Paige Haile V. Jessica Doyle, Karl Juergensen, Ashley Goff

Case Number: 21STCV29759 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: B SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHWEST DISTRICT REYES VALADEZ, Plaintiff, vs. CITY OF NORWALK; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY; FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION; and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 21STCV29759 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT Dept. B 1:30 p.m. July 17, 2024 1. Background On August 12, 2021, Plaintiff REYES VALADEZ (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants CITY OF NORWALK (City); COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (County); CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (Department); SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY (SCE); FRONTIER CALIFORNIA, INC., erroneously sued as, FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (Frontier); and DOES 1 to 50 (collectively, Defendants), inclusive for: (1) Premises Liability and (2) General Negligence. Defendant Frontier, at this time, moves for an (1) order determining that the settlement between it and Plaintiff is in good faith; (2) order barring all potential third-party complaints and/or cross-complaints and further claims against Defendant Frontier for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity; and (3) order dismissing all causes of action against Defendant Frontier. Defendant Spectrum Pacific West LLC (Doe 1 or Spectrum) opposes the instant motion, and Defendant Frontier filed a reply. 2. Evidentiary Objections Defendant Frontiers objections to the Declaration of Ernest Chang submitted in support of Defendant Spectrums Opposition are: SUSTAINED. 3. Motion to Determine Good Faith Settlement a. Legal Standard Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 877.6, subdivision (a)(1),[a]ny¿party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or. . . and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(a)(1).) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(c).)¿Although a determination that a settlement was in good faith does not discharge any other party from liability, it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the settlement.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 877(a).)¿¿¿¿¿¿ The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(d).)¿¿ In¿ Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates¿ (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section 877.6:¿a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial.¿Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of¿nonsettling¿defendants.¿( Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates¿ (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) The evaluation of whether a settlement was made in good faith is required to be made¿on the basis of¿information available at the time of settlement.¿( Tech-Bilt,¿supra , 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.)¿[A] defendants settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendants liability to be. [Citation.]¿( Ibid. )¿¿¿¿ The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6,¿subd. (d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far out of the ballpark in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.¿Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a settlement made in good faith within the terms of section 877.6.¿( Id. at 499-500.)¿¿¿¿ ¿Thus,¿Tech-Bilt¿held that in determining whether a settlement was made in good faith for purposes of section 877.6, a key factor a trial court should consider is whether the amount paid in settlement bears a reasonable relationship to the settlors proportionate share of liability. ( Tech-Bilt, supra , 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499500¿. . . .)¿This is because one of the main goals of section 877.6 is allocating costs equitably among multiple tortfeasors.¿( Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 502¿. . . .).¿( TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court¿ (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)¿Accordingly, a court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury.¿Potential liability for indemnity to a¿nonsettling¿defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor.¿[Citation.]