Joshua E Willover V. Kenneth G Reiss, Erlon Ross Shaffer

Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Thursday, July 18, 2024, Line 11. PLAINTIFF CHINA LIVE VENTURES LIMITED, L.P. A CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, CHINA LIVE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY, CHINA LIVE, LLC AND GEORGE CHEN's MOTION TO STRIKE ANSWER to Amended COMPLAINT. Off calendar. An amended notice of motion was filed that properly set this motion in department 501 per SF Local Rule 8.10A1. =(302/CK)

Case Number: 23STCV01424 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 57 The motion to strike of Defendant Caesarstone Ltd. is denied. The Court previously has denied nearly identical motions filed by other Defendants in this action and in another stonecutter fabricator silicosis action pending before the Court. The Court finds no reason to treat Caesarstone's motion any differently from those other motions that the Court has denied.

Case Number: 22STCV28221 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the petitioning papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On August 30, 2022, Plaintiffs Paul Culver, Landon Culver, a minor by and through his guardian ad litem Paul Culver , and Katrina Culver, a minor by and through her guardian ad litem Paul Culver, filed this action against Defendants Karina Del Carmen Hussey (Defendant) and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. On September 6, 2022, the Court appointed Paul Culver to serve as guardian ad litem for Plaintiffs Katrina Culver and Landon Culver. On January 24, 2024, Defendant filed an answer. On June 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement. On June 17, 2024, Petitioner Paul Culver (Petitioner) filed petitions for expedited approval of minors compromises. PETITIONERS REQUESTS Petitioner asks the Court to approve the compromises of the claims of Plaintiffs Katrina Culver and Landon Culver. DISCUSSION A. Katrina Culver The petition states that both Medicare and the claimants health plan will be reimbursed from the settlement proceeds for $1,440.00 in medical expenses. (Sections 13b(2), 13d.) Petitioner should explain whether both Medicare and the health plan are receiving this amount as reimbursement (and if so, why). (Section 17b of the petition shows only one reimbursement of $1,440.00.) Attachment 13b(2) describes a November 30, 2022 letter from the Rawlings Company as the Final Medicare agreement. (Attachment 13b(2).) It is unclear why a letter stating that The Rawlings Company is to receive $1,440.00 is a Final Medicare agreement. The petition does not provide any information showing that Medicare paid for any of the medical expenses. If Medicare is to receive $1,440.00 in reimbursement, Petitioner should explain why the attachment refers to The Rawlings Company and not to Medicare. (The proposed order states that $1,440.00 will be paid to The Rawlings Company and does not mention Medicare.) For the reasons stated above, the Court denies the petition. B. Landon Culver The petition states that $1,845.00 in medical expenses will be reimbursed from the settlement proceeds to Medicare. (Section 13b(2).) However, the attachment described as the Final Medicare agreement is a November 30, 2022 letter from the Rawlings Company. (Attachment 13b(2).) The letter states that The Rawlings Company is to receive the reimbursement. The petition does not provide any information showing that Medicare paid for any of the medical expenses. If Medicare is to receive $1,845.00 in reimbursement, Petitioner should explain why the attachment refers to The Rawlings Company and not to Medicare. (The proposed order states that $1,845.00 will be paid to The Rawlings Company and does not mention Medicare.) For the reasons stated above, the Court denies the petition. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES without prejudice the petition to approve the compromise of minor Plaintiff Katrina Culvers action filed by Petitioner Paul Culver on June 17, 2024. The Court DENIES without prejudice the petition to approve the compromise of minor Plaintiff Landon Culvers action filed by Petitioner Paul Culver on June 17, 2024. Petitioner is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Petitioner is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Case Number: 23PSCV00282 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 6 CASE NAME: Holly Robin Garcia v. Unlimited Rubber Supplies, LLC, et al. