Novus Capital Funding Ii Llc V. Gator Supreme Wholesale And Distribution Llc Dba Gator Supreme Wholesale And Distribution/America Group Wholesale, Fouad Ali El-Ahmar

CV-23-000035 – DRUESEDOW, DIANE vs JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike or in the Alternative Tax Costs – GRANTED, in part; DENIED, in part, and unopposed. The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden of demonstrating that certain of the costs claimed by Defendant herein are excessive and/or unreasonable, such that the burden shifts to Defendant to show that the items charged were for matters necessarily relevant and material to the issues involved in the action.  (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131; Oak Grove School Dist. V. City Title Ins. Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 698.)  The Court further finds that Defendant’s cost memorandum contains adequate substantiation as to certain of the challenged costs but fails to offer adequate substantiation as to other challenged costs, and Defendant has failed to offer additional substantiation as to the latter.  The Court acts within its discretion in determining whether costs are excessive and should be reduced.  (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816-817.) Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendant’s claimed costs should be taxed as follows: The costs claimed in Item #1 (Filing Fees) should be taxed in the amount of $311.65, which appears to consist of charges imposed by Defendant’s legal service provider for electronic submission of certain documents to the Court. Plaintiff’s motion raises the issue of whether such charges are unreasonable and/or excessive in this context, and Defendant has failed to offer additional substantiation in this regard. Therefore, the Court grants the motion with regard to the challenged amount. The Court finds that the remaining claimed costs are adequately substantiated by the documentation submitted with Defendant’s cost memorandum and were reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection with this action. Therefore, the amount claimed in Defendant’s’ Memorandum of Costs shall be reduced by $311.65, for a total cost award of $1,046.05. The clerk shall enter the cost award on the judgment in this matter. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1700(b)(4).)

Case Number: 23SMCV01851 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER 23SMCV01851 MOTION Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint MOVING PARTY Defendant Fidelity National Home Warranty, Inc. dba FNHW OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiff Ian Herzog MOTION On April 27, 2023, Plaintiff Ian Herzog (Plaintiff) brought suit against Defendants Fidelity National Home Warranty, Inc. dba FNHW; Dameriol L.; and Monet R. (Defendants) alleging four causes of action for (1) breach of contract; (2) fraud; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) and insurance bad faith. Defendant Fidelity National Home Warranty, Inc. dba FNHW (FNHW) moves for leave to file a cross-complaint against Plaintiff for declaratory relief. Plaintiff opposes the motion and FNHW replies. LEGAL STANDARD A party against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint or cross-complaint may file a cross-complaint setting forth either or both of the following: (a) Any cause of action he has against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him. Nothing in this subdivision authorizes the filing of a cross-complaint against the plaintiff in an action commenced under Title 7 (commencing with Section 1230.010) of Part 3. (b) Any cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.10, subds. (a)-(b).) (a) A party shall file a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint. (b) Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date for trial. (c) A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b). Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50, subds. (a)-(c).) Indeed, where a cause of action would otherwise be lost, leave to amend is appropriate even if the party was negligent in not moving for leave to amend earlier. The legislative mandate is clear. A policy of liberal construction of section 426.50 to avoid forfeiture of causes of action is imposed on the trial court. A motion to file a cross-complaint at any time during the course of the action must be granted unless bad faith of the moving party is demonstrated where forfeiture would otherwise result. ( Silver Organizations, Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99.) Further, Cross-complaints for comparative equitable indemnity would appear virtually always¿transactionally¿related to the main action.¿¿( Time for Living, Inc. v. Guy Hatfield Homes ¿(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 30, 38; see also Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 785, 799 [Undoubtedly, a claim for contribution or indemnity arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim].) ¿ DISCUSSION FNHW seeks leave to file a cross-complaint against Plaintiff for declaratory relief that the parties contract limits FNHWs liability to Plaintiff to a maximum of $1500. Plaintiff opposes the motion on the grounds that declaratory relief is not available where, as here, Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of contract has already matured. However, the Court does not generally consider the merits of the proposed pleading in determining whether to grant leave. Instead, the Court implements the legislative mandate to liberally construe requests for leave to avoid forfeiture of causes of action. To the extent Plaintiff takes issue with the proposed cross-complaint, Plaintiff may raise those by appropriate motion. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings].) CONCLUSION AND ORDER For these reasons, the Court grants FNHWs motion for leave to file a cross-complaint, and orders FNHW to file and serve the proposed cross-complaint on or before July 30, 2024. Further, the Court orders FNHW to provide notice of the Courts ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 16, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV30316 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 OPERA BRIGHT, LLC , Plaintiff, vs. HILLS ONE, LLC , et al. Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV30316 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Hearing Time: 2:00 p.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT HILLS ONE, LLC TO PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT; DEMURRER OF DEFENDANT HILLS GROUP, LLC TO PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT Background Plaintiff Opera Bright, LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action on December 12, 2023 against Defendants Hills One, LLC (Hills One), Key Compounds, LLC, Hills Group, LLC ( Hills Group) , Alex Reyter, Jay Rifkin, and Paul Fiore (collectively, Defendants). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) fraud, (2) fraudulent transfer, (3) conspiracy to defraud, (4) aiding and abetting fraud, (5) negligent misrepresentation, and (6) breach of contract. Hills One now demurs to each of the causes of action of the Complaint. Hills Group also demurs to each of the causes of action of the Complaint. Plaintiff opposes both. Legal Standard A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable . (( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 .) To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiffs proof need not be alleged. (( C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 .) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded . (( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967 .) A demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (( Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713 .) Allegations of the Complaint In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that [a]t various times from about July to October 2019, HILLS ONE took loans from Claimants predecessors-in-interest in varying amounts, from $5,000 up to $250,000. For each of those loans, HILLS ONE executed four separate written documents with the lender, entitled Promissory Note, Security Agreement, Pledge Agreement and Corporate Guaranty (collectively, the Loan Documents). (Compl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that [a] true and correct copy of one set of Loan Documents is attached hereto as Exhibits A through D (Compl., ¶ 12.) For each loan memorialized by the Loan Documents, the loan was secured by designated assets (the Equipment) purportedly owned by HILLS ONE. (Compl., ¶ 14.) HILLS ONE defaulted on each loan memorialized by the Loan Documents. (Compl., ¶ 16.) Between about August and November 2020, the lender entities on each loan memorialized by the Loan Documents executed written assignments, assigning their respective interests and rights under the Loan Documents to Claimant OPERA BRIGHT. (Compl., ¶ 17.) In about April 2021, OPERA BRIGHT