU v. GAXIOLA CASE NO.: 23NWCV02588 HEARING: 07/18/24 #7 Plaintiff JENNIFER TUs unopposed Motion to Set Aside Dismissal under CCP §473(b) is CONTINUED to Thursday, July 25, 2024 at 10:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C . Moving Party to give notice. No Opposition filed as of July 15, 2024. This personal injury action was filed by Plaintiff on August 21, 2023. On May 30, 2024, Plaintiffs Complaint was dismissed without prejudice due to Plaintiffs Counsels second failure to appear without good cause for a Case Management Conference and OSC Re: Dismissal of the Entire Action for Plaintiffs Failure to Appear on 03/28/24. (See 05/30/24 M.O.) Plaintiff moves to set aside the dismissal under CCP §473(b). The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted &. (emphasis added.) (CCP §473(b).) The Motion is DENIED without prejudice for failure to comply with the express terms of CCP §473(b). There is no proposed pleading or proposed amended complaint attached to subject Motion. The Motion is CONTINUED as indicated above due to Plaintiffs failure to attach a copy of a pleading proposed to be filed therein as required by CCP §473(b). The terms of the code are mandatory; compliance is not optional. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file and serve a Proposed First Amended Complaint by no later than July 19, 2024.

Case Number: 23SMCV01089 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: I The demurrer is OVERRULED. While defendants statement of law is correct in that it is hard to see who the individual is that is alleged to be specifically responsible, there is enough here for pleading purposes. The specifics can be fleshed out in discovery and for now there are allegations, albeit general, as to the defendants acting together. In short, these issues are better raised by way of a summary judgment motion or at trial. The court is also having trouble understanding how the demurrer is timely. The court notes three discovery motions on file. That does not bode well this early in the case. The court has not worked up those motions, but for the parties aid, the court appends its guidelines on discovery responses, meet and confers, and IDCs. The court encourages IDCs where both parties would like to resolve the matter informally and in good faith, and often the failure to participate in an IDC can have an impact on the recovery or propriety of any sanctions request. DISCOVERY RELATED GUIDELINES FOR DEPARTMENT I The guidelines below are not rules and they are not universally applicable in all cases. Rather, they are guidelines as to the courts general views. Each case, of course, will be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and some of the guidelines below may not apply to particular circumstances. That said, the court does take these views seriously. Discovery Responses The Court provides the following guidance concerning its general views on some common issues regarding responses to written objections. The Court has noticed that many attorneys view objections and the manner of making them in a way different than does the Court. To avoid these common pitfalls, the Court offers the following in addition to the provisions of the Litigation Guidelines appended to the Los Angeles County Superior Court Local Rules. First , General Objections are not permitted. The Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for them, and therefore they are disregarded by the Court. Any response that incorporates the General Objections is improper by definition. Second , the Court often views boilerplate objections as being in bad faith. A bad faith response is no response at all in the Courts view. Therefore, making boilerplate objections does not preserve those objections nor does it constitute a good faith response to written discovery. A bad faith response is viewed by the Court for what it is: bad faith. The objections will be stricken and deemed waived. In the context of a Request for Admission, such objections may lead to a finding that the request is deemed admitted, although that will depend on the facts of the particular case and the specific discovery at hand. Objections should be tailored to each specific request. If a request truly is overbroad, then an objection to that effect is proper. But such an objection is best accompanied by some reasonable limitation by the responding party that will narrow the request appropriately and (as narrowed) provide a substantive response rather than a mere statement that the request is overbroad. The same is true as to an objection that a request is unduly burdensome. The Court also notes that the party asserting that a request is unduly burdensome has the obligation at some point to provide an evidentiary basis for the objection, including evidence as to what the burden of compliance would be. ( West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407.) Often such an objection will include a statement by the responding party as to a narrower request that would not be unduly burdensome and provide substantive responses as so limited. Objections that a request is vague and ambiguous must set forth the vague and ambiguous term as well as the responding partys reasonable interpretation of that term as well as a statement that, so interpreted, the response will provide the discovery requested. If there is no reasonable interpretation possible (which is a rare situation), then the responding party must so state. Objections as to privilege must set forth the basis explaining why the information sought is in fact privileged. Where a privilege is asserted in the context of a document request, a privilege log must accompany the answer or be provided within a short and reasonable time after the answer. Where the objection is made in the context of an interrogatory, it must be clear from the objection the scope of the information being withheld. If there is no log, there should be no privilege objection to a document request (meaning that a prophylactic privilege objection is the equivalent of no objection; it preserves nothing). There are some rare exceptions, such as where the entire point of the discovery is to get allegedly privileged information or where compliance would require a log that is in essence an index of counsels file. In that situation, the log is unnecessary, but the assertion should be made that the