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys Motion for Leave to Intervene TENTATIVE RULING The Court GRANTS State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys motion for leave to intervene. State Farm shall file an answer in intervention within five days of the Courts ruling on this motion. Otherwise, the motion will be DENIED without prejudice. State Farm is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order. BACKGROUND This is a motor vehicle accident case. On January 30, 2023, plaintiff Holly Robin Garcia (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Unlimited Rubber Supplies, LLC, Michael Antonio Diaz (Diaz), Malcolm Defrantz, and Does 1 to 50, alleging causes of action for general negligence and motor vehicle. On June 20, 2024, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company moved for leave to intervene. The motion is unopposed. LEGAL STANDARD An intervention takes place when a nonparty, deemed an intervenor, becomes a party to an action or proceeding between other persons by doing any of the following:& (2) Uniting with a defendant in resisting the claims of a plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (b)(2).) To intervene in an action, [a] nonparty shall petition the court for leave to intervene by noticed motion or ex parte application. ( Id. , § 387, subd. (c).) A nonparty must be permitted to intervene if either of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) a provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) the person seeking intervention claims an interest related to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that persons ability to protect that interest, unless that persons interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(1)(A)-(B).) A court has discretionary authority to allow a nonparty to intervene if the person shas an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both. ( Id. , § 387, subd. (d)(2).) DISCUSSION Analysis State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) seeks leave to intervene in this action on behalf of Defendant Diaz, its insured who has not appeared or otherwise participated in this action. State Farm contends it is entitled to intervene as Diazs insurer to protect its interests and Diazs interests. State Farm contends it has a property interest in this litigation because it is obligated to pay any judgments obtained against its insureds under Insurance Code section 11580, subdivision (b)(2), and it has the right to intervene when its insureds cannot defend themselves. State Farm contends it is also entitled to permissive intervention because Diaz is now in pro per and cannot or will not assist in his defense, and Diazs failure to comply with prior discovery matters may lead to his answer being stricken or a default being entered. State Farm contends it also has an immediate interest to stand in the shoes of Diaz in defending the present action and the policy State Farm issued. State Farm contends the proposed answer in intervention will assert the same general denial and affirmative defenses as to Diaz and that intervention will not enlarge the issues in this case in any substantive manner. State Farm also contends intervention will not create prejudice to any other party. The Court finds State Farm is entitled to intervention. An insurer's right to intervene in an action against the insured, for personal injury or property damage, arises as a result of Insurance Code section 11580. ( Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386.) An insurer has a direct and immediate interest in the litigation, because it may be required to satisfy any default judgment entered against its insured. ( Id. , at p. 387.) State Farm, as Diazs insurer, is therefore entitled to intervene on Diazs behalf since State Farm will be liable for any judgments that may be entered against Diaz. There is also no indication that State Farms intervention would enlarge the issues in this case since State Farm is merely seeking to stand in the shoes of Defendant Diaz who is already a party to this action and therefore potentially liable. The Court further notes that the motion is unopposed, which the Court construes as a tacit admission that the motion is meritorious. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410; C. Opposing the Motionand Rebutting the Opposition, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(I)-C, ¶ 9:105.10.) The Court does note, however, that it is not entirely clear what is the proposed answer for Defendant Diaz, which was supposed to be filed with the moving papers per Code of Civil Procedure section 387, subdivision (c). (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (c).) State Farm provided multiple answers to the complaint with its moving papers, and none of them indicate that they are the proposed answer in intervention for Diaz. (See Cullins Decl., ¶¶ 3-5, Exs. B-D.) Notwithstanding, the Court will grant the unopposed motion and require State Farm to file its answer in intervention forthwith. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys motion for leave to intervene. State Farm shall file an answer in intervention within five days of the Courts ruling on this motion. State Farm is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order.

