Jeffrey Day Individually And On Behalf Of All Others Similarly Situated V. Tops Markets Llc

Case Number: 24VECV00925 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 107 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES NORTHWEST DISTRICT Ingrid Guzman, et al. , Plaintiffs, v. Hyundai Motor America, Defendant. Case Number Department 107 COURTS [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: Motion to Compel Arbitration [THE FOLLOWING IS A TENTATIVE RULING IN THE ABOVE CASE]: Defendant Hyundai Motor America moves to compel arbitration of all claims brought by plaintiffs Ingrid Guzman and Edwin Hernandez. This court grants the motion to compel arbitration and stays all proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration. This court grants plaintiffs request for judicial notice. I. BACKGROUND On January 2, 2022, plaintiffs Ingrid Guzman (Guzman) and Edwin Hernandez (Hernandez and, together with Guzman, Plaintiffs) purchased a certain 2022 Hyunda Tucson (the Vehicle) manufactured by defendant Hyundai Motor America (Defendant). (Complaint ¶ 8.) To do so, Plaintiffs and the non-party seller executed a Retail Installment Sales Contract (the Sales Contract), which includes an arbitration provision (the Sales Contract Arbitration Provision). (Id. at p. 1.) The Sales Contract Arbitration Provision provides, in relevant part, Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action&. Any arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration. (Id. at p. 5.) The Vehicle came with Defendants New Vehicle Limited Warranty (the Warranty), which includes an arbitration provision (the Warranty Arbitration Provision and, together the with Sales Contract Arbitration Provision, the Arbitration Provisions). (Complaint p. 2.) The Warranty Arbitration Provision provides, in relevant part, If you purchased or leased your Hyundai vehicle in the State of California, you and we, Hyundai Motor America, each agree that any claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, advertising for the vehicle, use of your vehicle, the performance of the vehicle, and service relating to the vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or duties contemplated under the warranty, including without limitation claims relate to false or misleading advertising, unfair competition, breach of contract or warranty, the failure to conform a vehicle to warranty, failure to repurchase or replace your vehicle, or claims for a refund or partial refund of your vehicles purchase price (excluding personal injury claims), but excluding claims brought under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, shall be resolved by binding arbitration at either your or our election, even if the claim is initially filed in a court of law&. This agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. (Id. at p. 3.) On February 28, 2024, Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a complaint (the Complaint) alleging causes of action for (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Actbreach of express warranty, (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Actbreach of implied warranty, and (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Section 1793.2. On May 30, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to compel arbitration (the Motion). On July 1, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition (the Opposition) to the Motion, to which Defendant replied on July 8, 2024. II. PROCEDURAL MATTERS A. Timeliness of Filings Per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿1005, subdivision (b), moving papers should be filed at least 16 court days before they are set for hearing, oppositions thereto should be filed at least nine court days before the set hearing, and replies to any oppositions should be filed at least five court days before the set hearing. We are satisfied that all filings made in connection with the Motion are timely. B. Page Limits Per California Rules of Court rule 3.1113(d), no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages, which limit does not include the caption page, the notice of motion and motion, exhibits, declarations, attachments, the table of contents, the table of authorities, or the proof of service and [n]o reply or closing memorandum may exceed 10 pages. Defendants reply to the Opposition is 12 pages in length and therefore exceeds the page limit imposed by California Rules of Court rule 3.1113(d) for reply or closing memorandum. Although we do not decline to consider any part of the reply on this ground, we remind Defendant of the existence of this rule and the importance of abiding by the California Rules of Court. C. Plaintiffs Requests for Judicial Notice Judicial¿notice¿is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter. ( Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California ¿(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 364.) Judicial¿notice¿may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by law. (Cal. Evid. C. §¿450.) Matters subject to¿judicial¿notice¿are listed in California Evidence Code §§¿451452. ( Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. ¿(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.) The underlying theory of¿judicial¿notice¿is that the matter being¿judicially¿noticed¿is a law or fact that is¿ not reasonably subject to dispute. ¿ ( Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort¿ (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882 (emphasis original).) Although the¿ existence ¿of a document may be¿judicially¿noticeable, the truth of statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to¿judicial¿notice¿if those matters are reasonably disputable. ( Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. ,¿ supra , 113 (emphasis original);¿ Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California ¿(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 836.) Plaintiffs request that this court take judicial notice of two opinions by the Court of Appeals and one opinion by the Ninth Circuit Court. Plaintiffs attach to their request copies of the opinions of which they seek judicial notice. Under California Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), it is permissible for this court to take judicial notice of such opinions. Accordingly, this court GRANTS Plaintiffs requests for judicial notice. III. DISCUSSION Under both the Federal Arbitration Act and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on such grounds that exist at law or equity for voiding a contract. ( Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.) The right to arbitration depends upon contract; a petition to compel arbitration is simply a suit in equity seeking specific performance of that contract. ( Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv. Brokerage Co. v. Hock Inv. Co. (1998) 68 Cal. App.4th 83, 88.) The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, the party opposing the petition then bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to demonstrate that there should be no enforcement of the agreement, and the trial court sits as a trier of fact to reach a final determination on the issue. ( Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413; Provencio v. WMA Securities, Inc. , 125 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1031.) In determining whether an¿arbitration¿agreement applies to a specific dispute, the court may examine only the agreement itself and the complaint filed by the party refusing¿arbitration. ( Weeks v. Crow ¿(1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 350, 353.)¿¿ ¿ This court is empowered by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 to compel parties to arbitrate disputes pursuant to an agreement to do so. The court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists&. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §¿1281.2.) Thus, Section 1281.2 requires a court to order arbitration if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate exists. ( Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc . (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841.)¿¿ ¿¿ California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability. ( Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 97172.) This strong policy has resulted in the general rule that arbitration should be upheld unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute. ( Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 686.) Notwithstanding that strong policy, the United States Supreme Court has held, [A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit. ( AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648.) The hearing and determination of a petition to compel arbitration in the manner and upon the notice provided by law for the hearing of motions generally means that the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court's discretion. ( Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1157.) A. Defendants Standing to Enforce the Arbitration Provisions 1. The Warranty Arbitration Provision Arbitration provisions in warranty booklets do not constitute the consumers assent to the arbitration provisions and are thus unenforceable. (See Norcia v. Samsung Telecommunications Am., LLC (2017) 845 F.3d 1279, 1285, 1288 [stating that language in a written warranty agreement is contractual in the sense that it creates binding, legal obligations on the seller& but a warranty does not impose binding obligations on the buyer], internal citations omitted.) A party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a written contract precludes enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause when he has consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be enforced to benefit him. A nonsignatory is estopped from refusing to comply with an arbitration clause when it receives a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause. ( Boucher v. Alliance Title Co., Inc . (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 269.) [A] plaintiff who relies on the contractual terms in a claim against a nonsignatory may be precluded from repudiating the arbitration clause in the contract. ( JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1237.) Per the terms of the Warranty Arbitration Provision, because Plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle in California, they agreed to the terms of the Warranty Arbitration Provision and it may be enforced against them by Defendant. But, like in Norcia v. Samsung Telecommunications Am., LLC , supra , 845 F.3d 1279 at 1285, 1288, the Warranty Arbitration Provision, being contained in a warranty booklet, cannot impose binging obligations on the consumers, Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of an express warranty relies on the Warranty to derive a direct benefit and impose liability on Defendant. Thus, following Boucher v. Alliance Title Co., Inc ., supra , 127 Cal.App.4th 262 at 269, Plaintiffs are estopped from repudiating the Warranty Arbitration Provision while relying on other provisions of the Warranty to bring their claims. Thus, we find that Defendant has standing to compel arbitration under the Warranty Arbitration Provision. 