exercised its rights under the Loan Documents to foreclose on the Equipment. After providing all due notices and fulfilling all required prerequisites for the foreclosure, OPERA BRIGHT caused the Equipment to be sold at auction to a third party. (Compl., ¶ 18.) On about December 22, 2022, KEY COMPOUNDS filed a judicial complaint against OPERA BRIGHT in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Linn, designated as Case No. 22CV42152, initiating the Oregon Litigation&In the Oregon Litigation, KEY COMPOUNDS alleges that it is a wholly owned subsidiary of HILLS ONE. KEY COMPOUNDS also alleges that it, not HILLS ONE, was the owner of the Equipment when OPERA BRIGHT foreclosed on the Equipment and caused it to be sold at auction. (Compl., ¶¶ 19-20.) Plaintiff alleges that [a]s a consequence of being forced to defend itself in the Oregon Litigation, OPERA BRIGHT has had to retain counsel and has incurred, and will continue to significant attorneys fees and litigation costs. (Compl., ¶ 22.) Hills Ones Demurrer A. Standing Hills One first asserts that [a]ll of Plaintiffs Causes of Action fail as against Hills One because Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this lawsuit. (Demurrer at p. 5:22-23.) Standing is the threshold element required to state a cause of action and, thus, lack of standing may be raised by demurrer. To have standing to sue, a person, or those whom he properly represents, must have a real interest in the ultimate adjudication because [he] has [either] suffered [or] is about to suffer any injury of sufficient magnitude reasonably to assure that all of the relevant facts and issues will be adequately presented. Code of Civil Procedure section 367 establishes the rule that [e]very action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute. A real party in interest is one who has an actual and substantial interest in the subject matter of the action and who would be benefited or injured by the judgment in the action. (( Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031-1032 [internal quotations and citations omitted] .) In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that OPERA BRIGHT is the assignee of all rights of the lenders under the Loan Documents, including the right to bring this claim against Defendants. (Compl., ¶ 36.) Hills One asserts that this allegation is unsupported by the Exhibits attached to the Complaint. In fact, those Exhibits reveal that any such assignment requires the consent of Hills One, and Plaintiff does not allege any such consent occurred& (Demurrer at p. 5:25-27.) As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges that [a]t various times from about July to October 2019, HILLS ONE took loans from Claimants predecessors-in-interest in varying amounts, from $5,000 up to $250,000. For each of those loans, HILLS ONE executed four separate written documents with the lender, entitled Promissory Note, Security Agreement, Pledge Agreement and Corporate Guaranty (collectively, the Loan Documents). A true and correct copy of one set of Loan Documents is attached hereto as Exhibits A through D and incorporated herein. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Hills One notes that the Promissory Note attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint states that it is made by Hills One, LLC&in favor of Primus Trust Corp., located in Budapest, Hungary, in its capacity as the trustee of the AC Trust& (Compl., ¶ 12, Ex. A.) The Security Agreement attached as Exhibit B to the Complaint lists the Creditor as Primus Trust Corp., as the trustee of The AC Trust and the Debtor as Hills One, LLC. (Compl., ¶ 12, Ex. B.) The Pledge Agreement attached as Exhibit C to the Complaint is between Primus Trust Corp., located in Budapest, Hungary, in its capacity as the trustee of The AC Trust&and Hills One, LLC& (Compl., ¶ 12, Ex. C.) The Corporate Guaranty attached as Exhibit D to the Complaint is entered into by Hills One, LLC&for the benefit of Primus Trust Corp., located in Budapest, Hungary, as the trustee of the AC Trust. (Compl., ¶ 12, Ex. D.) Hills One notes that Exhibits A and B to the Complaint contain the following provision: [t]he rights, duties and obligations of this [Note/Agreement] may not be assigned in whole or in part by either arty [sic] without the prior written consent of the non-assigning party. Any assignment without such consent shall be void. (Compl., ¶ 12, Ex. A, § 17 ; Ex. B, § 13 .) Hills One asserts that Plaintiffs Complaint does not allege that it obtained the necessary prior written consent of Hills One. Plaintiff thus has no rights, duties, or obligations under the written agreements to which it is not a party and Plaintiffs lack of standing bars the Complaint entirely. (Demurrer at p. 6:12-15.) As an initial matter, the Court notes that Hills One does not appear to assert that Exhibits C or D to the Complaint contain any non-assignment provision. Thus, Hills Ones standing argument only appears to apply to the documents attached as Exhibits A and B to the Complaint. As set forth above, the Complaint refers to Exhibits A through D collectively as the Loan Documents. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Each of the causes of action of the Complaint refer to the collective term Loan Documents. ( See Compl., ¶¶ 30, 34, 36, 40, 41, 43, 48, 52, 56, 60, 64, 67, 68, 71, 73, 74.) The Court notes that ¿ ¿¿a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.¿ ¿ ¿ (¿ Kong ¿ v. ¿ City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047 ¿ ¿ ¿; ¿ see also ¿ PH ¿ II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682 [A demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action.] ¿ ¿ ¿.) Hills One also asserts that without the alleged assignment documents, it is impossible to determine the scope of the rights Plaintiff has allegedly been assigned. (Demurrer at p. 6:21-22.) But in each of the causes of action, Plaintiff alleges that OPERA BRIGHT is the assignee of all rights of the lenders under the Loan Documents, including the right to bring this claim against Defendants. (Compl., ¶¶ 36, 43, 52, 60, 68, 74.) The Court notes that [i]t is well settled that a general demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and that the question of plaintiffs ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof, does not concern the reviewing court. (( Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1262, 1267 .) B. First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action Next, Hills One asserts that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege falsity as to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action. (Demurrer at p. 7:26-27.) Hills One asserts that Plaintiffs First (Fraud), Second (Fraudulent Transfer), Third (Conspiracy to Defraud), Fourth (Aiding And Abetting Fraud), and Fifth (Negligent Misrepresentation) Causes of Action all require that Plaintiff sufficiently allege falsity of the alleged representations made by Hills One in the Loan Documents. (Demurrer at pp. 7:28-8:3) With regard to the element of falsity, [t]he elements of fraud or deceit&are: a representation, usually of fact, which is false , knowledge of its falsity, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, and damage resulting from that justifiable reliance. ( Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 72-73 [emphasis added].) The elements of negligent misrepresentation are similar to intentional fraud except for the requirement of scienter; in a claim for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff need not allege the defendant made an intentionally false statement, but simply one as to which he or she lacked any reasonable ground for believing the statement to be true. (( Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 184 .) In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in the Loan Documents, HILLS ONE represented that it owned the Equipment which was pledged as security for the underlying loans, and that it would not transfer or hypothecate the Equipment to harm the lenders rights, and that [a]s alleged by KEY COMPOUNDS in the Oregon Litigation, those representations by HILLS ONE were false because KEY COMPOUNDS was actually the owner of the Equipment. (Compl., ¶¶ 30, 32.) In the demurrer, Hills One asserts that Plaintiffs Complaint and the Exhibits thereto reveal that Hills One made no false representations about ownership of the Equipment: Hills One represented that it and/or its wholly-owned subsidiaries owned the Equipment which comprised the Collateral. (Demurrer at p. 8:9-11.) However, in support of this assertion, Hills One only cites to certain language of Exhibit C to the Complaint. ( See Demurrer at p. 8:16-21.) As discussed, Plaintiff refers to Exhibits A through D collectively as the Loan Documents, and each of the causes of action of the Complaint refer to the collective Loan Documents. Hills One does not appear to argue or show that the definition of Collateral in Appendix A to Exhibit C pertains to each of the other exhibits to the Complaint. As set forth above, ¿ ¿ ¿a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.