Case Number: 22STCV38178 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-18-24 a/f 8-26-24 Case: 2STCV38178 (related to 23STCV13772) Trial Date: 8-19-24 c/f 6-17-24 PITCHESS MOTION MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Richard Tipping, et al. RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, City of Los Angeles, et al. RELIEF REQUESTED Motion for LAPD records SUMMARY OF ACTION Houston Tipping, son of Shirley Huffman and Richard Tipping, was a Los Angeles Police Department officer, suffered fatal head injury when a fellow officer conducted an exercise causing blunt force trauma to the head and neck of Officer Tipping during a training exercise purportedly to simulate a fall from a certain height. The training program was part of the Arrest and Control Bicycle Training Program. Officer Tipping was not provided any protective gear normally associated with such a training program, and other padding was not properly placed. Plaintiffs allege that at the time of the fatal injury, Officer Tipping was investigating a fellow officer allegedly responsible for sexually assaulting a person, thereby providing motivation to an officer to cause harm to Officer Tipping. On December 7, 2022, Shirley Huffman, Houston Tipping, and the Estate of Houston Tipping, filed a complaint for Battery, Whistleblower Retaliation, Bane Act, and Wrongful Death against City of Los Angeles and Richard Tipping (nominal defendant). On June 14, 2023, Richard Tipping and the Estate of Houston Tipping filed a complaint for Assault, Battery, Violation of Civil Code section 52.1, Violation of Civil Rights 42 USC 1983, Bane Act, and Wrongful Death against City of Los Angeles, and David Cuellar. On March 6, 2024, the court entered the stipulation of the parties to consolidate the actions. RULING : Denied in Part/Granted in Part. Plaintiffs move for the following records from the City of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD): 1. All WRITINGS related to the investigation conducted by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Administrative Bureau into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, including without limitation witness statements, findings, and conclusions of said investigations. The term WRITINGS as used throughout this motion has the meaning of writing as defined in California Evidence Code § 250 (i.e., tapes, recordings, transcripts of same, etc. are part of this request). 2. With respect to the LAPD Administrative Bureau investigation into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, all WRITINGS related to the video/audio interview of Officer David Cueller conducted by the Administrative Bureau in connection with the investigation into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, together with the handwritten notes taken concurrently by the interviewing officers during the interview. This interview is approximately one (1) hour in length. The Interview occurred in or around 2022. 3. All documents and recordings related to the investigation conducted by LAPD Internal Affairs into the injury and death of Houston Tipping, including without limitation witness statements, findings, and conclusions of said investigations. 4. Produce all WRITINGS, interview notes, summaries, transcripts of interviews, chronologies showing follow up and all other documents showing the follow up to the investigation of L.K. by Officers Tipping and Ramos. 5. Produce all WRITINGS, interview notes, summaries, transcripts of interviews, chronologies showing follow up and all other documents showing the follow up to the investigation of L.K. by Detective Stefani Valdes. This would include but is not limited to Reference No. 211710752. 6. The TEAMS and TEAMS II Reports for Officer David Cuellar. 7. The TEAMS and TEAMS II Reports for Officer Marc Ferris. 8. The TEAMS and TEAMS II Reports for Officer Robert Villegas. 9. All WRITINGS contained in Officer Mark Ferris personnel records concerning his voluntary demotion from Police Officer III to Police Officer II in or around November 2022. 10. All WRITINGS contained in Officer Robert Villegas personnel records concerning his retirement from the LAPD in or around 2022. 11. Produce all Body Worn Camera (BWC) and Body Worn Video (BWV) footage, videos, audio and photos showing L.K., any LAPD officer's interaction with L.K., and/or depicting her home at any point in the past five years, including without limitation: a. The BWC footage taken by Officer Tipping and/or his partner Officer Ramos at the Hospital on or about July 16, 2021, in connection with Incident No. 210716004284, Reference No. 211710752; b. The BWC footage taken by any Detectives or other Officers interviewing LK at any time. 12. All recorded interviews of L.K. by any LAPD officers in the last ten years, including without limitation concerning allegations of assault, sexual assault, and/or rape. Plaintiffs bring a Pitchess motion but also qualifies their request with a disclaimer that categories 4, 5, 11, and 12 are actually not within the purview of a Pitchess motion in that said records are not part of any personnel file. Plaintiffs move for said non-personnel records in regards to officers Marc Ferris and Robert Villegas based on a claim that said officers were likely going to be identified in a sexual assault report being compiled by Houston Tipping, and the officers sought to silence Tipping. City of Los Angeles in opposition cites to limitations in Pitchess motions in discovery and the impropriety of the subject Pitchess motion for admittedly non-personnel related material. City of Los Angeles also challenges categories 1-3 as not constituting personnel records or a complaint within the purview of the motion. Plaintiffs in reply maintains the motion establishes good cause for production of the records, and the sought after records are proper subject matter for a Pitchess motion. The court considers the standard as to all categories. The Pitchess statutes provide for two categories of confidential records: (1) personnel records, and (2) records of citizen complaints about individual officers, and reports or findings relating to investigation of such complaints. ( Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 268, 285.) A party seeking discovery of a peace officer's personnel records must follow a two-step process. (Citation.) First, the party must file a written motion describing the type of records sought, supported by [a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery. . ., setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records. [Evid. Code § 1043(b)(3).] This