2. The Sales Contract Arbitration Provision Defendant argues that it may enforce the Sales Contract Arbitration Provision under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (Motion p. 13.) The doctrine of¿equitable¿estoppel¿is an exception to the general rule that a nonsignatory to an agreement cannot be¿compelled¿to¿arbitrate¿and cannot invoke an agreement to¿arbitrate, without being a party to the¿arbitration¿agreement. Under that doctrine, as applied in both federal and California decisional authority, a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an¿arbitration¿clause to¿compel¿a signatory plaintiff to¿arbitrate¿its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations. By relying on contract terms in a claim against a nonsignatory defendant, even if not exclusively, a plaintiff may be¿equitably¿estopped¿from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that agreement. ( Kielar v. Superior Court (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 614, 619, internal quotation marks omitted.) Merely making reference to an agreement with an arbitration clause is not enough. The plaintiff's actual dependence on the underlying contract in making out the claim against the nonsignatory is always the sine qua non of an appropriate situation for applying equitable estoppel. Even if a plaintiff's claims touch matters relating to the arbitration¿agreement, the claims are not arbitrable unless the plaintiff relies on the agreement to establish its cause of action. But-for causation alone is insufficient. ( Ibid .) In Kielar v. Superior Court (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 614, 62021 (hereafter, Kielar ), the plaintiff brought a cause of action for breach of express and implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, but the express warranty was not part of his sales contract with the dealership. Indeed, the sales contract acknowledges this separate warranty and disclaims any implied warranties by the dealership. On the basis that manufacturer vehicle warranties that accompany the sale of motor vehicles without regard to the terms of the sale contract between the¿purchaser and the dealer are independent of the sale contract, the court in Kielar found that a manufacturers express or implied¿warranties¿that accompany a vehicle at the time of sale do not constitute obligations arising from the sale contract, permitting manufacturers to enforce an¿arbitration¿agreement in the contract pursuant to¿equitable¿estoppel. ( Ibid .) Defendant may not invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to enforce the Sales Contract Arbitration Agreement. The causes of action brought by Plaintiffs all allege violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and relate to Defendants statutorily imposed warranty and repair obligations; they are not brought to enforce the Sales Contract or relate to any terms of or the financing provided by the Sales Contract. Thus, we find that Plaintiffs claims are not intimately founded in and intertwined the Sales Contract. Additionally, Plaintiffs do not rely on any contract term of the Sales Contract to bring their claims and their claims do not depend on the Sales Contract. And, as the court in Kielar found, Defendants express and implied warranties that accompanied the Vehicle at the time it was purchased do not constitute obligations arising from the Sales Contract, which would permit Defendant to enforce the Sales Contract Arbitration Clause pursuant to equitable estoppel. Thus, we find that Defendant does not have standing to compel arbitration under the Sales Contract Arbitration Provision. B. Unconscionability The doctrine of unconscionability applies to arbitration agreements. ( Peng v. First Republic Bank (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.) Civil Code section 1670.5, subdivision (a)¿provides, If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract. The general principles of unconscionability are well established. A contract is unconscionable if one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice in deciding whether to agree and the contract contains terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party. ( OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125.) Unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results. The prevailing view is that procedural and substantive unconscionability must¿ both ¿be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability. But they need not be present in the same degree. The more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa. ( Peng v. First Republic Bank , supra , at 1469, internal citations omitted, emphasis original.) The ultimate issue in every case is whether the terms of the contract are sufficiently unfair, in view of all relevant circumstances, that a court should withhold enforcement. ( Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 912.) 1. Procedural Unconscionability Procedural unconscionability focuses on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power that results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice. Surprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them. ( Davis v. Kozak (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 897, 906.) Ordinary¿contracts¿of¿adhesion, although they are indispensable facts of modern life that are generally enforced, contain a degree of procedural¿unconscionability even without any notable surprises, and bear within them the clear danger of oppression and overreaching. ( Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc . (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1244.) Plaintiffs submit with the Opposition a sworn declaration by Hernandez (the Hernandez Declaration) that describes the Sales Contract being quickly presented to him for signature as a non-negotiable requirement before Plaintiffs purchase of the Vehicle. (Hernandez Decl. ¶ 4.) The Hernandez Declaration states that Hernandez was inadequately informed by the seller of the Vehicle about the Sales Contract Arbitration Agreement, and states, [b]elieving that I had no other options, nor additional time to fully understand the [Sales Contracts] terms in their entirety, or at least to seek counsel, I signed each portion of the [Sales Contract]. (Id. at ¶ 5.) He states that he only became aware of the Warranty Arbitration Agreement when the Motion was filed. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs also submit with the Opposition a sworn declaration by Guzman (the Guzman Declaration) that contains the same statements as the Hernandez Declaration. Plaintiffs attach to each of the Hernandez Declaration and the Guzman Declaration a copy of the Sales Contract. (Id. at Exh. A.) Defendant does not dispute that the Sales Contract is an adhesion contract. We agree with Plaintiffs that the Sales Contract is an adhesion contract, and, based on the sworn statements in the Hernandez Declaration and the Guzman Declaration, believe that Plaintiffs were not afforded an opportunity to fully understand or consult counsel about the contents of the Sales Contract before signing it. We therefore find some amount of procedural unconscionability in the Sales Contract Arbitration Agreement. The Hernandez Declaration and the Guzman Declaration each states that the warranty booklet containing the Warranty Arbitration Agreement is 50 pages long and that neither Plaintiff was never given notice by either [the seller of the Vehicle] or [Defendant] that a subsequent enforceable Arbitration Provision existed inside a Warranty Booklet that was sent to me around the time the [Vehicle] was delivered to me, and that he was consequently completely oblivious to the Warranty Arbitration Provision buried in the warranty booklets 50 pages. (Hernandez Decl. ¶ 6; Guzman Decl. ¶ 6.) Also based on the sworn statements of the Hernandez Declaration and the Guzman Declaration, we also find some procedural unconscionability in the Warranty Arbitration Agreement. We find that putting the Warranty Arbitration Agreement within the lengthy warranty booklet without calling attention to the Warranty Arbitration Agreement results in some surprise to Plaintiffs that it exists and as to its terms. Thus, we find some procedural unconscionability in both the Sales Contract Arbitration Agreement and in the Warranty Arbitration Agreement. Consequently, we proceed with our analysis by looking for substantive unconscionability in the Arbitration Agreements. 