¿ ¿ ¿ (¿ Kong ¿ v. ¿ City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency, supra , 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047 ¿ ¿ ¿; ¿ see also ¿ PH ¿ II, Inc. v. Superior Court , supra , 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1682 [A demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action.] ¿ ¿ ¿.) C. First Cause of Action for Fraud Hills One also asserts that the fraud cause of action fails. In the first cause of action for fraud, Plaintiff alleges that in the Loan Documents, HILLS ONE represented that it owned the Equipment which was pledged as security for the underlying loans, and that it would not transfer or hypothecate the Equipment to harm the lenders rights, and that [a]s alleged by KEY COMPOUNDS in the Oregon Litigation, those representations by HILLS ONE were false because KEY COMPOUNDS was actually the owner of the Equipment. (Compl., ¶¶ 30, 32.) Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made&This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. ( Stansfield v. Starkey , supra , 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 73 [internal quotations and emphasis omitted].) In the demurrer, Hills One asserts, inter alia , that Plaintiff does not allege&any of the when, where, to whom beyond pointing to one set of loan documents. (Demurrer at p. 9:25-26, emphasis omitted.) Plaintiff does not appear to respond to this point in the opposition. Rather, Plaintiff concedes that but for Defendants pending anti-SLAPP motions, OPERA BRIGHT probably would have amended its complaint to add more specificity to the fraud claims. (Oppn at p. 7:27-28.) In addition, Hills One notes that the Complaint alleges that Defendants made those false representations in the Loan Documents with the intent to induce the lenders to make the underlying loans to HILLS ONE, and those lenders reasonably relied on HILLS ONEs false representations in making the loans. (Compl., ¶ 34.) Hills One asserts that Plaintiff offers no factual support for either of these legal conclusions. (Demurrer at p. 10:3-4.) The Court agrees that paragraph 34 is conclusory. Moreover, Plaintiff does not respond to or dispute this point in the opposition. Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Hills Ones demurrer to the first cause of action for fraud. D. Second Cause of Action for Fraudulent Transfer In the second cause of action for fraudulent transfer, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants caused HILLS ONE to transfer the Equipment to KEY COMPOUNDS in an effort to deprive the lenders on the Loan Documents of the value and security of the underlying loans, and to place the Equipment beyond the lenders reach. (Compl., ¶ 41.) Plaintiff alleges that [w]hen HILLS ONE transferred the Equipment to KEY COMPOUNDS, HILLS ONE did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the Equipment and HILLS ONE was left insolvent. (Compl., ¶ 42.) Hills One cites to Optional Capital, Inc. v. DAS Corp. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1401-1402 , where the Court of Appeal noted that California has adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ( Civ. Code §§ 34393439.12 ). The purpose of the Act is to prevent debtors from placing property which legitimately should be available for the satisfaction of demands of creditors beyond their reach& Civil Code section 3439.04 provides two methods of establishing a fraudulent transfer. Actual fraud, as defined in subdivision (a)(1), is a transfer made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor. Constructive fraud, as defined in subdivision (a)(2), requires a showing that the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the transfer, and the transfer was made when the debtor (A) [w]as engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or (B) the debtor [i]ntended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he or she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became due. Section 3439.04 is construed to mean a transfer is fraudulent if the provisions of either subdivision (a)(1) or subdivision (a)(2) are satisfied. (Internal quotations omitted.) In the demurrer, Hills One notes that Plaintiffs Complaint fails to allege any details surrounding the purported fraudulent transfers. Plaintiff fails to allege the value of the assets, when the transfers were made, how they were made, or any other details that would transform an ordinary transfer of assets routinely done by businesses into a fraudulent transfer. (Demurrer at p. 10:15-19.) Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this point in the opposition. [1] Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Hills Ones demurrer to the second cause of action for fraudulent transfer. E. Third Cause of Action for Conspiracy to Defraud The third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that [a]ll Defendants were aware that HILLS ONE represented in the Loan Documents that it had pledged the Equipment as security for the underlying loans&All Defendants knew those representations were false, and intended for the lenders to rely on those false statements&All Defendants except KEY COMPOUNDS directed and caused HILLS ONE to make those false statements. (Compl., ¶¶ 48-50.) Plaintiff further alleges that KEY COMPOUNDS, under the direction and management of all Defendants, planned to use the lenders deception and HILLS ONEs default on the loans to set up the Oregon Litigation, to fraudulently collect money from the lenders or their assignees. (Compl., ¶ 51.) In the demurrer, Hills One asserts that Plaintiffs cause of action for conspiracy to defraud fails because as a matter of law under the agents immunity rule, Hills One cannot conspire with its own agents. (Demurrer at p. 11:4-5.) Hills One cites to Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 512, footnote 4 , where the Court of Appeal noted that [t]he agents immunity rule emanates from a further holding in Wise that: Agents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capacities on behalf of the corporation and not as individuals for their individual advantage. Hills One notes that Plaintiff alleges that HILLS ONE, as the sole member and manager of KEY COMPOUNDS, directed all actions and conduct of KEY COMPOUNDS which is alleged herein. (Compl., ¶ 24.) As noted by Hills One, Plaintiff also alleges that HILLS GROUP was the designated manager of HILLS ONE, and that [a]t all times relevant, FIORE, RIFKIN and REYTER together were the designated management team of HILLS ONE. (Compl., ¶¶ 8-9.) In the opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the agents immunity rule is inapplicable here because OPERA BRIGHT alleges the other Defendants were primarily managers of HILLS ONE, not its agents. (Oppn at p. 6:7-8.) However, as Plaintiff acknowledges, the Complaint alleges that at all times herein mentioned each of the defendants, including each of the unidentified and fictitiously named defendants, was the agent , principal, employer or employee of each other defendant, and they were acting within the course and scope of such relationship in doing the things herein alleged, or they ratified, acquiesced in, consented to or approved each and all of the acts of each of the other defendants, so that each defendant is jointly and severally responsible and liable for the acts alleged herein. (Compl., ¶ 11, emphasis added.) In addition, in the reply, Hills One cites to Western Surety Co. v. La Cumbre Office Partners, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 125, 131 , where the Court of Appeal noted that [t]he management of a limited liability company may be vested in the companys members. Where such vesting occurs, every member is an agent of the limited liability company for the purpose of its business or affairs, and the act of any member&binds the limited liability company, unless the member so acting has, in fact, no authority to act for the limited liability company in the particular matter, and the person with whom the member is dealing has actual knowledge of the fact that the member has no such authority. (Internal quotations and citations omitted) Plaintiff also asserts that to the extent there was an agent/principal relationship between HILLS ONE and other Defendants, HILLS ONE played the role of principal, not agent. ( Oppn at p. 6, fn. 2 .) But here, Hills One is arguing that Hills One cannot conspire with its own agents. (Demurrer at p. 11:5.) Moreover, Plaintiff does not cite to any legal authority demonstrating that such circumstances would mean that the agents immunity rule is inapplicable here. Hills One also asserts that [e]ven assuming arguendo that the agents immunity rule might be applicable, it still would not shield HILLS ONE or any Defendant from liability in this case because that rule does not apply when the agents are acting as individuals for their individual advantage& In this case, OPERA BRIGHT alleges that Defendants each worked to defraud their lenders (OPERA BRIGHTs predecessors) for their separate and collective benefit. (Oppn at pp. 6:17-7:2.) But Plaintiff does not point to any allegations of the Complaint stating that Defendants each worked to defraud their lenders for their separate benefit. Plaintiff does not point to any allegations that the Defendants acted as individuals for their individual advantage. (( Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. , supra , 7 Cal.4th at p. 512, fn. 4 .) Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Hills Ones demurrer to the third cause of action for conspiracy to defraud. F. Fourth Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting Fraud In the fourth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that [a]ll Defendants were aware of the fraudulent statements HILLS ONE made in the Loan Documents about the Equipment, and were aware of how those statements would damage the lenders or their assignees&All Defendants were aware of how KEY COMPOUNDS would use and is using the Oregon Litigation to continue the fraud on the lenders or their assignees and to fraudulently collect money from the lenders or their assignees&All Defendants participated in, aided and abetted the other Defendants in perpetrating that fraud. (Compl., ¶¶ 56-58.) California has adopted the common law rule for subjecting a defendant to liability for aiding and abetting a tort. Liability may&be imposed on one who aids and abets the commission of an intentional tort if the person (a) knows the others conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so act or ( b ) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and the persons own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. (( Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 879 [internal quotations omitted] .) In the demurrer, Hills One asserts, inter alia , that Plaintiffs allegation that Hills One participated in, aided and abetted the other Defendants is merely a legal conclusion. (Demurrer at p. 13:6-7.) Plaintiff does not respond to or dispute this point in the opposition. Indeed, the fourth cause of action does not appear to include factual allegations demonstrating how Defendants purportedly participated in, aided and abetted the other Defendants in perpetrating that fraud. (Compl., ¶ 58.) Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Hills Ones demurrer to the fourth cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud. G. Fifth Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation In the fifth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that in the Loan Documents, HILLS ONE represented that it owned the Equipment which was pledged as security for the underlying loans, and that it would not transfer or hypothecate the Equipment to harm the lenders rights&As alleged by KEY COMPOUNDS in the Oregon Litigation, those representations by HILLS ONE were false because KEY COMPOUNDS was actually the owner of the Equipment&Defendants failed to act in a reasonably prudent manner to ensure the representations by HILLS ONE in Loan Documents were true. (Compl., ¶¶ 64, 66-67.) In the demurrer, Hills One asserts that the negligent misrepresentation cause of action fails because Plaintiff fails to identify what, if any, legal duty Hills One owed either to Plaintiff or its alleged predecessor in interest. (Demurrer at p. 13:20-22.) Plaintiff does not appear to address this point in the opposition. Hills One notes that [a]s is true of negligence, responsibility for negligent misrepresentation rests upon the existence of a legal duty, imposed by contract, statute or otherwise, owed by a defendant to the injured person. The determination of whether a duty exists is primarily a question of law. (( Eddy v. Sharp (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 858, 864 [internal citation omitted] .) Here, the fifth cause of action does not appear to allege the existence of any legal duty owed by any of the Defendants to Plaintiff. In light of the foregoing, the Court sustains Hills Ones demurrer to the fifth cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. H. Sixth Cause of Action for Breach of Contract In the Demurrer, Hills One asserts that Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action for Breach of Contract is deficient because it fails to attach or even reference all of the Loan Documents purportedly at issue. (Demurrer at p. 14:25-26.) Hills One asserts that the Complaint attaches only one set of Loan Documents that were purportedly breached not all of the loan documents that it is now seeking to collect on. (Demurrer at p. 15:3-4.) Hills One argues that [i]t is impossible for Hills One to defend this litigation when Plaintiff refuses to identify the documents allegedly at issue Defendant cannot infer how much it is being sued for or to articulate defenses to the breaches of loan documents without Plaintiff alleging the critical terms of those purported contracts. (Demurrer at p. 15:10-13.) As set forth above, paragraph 12 of the Complaint alleges that [a]t various times from about July to October 2019, HILLS ONE took loans from Claimants predecessors-in-interest in varying amounts, from $5,000 up to $250,000. For each of those loans, HILLS ONE executed four separate written documents with the lender, entitled Promissory Note, Security Agreement, Pledge Agreement and Corporate Guaranty (collectively, the Loan Documents). A true and correct copy of one set of Loan Documents is attached hereto as Exhibits A through D and incorporated herein. (Compl., ¶ 12, emphasis added.) The Court agrees that Plaintiffs reference to one set of Loan Documents makes it unclear what loan documents are purportedly at issue. ( Ibid . ) In the opposition, Plaintiff appears to concede that other loan documents in addition to those attached as Exhibit A through D of the Complaint are at issue here. Plaintiff states that it attached only one set of loan documents to its complaint for efficiency and because, again, this case was supposed to be resolved through ADR. Of course OPERA BRIGHT can and will, if necessary, attach the other loan documents to an amended pleading. (Oppn at p. 8:7-9.) As noted by Hills One, [i]f the action is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference. (( Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (199 9) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307 .) Plaintiff also asserts in the opposition that it alleges the effect of the loan documents& (Oppn at p. 8:20.) In McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489 , cited by Plaintiff, the Court of Appeal noted that [a] cause of action for breach of contract requires pleading of a contract, plaintiffs performance or excuse for failure to perform, defendants breach and damage to plaintiff resulting therefrom. A written contract may be pleaded either by its termsset out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by referenceor by its legal effect. In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions. (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Plaintiff does not appear to point to any allegations of the substance of the relevant terms of the purported loan documents that are not attached to the Complaint. Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Hills Ones demurrer to the sixth cause of action for breach of contract. Hills Groups Demurrer Hills Group also demurs to each of the causes of action of the Complaint. In its demurrer, Hills Group asserts that instead of Hills Group submitting an identical Memorandum of Points and Authorities here that mainly changes Hills One to Hills Group, Hills Group incorporates by reference the Memorandum of Points And Authorities filed by Defendant Hills One as if fully set forth herein& (Demurrer at p. 1:10-13.) In light of the foregoing discussion pertaining to Hills Ones demurrer, the Court also sustains Hills Groups demurrer to the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action of the Complaint. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Hills Ones demurrer to the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action of the Complaint. In addition, the Court sustains Hills Groups demurrer to the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action of the Complaint. The Court orders Plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this order. If no amended complaint is filed within 20 days, the Court orders Hills One and Hills Group to file and serve proposed judgment(s) of dismissal within 30 days of the date of this Order.¿¿¿ Hills One is ordered to give notice of this Order.¿ DATED: July 17, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court [1] As set forth above, Plaintiff concedes that but for Defendants pending anti-SLAPP motions, OPERA BRIGHT probably would have amended its complaint to add more specificity to the fraud claims. (Oppn at p. 7:27-28.)