initial burden is a relatively relaxed standard [ ]. (Citation.) Information is material if it will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial. (Citations.) [A] declaration by counsel on information and belief is sufficient to state facts to satisfy the materiality component of that section. ( Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal. App. 4th 1079, 10851086.) City of Los Angeles also emphasizes the lack of applicability on categories 1-5, and 11-12, under the guise of a Pitchess motion, and counters Plaintiffs should have brought a motion to compel. Plaintiffs represent in discovery that City of Los Angeles objected to production on grounds of a required Pitchess motion and now moves the argument saying proper procedure was a motion to compel under the discovery statutes. Penal Code section 832.7 states in part: (b)(1) Notwithstanding ... the following peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by a state or local agency shall not be confidential and shall be made available for public inspection ... (A) A record relating to the report, investigation, or findings of any of the following: (i) An incident involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial officer. (ii) An incident involving the use of force against a person by a peace officer or custodial officer that resulted in death or in great bodily injury. (iii) A sustained finding involving a complaint that alleges unreasonable or excessive force. (iv) A sustained finding that an officer failed to intervene against another officer using force that is clearly unreasonable or excessive. (B)(i) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in sexual assault involving a member of the public. (ii) As used in this subparagraph, sexual assault means the commission or attempted initiation of a sexual act with a member of the public by means of force, threat, coercion, extortion, offer of leniency or other official favor, or under the color of authority. For purposes of this definition, the propositioning for or commission of any sexual act while on duty is considered a sexual assault. (iii) As used in this subparagraph, member of the public means any person not employed by the officer's employing agency and includes any participant in a cadet, explorer, or other youth program affiliated with the agency. (C) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency involving dishonesty by a peace officer or custodial officer directly relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime, or directly relating to the reporting of, or investigation of misconduct by, another peace officer or custodial officer, including, but not limited to, any false statements, filing false reports, destruction, falsifying, or concealing of evidence, or perjury. (D) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in conduct including, but not limited to, verbal statements, writings, online posts, recordings, and gestures, involving prejudice or discrimination against a person on the basis of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military and veteran status. ... (Pen. Code, § 832.7.) (a) In any case in which discovery or disclosure is sought of peace or custodial officer personnel records or records maintained pursuant to Section 832.5 of the Penal Code or information from those records, the party seeking the discovery or disclosure shall file a written motion with the appropriate court or administrative body upon written notice to the governmental agency that has custody and control of the records , as follows: (1) In a civil action, the written notice shall be given at the times prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ... (b) The motion shall include all of the following: (1) Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the governmental agency that has custody and control of the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard. (2) A description of the type of records or information sought. (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records. (c) Upon receipt of a notice served pursuant to subdivision (a), the governmental agency shall immediately notify the individual whose records are sought. (d) No hearing upon a motion for discovery or disclosure shall be held without full compliance with the notice provisions of this section except upon a showing by the moving party of good cause for noncompliance, or upon a waiver of the hearing by the governmental agency identified as having the records. (Evid. Code, § 1043) The court agrees with Plaintiffs that to the extent the Pitchess statute encompasses records arising from a citizen complaint, the Pitchess procedures and protections apply. ( City of Eureka v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 755, 765; Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 291.) The statutes however also specifically define the categories of applicable records. Plaintiffs concede the Pitchess categories 4, 5, 11 and 12 remain outside the scope of discovery guidelines (motion, 8:1-2) [ records requested in Request Numbers 4, 5, 11, and 12 should not require a Pitchess motion since they are not personnel records [ sic ]. ]. Plaintiffs in reply somewhat circle back to the argument with a broader interpretation based on production for impeachment purposes. ( Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386, 400 [However, once materiality has been shown, nothing in this procedure excuses the trial court from examining information that might reasonably lead to evidence relevant to the defense].) The key terms in the disputed items include WRITINGS and documents and recordings, recorded interviews, and body camera footage. While the report(s) remains categorically discoverable, information, including statements and general camera footage utilized as part of internal investigations appear to remain protected. ( Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 290.) The court additionally finds the broad nature of the request renders the request well outside the specific incident, and the pursuit of the motivation for the coverup of a potential sexual assault while allowable (see below), insufficiently supports the sought after broad based review of files for the last five years. ( City of Eureka v. Superior Court , supra , 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 764-765.) Thus, the court finds the expansive requests improperly lack a sufficient nexus to the exact incident or even a sufficient enough link to the alleged motivation for purposes of compelling the requested information beyond the reports. While