2. Substantive Unconscionability Substantive unconscionability examines the fairness of a contract's terms. This analysis ensures that contracts, particularly contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been variously described as overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one-sided. All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with a simple old-fashioned bad bargain, but with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party. Unconscionable terms impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy or attempt to impermissibly alter fundamental legal duties. They may include fine-print terms, unreasonably or unexpectedly harsh terms regarding price or other central aspects of the transaction, and terms that undermine the nondrafting party's reasonable expectations. These examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. ( OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho , supra , 8 Cal.5th 111 at 12930.) The principle that an arbitration agreement may not limit statutorily imposed remedies& appears to be undisputed. ( Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 103.) An agreement cannot waive non-waivable statutory rights because statutes enacted for the public benefit and to enforce public policy are unwaivable as a matter of law. ( Id . at p. 100.) Where& arbitration provisions undermine statutory protections, courts have readily found unconscionability. ( Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147, citing Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1283; Martinez v. Master Protection Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 107, 117; Wherry v. Award, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249.) Thus, for example, it is indisputable that an employment contract that required employees to waive their rights under the FEHA to redress& harassment and discrimination would be contrary to public policy and unlawful. ( Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. , supra , at pp. 10001.) The court in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. , supra , at p. 90 concluded that employee antidiscrimination claims brought under FEHA are in fact arbitrable if the arbitration permits an employee to vindicate his or her statutory rights. (Emphasis original.) The court determined that in order for such vindication to occur, the arbitration must meet certain minimum requirements, including neutrality of the arbitrator, the provision of adequate discovery, a written decision that will permit a limited form of judicial review, and limitations on the costs of arbitration. (Id. at pp. 9091.) Plaintiffs do not argue in the Opposition for the existence of any substantive unconscionability in either of the Arbitration Agreements. Rather, Plaintiffs merely repeat their arguments for procedural unconscionability. (Opposition p. 12.) This, without more, is insufficient. (See Peng v. First Republic Bank , supra, 219 Cal.App.4th 1462 at 1469 [some degree of both procedural and substantive unconscionability is required for an arbitration agreement to be unenforceable due to unconscionability].) This court independently reviews the Arbitration Agreements for substantive unconscionability and considers whether the Arbitration Agreements limit Plaintiffs statutory rights. The Sales Contract provides for mutually enforceable mandatory neutral binding arbitration of disputes, payment of certain of Plaintiffs fees by Defendant up to $5,000, and a final decision in writing that is subject to a limited right to appeal under the FAA. (Hernandez Decl. Exh. A; Guzman Decl. Exh. A.) We therefore find that, as described in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. , supra , 24 Cal.4th 83 at pp .9091, the Sales Contract Arbitration Agreement permits Plaintiffs to vindicate their statutory rights under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act through arbitration. The Warranty Arbitration Agreement similarly provides for mutually enforceable mandatory minding arbitration of disputes, the payment by Defendant of all fees except Plaintiffs initial filing fee, and a final decision in writing that is subject to a limited right to appeal under the FAA. (Willette Decl., Exh. A.) We therefore similarly find that, as described in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. , supra , 24 Cal.4th 83 at pp .9091, the Warranty Arbitration Agreement permits Plaintiffs to vindicate their statutory rights under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act through arbitration. We fail to find any indicators of substantive unconscionability in either of the Arbitration Agreements. Consequently, the Arbitration Agreements cannot be held to be unenforceable on the grounds of unconscionability. C. Stay of Proceedings California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4 provides, in relevant part, [i]f a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies.¿In accordance with choice-of-law principles, the parties may limit the trial court's authority to stay or deny arbitration under the CAA by adopting the more restrictive procedural provisions of the FAA. ( Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) Absent such an express designation, however, the FAA's procedural provisions do not apply in state court. ( Id . at 174.) The Warranty Arbitration Agreement specifies that the FAA shall govern any arbitration under the Warranty Arbitration Agreement, but it does not specify that the FAAs procedural provisions should apply to a motion to stay or deny arbitration. Thus, this being a state court, the CAA applies. Following California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4, this action should therefore be stayed pending the outcome of arbitration. D. Conclusion This court finds that Defendant has standing to enforce the Warranty Arbitration Agreement but not the Sales Contract Arbitration Agreement. This court additionally finds that neither of the Arbitration Agreements are unconscionable because, although both contain some procedural unconscionability, neither is substantively unconscionable. Accordingly, this court GRANTS the Motion and STAYS all proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration. Dated: July 15, 2024 _______­­­­­­­­­­___________________________ Hon. Eric Harmon Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23NWCV00656 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: C VARGAS, ET AL. v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA CASE NO.: 22 NWCV00656 HEARING: 7/17/24 @ 10:30 A.M. #9 TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Aida Solares Vargas and William Solares Vargas motion to compel further responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One is GRANTED in part as set forth below. No sanctions are awarded. Moving Party to give NOTICE. This is a Song-Beverly action. This hearing is a continuation from June 12, 2024 when the court ordered the parties to submit a joint statement of issues in dispute. The parties submitted a joint statement on July 2, 2024, and there appear to be unresolved issues regarding Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, numbers 37-41 and 45-46. Plaintiffs withdraw RFP No. 18. Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants 601-page document production does not identify which documents are responsive to which documents. First, any documents produced in response to demand for inspection shall be identified with the specific request number to which the documents respond. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.280, subd. (a).) Defendant must comply with this requirement within 30 days. As to motions to compel further document responses, moving parties must file evidence showing good cause based on specific facts that the requested matter is admissible evidence, or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of such evidence. ( Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Super. Ct . (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223-24.) "[E]ven when no . . . supporting affidavits are filed . . .good cause may be found in the pleadings theretofore filed in the action." ( Greyhound Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 389.) If good cause is shown by the moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. ( Kirkland v. Super. Ct. (Guess?, Inc.) (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Request numbers 37-41 seek documents related to OBDII codes, vehicle symptom codes, vehicle component repair codes, customer complaint codes, and labor operation codes issued generated or utilized by Defendant. In the joint statement, Plaintiffs state that they will accept tables that set forth all applicable codes and what those codes mean, not a subset of codes chosen by Defendant. Plaintiffs further state they have a right to discover what information the dealerships used and what information the dealerships did not use. The Court determines that the requests are overbroad. The responses shall be limited to repair codes generated by the repair of the Subject Vehicle. Accordingly, the motion to compel further response to RFP Nos. 37-41 is GRANTED in part. Request numbers 45-46 request similar consumer complaints of other 2017 Hyundai Elantra vehicles with the same or similar nonconformities. In their moving papers, Plaintiffs state that the information sought by Plaintiffs regarding other similar vehicle complaints may prove a widespread defect or nonconformity, show when it rose, or demonstrate Defendants knowledge of widespread problems and Defendants failure to act despite its knowledge. In opposition, Defendant argues that the requests seek irrelevant documents about other consumers vehicles that have no relation to Plaintiffs claims in this case. The Court determines that the requests are overbroad. The responses shall be limited to the specific defects and nonconformities identified in Plaintiffs repair orders for vehicles of the same year, make, and model sold in California. Accordingly, the motion to compel further response to RFP Nos. 45-46 is GRANTED in part. Sanctions In a motion to compel further discovery responses, the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).) Because of the mixed ruling, the Court will not award sanctions.