Case Number: 23GDCV00580 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: E Hearing Date: 07/18/2024 8:30am Case No:23GDCV00580 Trial Date: UNSET Case Name : RECONSTRUCTION EXPERTS, INC., a Colorado corporation v. THE EXCELSIOR AT THE AMERICANA AT BRAND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCITATION, et al. [TENTATIVE RULING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES] RELIEF REQUESTED ¿ Relief requested based on initial moving papers filed on 1/30/2024: Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Reconstruction Experts, Inc. (RE) will and hereby does move, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38, to recover REs attorneys fees and costs incurred in prevailing on the Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens (Motion to Expunge) filed jointly on September 18, 2023, by Defendant The Excelsior at The Americana at Brand Homeowners Association (Excelsior) and the Member Defendants (as that phrase is used in the Motion to Expunge). As set forth in REs moving papers, RE in this motion requests the Court award a total of $174,694.00 in attorneys fees and $4,496.00 in costs incurred by RE as the prevailing party on the Motion to Expunge. RE requests this award against Excelsior and Member Defendants jointly and severally. RE intends to supplementally submit attorneys fees and costs in finalizing and filing this motion (during January 2024) before hearing with the Court on this matter. REs motion for attorneys fees and costs incurred in prevailing on the Motion to Expunge is based on this notice of motion and motion, California Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38, the concurrently filed supporting memorandum, all exhibits filed with the motion, the concurrently filed declaration of Jeffrey B. Baird, the concurrently filed declaration of David E. Nemeth Jr., the concurrently filed proposed order, all pleadings, papers, and records in this action, and on such further oral or documentary evidence which may be presented before or at the hearing on this motion. (Notice, p. 1-2.) Relief requested based on Supplemental Filing: Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Reconstruction Experts, Inc. ("RE") will, and hereby does, moves and submits this supplemental filing requesting further prevailing party attorneys' fees and costs ("Supplemental Request") incurred to (i) prepare, draft, finalize, and file RE's January 30, 2024, Motion to Recover Prevailing Attorneys' Fees and Costs Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 405.38 (hereafter the "Initial Application") with respect to prevailing on the Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens ("Motion to Expunge") filed jointly on September 18, 2023 by Defendant and Cross-Complainant The Excelsior at The Americana at Brand Homeowners' Association ("Excelsior") and Defendant and Cross-Complainant Member Defendants ( as that phrase is used in the Motion to Expunge); (ii) work on this Supplemental Request preliminary draft; and (iii) to successfully oppose Excelsior's and the Member Defendants' Petition for Writ of Mandate ("Writ") filed in the Court of Appeal on the Motion to Expunge, as well as successfully file with the Court of Appeal RE's Application to File Certificate of Interested Entities or Persons Under Seal. RE in this Supplemental Request will separate the incurred attorneys' fees and costs related to the Court of Appeal legal services on the Motion to Expunge from the other fees and costs submitted herein associated with the Initial Application drafting and Supplemental Request drafting in this Court. RE's Initial Application will be heard on the same date, time, and courtroom department mentioned above as RE's Supplemental Request. The July 18, 2024 hearing date for RE's Initial Application and this Supplemental Request were set by the Court at the May 3, 2024 status conference in which counsel for RE, Excelsior, and the Member Defendants attended. In RE's Initial Application, RE provided notice this Supplemental Request will be submitted-prior to hearing-for the attorneys' fees and costs incurred to prepare, draft, finalize, and file the Initial Application in January 2024 because such amounts were not included in the Initial Application nor the Initial Application's accounting. RE here in this Supplemental Request submits the additional attorneys' fees and costs incurred in January 2024 related to the Initial Application filing, and the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in March 2024 for preliminarily working on this Supplemental Request, so these amounts can be accounted for together with the prior Initial Application amounts already submitted. RE in this Supplemental Request submits and seeks an additional $21,822.00 in attorneys' fees and $33.82 in costs incurred (i) in January 2024 to prepare, draft, finalize, and file the Initial Application; and (ii) in March 2024 to work on this Supplemental Request preliminary draft. As set forth in this Supplemental Request, the total attorneys' fees and costs incurred by RE at the trial court level to prevail on the Motion to Expunge, submit the Initial Application, and work on the Supplemental Request, is as follows: Initial Application and Supplemental Request Trial Court Attorneys' Fees : (i) Attorneys' Fees Submitted in Initial Application: $174,694.00 ( ii) Supplemental Request: Trial Court Attorneys' Fees: $21,822.00 (iii) Grand Total Trial Court Attorneys' Fees (i+ii): $196,516.00 Initial Application and Supplemental Request Trial Court Costs: (i) Costs Submitted in Initial Application: $4,496.00 (ii) Supplemental Request: Trial Court Costs: $33.82 (iii) Grand Total Trial Court Costs (i+ii): $4,529.82 Thus, in total, RE is entitled to $196,516.00 in attorneys' fees ("Trial Court Fees") and $4,529.82 in costs ("Trial Court Costs") to prevail on the Motion to Expunge at the trial court level. On December 7, 2023, Excelsior and the Member Defendants filed the Writ on the Motion to Expunge in the Court of Appeal. Based on the Writ, RE incurred further attorneys' fees and costs at the Court of Appeal level to file an opposition to the Writ ("Writ Opposition") and file a Certificate of Interested Entities or Persons Under Seal ("COIE Under Seal"). On May 2, 2024, after considering RE's Writ Opposition, the Court of Appeal denied the Writ and granted RE's COIE Under Seal. RE in this Supplemental Request therefore seeks the attorneys' fees and costs incurred at the Court of Appeal level to successfully file the Writ Opposition and COIE Under Seal as such tasks were performed as part of prevailing on the Motion to Expunge. As set forth in this Supplemental Request, RE requests $42,069.50 in attorneys' fees ("Appeal Fees") and $259.89 in costs ("Appeal Costs") as further prevailing on the Motion to Expunge at the Court of Appeal level related to successfully filing the Writ Opposition and COIE Under Seal. RE's attorneys' fees and costs for April 2024 legal services are reserved and not included in this Supplemental Request because such invoice was not finalized at the time of preparing this submission. For the same reason, RE also reserves all rights to fees and costs for May 2024 legal services to finalize and file this Supplemental Request. In total, accounting for the Initial Application and this Supplemental Request, RE submits and seeks