public policy supports discovery for purposes of establishing motivation, accountability, liability, etc., the rules in no way provide for general discovery absent more specific connections. ( Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 291-292; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1150.) The court also finds said items in no way constitute personnel records. To the extent the argument comes full circle as to the impropriety of bringing a Pitchess motion for non-covered items in the first place, the court also finds no support in the motion or reply for utilizing the Pitchess protocol for compelling review of said items under applicable statutory or case authority. The court also declines to grant the motion on grounds of estoppel. The court finds no basis to compel said records under the Pitchess statute regardless of the representation or objections from City of Los Angeles. Estoppel will not overcome a finding of insufficient authority. The court agrees with City of Los Angeles and DENIES the motion as to categories 1-5, and 11-12. The court finds no basis of authority to compel said documents within the purview of the instant motion and will not allow Plaintiffs to graft on such relief under the guise of a Pitchess motion since its now two months before trial and the discovery and law and motion windows are closing. As for items 6-10, the TEAMS reports and personnel records, City of Los Angeles offers no dispute as to the propriety of the motion to obtain said records, and instead challenges a lack of good cause and plausible factual foundation. The declaration of Mr. Gage seeks the records of Officer Cuellar, as the person responsible for performing the movement leading to the fatal injury. The files of Officers of Ferris and Villegas tie into the alleged cover-up scheme regarding the purported sexual assault. City of Los Angeles challenges the qualitative nature of the basis as not providing a special factual scenario. ( City of San Jose v. Superior Court , supra , 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1150.) While the death may very well have been unintentional, the deposition testimony of Cuellar specifically admits that a direct blunt force drop to the ground head first (a piledriver) was not an authorized move for an LAPD officer. Such an admission raises valid skepticism over the open use of the move during a training exercise. Cuellar also admitted to the fight club reputation of the bicycle unit. As for other circumstances, Officer Ferris in deposition confirms his presence, along with retired officer Vellegas, at the home of L.K., a person purportedly responsible for filing a sexual assault complaint. The court finds the scenario presented by Mr. Gage of a link between the admittedly improper fatal pile driver and report from citizen L.K. far more factually supported than the general claims rejected in the City of San Jose action notwithstanding the hyperbolic references to movies of police department corruption. The enforcement culture scenario whereby Cuellar effectively executed Tripping certainly lacks specific support of a direct admission or criminal conviction, but the court also appreciates the inability to gather additional information without the ability to seek potential review of the records. The court therefore finds Plaintiffs make a sufficient showing for review based on reasonable circumstantial inference. ( Garcia v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 70; Warrick v. Sup. Ct. , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1016; Zanone v. City of Whittier (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 174, 189; California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 10201021; City of San Jose v. Superior Court , supra , 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 11461147.) Given that moving party made a showing of good cause for category numbers 6-10, the court must engage in an in camera review. Second, if the trial court concludes the defendant has fulfilled these prerequisites and made a showing of good cause, the custodian of records should bring to court all documents potentially relevant to the defendant's motion. . . . The trial court shall examine the information in chambers [Evid. Code § 1045(b).], out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the person authorized [to possess the records] and such other persons [the custodian of records] is willing to have present.. . . Subject to statutory exceptions and limitations. . . the trial court should then disclose to the defendant such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation. ( Id . at p. 1086.) The court will exclude all complaints more than five years old, conclusions of an officer investigating any complaint, and facts determined too remote of offer little or no practical effect. (Evid. Code, 1045, subd. (b); Warrick v. Superior Court , supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 accord City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 9.) Any disclosure shall conform to names, addresses and telephone numbers of complainants and witnesses. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84; Carruthers v. Municipal Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 439, 442; Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 829.) The determination of admissibility of any alleged statements made during the course of the investigation will not prevent discovery into the information. A party is entitled to discovery of inadmissible evidence. Plaintiffs argument seeking to distinguish the noted limitations under Evidence Code section 1043 and 1045, and subsequent cited cases lack a direct factual or legal statement overruling the noted limitations. Plaintiffs are entitled to the witness information and limited contact information only. ( Haggerty v. Superior Court , supra , 117 Cal.App.4th 1089-1090.) The motion is therefore GRANTED as to items 6-11. Discovery or disclosure is protected. The court shall, in any case or proceeding permitting the disclosure or discovery of any peace or custodial officer records requested pursuant to Section 1043, order that the records disclosed or discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (e).) The court is required to conform to the requirements of Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (e) regarding the dissemination of any and all protected information from public file disclosure. The parties are to submit a stipulated protective order. Moving party to give notice. Trial remains set for August 19, 2024. Plaintiffs to provide notice.