request is in that rare context. Third , if an objection is made to the discovery but a response is being given, it must be clear whether information or documents are in fact being withheld on the basis of the objections. If the objections are clear and done in the manner set forth above, with statements in the objection as to a narrowing that will make the request proper, this is usually a simple task. The objections themselves state the limit and the response will be full and complete as limited. But where the objections are not so clear, the response must clearly state whether any information or document is being withheld on the basis of the objection and, if so, the extent of the withholding. Accordingly, in those situations, phrases like Notwithstanding and subject to the foregoing objections, responding party states as follows are improper. Those sorts of phrases make the verification useless, as the verifier can always fall back on the objections as the reason why a document was not produced or information was not disclosed. On the other hand, where the line of demarcation is clear, the verification will still serve its purpose. Fourth , for document requests, the substantive response must conform to the Code. There are relatively tight rules as to what the response must say, and the response must say it. For example, where a responding party is not producing documents because they are not in the partys possession, custody, or control, the responding party must verify that a diligent search has been made and must further provide the information set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure in such cases. In the case of interrogatories, the responses must also conform to the Code of Civil Procedure and must be made after diligent inquiry. It is not proper to refuse to respond because the responding party has no personal knowledge. If the knowledge is hearsay, it must still be disclosed, although it can be qualified to make it clear that it is not based on the verifiers personal knowledge. Fifth , the Court frowns on responses that do not conform to the foregoing rules being served with the view that the responses will moot themselves out in the meet and confer process. That is not how the process works. A good faith response is required before the meet and confer process begins. The meet and confer process will (hopefully) bridge the gaps between the parties respective positions. Further, where a response to a request for documents is made and documents are to be produced subject to certain objections (with the documents withheld properly delineated), the documents should be turned over irrespective of the meet and confer. The documents are to be produced with alacrity to the extent that there is no objection to them. What this means is that the response to a discovery request is not a trivial undertaking. Nabbing the response from the form file is a generally bad idea and can lead to all objections being waived. The point is that the boilerplate often renders the remainder of the response useless. The only exception is where it is clear that the substantive response is not in any way limited by the objections. In that case, the objections do no harm, although they also do no good. Meet and Confer The Code of Civil Procedure requires that before a motion to compel further responses or a motion for a protective order is filed, the parties engage in a good faith attempt to resolve their differences. They are to meet and confer for that purpose. Only if that effort fails can a motion be brought. Sadly, many litigants view the meet and confer process as just another procedural hoop through which they must jump in order to bring the motion, similar to the need to include an actual demurrer with the demurrer papers. The Code requires it, so they do it, but no ones heart is really in it. That is not sufficient. Given that, the Court believes it appropriate to set forth how the Court views the meet and confer requirement. Failure to abide by the guidelines below may well justify denial of the motion or a continuance of it to allow the process to take place. If one party but not the other refuses to participate as set forth, more likely than not the party refusing to participate will find itself on the losing end of the motion. The following quotation fairly sums up the Courts own view. [W]e feel compelled to observe that resort to the courts easily could have been avoided here had both parties actually taken to heart Justice Stone's admonitions in Townsend that the statute requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. ( Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.) Perhaps after 11 years it is necessary to remind trial counsel and the bar once again that [a] rgument is not the same as informal negotiation ( id at p. 1437); that attempting informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent to persuade the objector of the error of his ways ( id. at p. 1435); and that a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel.... Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. ( Id. at p. 1439.) ( Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294, emphasis in original, parallel citations omitted.) In practical terms, it means as follows. It is entirely appropriate to begin the process with a letter or other correspondence. The letter should not include a demand in the form of an ultimatum, but it can certainly include the relief that is being sought with an invitation to meet and confer. It is also entirely appropriate for the other party to respond with a letter or other correspondence to set forth its position on the issues. Such an initial exchange can often be helpful to narrow the dispute. Whether further exchanges make sense will depend on each case and each dispute. However, at some point, before impasse is reached the process must include an actual meet. The letters might well suffice to confer, but an exchange of correspondence is not a meeting. In the COVID-19 era, the meeting can be virtual or telephonic, but a meeting there must be. The meeting must be attended by a person from each side with the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission from anyone, including the client. If only the client can give the needed authority, then the client must be available instantaneously at all times during the meeting. This does