the following total amounts for prevailing on the Motion to Expunge: (i) Trial Court Fees: $196,516.00 (ii) Appeal Fees: $42,069.50 (iii) Total Attorneys Fees: $238,585.50 (iv) Trial Court Costs: $4,529.82 (v) Appeal Costs: $259.89 (vi) Total Costs: $4,789.71 (vii) Grant Total Fees and Costs (iii + vi) $243,375.21 RE's Supplemental Request is based on this notice, the concurrently filed supporting memorandum; the concurrently filed declaration of Jeffrey B. Baird in support of the Supplemental Request; the concurrently filed declaration of David E. Nemeth in support of the Supplemental Request; the concurrently filed proposed order; and on such further oral or documentary evidence which may be presented before or at the hearing on the Supplemental Request. This Supplemental Request is also based on the Initial Application; California Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38; and all exhibits, declarations, and proposed order concurrently filed with the Initial Application. (Supplemental Notice, p. 1-5.) PROCEDURAL Moving Party: Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant, Reconstruction Experts, Inc. (Movant, Plaintiff, or RE) Responding Party: Defendants and Cross-Complainants, The Excelsior at the Americana at Brand Homeowners Association and Member Defendants 16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b): Ok Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300): Ok Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a): Uncertain The Court will hear argument as to if the moving papers were served on all Defendants. Scott Levine appears to represent Defendant Excelsior and the Member Defendants. The email address on the proof of service for Scott Levine matches with the email address that is listed on eCourt for Scott Levine. The proof of service also lists the attorneys for Defendant and Cross-Complainant Sierra Pacific Mortgage Company, Inc. The email address on eCourt matches with the email address on the proof of service as to Sierras counsel. The proof of service also lists that this motion was served on Defendant Pennymac Loan Services LLC, Rocket Mortgage LLC, AMWest Funding Corp, Evertrust Bank, and MERS. The email address on eCourt for these parties counsel does not match the email address on the proof of service for these parties counsel. Moving Papers : All filed on 1/30/2024: Notice; Memorandum; David E. Nemeth Jr. Declaration; Jeffrey B. Baird Declaration; Proposed Order; Proof of Service Moving Supplemental Papers : All filed on 5/13/2024: Notice For Supplemental Filing; Memorandum Supplemental Filing; David E. Nemeth Jr. Declaration for Supplemental Filing; Jeffrey B. Baird Declaration for Supplemental Filing; Proposed Order Supplemental Filing; Proof of Service Opposition Papers : Opposition; Proof of Service; Scott D. Levine Declaration; Mitchell S. Golub Declaration; Reply Papers : Reply; Proof Of Service ANALYSIS Prevailing Party Under CCP § 405.38, The court shall direct that the party prevailing on any motion under this chapter be awarded the reasonable attorneys fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of attorneys fees and costs unjust. ( Ibid .) The party successfully defending against the motion to expunge the lis pendens is the prevailing party for purposes of 405.38. (See J & A Mash & Barrel, LLC v. Superior Court of Fresno County (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1, 44.) Here, Movant/Plaintiff, was the prevailing party based on the fact that this Court denied Defendants motion to expunge the lis pendens on 11/17/2023. (See 11/9/2023 and 11/17/2023 Minute Orders). Reasonable Attorneys Fees and Costs The initial moving papers filed on 1/30/2024 request attorneys fees in the amount of $174,694.00 and costs in the amount of $4,496.00. Movant submitted the declarations of Jeffrey B. Baird (Baird), counsel for Movant, and David E. Nemeth Jr., an attorney that does not represent Movant who opines on the reasonableness of Movants fees. The request the initial moving papers are based on the fees and costs for September, October, and November 2023 based on services incurred opposing the motion to expunge. The initial moving papers argue that the fees and costs sustained after being served Defendants motion to expunge were necessary to: (i) analyze Defendants Motion to Expunge; (ii) outline and research authority in the preparation of REs defense; (iii) prepare a 25-page Opposition pleading; (iv) significant involvement with REs percipient witnesses and experts to prepare admissible factual support for the various components underlying the Liens claim entitlement and accounting; (v) work with REs percipient witnesses and experts to finalize the respective declarations (157 pages in total); (vi) review voluminous Project records and prepare a Notice of Lodgment with 86-exhibits in support of the Lien; and (vii) multiple hearings with the Court and oral arguments on the Motion to Expunge. (See Pl. Mot. p. 16.) The explanation for the reasonableness of Movants requests for fees and costs can more fully be examined in the declarations of Baird and Nemeth. The supplemental papers request additional fees and costs. [The moving papers noted that supplemental papers would be filed.] The supplemental request filed on 5/13/2024 requests additional attorneys fees of $21,822.00 and costs of $33.82 from the services related to filing the initial moving papers for this motion and the services related to the supplemental papers filed on 5/13/2024. The supplemental papers also request attorneys fees in the amount of $42,069.50 and costs of $259.89 for services rendered in the Court of Appeal to successfully oppose the writ. In total, based on initial and moving papers, Movant requests attorneys fees in the amount of $238,585.50 and costs of $4,789.71. The supplemental papers also include declarations of Baird and Nemeth attesting to the reasonableness of these requests. General Legal Standard - Lodestar and Multiplier A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case. ( Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 [internal quotations omitted].) The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. [citation] The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work. ( Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. ( Horsford v. Board Of Trustees Of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) The law is clear, however, that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records. ( Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) ...[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous. ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) The Court has the discretion to reduce the amount of fees (or deny recovery altogether) when the amount of attorney fees is inflated. ( Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635; Meister v. Regents of the Univ. of California (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 437, 455). In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work. ( Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664; see also Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009 [[R]ate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.].) The Court in Serrano IV also stated that fees associated with preparing the motion to recover attorneys fees are recoverable. ( Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 624 ( Serrano IV ).) The lodestar amount may be adjusted by the court based on factors including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.