¿( Ibid. )¿¿ b. Discussion Defendant Frontier moves for an order determining that the settlement between it and Plaintiff was in good faith. Here, Defendant Frontier and Plaintiff have entered into a settlement agreement wherein Plaintiff will receive $5,000 and a mutual waiver of costs of suit and attorneys fees in exchange for dismissing Defendant Frontier with prejudice in this instant case. (Terzakarian Decl., ¶2.) Defendant Frontier contends this settlement with Plaintiff is for a substantial and equitable amount considering the disputed nature of the claim, Plaintiffs approximated total damages, and Defendants Frontiers proportionate share of potential liability. ( Id. at ¶3.) Specifically, Defendant Frontier argues Plaintiff has no evidence to support a finding that it caused or contributed to any claimed damages. Nonetheless, Defendant Frontier contends the cost of engaging in a long and protracted litigation led to the decision to resolve the matter without a need for trial. (Terzakarian Decl., ¶15.) Furthermore, Defendant Frontier contends that the settlement agreement does not include any collusive or secretive terms. ( Id. at ¶16.) Moreover, Defendant Frontier asserts that co-defendants have been informed of all relevant terms of the settlement agreement. ( Id. at ¶¶4, 17.) In opposition, Defendant Spectrum contends the basis for the settlement agreement between Defendant Frontier and Plaintiff, i.e., that Defendant Frontier has no liability because it did not own, maintain, operate, and/or control the guy-down cables Plaintiff allegedly struck or the surrounding sidewalk is supported by a declaration that lacks personal knowledge and attaches an exhibit that does not support the declared testimony. Defendant Spectrum further contends at the time of the accident in 2020, Defendant Frontier jointly-owned pole 977901E and performed construction at the pole, which removed, lowered, and reorganized Defendant Spectrums lines without its knowledge to allow for an over-build. (Oppn at pp. 4-6.) As such, Defendant Spectrum argues this information demonstrates Defendant Frontiers control over the subject property and directly informs Defendant Frontiers potential liability. However, Defendant Spectrum contends it is a recent addition to the case and has not had sufficient time to fully investigate Defendant Frontiers scope of ownership and control of the jointly-owned utility pole. Thus, Defendant Spectrum requests a continuance to allow for investigation into Defendant Frontiers lack of liability. In reply, Defendant Frontier argues Defendant Spectrum asserts claims that are inapposite to the instant motion, wholly inappropriate for this venue, and improperly presents evidence. The Court agrees. Defendant Spectrum presents Changs declaration, which purports to be based on personal knowledge but fails to lay a foundation for Changs expertise or knowledge apart from being Defendant Spectrums Construction Manager, fails to provide foundational facts for how Chang knows the utility pole is allegedly joint-owned by Defendant Frontier and Defendant Spectrum, and fails to cite any authority that would allow for a continuance in this instance to produce such admissible evidence. As such, the Court will rule on the merits of the instant motion. The Court finds that the settlement agreement between Defendant Frontier and Plaintiff satisfies the Tech-Bilt factors. First, the settlement is based on Defendant Frontier (1) representation that it did not own, maintain, operate, and/or control the guy-down cables that Plaintiff struck or the surrounding sidewalk and (2) Plaintiffs own purported negligence by riding his bicycle along the sidewalk in violation of Traffic Code Section 15.76.080. Thus, it is based on an approximation of Plaintiffs total recovery if the matter went to trial. Also, Defendant Frontier and Plaintiff engaged in lengthy negotiations to reach the settlement amount of $5,000. Moreover, neither Defendant Spectrum nor the other co-defendants argue that the settlement amount is disproportionate to Defendant Frontiers potential liability in this case. Finally, as discussed above, Defendant Spectrum does not present any admissible evidence demonstrating that the settlement agreement between Defendant Frontier and Plaintiff is so far out of the ballpark in relation to the Tech-Bilt factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of Code of Civil Procedure Section 877.6. Therefore, Defendant Frontier California, Inc.s Motion for Determination of Good Faith is GRANTED. Moving Defendant is ordered to give notice. Dated this 17 th day of July, 2024 Hon. Karen Moskowitz Judge of the Superior Court

VALDEZ RODRIGUEZ vs Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for CVRI2304860 CONNER TRAVIS ARMAND CONNER Tentative Ruling: Grant motion to be relieved.