not mean that one side or the other must concede, but it does mean that the people meeting have the ability in real and practical terms to strike a deal then and there. The parties should approach the meet and confer process as a problem-solving exercise. The purpose of the meet and confer is not to convince the other side of the bankruptcy of its position; rather the purpose is to reach an agreement by which the party seeking discovery is able to obtain the information that it reasonably needs and the party providing discovery is not put to an undue burden or forced to provide unnecessary information that might infringe on a privacy interest or disclose a competitive trade secret or the like. At the conclusion of the meet and confer, the parties should have an agreed statement as to the outcome. If the outcome is a total impasse, then they should agree on that. If they have resolved some or all of their differences, then they should statein writingwhat that agreement is so that there will be no confusion later. Often, an agreement will be without prejudice to a further request by the propounding party for more information after that party receives the responses. If a motion is still required, the declaration in support should describe with some detail the meet and confer process. While the Court is not interested in the back and forth, the court is interested in when the meeting took place, who was there, and how long it lasted. All communicationsin writing or oralmust be civil, polite, and professional. Name-calling and accusations are devices that undermine the process; they do not further it. A party engaging in such activity generally is not acting in a good faith effort to reach an agreement. Informal Discovery Conferences The court generally will encourage an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) before any party files a motion to compel further responses. The goal of the IDC is to get to yes. To achieve that goal, the court adopts the following. Five Court days before the IDC, the parties will submit a JOINT statement no more than eight pages total (on pleading paper) setting forth their respective positions. Where a similar issue is raised that will resolve many requests, it can be dealt with as a single issue. The IDC follows the good faith meet and confer. It is not a substitute for the meet and confer. The courts time is to be spent only on issues after the parties have tried to narrow the dispute as much as possible. As stated above, the goal is to get to yes. This means a few things. One is that each party must be represented by a person who has the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission. It need not be lead counsel and that authority need not be exercised. But the people at the conference must have that authority. If only the client has that authority, then the client will be present physically with counsel in an adjacent room without distraction after initial introductions are made. All IDCs are off the record. That means that whatever anyone says at the IDC will not be binding or quoted back at the party unless an agreement is struck. It is very bad form to quote the courts comments at an IDC during a later hearing unless the comments were part of a stipulated order. All parties have the right to change position if no deal is reached. The court, for example, might strongly indicate that it believes one side or the other has the better position but rule in a completely different way if there is a formal motion. Partial agreements that are contingent upon a full resolution are not binding unless a full resolution is reached. Partial resolutions that are not contingent on a full resolution are binding. Parties who are suggesting a resolution should make it clear whether their proposal depends upon other resolutions. Parties should be especially willing to give up sanctions at an IDC if it will resolve the dispute. That is not a requirement, but the courts experience is such that if a party is really going to insist on a sanction, the likelihood of a resolution is very low. It is likely that no party will get everything that it wants. The goal is to abide the Code, but at the same time make sure that the party seeking discovery is not creating busy-work or demanding a lot of work for no benefit (or virtually no benefit). The responding party might well have the right (should it come to motion practice) to avoid some aspect of the discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the responding partys interest to be willing to offer something. Conversely, the propounding party might have the right (should it come to motion practice) to get some aspect of discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the propounding partys interest to forego aspects of the discovery that are not really needed, perhaps reserving the right to seek that information at a later time should it prove necessary. The point is not to have the Court simply hammer away at the opponent. That might happen at a motion, but it is not the goal of the IDC. No orders will be made except on stipulation. However, if there is an agreement, the court may well want to make an appropriate order or ask the parties to confirm it in writing. Parties should take careful notes on any agreements. Because there are no Court Reporters, it is hard to put an agreement on the record. However, unless the agreement is confirmed quickly, people have a tendency to forget or to have buyers remorse. Therefore, it is best to have one party send an immediate confirming email to the other and obtain an agreement. The court would prefer not to get into the specific wording of the agreement during the IDC unless absolutely necessary. The IDC process does not work if people view it as just a necessary step to filing a motion. The court does not see it that wayif it did, then the court would abandon the IDC as a waste of time. Rather, this is an off-ramp to avoid motion practice and the attendant costs and time. Hopefully, it is also a way to get discovery more quickly than through formal motion practice. At the IDC, no matter how hot tempers have run in the past, the court expects all counsel to be polite and civil in tone to one another. The court will not tolerate rudeness or unnecessary accusations. They do not move the ball forward and they make it nigh impossible to reach an agreement.