¿ ( Bernardi¿v. County of Monterey¿( 2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1399 [citing Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132].)¿ The purpose of any lodestar and the increase thereto is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services and is entirely discretionary.¿ (Id.)¿ The purpose of a fee enhancement is not to reward attorneys for litigating certain kinds of cases, but to fix a reasonable fee in a particular action.¿ ( Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie¿ (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1171-72.) Opposition on Reasonableness The Opposition argues that Movants requests for attorneys fees and costs is unreasonable. Exhibit A in the Levine Declaration in the Opposition includes the Oppositions objections to Movants billing entries. Opposition argues that Movants requests include entries that are unrelated to the Motion to Expunge, duplicative entries, excessive hours, administrative tasks billed by attorneys at high hourly rates, and more. Opposition argues the billing entries lack specificity, are vague, include block billing, and make it unclear if they pertain to the motion to expunge. Opposition also cites to a case that supports the argument that courts can compare opposing counsels fees to help determine whether the moving partys fees are reasonable. Substantially Justified Movant argues Defendants did not act with substantial justification in filing the motion to expunge because it lacked evidentiary and legal merit. As to what is considered substantial justification under § 405.38, neither party provides case law directly on point as to what is considered substantial justification. Opposition accurately points out that Movants argument regarding J&A Mash is not directly on point because that case did not define substantial justification. However, both parties cite case law that substantial justification has been understood to mean being justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person reasonably based in both law and fact. Opposition argues that unlike the motion to expunge, the present motion concerns the reasonableness of Excelsiors position rather than its success. Opposition argues that just because the Court did not agree with Excelsiors position does not at all mean it was not substantially justified. Opposition argues that nowhere in the Courts order on the motion to expunge the lis pendens or during the hearing did the Court suggest that Excelsiors motion was frivolous or that it abused the lis pendens procedure for ulterior motives. Movant also argues that Defendants were not substantially justified in filing the motion to expunge by citing portions from the 11/9/2023 Minute Order. For example, this Court in the 11/9/2023 Minute Order stated, Rather than coherent argument, the Movant turns repeatedly to overheated rhetoric that aids no one, generating more heat than light. (11/9/2023 Minute Order p. 38-39.) Further, Movant points to a portion of the 11/9/2023 Minute Order that states: This type of rhetoricaccusing another party of extort[ion] and strong-arm tactics, name-calling, etc.is utterly unhelpful and ineffective, and suggests that rhetoric is being deployed in place of detailed and well-supported legal argument. Plaintiffs detailed legal argument in opposition, supported by numerous detailed and specific declarations, with supporting exhibits, makes Movants suggestion that Plaintiff is engaged in any kind of sham or extort[ion] utterly lacking in credibility. There is nothing about the Plaintiffs case, in the Courts view, that would suggest to any reasonable observer that it is a fraudulent activity and misuse of the courts. Those are grave accusations to level against opposing counsel, and counsel for Movant should be prepared to address those accusations at the hearing. (Min. Order, 11/9/2023, p. 39.) The Court will hear argument. Recovering Fees and Costs for the Instant Motion and On Appeal Movant cites authority that although not directly on point, supports the position that Movant can recover for fees and costs for the filing of the instant motion and for filing of the opposition of the appeal. Opposition argues that Movant cannot recover for the filing of the instant motion and the fees and costs on appeal. Opposition bases its arguments on the language of the statute because 405.38 does not directly mention recovering fees and costs for the filing of the motion for attorneys fees and the appeal. Opposition argues that 405.38 only applies to making or opposing the motion to expunge. Opposition argues that the words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning. The Court will hear argument. Neither party provides arguments that are directly on point. Apportionment Opposition argues that Movant did not apportion the request for fees and costs between the Association and Member Defendants. While Opposition argues that courts have discretion in apportioning fees based on relative culpability, Opposition provides no argument as to what is a fair way to apportion fees and costs. Further, the Reply argues that the Defendants filed a joint motion to expunge. The Court will hear argument. Fees Not Required at this Point Opposition argues that fees are not required to be awarded at this point in the litigation because Movant and Excelsior signed a contract with a prevailing party clause. Opposition argues that if Movant prevails now, it is uncertain whether these attorneys fees and costs will be returned to Excelsior if it becomes the prevailing party at trial. Opposition argues that it would be absurd if Excelsior prevails at trial, but the Court now finds that Excelsior did not act with substantial justification in filing the motion to expunge. The Reply argues that 405.38 mandates an award of attorneys fees and costs to the prevailing party and that the legislature did not require a prevailing party to wait until the end of the underlying litigation to recover on the motion to expunge with respect to attorneys fees and costs. Opposition also argues this motion should be stayed pending the conclusion of litigation. TENTATIVE RULING The Court will hear argument. Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a): Uncertain The Court will hear argument as to if the moving papers were served on all Defendants. Scott Levine appears to represent Defendant Excelsior and the Member Defendants. [Not entirely clear who all the Member Defendants are. Opposition does not indicate who Member Defendants are.] The email address on the proof of service for Scott Levine matches with the email address that is listed on eCourt for Scott Levine. The proof of service also lists the attorneys for Defendant and Cross-Complainant Sierra Pacific Mortgage Company, Inc. The email address on eCourt matches with the email address on the proof of service as to Sierras counsel. The proof of service also lists that this motion was served on Defendant Pennymac Loan Services LLC, Rocket Mortgage LLC, AMWest Funding Corp, Evertrust Bank, and MERS. The email address on eCourt for these parties counsel does not match the email address on the proof of service for these parties counsel.