MSC19-01436 CASE NAME: GONZALEZ VS. ROCKWELL *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: NEW TRIAL (SECOND MOTION) FILED BY: ROCKWELL, LESLIE ANDRES *TENTATIVE RULING:* Defendants Leslie Andres Rockwell and D-Line Logistics, Inc. filed a second motion for a new trial against a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Marielena Gonzalez. Plaintiff has filed opposition and requests the court to dey the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the second motion for a new trial is denied. Background This case arises from a motor vehicle accident on August 9, 2017, in which Defendant Leslie Andres Rockwell, while in the course of employment under Defendant D-Line Logistics, Inc, failed to stop at a red light and struck Plaintiff Marielena Gonzalez’s vehicle. On February 16, 2024, judgment was filed after a jury found that the negligence of Defendants was a substantial factor in causing harm to Plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of $2,640,000.00. Defendants hired an investigator to conduct post-trial interviews with jurors. After review of the declarations and interviews with the jurors, Defendants found what they believed to be juror misconduct. Multiple jurors made similar statements to the same effect that Juror Michael Cannon and Juror Viginia Bones used their personal opinions and experience to affect the outcome of the jury verdict. Juror McCannon advocated for a significantly higher award (at least $600,000 higher than the number the jury came to) because of attorney fees and insurance rates. (Declaration of Lavar Castle ¶ 3–7; Declaration of Marcy Kwiatkowski ¶ 3–7.) Juror Bones was involved in a motor vehicle accident that traumatized her, and she did not fully disclose the effects of it on her during voir dire, but used it to sway other jurors to award a higher amount. (Declaration of Lavar Castle ¶ 11–15; Declaration of Marcy Kwiatkowski ¶ 12–16.) On April 9, 2024, Defendants filed notice of a motion for new trial based on the following grounds: (1) irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which Defendants were prevented from having a fair trial; (2) misconduct of the jury; (3) accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against; (4) newly discovered, material evidence which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial; (5) excessive damages; (6) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or decision, or the verdict is against law; (7) error in law occurring at the trial and excepted to by Defendants. In the first motion for new trial, Defendants requested either a new trial or remittitur as a remedy. (Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial, 12:11–12.) Defendants now reject remittitur as an improper remedy. After weighing the declarations and evidence of both parties, and considering the affidavits of other jurors, the court found remittitur was the proper remedy for a reduction of excessive damages. Remittitur was set at a reduction of $420,000 to the original judgment, if Plaintiff chose to reject the reduction, a new trial would be granted. Plaintiff consented and accepted the reduction of the judgment, judgment was so entered on June 17, 2024. On June 6, 2024, Defendants filed a second motion to set aside judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Marielena Gonzalez and grant Defendants a new trial, listing the same seven grounds for new trial as were set forth in the previous motion for new trial. Defendants argue that since prejudicial jury misconduct is established, a new trial is required, the court’s remittitur is invalid, Juror Bones concealed her bias during voir dire, and the law permits defendants to question whether amounts paid are less than the amounts billed for medical services. On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion for a new trial, arguing that Defendants’ motion fails under CCP section 1008, this court properly granted Defendant’s requested remittitur, Juror Bones did not conceal bias, and this court properly precluded cross-examination using inapplicable “paid” amounts. Legal Standard A party who originally made an application for an order that was refused in whole or part may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law. (CCP §1008(b).) It shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. (Ibid.) A verdict may be vacated, and any other decision may be modified or vacated, and a new trial granted for the following: irregularity in the proceedings, misconduct of the jury, accident or surprise, newly discovered material evidence, excessive damages, insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, or the verdict is against the law, and error in law occurring at the trial and excepted to by Defendants. (Code Civ. Proc. §657.) A remittitur judgment may be granted in any civil action where after trial by jury an order granting a new trial limited to the issue of damages would be proper if the ground for granting a new trial is excessive damages, issue a conditional order granting a new trial unless the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered consents. (Schelbauer v. Butler Manufacturing Co.. (1984) 35 Cal. 3rd 442.) Analysis Procedural Posture This is Defendants’ second motion for new trial, but first after the court entered an amended judgment. The California Supreme Court held there can only be one final judgment in an action. (Amell v. Amell (1937) 10 Cal. 2d 153, 155.) If a court for any reason modifies the judgment and enters a new one, the new judgment becomes the controlling judgment of the case, therefore the modified judgment becomes the appealable judgment. (In re Marriage of Micalizio (1988) 199 Cal. App. 3d 662, 660.) Plaintiff argues that this is a motion to reconsider disguised as a second motion for new trial. If an amended judgment did not exist, then the court would be inclined to agree, as new