Case Number: 23SMCV05352 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: I The court already ruled on many of the issues presented herein. The court incorporates by reference and reaffirms its prior rulings and adopts them (as reflected in tentative decisions recited in the minutes of the prior hearing) to the extent not inconsistent with the following. The matter is here today because there was one open issue. The demurring defendant contends that even if the continuing violation doctrine applies to Kennedy William Gordy (Kennedy) such that there is no statute of limitations issue as to him (and that is not conceded more generally), the doctrine does not apply to Berry Gordy (Gordy). Gordy is Kennedys father. He is not accused of actual sexual assault on plaintiff Anita Thompson (Thompson or plaintiff). Instead, he is sued because he allegedly aided and abetted Kennedy in Kennedys conduct, including by making threats against plaintiff to stop her from reporting the violence. Among other things, Gordy is alleged to have moved Kennedy and Thompson to his guesthouse to isolate Thompson and facilitate the assaults; prevent Thompson from speaking to the police by, among other things, taking from her the officers card after the police were called to the scene; and pressuring her into not being candid with the police. Gordy also allegedly threatened Thompson regarding custody and child support issues concerning Thompson and Kennedys child. Eventually, though, Thompson left the property and left Kennedy. And, tragically, her son died. Some years later she re-entered Kennedys life at Kennedys request. Once she did that, Kennedys sexual assault and other physical assaults allegedly resumed or continued. And, eventually, she sued. Many of the allegations occurred before 2016, which is when Thompson left the property and her son passed. She returned to Kennedys life in 2020, and the most recent act of alleged abuse is well within the statutory time frame. Gordy, however, asserts that the last act alleged against him occurred in 2016, which is long before the complaint was filed in November 2023 or the cross-complaint (which is the operative pleading for this motion) was filed in April 2024. According to plaintiff, though, even if Gordys liability is in the nature of aiding and abetting, the statute of limitations for him as an aider and abettor is the same as the statute of limitations for Kennedy, and therefore the action is timely. That is true, Thompson asserts, even if Gordy personally did nothing after 2016. (She does not concede that he took no improper actions after that date, but she agrees that none is listed in the cross-complaint). Gordy, for his part, states that although Thompson correctly cites the general rule, it does not apply to this case. Rather, Gordy asserts, an aider and abetters liability ends when the last act of aiding and abetting took place. At the last hearing, the court noted that in the context of a conspiracy, a co-conspirators liability extends throughout the conspiracy until and unless the conspirator leaves the conspiracy, at which point the conspirator is not liable for things that come later. The court ultimately allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs on this issue. All parties agree that the statute of limitations here is found in CCP section 340.15and that it is three years. There is no separate statute of limitations for aiding and abetting. Thus, at least to start, Gordys liability seems to be tied with the statute for the underlying tort, and that is well settled as a general matter. ( American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1451.) It boils down, then, to the date of accrual. For Kennedy, it would be the last act of violence unless the break between 2016 and 2020 is too great to allow the continuing wrong doctrine to applya question not before the court at this time. That is because the statute expressly states that the date of accrual is three years from the last act of domestic violence by the defendant against the plaintiff. Gordy claims that as applied to him, though, this does not mean the last act of violence, but rather the last act of violence that he aided or abetted. In support of his view, Gordy cites to non-binding authority, including an unpublished Ninth Circuit case and out of state cases. While the Ninth Circuit case purports to apply California law, the court puts little weight on it. The Ninth Circuit very intentionally decides what cases to publish and what cases not to publish. Not only that, but unlike our California Court of Appeal, the Ninth Circuits memo dispo process results in much thinner decisions for unpublished cases. While the court will not ignore the unpublished authority due to the 2001 rule change allowing such cases to be looked to for persuasive value, the court does not believe it is or was meant to be a definitive recitation of California law. The other cases might or might not reflect the common law view, but none of them purport to reflect California law, which has a special statute of limitations that supersedes the common law. Of course, we presume that the Legislature did not mean to supersede common law principles when it enacts statutes. ( Atempa v. Pedrazzani (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 809.) But ultimately, the statute will prevail. Because no one has cited any precedential case on point, and the court has found none, the court must assume that this is a matter of first impression. Given that, the court views the common lawwhich might support Gordyand the statute and general rulewhich support Thompson. The court also looks to conspiracy, where the law is at least plain. Turning to conspiracy, the doctrine would support Thompson. The law there is that once one is in a conspiracy, that party must take some sort of affirmative act to withdraw. Merely not doing anything more is not enough; there must be some affirmative and objective conduct. Thus, for example, if a