Case Number: 24SMCV00082 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Anicete, et al., v. Dias, et al. CASE NO.: 24SMCV00082 MOTION: Motion to Compel Initial Discovery Responses HEARING DATE: 7/17/2024 Legal Standard If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses and for a monetary sanction. (CCP § 2030.290(b).) The statute contains no time limit for a motion to compel where no responses have been served. All that need be shown in the moving papers is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. ( Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905-906.) Where there has been no timely response to a CCP section 2031.010 inspection demand, the demanding party must seek an order compelling a response. (CCP § 2031.300.) Failure to timely respond waives all objections, including privilege and work product. Thus, unless the party to whom the demand was directed obtains relief from waiver, he or she cannot raise objections to the documents demanded. There is no deadline for a motion to compel responses. Likewise, for failure to respond, the moving party need not attempt to resolve the matter outside court before filing the motion. Where the motion seeks only a response to the inspection demand, no showing of "good cause" is required. ANALYSIS Defendants Mona S. Srivastava and Luiz-Carlos Da Silva Dias Jr. move for orders compelling P laintiff Myles Anicetes initial responses to: 1) form and special interrogatories, set one; and 2) requests for production of documents, set one. Defendants also requests $555.00 in sanctions for each motion against Plaintiff and counsel of record, Steven Zelig. Defendants meet their burden to show Plaintiff failed to respond to duly served discovery. On February 20, 2024, Defendants propounded the subject discovery upon Plaintiff. (See Germany Decls., ¶¶ 2, Exs. A.) Plaintiff was given five extensions, but did not respond to the discovery requests. (Id., ¶¶ 3-4, Exs. B.) Accordingly, the motions are GRANTED. Responses are due within 10 days without objections. Sanctions are mandatory. The Court must sanction any party that unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (See, e.g., CCP, § 2030.290 (c).) Plaintiff failed to oppose, and therefore failed to justify their non-response. Sanctions are therefore imposed in the noticed, total amount of $1,110.00 against Plaintiff and counsel of record. Sanctions are to be paid in 30 days.

BAILEY VS. OLSEN Case Number: 24CV-0204127 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Order Granting Prioritized Trial Setting: Plaintiff Rowland Bailey, by and through his Guardian Ad Litem, Shalana Bailey brings a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (c), for preference in setting trial. The motion is unopposed by Defendant Caleb Olsen. Merits of Motion: Code of Civil Procedure section 36 provides, in relevant part, as follows: (c) A civil action to recover damages for wrongful death or personal injury shall be entitled to preference upon the motion of any party to the action who is under 14 years of age unless the court finds that the party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole. (f) Upon the granting of such a motion for preference, the court shall set the matter for trial not more than 120 days from that date… Here, Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of CCP § 36(c). Plaintiff is only 10 years old. Defendant does not oppose the motion on the merits. Finally, upon granting of a motion for preference, the clerk of the Court is required to set the case for trial not more than 120 days from the date the order is made. Here, the trial date is currently set outside of that timeframe. The Court will need to re-set the trial for a date no later than November 12, 2024. The date of November 12, 2024 is not a trial date. The closest trial date without going over the 120 days is November 5, 2024. The motion is GRANTED. A proposed order was lodged with the Court and will be modified to conform to the filing ruling. The trial date of December 17, 2024, and the mandatory settlement conference set for October 21, 2024 are VACATED. The Court notes that, upon granting a motion for preference, the clerk of the Court is required to set the case for trial not more than 120 days from the date the order is made. The Court intends to set trial no later than November 5, 2024, in compliance with CCP § 36. An appearance is necessary to provide the Court with acceptable trial and mandatory settlement conference dates.