facts are not alleged. But, a successive motion for new trial on an amended judgment operates as if it were the first. Defendants are permitted to file the motion for new trial. Remittitur Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff’s acceptance of the remittitur and Defendants’ motion for new trial rests heavily upon the California Supreme Court case, Schelbauer v. Butler Manufacturing Co.. (35 Cal. 3rd 442.) The California Supreme Court vacated a lower court order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the plaintiff’s consent to the improper remittitur. (Id. at 447.) While the case was brought up to the California Supreme Court on the issue of proper granting of remittitur, the court vacated for new trial limited to the issue of the proper apportionment of liability. (Id. at 458.) Defendants mischaracterize the holding in Schelbauer as applied to the case at hand, the Schelbauer court specifically separates the damages issue from the liability apportionment issue. (Id.) The California Supreme Court states, “[t]he statutory requirement that use of remittitur be limited to those cases where jury error is confined to the issue of damages is express and unequivocal.” (Id. at 453.) Defendants’ understanding that the use of remittitur is narrowly confined to reduce an award of excessive damages is correct. The Schelbauer court observed that “use of remittiturs was uniformly confined to cases in which an excessive damage award was the only error in the jury’s verdict.” (Id. at 454.) While Defendants state remittitur is not the proper mechanism to remedy the juror misconduct, they do not raise any issues beyond an award of excessive damages. Moreover, Defendants now strenuously object to remittitur as the remedy, but asked the court in their first motion for new trial for remittitur as relief. (Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial, 12:11–12.) Defendants are accurate in their contentions that juror misconduct occurred and marred the damages award, but fail to allege any reasons beyond the award of excessive damages that the court should grant a new trial. Defendants asked for remittitur as a remedy. Remittitur was granted because the court was concerned with the allegations and evidence concerning juror misconduct, resulting in what the court perceived were excessive damages. Juror Cannon Juror Cannon’s misconduct was discussed and considered in the first motion for new trial. ( See Order for New Trial, dated May 3, 2024.) Juror Bones Defendants contend that because Juror Bones stated that she had no injuries from her disclosed motor vehicle accident, defense counsel could not have known to further question her and assumed no bias would result. Plaintiff argues Juror Bones disclosed the motor vehicle accident, and defense counsel should have probed the issue more. The trial arose from a motor vehicle accident and was primarily about awarding damages, not liability. Defense counsel in a personal injury motor vehicle accident case should know to question or probe further the views of a potential juror further when the juror discloses that he or she had been in an accident. Additionally, the response of Juror Bones invited potential further questions because not every individual might view injuries (whether physical, mental, and emotional) either collectively or separately. Dr. Karandikar The motion for new trial is denied on this ground. See Order on Motion for New Trial, dated May 3, 2024. Disposition Amended judgment was entered on May 13, 2024, this motion for new trial was timely filed on June 20, 2024. Defendants properly filed this motion under CCP section 657. In sum, the Defendants in the first motion for new trial requested remittitur or a new trial. The court issued an order offering remittitur subject to Plaintiff’s consent, and absent that consent an order for new trial for past and future non-economic losses only. Plaintiff consented, and remittitur was granted. The court viewed the jury misconduct alleged as troubling, and likely leading to an excessive award of damages to plaintiff. Case law and statutory language establishes remittitur as the proper remedy for excessive damages under the present circumstances. Defendants fail to allege issues beyond an award of excessive damages. Defendants Leslie Andres Rockwell and D-Line Logistics, Inc.’s motion for new trial against Plaintiff Marielena Gonzalez is denied.

Case Number: 22STCV20052 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 74 McDaniel v. Colaianni et al. Defendants Motion to Correct and Confirm Arbitration Award BACKGROUND Plaintiff April McDaniel sued defendants Rodrigue Colaianni and Lisa Colaianni aka Lisa Leroy on September 14, 2022 for (1) breach of contract, (2) negligence, (3) fraud, (4) negligent misrepresentation, and (5) concealment. Plaintiff alleged Defendants knowingly sold her a home replete with construction defects after Defendants negligently remodeled it. On October 31, 2022, the parties stipulated to arbitrate their claims and stay court proceedings in the interim. The arbitrator, Ernest C. Brown, issued a twenty-six-page Final Award on April 19, 2024, awarding Plaintiff $391,114.50, accruing simple interest at 10% annually from the date of the award. (D.Ex. 10, 26:2-7 (Award).) On May 28, 2024, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Confirm the Arbitration Award With Corrections by Striking the Award of Attorneys fees and Pre-Judgment Interest. On July 3, 2024, Plaintiff opposed. On July 10, 2024, Defendants replied. LEGAL STANDARD ¿¿ Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.) If a petition or response under [section 1285] is duly served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as made ... , unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding. ( Id. , § 1286.) [T]he court ... shall correct the award and confirm it as corrected if the court