Case Number: 23STCV30316 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 OPERA BRIGHT, LLC , Plaintiff, vs. HILLS ONE, LLC , et al. Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV30316 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Hearing Time: 2:00 p.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT HILLS ONE, LLCS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CCP § 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP); DEFENDANT HILLS GROUP, LLCS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CCP § 425.16 (ANTI-SLAPP) Plaintiff Opera Bright, LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action on December 12, 2023 against Defendants Hills One, LLC (Hills One), Key Compounds, LLC, Hills Group, LLC ( Hills Group) , Alex Reyter, Jay Rifkin, and Paul Fiore. The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) fraud, (2) fraudulent transfer, (3) conspiracy to defraud, (4) aiding and abetting fraud, (5) negligent misrepresentation, and (6) breach of contract. Hills One now moves pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 to strike certain allegations and parts of certain causes of action in Plaintiffs Complaint. In addition, Hills Group now moves pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 to strike portions of certain causes of action in Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff filed a single opposition to Hills Ones and Hills Groups special motions to strike. The special motions to strike filed by Hills One and Hills Group are continued as set forth below. In connection with Hills Groups motion, the parties have interposed 45 evidentiary objections. In addition, in connection with Hills Ones motion, the parties have interposed 45 evidentiary objections. [1] Due to the voluminous number of objections, the hearings on the motions will be continued to a date that will be set at the Hearing on Objections discussed below. The Court orders the parties to meet and confer by telephone or in person in a serious and good faith effort to resolve and eliminate the objections. The only objections that should remain are those that pertain to material evidence regarding material issues. Keeping the rules of evidence in mind, the parties should be able to reduce the objections to just a few. If any material objections remain unresolved, the parties are to set them forth in a joint statement with the text, the objection, and the argument of each side in favor of their respective positions regarding the remaining material objections, along with a space for a ruling. The joint statement must be filed on or before _______ with a courtesy copy delivered to Department 50 . The Court will review any remaining objections with the parties at a hearing on _______________ at 2:00 p.m. (the Hearing on Objections). The date for the hearings on the motions will be set at the Hearing on Objections. If necessary, based upon the resolutions reached during the meet and confer process and/or at the Hearing on Objections, the parties may respectively file and serve revised briefing and evidence. The revised evidence may eliminate objectionable material; however, no new evidence or new argument is to be submitted unless it is as a result of compromises reached during the meet and confer process . In the event that revised briefing and evidence is necessary, the Court will discuss with the parties a briefing schedule for the revised briefing at the Hearing on Objections. Lastly, the Court notes that in the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint in response to the Courts ruling on Hills Ones and Hills Groups demurrers [2] , the instant motions may be moot. In JKC3H8 v. Colton (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 468, 477-478 , the Court of Appeal noted that [a] n amendatory pleading supersedes the original one, which ceases to perform any function as a pleading. The amended complaint furnishes the sole basis for the cause of action, and the original complaint ceases to have any effect either as a pleading or as a basis for judgment&Because there is but one complaint in a civil action, the filing of an amended complaint moots a motion directed to a prior complaint. Thus, the filing of an amended complaint renders moot a demurrer to the original complaint. Similarly, once an amended complaint is filed, it is error to grant summary adjudication on a cause of action contained in a previous complaint&So too does an amended complaint render moot an anti-SLAPP motion directed to a prior complaint, with the following caveat: A plaintiff or cross-complainant may not seek to subvert or avoid a ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion by amending the challenged complaint or cross-complaint in response to the motion. ( Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Hills One and Hills Group are ordered to give notice of this Order. DATED: July 18, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court [1] The Court notes that on July 11, 2024, Hills One filed a notice indicating, inter alia , that HILLS ONE, LLC joins in&Defendant HILLS GROUP, LLCs Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Jacob Stein& (Hills Ones July 11 2024 Notice of Joinder at p. 1:5-8.) Hills One states that [a]s part of this joinder and the underlying Motion, Defendant HILLS ONE, LLC seeks an order striking the allegations of protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute as to Defendant HILLS ONE, LLC in Plaintiff's Complaint& ( Id . at p. 1:10-12 .) [2] Hills Ones and Hills Groups demurrers were set for hearing on July 17, 2024, before the July 18, 2024 hearings on the instant special motions to strike.

Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Wednesday, July 17, 2024, Line 10. CROSS DEFENDANT LINA HERNANDEZ VIRVIESCAS' DEMURRER to CROSS COMPLAINT. Off calendar. The Hayes declaration indicates counsel did not meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference, as required by CCP 430.41. Responsive pleadings are now due by August 19, 2024. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/CK)

CU23-03915 Petition by Defendants STEVE and ROBYN BROWN to Compel Arbitration TENTATIVE RULING The unopposed motion to compel arbitration is granted, and this action is stayed pending the completion of arbitration. The Case Management Conference set for October 02, 2024 is VACATED. The matter is set for ARBITRATION REVIEW on July 10, 2025 at 9:00 a.m., Department 7.

Case Number: 20STCV30039 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Ariana Builders, Plaintiffs, Case No.: 20STCV30039 vs. Ruling 1999 Sycamore LLC., et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter Motions to Be Relieved as Counsel Moving Party : Randy S. Snyder, counsel of record for Defendants Robert Haro; R. Douglas Spiro, Jr.; Cole Harris; CSM Sycamore, LLC; and Capital Stone Management, Inc. Responding Party : None T/R : THE MOTIONS ARE GRANTED. COUNSEL IS TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE OF ORDER ON THE PARTIES WITHIN 5 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING. COUNSEL WILL BE RELIEVED UPON FILING OF PROOF OF SERVICE OF ORDER. COUNSEL TO GIVE NOTICE. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers. No opposition has been received. The Court may issue an order allowing an attorney to withdraw from representation, after notice to the client. (CCP § 284.) The attorney may withdraw from representation as long as the withdrawal would not result in undue prejudice to the clients interesti.e., counsel cannot withdraw at a critical point in the litigation. ( Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal. App. 4th 904, 915; see California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-700.) Attorney Randy S. Snyder, counsel of record for Defendants Robert Haro; R. Douglas Spiro, Jr.; Cole Harris; CSM Sycamore, LLC; and Capital Stone Management, Inc, seeks to withdraw from representation of each Defendant. Counsel states that, due to a change in the management of 1999 Sycamore, LLC, conflicts have arisen among counsels clients in this action. Trial has not been set in this matter, and no prejudice will result from Counsels withdrawal. Counsel has complied with CRC 3.1362. There is good cause for Counsels withdrawal. The motions are GRANTED. As this will result in corporate defendants without counsel, the Court will set an OSC re representation of the corporate entities.