conspiracy exists to defraud people of property, all members of the conspiracy will be liable for the fraud even if a particular conspirator did not participate with regard to a particular victim or stopped being active entirely. To end the liability, the co-conspirator must take an affirmative action, such as telling the remaining members that the conspirator will no longer be a part of the group. There is no allegation in the complaint that Gordy ever took such an action. But a conspiracy is not the same as aiding and abetting. The scope of liability is broader, but each co-conspirator must be able to commit the tort. A person with no fiduciary duty cannot conspire to breach a fiduciary duty, for example. Nor is aiding and abetting the same for purposes of public policy as conspiracy. Notwithstanding the courts prior musings, the court does not believe that to stop the liability for aiding and abetting an affirmative act is needed. But that hardly answers the question. The statute of limitations for this tort was deliberately enacted with the recognition that it is often difficult for victims of this kind of abuse to come forward and sue. The common law was abrogated by the statute for public policy reasons. Thus, the court tends to look at the question through the lens of recognizing that the Legislature intended to make it easier for the victim of such abuse to bring suits against those responsible and recognizing that victims of abuse are often psychologically unable to come forward. Moreover, the Legislature expressly recognized that issues of child custody and support often played into the psyche of a victim of abuse, making it harder to bring a suit. (California Bill Analysis, S.B. 924 Assem., 7/18/1995.) Those are precisely the mix of things at issue in this case. True, plaintiffs child died and after that issues of child custody and support were no longer in play, but it is fair to say, at least in the courts view, that the mind of a person who has been abused does not work like a computer and does not have an on/off switch. The coercion allegedif it occurreddoes not go away immediately upon the childs death. In a nutshell, the rule Gordy proposes does not further the Legislatures goal; in fact, it thwarts it, for it forces the victim of abuse to come forward against an aider and abettor even when the victim cannotas a practical mattercome forward at all. The courts view is that it might well be that in some cases an aider and abettors conduct was so particular and fleeting such that the statute accrues on the last date of aiding and abetting. But not in all cases, or even most. To illustrate, one can imagine a case where there is a ring of car thieves. One day, a witness sees the theft. Upon approaching the thieves, they offer to cut the witness in for $200 if the witness deletes the cell phone footage of them stealing the car. The witness agrees and not only that, tells the police that the thieves went north when they really fled south. Plainly aiding and abetting. If the thieves go on to steal more cars in the coming months, it is far from clear to the court that the aider and abettor is liable for those other thefts. On the other hand, if the aider and abettor gives the cyberthieves the a list of passwords on day 1 in return for $1000 and thereafter does nothing else, and the thieves keep the list for 4 years, during which time they slowly drain various victims bank accounts, it is not at all clear to the court that the aider and abettor gets to walk due to the statute of limitations. Of course these analogies, like all analogies, break down. But they illustrate the point that the court does not believe that there is a one-size-fits-all answer to the question. The court believes that the better rule is to presume that the statute for aiding and abetting is co-extensive with the statute for the main tortfeasor. The court will not rule out the possibility that, under a particular set of facts, the aiding and abetting conduct may be so specific and relatively minor that the accrual will be earlier. But as a general rule, it runs with the regular statute and limits to the aider and abbettors liability are better dealt with when the jury apportions damages. This also furthers the public policy reflecting the difficulty of bringing a suit that motivated the Legislature to change the law. If one can presume that the psychological trauma of the conduct is such that the victim ought not be forced to sue until three years after the last act of abuse, it is somewhat of an anomaly to expect the victim to sue the aider and abettor earlier than that. After all, it is hard to imagine the victim suing the aider and abettor at a time when the victim is still psychologically unable to sue to major tortfeasor. While it might be that this tilts the pitch in favor of the victim and against the accused aider and abettor, that is a policy question for the Legislature to decide, and it has. At least absent some significant factual showing that the aider and abettors influence had completely dissipated and that it would not be odd to assume that the victim would sue the aider and abettor but not the main tortfeasor, the court believes that the statutes of limitations are co-extensive. While the court will not definitively rule out the possibility that such a showing can be made herealthough it would be difficultit certainly cannot be made on demurrer, which is a pleading motion. Because the court must read the complaint liberally and draw all reasonable inferences in the cross-complainants favor, the court believes that the pleadings pass muster. Of course, that is not to say that when evidence is considered, the gap in time will not be too large to bridge; indeed, the court knows that Kennedy will (at some point) so argue. But for now, the demurrer is OVERRULED. Because the demurrer is overruled on regular statute of limitations grounds, the court need not, and does not, address equitable estoppel. Gordy has 30 days to answer.