determines that: (a) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; (b) The arbitrators exceeded their powers but the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted; or (c) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy. ( Id. , ¶ 1286.6.) [A]n arbitrator's decision is not generally reviewable for errors of fact or law, whether or not such error appears on the face of the award and causes substantial injustice to the parties. ( Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase ¿(1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 6.) An arbitrator does not exceed their powers by assigning an erroneous reason for their decision. ( Id . at 28.) Arbitrators do not exceed their statutory powers merely by rendering an erroneous decision on a legal or factual issue, so long as the issue was within the scope of the controversy submitted to the arbitrators. ( Roehl v. Ritchie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 338, 348.) DISCUSSION 1. Attorneys Fees Defendants move the Court to strike the arbitrators $87,320.00 attorneys fees award. Defendants mistakenly suggest that the award of attorneys fees and the award of interest [by the arbitrator] are reviewed de novo but the authorities they cite refer to the standard a higher court applies when reviewing a lower court s fees determination. (Mot., 3:27-28.) When a trial court reviews an arbitrators decision, the standard is more deferential, as described above. (See Moncharsh , supra , 3 Cal.4th at p. 6.) Defendants argue Plaintiff is not entitled to fees because she did not attempt to mediate with them before resorting to legal action. The arbitrator found differently. The Final Award includes findings that on May 25, 2022, Plaintiffs counsel demanded prompt mediation, and between June and August 2022, Plaintiff requested that Respondents participate in an early mediation and Respondents and its [ sic ] counsel did nothing and refused to agree to mediate. (Award, 14:20-26, 15:7-14.) Defendants ask the Court to reverse the arbitrators factual determinations, not to correct them. The Court cannot do so. [P]arties who enter into arbitration agreements are presumed to know the arbitrators decision will be final and binding; arbitral finality is a core component of the parties agreement to submit to arbitration. ( SingerLewak LLP v. Gantman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 610, 616, quoting Moncharsh , supra , at pp. 6, 10.) The Court defers to the arbitrators finding of fact that Plaintiff tried to mediate and Defendants refused. The arbitrator was thus empowered to award fees. 2. Prejudgment Interest Defendants contend the arbitrators award is not clear and unequivocal as to the scope of interest awarded. (Mot., 10:23-25 [heading].) The contention is unavailing because the award is straightforward. The arbitrator awarded Plaintiff 10% simple annual interest beginning on the date of the award. That rate will continue after judgment. The arbitrator simply formalized the date on which damages were capable of being ascertained for purposes of post-award, prejudgment interest. 3. Attorneys Fees for This Motion A party entitled to attorneys fees in an arbitration award is similarly entitled to fees incurred to confirm it, where fees are otherwise authorized by the parties contract. (See Carole Ring & Associates v. Nicastro (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 253, 260-261.) The prevailing partys right to fees extends from Code of Civil Procedure section 1293.2, entitling a party to costs after a successful petition to confirm, and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a)(10), incorporating attorneys fees within costs when authorized by contract. Here, the parties contract authorized a fees award. (See Mot. Ex. 1, ¶ 25 [reasonable fees to prevailing party [i]n any action, proceeding, or arbitration between the parties arising out of [their] Agreement].) The arbitrator determined Plaintiff to be the prevailing party and awarded fees. The Court awards Plaintiff the costs of litigating this petition based on section 1293.2, and per section 1033.5, those costs include Plaintiffs fees. Plaintiffs two attorneys charge a reasonable hourly rate of $400.00 based on their experience and qualifications. (Markow Dec., ¶¶ 17-19.) Counsel Ari Markow estimates his colleague spent 15.4 hours reading and analyzing Defendants motion, conducting legal research, and writing the opposition, and Markow himself spent 2.2 hours discussing the motion, case status, and strategy with Plaintiff, and reviewing and finalizing [counsels] declaration and related exhibits. ( Id. , ¶ 21 [typo omitted].) Markow estimated 3.5 hours reviewing a reply brief and appearing at the hearing. Plaintiffs counsels billing is slightly excessive. 2.2 hours spent meeting with the client about a single law and motion matter is unnecessary, as is 3.5 hours to review the reply and prepare for the hearing on a straightforward legal issue. The Court will award 15.0 hours, in total, to review the motion and reply and prepare the opposition, and 1.0 hours to prepare for and attend the hearing, which can be accomplished remotely. The Court awards $6,400.00 in attorneys fees. 4. Prejudgment Interest The Court also calculates interest from April 19, 2024, through date of judgment as follows: ten percent, divided by three-hundred sixty five, multiplied by the total award of $391,114.50, results in a $107.15 per diem accrual. Eighty-nine (89) days passed between the award on April 19, 2024 and the judgment on July 17, 2024; $107.15 multiplied by 89 is $9,536.35. CONCLUSION The Court denies Defendants petition to correct the arbitration award. The Court confirms the award as rendered and enters judgment for Plaintiff against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $413,450.85, inclusive of attorneys fees and interest accrued to the date of judgment.