Case Number: 23STCV08765 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 SONIA MARAVILLA, Plaintiff, v. FCA US LLC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV08765 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Trial Date: August 20, 2024 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiff Sonia Maravillas Motion to Compel Compliance With Courts February 7, 2024 Discovery Order. On April 20, 2023, Plaintiff SONIA MARAVILLA (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants FCA US LLC (FCA) and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. The Complaint asserts the following causes of action against all defendants: 1) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(d); 2) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(b); 3) Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(a)(3); 4) Breach of Express Written Warranty Civil Code Sections 1791.2(a), 1794; and 5) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Civil Code Sections 1791.1, 1794. Plaintiff now brings a Motion to Compel Compliance under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.310 (further responses) and 2031.320 (compel compliance) with this Courts February 7, 2024 Discovery Order, which Defendants have not opposed. After review, the Court GRANTS the Motion because Plaintiff has shown that Defendant FCA has failed to comply with the Courts previous discovery order and has not provided any substantial justification or other circumstances explaining why it has not complied. Background Allegations This Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty action involves Plaintiffs purchase of a 2021 jeep Cherokee (Vehicle) on or about September 19, 2021. (Compl., ¶5.) The Vehicle is manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant. ( Id. at ¶6.) Plaintiff received an express written warranty stating Defendant FCA would preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the vehicle or provide compensation if there is a failure in utility or performance for a specified period of time. ( Id. at ¶9.) The Vehicle contained or developed defects after Plaintiff took possession and during the warranty period. ( Id. at ¶¶10-11.) Defendant FCA was unable and/or failed to service or repair the Vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts. ( Id. at ¶14.) The Vehicles defects have substantially impaired its safety, use and/or value and could not have been discovered by Plaintiff prior to taking possession. ( Id. at ¶¶15-16. ) Motion to Compel Compliance Compel Compliance with Discovery Legal Standard: If a party filing a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling under Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280 thereafter fails to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with that party's statement of compliance, the demanding party may move for an order compelling compliance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.320(a).) Here, Plaintiff served on Defendant FCA US LLC (Defendant FCA) Form Interrogatories (Set One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), Requests for Admissions (Set One), and Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) on August 11, 2023. ((Maxfield Decl., ¶3.) As such, Defendant FCA had until September 28, 2023 to serve its responses and produce the requested documents because it would within 30 days after service of the written discovery plus the two additional court days for electronic service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.260(a).) Defendant FCA failed to provide any responses to the propounded discovery, so on December 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel initial discovery responses, which were granted on February 7, 2024. (Maxfield Decl., ¶8.) As of the date of the filing of the instant motion, Plaintiff contends Defendant FCA has not provided any discovery response or document production in compliance with the February 7, 2024 order. ( Id. at ¶12.) Although not required to do so, Plaintiffs counsel met and conferred with Defendant FCAs counsel telephonically and through email concerning the discovery responses. ( Id. at ¶¶9, 11, Exs. 1-2.) Plaintiff asserts no response has been received pertaining to the email sent to Defense counsel. ( Id. at ¶15.) Finally, Defendant FCA has not opposed the instant motion to refute or rebut Plaintiffs contentions. The Court notes that, however frustrating the situation to the Plaintiff must be, the relief sought here to compel compliance with a courts prior order -- is inapt. Courts do not generally make orders to comply with their prior orders; each one stands on its own, and it will be up to the Plaintiff to request appropriate sanctions if the Defendant fails to comply with any particular court order. The statutes upon which Plaintiff relies in her notice do not support said order in any event. A motion to compel further responses under CCP section 2031.310 applies when a response is filed and further responses are requested; a motion to compel compliance under CCP 2031.320 is brought when a party states in its responses that it will provide documents and fails to do so. Here, neither situation applies. Rather, Defendant has failed to file any responses to the original discovery; to the original motion to compel; or to the instant motion. As a result, a motion for issue, evidence, monetary or terminating sanctions under CCP section 2031.300 subd. (c) might have been appropriate. The Court will consider an OSC or other appropriate mechanism to see what action should be taken in light of Defendants apparent failure to participate in this case since at least August of 2023 when the trial was set. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Sonia Maravillas Motion to Compel Compliance with Courts February 7, 2024 Discovery Order is DENIED.

Case Number: 23GDCV02277 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B Jie Jiang , Plaintiff, v. tesla, inc. d/b/a tesla motors, inc., Defendant. Case No.: 23GDCV02277 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: motion to compel binding arbitration BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiff Jie Jiang (Plaintiff) alleges that he purchased a 2023 Tesla Model Y on April 13, 2023, for which manufacturer/distributor Defendant Tesla, Inc. d/b/a Tesla Motors, Inc. (Defendant) issued a written warranty. Plaintiff alleges the warranty was not issued by the selling dealership. Plaintiff alleges the subject vehicle was delivered with serious defects and nonconformities to the warranty and that it developed other serious defects and nonconformities to the warranty including, but not limited to, structural and electrical system defects. (Compl., ¶10.) Plaintiff alleges that he first presented the subject vehicle for repairs on May 10, 2023 and reported that the front passenger seat was unable to adjust backward. ( Id. , ¶11.) Plaintiff presented the vehicle again on May 31, 2023 and reported that the back seat squeaked when driving over bumps, the vehicle made a wind-like noise while driving, there was a vibration from the back seat and headliner, and there was a large gap in between the driver side door and the body upon closing. ( Id. , ¶12.) Plaintiff presented the vehicle in June 2023 and again reported back seat squeaking. ( Id. , ¶13.) The complaint, filed October 26, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act breach of express warranty; (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act breach of implied warranty; and (3) violation of Song-Beverly Act § 1793.2. B. Motion on Calendar On November 28, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On July 5, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE With the moving papers, Defendant submitted a request for judicial notice of the complaint. The request is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452(d).) DISCUSSION Defendant moves to compel arbitration against Plaintiff and an order to stay the action pending the outcome of the arbitration. A. Terms of the Arbitration Agreement In support of the motion, Defendant provides the declaration of Raymond Kim, Manager, Business Resolution at Defendant. He states that when Plaintiff ordered the subject vehicle from Defendant on January 23, 2023, Plaintiff agreed to the terms of the Motor Vehicle Order Agreement (Order Agreement), which included the arbitration agreement. (Kim Decl., ¶¶3, 6.) Mr. Kim states that Plaintiff placed the order by clicking a Place Order button on Defendants website and that Plaintiff could not have placed an order without clicking the button or authorizing someone to do so on his behalf. ( Id. , ¶¶4-5.) Mr. Kim states that customers may opt out of the arbitration agreement within 30 days of execution of the Order Agreement, but Plaintiff did not do so. ( Id. , ¶¶6-7.) On April 13, 2023, Plaintiff took delivery of the subject vehicle and executed the Retail Installment Sales Contract (Sales Contract), which also includes an arbitration provision. ( Id. , ¶¶3, 8, 13.) Mr. Kim states that vehicle buyers like Plaintiff have the opportunity and are expected by Defendant to read the entire Sales Contract. ( Id. , ¶9.) He states that the Sales Contract was made at or near the time of the sale of the subject vehicle. ( Id. , ¶11.) Mr. Kim states that both the Order Agreement and the Sales Contract are available for Plaintiff to view on their mytesla.com account as long as the customer own the