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Case Number: 22SMCV01360 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Pollard v. Barlow Respiratory Hospital CASE NO.: 22SMCV01360 MOTION: Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication HEARING DATE: 07/18/2024 Legal Standard A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (CCP, § 437c(a).) The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co . (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in¿Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.¿(CCP,¿§ 437c(f)(1).)¿If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. ( Gonzales v. Superior Court ¿(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)¿ [A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to subdivision (t). (CCP,¿§ 437c(t).)¿ To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP, §¿437c(c).)¿The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. ( Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc . (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, [a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment& ( Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true. ( Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion may not be denied on grounds of credibility, except when¿a material fact is the witnesss¿state of mind and that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witnesss] affirmation thereof. (CCP, § 437c(e).)¿ Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (CCP § 437c(p)(1).) [T]here¿is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.¿( Consumer Cause, Inc. v.¿SmileCare ¿(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿ ¿ The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to¿frame¿the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding. ( Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. ¿ (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability¿ as alleged in the complaint ; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings. ( Ibid .)¿ Analysis Defendant Barlow Respiratory Hospital moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of each cause of action. Defendant fails to meet its burden of production on any noticed issue. As an initial matter, Defendant failed to file the principal evidence in the motion: the Medical Records (Exhibits A, B and C). The Medical Records were instead lodged with Department M via a flash-drive. The records on file, however, omit the Medical Records entirely. Defendant cannot meet their burden without presenting these exhibits filed with the Court and not simply lodged. Defendant contends that these records demonstrate that no abuse/neglect occurred, no breach of the standard of care occurred, and that no act or omission caused any injury to Plaintiff. Critically, Defendant proffers the declaration of expert nurse Lisa Gildred, BSN, RN-BC, CWCA, in support of such conclusions. (Exhibit D.) Gildred extensively (and almost exclusively) relies on the Medical Records to come to her conclusions on neglect, the standard of care and causation. Without the Medical Records being properly filed, the Court cannot consider the material evidence, and cannot conclude that Defendant has submitted evidence showing that there is no triable issue of fact as to the noticed issues. Second, Defendants memorandum and separate statement make impermissibly vague citations to the entirety of Plaintiffs medical records from a given facility, without directing the Court to the relevant pages of the exhibits. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(3) requires that Citation to the evidence in support of each material fact must include reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers. The instant separate statement violates this rule with every citation to Exhibits A-C. For example, in support of UMF 1, Defendant cites the entirety of Exhibit A Medical records from Barlow Respiratory Hospital and Exhibit B Medical records from Providence St. Joseph Medical Center without even noting a page number. The same can be said of every other citation to Exhibits A-C. Exhibit A is a collection of over 27,000 pages. Exhibits B and C are likewise thousands of pages. Defendant cannot reasonably expect the Court or Plaintiff to sort through the voluminous exhibits to guess which documents support the motion. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

CV-24-001951 – HERNANDEZ, KEIRA vs VALLEY HOME JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT – Defendants Valley Home Joint School District and Sara Vivian Decavit’s Demurrer to Complaint - OVERRULED. Requests for judicial notice are DENIED as the Court can consider the complaint and law without such notice. Defendant district’s primary argument is that there is a failure to meet statutory requirements. But as Defendant quotes Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809 for: “Every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded.” Defendant cites to State of California v. Superior Court (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 848 for the proposition that the statute which establishes a duty must be identified in the pleading. The Court read the entire opinion and searched for “statute” and “identified,” and was unable to find this proposition in this case. In any event, Plaintiff asserts a bus ran into a bridge and that various Government Codes permit pursuit of these claims against a government agency. The facts of the bus crash are sufficient to avoid uncertainty. Defendant district has sufficient notice of the alleged facts.