VOGES VS. HOUSER Case Number: 22CV-0200010 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of judgment/dismissal. At the last hearing on June 10, 2024, the Court was informed that Plaintiff was waiting on the final Medi-Cal lien. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 20STCV03577 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 17, 2024 CASE NUMBER 20STCV03577 MOTION Motion for an Order that Plaintiff Post an Undertaking MOVING PARTIES Defendants and Cross-Complainants Label27 and Brooks Ellis OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiff Derek Underwood MOTION Defendants and Cross-Complainants Label 27, LLC (L27) and Brooks Ellis (Ellis) (together, Defendants) move for an order that Plaintiff Derek Underwood (Plaintiff) post an undertaking pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1030, subdivision (b) in the amount of $18,810.25. Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendants reply. ANALYSIS When the plaintiff in an action or special proceeding resides out of the state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may at any time apply to the court by noticed motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to file an undertaking. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (a).) The plaintiff is not required to file an undertaking unless there is a reasonable possibility that the moving defendant will obtain judgment in the action or special proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (b).) The defendant is not required to show that there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prevail at trial, but rather must demonstrate only that it is reasonably possible that the defendant will prevail. ( Baltayan v. Estate of Getemyan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1432-1433.) The defendant must also submit an affidavit stating the nature and amount of costs and attorneys fees the defendant has incurred, and expects to incur throughout the remainder of the proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (b).) If the court, after hearing, determines that the grounds for the motion have been established, the court shall order that the plaintiff file the undertaking in an amount specified in the courts order as security for costs and attorneys fees. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (c).) If the court grants the motion and the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking within the time allowed, the court must dismiss the plaintiffs action or special proceeding as to the defendant in whose favor the order requiring the undertaking was made. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1030, subd. (d).) Here, Defendants advance the Declaration of Kent G. Mariconda, counsel for Defendants (Mariconda), asserting that Plaintiff is a resident of Panama. In support, Defendants provide Plaintiffs response to a demand for a Defense Medical Examination (DME), to which Plaintiff provided a written objection on the grounds that Plaintiff currently resides in Panama, which is more than 75 miles from the location set forth in the Demand. (Mariconda Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff does not contest that he lives in Panama. With regard to a reasonable possibility that Defendants will prevail, Defendants primarily point to the fact that Plaintiff failed to show for a DME. Defendants also provide an attorney declaration, which purports to summarize the discovery responses received in this case, indicating that Plaintiff was intoxicated and initiated the physical altercation, first by shouting racial epithets toward Ellis and [Andrew] Heric, then physically charging at them with a cornhole board, and ultimately physically moving aggressively toward an individual protecting the premises, at which point Ellis tackled Plaintiff to subdue him. (Mariconda Decl. ¶ 3.) In opposition, Plaintiff advances the declaration of Manuel D. Balam, counsel for Plaintiff (Balam). Regarding Plaintiffs failure to appear for a physical examination, Balam indicates that Defendants have no recourse to obtain issue, evidentiary, or terminating sanctions due to Plaintiffs failure to appear for the examination, because it was served on Plaintiff by other Defendants to the litigation, who have since settled with Plaintiff: 14) Defendants falsely claim, in part: At this point, in this litigation, plaintiff has failed to show for a DME, his doctors have failed to show for deposition, and he currently resides in Panama. (Motion, p.3:9-12). Presumably, they are suggesting or implying that they believe Plaintiff will likely lose because of DME or expert deposition issues and that Defendants would be able to exclude evidence and/or experts. On the contrary, LABEL27 Defendants do not have grounds to seek relief by way of excluding any evidence because they have failed to conduct their own discovery in riding the coattails of settled-out TCP Defendants and they never filed joinder to their applicable discovery. Fatally, there is and will be no basis for LABEL27 Defendants to seek exclusion of anything. 