vehicle. ( Id. , ¶14.) The Order Agreement was entered between Plaintiff and Tesla, Inc. and includes an agreement to arbitrate. (Kim Decl., Ex. 1 [Order Agreement at pp. 2, 3].) The Order Agreement is only 4 pages in length. Page 3 of the Order Agreement includes a box with the bolded term: Agreement to Arbitrate. It states: Agreement to Arbitrate. Please carefully read this provision, which applies to any dispute between you and Tesla, Inc. and its affiliates, (together Tesla). If you have a concern or dispute, please send a written notice describing it and your desired resolution to resolutions@tesla.com. If not resolved within 60 days, you agree that any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla will not be decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator in an arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules. This includes claims arising before this Agreement, such as claims related to statements about our products. You further agree that any disputes related to the arbitrability of your claims will be decided by the court rather than an arbitrator, notwithstanding AAA rules to the contrary. To initiate the arbitration, you will pay the filing fee directly to AAA and we will pay all subsequent AAA fees for the arbitration, except you are responsible for your own attorney, expert, and other witness fees and costs unless otherwise provided by law. If you prevail on any claim, we will reimburse you your filing fee. The arbitration will be held in the city or county of your residence. To learn more about the Rules and how to begin an arbitration, you may call any AAA office or go to www.adr.org. The arbitrator may only resolve disputes between you and Tesla, and may not consolidate claims without the consent of all parties. The arbitrator cannot hear class or representative claims or requests for relief on behalf of others purchasing or leasing Tesla vehicles. In other words, you and Tesla may bring claims against the other only in your or its individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any class or representative action. If a court or arbitrator decides that any part of this agreement to arbitrate cannot be enforced as to a particular claim for relief or remedy, then that claim or remedy (and only that claim or remedy) must be brought in court and any other claims must be arbitrated. If you prefer, you may instead take an individual dispute to small claims court. You may opt out of arbitration within 30 days after signing this Agreement by sending a letter to: Tesla, Inc.; P.O. Box 15430; Fremont, CA 94539-7970, stating your name, Order Number or Vehicle Identification Number, and intent to opt out of the arbitration provision. If you do not opt out, this agreement to arbitrate overrides any different arbitration agreement between us, including any arbitration agreement in a lease or finance contract. (Order Agreement at p.3.) The Sales Contract includes an ARBITRATION PROVISION on page 5. It states: ARBITRATION PROVISION PLEASE REVIEW - IMPORTANT - AFFECTS YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS 1. EITHER YOU OR WE MAY CHOOSE TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU AND US DECIDED BY ARBITRATION AND NOT IN COURT OR BY JURY TRIAL. 2. IF A DISPUTE IS ARBITRATED, YOU WILL GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A CLASS REPRESENTATIVE OR CLASS MEMBER ON ANY CLASS CLAIM YOU MAY HAVE AGAINST US INCLUDING ANY RIGHT TO CLASS ARBITRATION OR ANY CONSOLIDATION OF INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATIONS. 3. DISCOVERY AND RIGHTS TO APPEAL IN ARBITRATION ARE GENERALLY MORE LIMITED THAN IN A LAWSUIT, AND OTHER RIGHTS THAT YOU AND WE WOULD HAVE IN COURT MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION. Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, any allegation of waiver of rights under this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action. If federal law provides that a claim or dispute is not subject to binding arbitration, this Arbitration Provision shall not apply to such claim or dispute. Any claim or dispute is to be arbitrated by a single arbitrator only on an individual basis and not as a plaintiff in a collective or representative action, or a class representative or member of a class on any class claim. The arbitrator may not preside over a consolidated, representative, class, collective, injunctive, or private attorney general action. You expressly waive any right you may have to arbitrate a consolidated, representative, class, collective, injunctive, or private attorney general action. You or we may choose the American Arbitration Association (www.adr.org) or National Arbitration and Mediation (www.namadr.com) as the arbitration organization to conduct the arbitration. If you and we agree, you or we may choose a different arbitration organization. You may get a copy of the rules of an arbitration organization by contacting the organization or visiting its website. Arbitrators shall be attorneys or retired judges and shall be selected pursuant to the applicable rules. The arbitrator shall apply governing substantive law and the applicable statute of limitations. The arbitration hearing shall be conducted in the federal district in which you reside unless the Seller-Creditor is a party to the claim or dispute, in which case the hearing will be held in the federal district where this transaction was originated. We will pay the filing, administration, service, or case management fee and the arbitrator or hearing fee up to a maximum of $5,000, unless the law or the rules of the chosen arbitration organization require us to pay more. You and we will pay the filing, administration, service, or case management fee and the arbitrator or hearing fee over $5,000 in accordance with the rules and procedures of the chosen arbitration organization. The amount we pay may be reimbursed in whole or in part by decision of the arbitrator if the arbitrator finds that any of your claims is frivolous under applicable law. Each party shall be responsible for its own attorney, expert and other fees, unless awarded by the arbitrator under applicable law. If the chosen arbitration organization's rules conflict with this Arbitration Provision, then the provisions of this Arbitration Provision shall control. Any arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration. Any award by the arbitrator shall be in writing and will be final and binding on all parties, subject to any limited right to appeal under the Federal Arbitration Act. & This Arbitration Provision shall survive any termination, payoff or transfer of this contract. If any part of this Arbitration Provision, other than waivers of class rights, is deemed or found to be unenforceable for any reason, the remainder shall remain enforceable. You agree that you expressly waive any right you may have for a claim or dispute to be resolved on a class basis in court or in arbitration. If a court or arbitrator finds that this class arbitration waiver is unenforceable for any reason with respect to a claim or dispute in which class allegations have been made, the rest of this Arbitration Provision shall also be unenforceable. (Sales Contract at p.5.) Accordingly, the Court finds there is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate the claims asserted in the complaint and the scope of the arbitration provisions are sufficiently broad to cover the claims in this action between Plaintiff and Defendant. Thus, the motion to compel arbitration is granted. In the opposition brief, Plaintiff does not raise any arguments regarding the existence of the arbitration agreement, whether he signed the agreement, or the scope of the arbitration agreement. Rather, he argues that the arbitration provision is unconscionable. As the parties do not dispute the existence or scope of the arbitration agreement, the Court will discuss whether the terms of the arbitration agreement are unconscionable. B. Unconscionability Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable because the Order Agreement was a pre-printed consumer sales contract that was presented to Plaintiff on a take it or leave it basis (contract of adhesion), such that Plaintiff had no meaningful opportunity to negotiate with Defendant about the terms. However, the Order Agreements arbitration agreement expressly allowed Plaintiff 30 days after signing the arbitration agreement to opt out of the arbitration provision by sending a written letter to Defendant. As such, this particular term was not a contract of adhesion. Further, there is no evidence that the arbitration clauses in the Order Agreement or the Sales Contract were non-negotiable or that Plaintiff made any attempt to negotiate such terms and was denied. (See Bolanos v. Khalatian (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1586 [holding that arbitration agreement was enforceable because the plaintiffs declaration did not say that she could not read or understand the agreement and because she did not offer any evidence that she was forced or tricked into signing the agreement].) Plaintiff has not provided a declaration stating that he attempted to ask questions about or negotiate the terms of the arbitration agreement in the Order Agreement or the Sales Contract and that he was denied such requests. Plaintiff also argues that the arbitration agreement did not include a copy of the relevant arbitration rules. However, the Order Agreements arbitration agreement stated that the American Arbitration Association would be the chosen arbitrator and that rules may be found by calling the AAA office or going on the www.adr.org website. Similarly, the Sales Contracts arbitration provision directs Plaintiff to contact AAA or National Arbitration and Mediation or visit their websites for the arbitration rules. T he failure to attach or provide the AAA and/or NAM rules to the arbitration agreement is not, in itself, a sufficient ground to support a finding of procedural unconscionability. For example, in Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 690, the Court of Appeal concluded: [T]he failure to attach a copy of the AAA rules did not render the agreement procedurally unconscionable. There could be no surprise, as the arbitration rules referenced in the agreement were easily accessible to the partiesthe AAA rules are available on the Internet. Thus, there are no indications of procedural unconscionability. Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable because the clause allows for a choice of the arbitration forum only for the party electing to arbitrate. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has elected the forum and rules for the arbitration, citing to Chavarria v. Ralphs (9th Cir. 2013) 733 F.3d 916 ( Even if it were the case that Ralphs' policy does not guarantee that Ralphs will always be the party with the final selection, the selection process is not one designed to produce a true neutral in any individual case.). (Opp. at p.6.) Part of the issue in Chavarria was that the arbitration selection provision would always produce an arbitrator proposed by Ralphs and that the provision precluded institutional arbitration administrators like AAA or JAMS which had established rules and procedures to select a neutral arbitrator. Here, Defendants arbitration agreement does not preclude the selection of neutral arbitrators at qualified institutions like AAA or JAMS. Plaintiff also argues that the arbitration cost provision is substantively unconscionable and would impose prohibitive costs on Plaintiff. However, the arbitration agreement in the Order Agreement states: To initiate the arbitration, you will pay the filing fee directly to AAA and we will pay all subsequent AAA fees for the arbitration, except you are responsible for your own attorney, expert, and other witness fees and costs unless otherwise provided by law. If you prevail on any claim, we will reimburse you your filing fee. The arbitration will be held in the city or county of your residence. (Order Agreement at p.3.) As such, it is unclear how the arbitration cost provision in the Order Agreement is unconscionable. The Sales Contract states in relevant part: We will pay the filing, administration, service, or case management fee and the arbitrator or hearing fee up to a maximum of $5,000, unless the law or the rules of the chosen arbitration organization require us to pay more. You and we will pay the filing, administration, service, or case management fee and the arbitrator or hearing fee over $5,000 in accordance with the rules and procedures of the chosen arbitration organization. The amount we pay may be reimbursed in whole or in part by decision of the arbitrator if the arbitrator finds that any of your claims is frivolous under applicable law. Each party shall be responsible for its own attorney, expert and other fees, unless awarded by the arbitrator under applicable law. (Sales Contract at p.5.) The Sales Contract contemplates Defendant paying fees up to $5,000 and then the parties splitting any arbitration fees over $5,000 in accordance with the rules and procedures of the chosen arbitration organization. The provision does not require Plaintiff to pay all costs above $5,000 as argued by Plaintiff in the opposition brief. (Opp. at p.7.) The Court does not find this provision to be substantively unconscionable. As there are no indications of procedural or substantive unconscionability, the motion to compel arbitration is granted. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendant Tesla, Inc.s motion to compel arbitration is granted. The action shall be stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration. The Case Management Conference set for August 7, 2024 is vacated. The Court sets a Status Conference re: Status of Arbitration for January 15, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. Defendant shall give notice of this order. DATED: July 19, 2024 ___________________________ John J. Kralik Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23AHCV02404 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 16, 2024 TRIAL DATE: February 25, 2025 CASE: TEJ KISHOR NAIK v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. , and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive. CASE NO.: 23AHCV02404 MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION MOVING PARTY : Plaintiff Tej Kishor Naik RESPONDING PARTY : Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. SERVICE: Filed April 9, 2024 OPPOSITION: Filed April 18, 2024 REPLY: Filed July 9, 2024 RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiff moves for an order compelling Defendant to produce its person most qualified for deposition and to produce the documents requested, within 30 days. Plaintiff also requests monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,150.00. BACKGROUND This case arises out of Plaintiffs lemon law claim for a 2020 Honda Odyssey Van with Vehicle Identification Number 5FNRL6H92LB068018 (Subject Vehicle). Plaintiff filed this complaint on October 17, 2023. TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Tej Kishor Naiks Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. is DENIED. Plaintiffs request for sanctions is also DENIED. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, subdivision (a) provides: If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. The motion shall (1) set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice and (2) be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(b)(2).) DISCUSSION Plaintiff moves for an order compelling the deposition testimony of Defendants person most qualified. According to Plaintiffs counsel, Isaac Agyeman, Plaintiff served a Notice of Deposition for AHMs PMQ on November 21, 2023. (Agyeman ¶ 6, Ex. A.) On December 7, 2023, AHM served objections to the Notice. ( Ibid. at ¶ 7, Ex. B.) In December 2023, Plaintiff initiated its meet and confer efforts and asked Defendant to provide available dates for the deposition; Defendant did not provide any dates. ( Ibid. at ¶ 8, Ex. C.) On December 12, Plaintiff served a 1 st Amended Notice of Deposition on Defendant to produce its PMQ for a deposition. ( Ibid. at ¶ 9, Ex. D.) The following day, Defendant informed Plaintiff that there would be a delay in producing the witness. ( Ibid. at ¶ 10, Ex. E.) On January 3 and February 16, 2024, Plaintiff once again reached out to Defendant and asked for available dates, Defendant responded to the first communication promising to provide a date but did not respond to the second communication. ( Ibid. at ¶ 11, Ex. F.) On March 6, 2024, Plaintiff served its 2 nd Amended Notice of Deposition, to which AHM responded with additional objections. ( Ibid . at ¶¶ 13, Exs. H-I.) Plaintiff followed up with a voicemail and written correspondence attempting to meet and confer. ( Ibid. at ¶ 15, Ex. J.) To date, AHM has refused to discuss its objections or provide any available dates for the deposition. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,150.00 as follows: three hours for drafting the instant Motion, two hours in reviewing the opposition and drafting a reply, and an hour to attend the hearing, at a billing rate of $525 per hour. ( Ibid . at ¶ 18.) Plaintiff argues that the deposition is crucial to Plaintiffs ability to prove his case. Plaintiff has attempted to meet and confirm and cooperate with Defendant on several occasions, however, AHM has continued to refuse to produce a witness. The matters Plaintiff seeks to uncover through the deposition and production of documents are basic and benign and universally discoverable in lemon law cases. (Mot. pp. 9-10.) Plaintiff is not seeking objectionable, overbroad, or privileged information. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that good cause exists to compel the deposition and production of documents because the testimony topics and document requests go to the essential elements of Plaintiffs express and implied warranty and damages claims. (Mot. p. 14.) Plaintiff has submitted a Separate Statement explaining why AHM should be deposed regarding all of the matters indicated and produce all of the documents requested in the Notice. ( See 4-12-24 Separate Statement.) AHM opposes the Motion, stating that it never refused to produce the witness requested, but rather informed Plaintiff that it is diligently attempting to obtain deposition dates. Due to the volume of cases requesting depositions of its person most qualified, AHM has been unable to produce the witness in the timeframe noticed by Plaintiff. Trial is currently set for February 25, 2025, and Plaintiff has served three notices within a very short timeframe without making a good faith effort to meet and confer, which has not provided AHM with enough time to produce a PMQ. AHM continues to make a good faith effort to schedule the deposition and requests that the Court deny the Motion. AHM also argues that the Motion should be denied because Plaintiff did not give proper notice, as the Motion was served electronically 16 court days before the May 1, 2024, hearing instead of 16 courts and two calendar days as required for electronic service. AHM states that the Motion should be denied pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450(a) because ADM has not failed to appear at a deposition without filing timely valid objections. Sanctions should also be denied as AHM has acted with substantial justification in attempting to come up with a mutually convenient date for the deposition. AHM has submitted the declaration of the attorney newly assigned to the case, Candie Chang, who states that she is actively working on securing an available date for the corporate witness. ( See Change Decl.) Furthermore, AHM has filed a Separate Statement responding to Plaintiffs arguments regarding each category of questions and documents requested. In its Reply, Plaintiff argues that notice was served timely as the hearing on the Motion was rescheduled to July 16, 2024. Plaintiff reasserts that AHM has served baseless, boilerplate objections, failed to meet and confer in good faith, and to comply with its discovery obligations. Prior to the hearing on this Motion, AHM informed Plaintiff that the earliest available deposition date is on November 8, 2024, which Plaintiff argues is too close to the trial date. Thus, Plaintiff requests that the deposition be ordered to take place within thirty days. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that due to the rescheduled hearing date of July 16, 2024, proper notice was given regarding the Motion. The basis of Plaintiffs Motion is that AHM has refused to provide its witness for deposition or to produce the requested documents. Based on the Motion and the Opposition, the Court finds that AHM has served timely objections and is continuing to attempt to secure a convenient date for the deposition of its PMQ. The Court does not find that AHM has refused to attend the deposition and failed to produce the documents requested. If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document , electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent's control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production. (Code Civ. Proc. section 2025.480, subd. (a).) If the court determines that the answer or production sought is subject to discovery, it shall order that the answer be given or the production be made on the resumption of the deposition. (Code Civ. Proc. section 2025.480, subd. (i).) Because no deposition has occurred yet and Defendant has filed a sworn declaration of its counsel indicating that diligent efforts are being made to secure a mutually convenient deposition date, an order on the specific categories is premature. Moreover, as the Motion is denied, Plaintiffs request for sanctions is also denied. CONCLUSION Plaintiff Tej Kishor Naiks Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. is DENIED. Plaintiffs request for sanctions is also DENIED. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July 16, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org

Case Number: 24STCV01332 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 JOHN PARK, Plaintiff(s), v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC , et al , Defendant(s). Case No.: 24STCV01332 DISCLOSURE AND ORDER Judge Beaudet hereby discloses that approximately 24 years ago, she and her husband purchased a pickup truck for her husbands use that he recalled was either a Dodge or Chrysler pickup; Judge Beaudet does not remember the maker of the pickup. The pickup developed electrical problems. Judge Beaudets husband took the pickup in to the dealer many times for the same electrical problem. The pickup was tested with some device while it was operating, and eventually, the manufacturer and the dealer agreed to take the pickup back and refund the purchase price. No litigation was involved. Judge Beaudet does not believe that her experience will cause her to be biased for or against either party. However, if you believe differently, you will have until July 31, 2024, to file and serve a verified statement of disqualification per section CCP 170.3(c)(1) (the Statement). If you do not file and serve a Statement, grounds for recusal will be deemed waived. The hearing on the status conference re completion of mediation or ADR will be continued to September 5, 2024 , at 10:00 a.m. in Department 50 unless both parties waive the right to file the Statement. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this Disclosure to any new parties who are added to the case and to file proof of service of same promptly after service, with a courtesy copy delivered to Department 50. Any new party has 14 calendar days from the date of service to file and serve the Statement per section CCP 170.3. DATED: July 16, 2024 _____________________________ Honorable Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

Case Number: 23CHCV01444 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: F49 Dept. F49 Date: 7/18/24 Case Name: Juan Mendoza and Elizabeth Iniguez Marquez v. FCA USA LLC, San Fernando Motor Company, and Does 1 through 10 Case No. 23CHCV01444 LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT DEPARTMENT F49 JULY 18, 2024 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23CHCV01444 Motion filed: 5/22/24 MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Juan Mendoza and Elizabeth Iniguez Marquez (collectively Plaintiffs) RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant FCA USA LLC (FCA) NOTICE: OK RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling FCA to produce supplemental responses to Plaintiffs first set of Requests for Production, Nos. 45-46, and imposing monetary sanctions against FCA in the amount of $2,620.00. TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED AS MOOT. The request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs filed this Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (SBA) lawsuit over alleged defects in their 2020 Jeep Gladiator with VIN: 1C6JJTEG1LL208648 (the Subject Vehicle), which was manufactured by Defendant FCA. Plaintiffs allege that they purchased the Subject Vehicle on March 12, 2022, entering into a warranty contract with FCA. (Compl. ¶ 15.) On May 16, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendants FCA, San Fernando Motor Company (SFMC), and Does 1 through 10, alleging the following causes of action: (1) violation of SBA breach of express warranty (against FCA), and (2) negligent repair (against SFMC). Subsequently, FCA and SFMC filed their respective Answers to the Complaint on June 21, 2023. On May 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Compel Further Responses from FCA to their Requests for Production (RFP), Nos. 45-46, Set One (the Motion). On July 5, 2024, FCA filed its Opposition. Subsequently, Plaintiffs replied on July 10, 2024. ANALYSIS On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that & [a] statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete[;] & [a] representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive[; or] & [a]n objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) A. Procedural Requirements 1. Timeliness A motion to compel further responses to requests for production must be brought within 45 days of service of the verified response, supplemental verified response, or on a date to which the propounding and responding parties have agreed to in writing; otherwise, the propounding party waives the right to compel further responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c); but see Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 134-136 [suggesting that the 45-day deadline does not apply to (i.e., it does not begin to run with service of) objections-only responses; it only applies to responses that are required to be verified].) [T]he time within which to make a motion to compel production of documents is mandatory and jurisdictional just as it is for motions to compel further answers to interrogatories. (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) The 45-day deadline is jurisdictional in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them. ( Ibid .) Here, FCA served unverified responses to Plaintiffs' first set of RFP on January 8, 2024, with FCAs electronic verifications following on January 9, 2024. (Lopez Decl. ¶ 4.) The service of verification establishes the deadline for Plaintiff to file a motion to compel further as February 27, 2024, calculated based on a 45-day period with an extension of two court days per Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(3), accounting for the method of electronic service. Therefore, the Court finds the Motion is filed timely as it was filed prior to the established deadline. 2. Meet and Confer A motion [to compel further responses to requests for production] shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (b)(1).) A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) Here, Plaintiffs have satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Lopez Decl. ¶¶ 5-7, and 9, Ex. C.) 3. Separate Statement The California Rules of Court rule 3.1345 (a)(3) explicitly states that Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement. The motions that require a separate statement include a motion: ... (3) To compel further responses to a demand for inspection of documents or tangible things[.] Here, Plaintiffs have fulfilled the requirement by concurrently filing a separate statement with the Motion. B. Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFP Nos. 45-46 1. Moving Partys Showing of Good Cause (RFP Nos. 45-46.) A motion to compel further responses to requests for production shall set forth specific facts showing good cause. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) To establish good cause, the moving party must show (1) the items demanded are relevant to the subject matter and (2) specific facts justify the discovery of the requested items (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); see Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) If good cause is shown by the moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. ( Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) RFP No. 45 seeks, All DOCUMENTS evidencing complaints by owners of the 2020 Jeep Gladiator vehicle regarding any of the complaints that the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented to YOUR or YOUR authorized repair facilities for repair during the warranty period. RFP No. 46 requests, All DOCUMENTS evidencing warranty repairs to 2020 Jeep Gladiator vehicles regarding any of the components that YOU or YOUR authorized repair facilities performed repairs on under warranty. Here, Plaintiffs argue that RFP Nos. 45-46 seek information relevant to determining whether a defect or nonconformity exists in these types of vehicles and when this defect or nonconformity first appeared. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that records of complaints regarding other similar vehicles may refute FCAs affirmative defense claiming that defects were caused by Plaintiffs engaging in unauthorized or unreasonable uses. (Mot. at p. 5.) Moreover, Plaintiffs note that the information sought in RFP Nos. 45-46 regarding other similar vehicle complaints and warranty repairs is relevant in determining FCAs knowledge about nonconformities and whether FCA willfully violated the statutory requirements. (Mot. at pp. 5-6.) In Donlen v. Ford Motor Co . (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154 ( Donlen ), the Third District held that the trial court had not erred in denying Fords motion in limine to exclude evidence of other customers complaints about the same transmission model Ford installed in plaintiffs truck and other vehicles. (Underlines added.) Similarly, in Jensen v. BMW of North America, LLC (S.D.Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557, 562-63 ( Jensen ), the federal district court in San Diego found that information regarding whether the same defects were reported to BMW in other cars of the same make, model, and year as [p]laintiffs subject vehicle could conceivably be relevant to whether BMW acted reasonably in denying [p]laintiffs warranty claim. A fact finder may find BMWs knowledge or lack of knowledge about the same defects to be a consideration in deciding whether BMW acted in good faith as to [p]laintiffs specific case. (Underlines added.) Here, the Complaint alleges that the Subject Vehicle contained a defect, which FCA was unable to repair after a reasonable number of repair attempts. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-19.) Additionally, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs are entitled to a civil penalty under the statute for FCAs willful failure to comply with its responsibilities. ( Id . ¶ 26.) Thus, the Court finds that the information sought in RFP Nos. 45-46 is relevant to the claims in the Complaint. The Court especially notes that the RFP Nos. 45 is limited to any of the complaints that the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented, which is narrowly tailored to relevant issues. Therefore, in alignment with established precedents, including those set in Donlen and Jensen , the Court concludes that good cause exists, and the information sought by RFP Nos. 45-46, is relevant and not overbroad. 2. FCAs Objections Here, FCA asserted uniform objections in its initial responses, including vagueness, overbreadth, and irrelevance. (FCAs Separate Statement, at pp. 2-3.) The Court finds the vagueness, overbreadth, and irrelevance objections do not overcome the Courts finding of relevance in the above analysis of good cause. FCA further contends that the Motion is moot as it has served the supplemental responses to RFP Nos. 45-46 on July 3, 2024. (Grimsrud Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 1), which states, FCA US has conducted a diligent search and reasonable inquiry and will comply in full with this request and produce all responsive documents within its possession, custody, and control , namely, subject to protective order, all responsive documents found relating to customer concerns/complaints and warranty claim data based upon the alleged conditions outlined in Plaintiffs repair history, in other 2020 Jeep Gladiator Mojave 4x4 vehicles . (FCAs Separate Statement, at pp. 2-3.) (Underlines added.) Plaintiffs acknowledge that FCA served them with Verification for its supplemental responses on July 10, 2024. (Grimsrud Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that the supplemental responses to RFP Nos. 45 and 46 are now code-compliant. The Court finds FCAs supplemental responses expressly state its agreement to comply, making them sufficient and compliant with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210, subdivision (a). Consequently, the Motion is DENIED AS MOOT. C. Monetary Sanctions The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).) (Underlines added.) Here, considering the supplemental responses were made after the Motion was filed, and finding no other circumstances making the imposition of the sanctions under California Rules of Court rule 3.1348(a) unjust, the Court finds that monetary sanctions against FCA and its attorney of record are justified. The Court determines the total and reasonable amount of attorneys fees and costs incurred for the instant Motion is $860.00, calculated at $400.00 per hour for two hours, in addition to a $60.00 filing fee. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, Nos. 45-46, Set One, is DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiffs Request for Monetary Sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. FCA USA, LLC and its attorney of record are ordered to jointly and severally pay $860.00 to Plaintiffs counsel. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 23NWCV02307 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: C MARIA E. SALMERON v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC CASE NO.: 23NWCV02307 HEARING: 7/17/24 @ 9:30 A.M. #4 TENTATIVE ORDER Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Response to Defendants First Set of Requests for Production is CONTINUED. Moving Party to give NOTICE. Background This is a Song-Beverly action. Plaintiff Maria E. Salmeron moves to compel further responses to her Request for Production of Documents, Set One from defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC. Timeliness Notice of the motion to compel further must be provided within 45 days of service of the verified response or on or before any specific later date to which the parties have agreed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).) This 45-day deadline runs from the date the verified response is served and is extended for service by mail in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure sections 1010.6, subdivision (a)(4) and 1013, subdivision (a). Failure to timely move to compel within the specified period constitutes a waiver of any right to compel a further response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).) On October 25, 2023, Defendant served unverified responses to Plaintiffs first set of requests for production of documents. (Decl. Kohanoff, ¶ 22, Ex. 5.) Responses consisted of objections and responses. (Decl. Kohanoff, ¶ 22, Ex. 5.) Defendant served verifications on November 21, 2023. (Decl. Kohanoff, ¶ 22. Ex, 6.) The 45-day clock runs only upon service of verified responses. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 2031.250, subd. (a).) Plaintiff filed the instant motion on December 8, 2023. Taking into account of November 21, 2023 as the response date, Plaintiff is timely. Meet and Confer The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) For purposes of determining whether a motion to compel discovery was preceded by a reasonable and good faith effort to meet and confer, such an attempt at informal resolution requires something more than bickering with opposing counsel; rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. ( Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.) Based on the meet-and-confer letters, it appears that the parties did not meet and confer in good faith. For example, Plaintiff proposed that the parties stipulate a protective order, and Defendant said that it will produce responsive documents pursuant to a protective order. (Decl. Kohanoff, ¶¶ 27, 29, Ex. 7, 8.) Defendants also suggested that the parties speak by telephone to further deliberate. (Decl. Kohanoff, ¶ 29, Ex. 8.) The parties are ordered to meet and confer telephonically, in person, or by video conference. If there are outstanding issues remaining, they are to submit a joint amended separate statement by August 16, 2024. The Court will hear any outstanding issues on Wednesday, August 28, 2024 at 10:30 A.M. in Dept. SE-C.