15) The truth is that LABEL27 Defendants did not actually serve their own demand for physical examination, did not serve their own demand for expert exchange, did not engage in a mutual exchange of expert information, and served no expert deposition notices. The Motion fails to point out that all prior discovery activity was solely by TCP Defendants, who are no longer in the case as Defendants. To certain discovery by TCP Defendants and only TCP Defendants, Plaintiff served objections. TCP Defendants never moved to compel. Thus, it has never been a matter of simply not appearing or not participating. Since LABEL27 Defendants did not conduct their own discoveryno DME; no expert demand; no expert exchange; and no expert notices; and no joinders to any of these things, they lack a basis to exclusion of anything. In fact, quite the opposite. Plaintiff is highly likely, if not certainly, to get exclusionary and dispositive orders against LABEL27 Defendants because they failed to designate ANY experts. Defendant has no experts. They will not be able to oppose Plaintiffs experts. Plaintiff, who actually did participate in expert exchanges, will or should win on exclusionary issues as a matter of law pursuant to CCP §2034.300. (Balam Decl. ¶¶ 14-15.) Plaintiff also provides purported video surveillance of the incident, in which Balam indicates was authenticated by ELLIS and HERIC during their depositions. (Balam Decl. ¶ 5.) However, the deposition transcripts provided do not provide any such authentications. As such, the video evidence is unauthenticated and provides no evidentiary value. Ultimately, the Court finds that, although it is a low bar, Defendants have not met their burden to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that they will prevail. With regard to Plaintiffs failure to appear for a physical examination, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that because Defendants did not serve the discovery at issue, they have no recourse to enforce it. As such, Defendants have no basis to obtain issue, evidentiary, or terminating sanctions against Plaintiff. With regard to Defendants evidence regarding who actually started the fight, the attorney declaration describing and summarizing Plaintiffs discovery responses is clearly inadmissible hearsay, and Defendants did not provide authenticated copies of the discovery responses themselves. Therefore, Defendants have not provided any admissible evidence that there is a reasonable possibility they will prevail at trial in establishing that Plaintiff is culpable for starting the fight. CONCLUSION & ORDER The Court finds Defendants have failed to establish a reasonable possibility that they will prevail at trial and therefore, the Court denies Defendants motion to require Plaintiff to post an undertaking. Defendants shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 17, 2024 ________________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 21STCV07431 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Wallach, et al., v. Providence Health System, et al. CASE NO.: 21STCV07431 MOTION: Approve Minors Compromise HEARING DATE: 7/19/202 4 Summary of Proposed Minors Compromise : Claimant¿ Time Wallach ¿(Claimant), a minor, by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, ¿David Wallach (Petitioner), agreed to settle their claims against Defendant Providence Saint John's Health Center under the following terms: Settlement to Minor: $1,143,136.11 Settlement to Others: David Wallach - $6,356,863.89 Injuries: Elizabeth Wallach died from a pulmonary embolism the day after giving birth to her daughter, Time Wallach. Time lost her mother's love, companionship, relationship, guidance and support as a result of her mother's wrongful death. Medical Expenses: None. Costs : Petitioner bears costs. Fees : $243,135.42. Counsel provides the retainer with a contingency fee. The terms provide that the Court will set the fee for representation of minor clients. (See ¶12.) The fee requested is approximately 21.26% of the recovery. The Court believes the fee request to be reasonable. Total Settlement $1,143,136.11 Less fees and costs -$243,135.42 Net Settlement $900,000.69 Petitioner proposes to dispose the funds as follows: i) $800,000.69 to be invested in a single-premium deferred annuity, subject to withdrawal only on authorization of the Court; and ii) $100,000.00 be transferred to the trustee of a trust that is either created by or approved in the order approving the settlement or judgment for the minor. Petitioner supplies the terms of the proposed annuity at attachment 18b(3) and trust at attachment 18b(7). These methods are permitted by L.A. County Super. Ct. Rule 4.115. Order : Claimant¿ Time Wallach ¿(Claimant), a minor, by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, ¿David Wallach (Petitioner), has agreed to settle their claims against Defendant Providence Saint John's Health Center in exchange for $1,143,136.11. The parties having appeared (CRC Rule 7.952(a)), and the Court having reviewed and heard the ¿Petition¿, the Court finds that the settlement is reasonable, and based thereon, approves and GRANTS the petition. (CRC Rule 7.950.) The Court intends to sign the proposed Orders (MC-351, MC-355). THE COURT SETS AN OSC RE COMPLIANCE/PROOF OF RECEIPT OF DEPOSIT ON September 24, 2024, at 8:30 AM. No appearance is required if the receipt is filed. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 23STCV02627 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 15, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV02627 MOTIONS : Motion to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena MOVING PARTY: Defendants Ehud Levy, 1621 Westerly Terrace, LLC, and Alexander Henry Levin OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Defendants Ehud Levy, 1621 Westerly Terrace, LLC, and Alexander Henry Levin (Defendants) now move to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena for medical records served on non-party Paramount Family Health Center. Defendants also seek sanctions. No opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD A party seeking discovery from a person who is not a party to the action may obtain discovery by oral deposition, written deposition, or deposition subpoena for production of business records.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.010.)¿ A deposition subpoena may command either: (1) only the attendance and testimony of the deponent, (2) only the production of business records for copying, or (3) the attendance and testimony of the deponent, as well as the production of business records, other documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.020.)¿ A service of a deposition subpoena shall be affected a sufficient time in advance of the deposition to provide the deponent a reasonable opportunity to locate and produce any designated documents and, where personal attendance is commanded, a reasonable time to travel to the place of deposition.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (a).)¿ Personal service of any deposition subpoena is effective to require a deponent who is a resident of California to: personally appear and testify, if the subpoena so specifies; to produce any specified documents; and to appear at a court session if the subpoena so specifies.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (c).)¿A motion to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena must be made within 60 days after completion of the deposition record. (Code Civ. Proc., §2025.480, subd., (b); Board of Registered Nursing v. Sup.Ct. (Johnson & Johnson) (2021) 59 CA5th 1011, 1032-1033.) California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a) states, [i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the courts own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a) states, in relevant part, . . . in making an order pursuant to motion made . . . under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorneys fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification . . . . MEET AND CONFER The Declaration of Christopher Babadjanian, Defendants counsel, states the following: On March 28, 2024, I sent a meet and confer letter to the COR for Paramount Family Health Center requesting compliance with the subpoena within 14 business days. I advised that failure to comply with the subpoena by this deadline would force my office to seek court intervention. (Babadjanian Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. F.) As of the date of this declarations signing, I have not received a response to my February 15, 2024, meet and confer letter. ( Id. ¶ 12.) DISCUSSION On March 7, 2024, Defendants personally served a deposition subpoena on Paramount Family Health Center. (Babadjanian Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. E.) The date of production was March 25, 2024. ( Id. ) To date, no response has been provided and no opposition has been filed. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to compel. Defendants seek $1,240.51 in monetary sanctions, representing a $160.17 hourly rate, $125 to personally serve the motion, and the $60 filing fee. This also includes $500 in sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1992. While the Court finds that sanctions are warranted, the amount requested in excessive given the lack of opposition and type of motion at issue. Therefore, the Court awards sanctions in the amount of $345.17 (1 hour of attorney time, $91.50 to personally serve this motion, and the $60 filing fee). CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court grants the motion for order compelling compliance with the deposition subpoena. The Custodian of Records for Paramount Family Health Center is ordered to produce the documents identified in the deposition subpoena at its place of business by August 5, 2024. The Court further grants Defendants request for monetary sanctions in the reduced amount of $345.17 against Paramount Family Health Center. Said monetary sanctions shall be paid to counsel for Defendants within 30 days. Defendants shall give notice of the Courts order and file a proof of service of such.