Case Number: 23VECV05230 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 107 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES NORTHWEST DISTRICT Leslie Klinger, Plaintiff, v. Leslie Klinger v. Horizons Senior Apts/Cirrus Asset Management, Defendant. Case Number Department 23VECV05230 107 COURTS [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: (1) Demurrer (2) Motion to Strike [THE FOLLOWING IS A TENTATIVE RULING IN THE ABOVE CASE]: Defendants 26705 Malibu Hills Road LLC and Cirrus Asset Management, Inc. demur to the complaint brought by plaintiff Leslie Klinger and move to strike punitive damages from the complaint. This court sustains the demurrer and denies the motion to strike as moot. This court denies Defendants request for judicial notice. I. BACKGROUND On November 22, 2023, plaintiff Leslie Klinger (Plaintiff) filed a form complaint against defendants Malibu Hills Road LLC (Malibu) and Cirrus Asset Management, Inc. (Cirrus and, together with Malibu, Defendants) alleging a single cause of action for intentional tort. On June 6, 2024, Defendants filed a demurrer (the Demurrer) and a motion to strike (the Motion) accompanied by a request for judicial notice. On July 8, 2024, Defendants filed notices of non-opposition (the Replies) to the Demurrer and the Motion, and on July 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed oppositions (the Oppositions) to the Demurrer and the Motion. II. PROCEDURAL MATTERS Timeliness of Filings Per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿430.40, subdivision (a), a demurrer to a complaint should be filed within 30 days after service of the complaint. Similarly, per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿435, subdivision (b)(1), a motion to strike should be filed within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, which is 30 days. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §¿412.20, subd. (a)(3).) If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §¿430.41(a)(2).) Per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿1005, subdivision (b), moving papers should be filed at least 16 court days before they are set for hearing, oppositions thereto should be filed at least nine court days before the set hearing, and replies to any oppositions should be filed at least five court days before the set hearing. Judges have discretion as to whether to consider or strike an untimely demurrer or pleading. ( McAllister v. County of Monterey (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 253, 281; Tuck v. Thuesen (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 193, 196, disapproved on other grounds by Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176.)¿ Plaintiff filed proofs of service indicating that Malibu was personally served on April 9, 2024 and Cirrus was personally served on April 19, 2024. On May 14, 2024, Defendants filed a declaration stating that parties had not been able to meet and confer and seeking an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a demurrer or motion to strike. Thus, the Demurrer and Motion are timely to the extent that they are brought by Cirrus. The Oppositions are untimely, and the Replies are timely. We note that the Replies were filed five court days before the set hearing, on the last day they were permitted to be filed, and that the Oppositions were filed the next day. Because the Oppositions were filed after the Replies, four court days before the hearing, we find that Defendants were not afforded a fair opportunity to respond to the Oppositions. We therefore decline to consider the Oppositions. The Meet and Confer Requirement California Code of Civil Procedure §¿430.41, subdivision (a) and §¿435.5, subdivision (a) requires parties to meet and confer in good faith before the filing of a demurrer or a motion to strike, respectively, to attempt to informally resolve the objections raised in the demurrer or the motion to strike. Each section requires that such meet and confer be done in person or by telephone. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§¿430.1, subd. (a), 435.5, subd. (a).)¿¿¿¿ Defendants submit with the Demurrer and the Motion a declaration by their counsel stating that she made three attempts to contact Plaintiff regarding the issues raised by the Demurrer and the Motion but received no response. (Déziel Decl. ¶¶ 46.) We remind Plaintiff of her obligation to meet and confer with Defendants counsel in good faith. The Request for Judicial Notice Defendants request that this court take judicial notice of the Complaint. The Complaint is already in the record in the instant action and therefore this court does not need to take judicial notice of it. Accordingly, this court DENIES Defendants request for judicial notice. III. DISCUSSION The Demurrer Defendants demur to the only cause of action in the Complaint on the grounds that it fails to state facts sufficient to allege a cause of action and that it is uncertain. As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged. ( E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaints properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. ( Ibid. ) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)¿A complaint is sufficient if it contains [a]¿statement¿of the¿facts¿constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §¿425.10(a)(1).) Under this standard, a complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. ( Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)¿¿¿¿ Demurrers for uncertainty are strictly construed, because discovery can be used for clarification, and apply where defendants cannot reasonably determine what issues or claims are stated. ( Khoury v. Malys of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Against a demurrer, a plaintiff is required only to set forth in his complaint the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant of the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. ( Elder v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 841, 858.) Plaintiff pleads a single cause of action for intentional tort. (Complaint p. 3.) A handwritten note beside this checkbox reads, May amend to more w. lawyer in future. (Ibid.) On a form attachment for intentional tort, Plaintiff pleads that the tort was committed from 2017 to present and under a section labelled (description of reasons for liability), she writes Harassment and Retaliation [¶] False accusations [¶] No fault eviction Notice [¶] Defamation [¶] Discrimination [¶] Libel [¶] Price Gauging/fraud [¶] Incorrect Notices [¶] Nuisance [¶] Neglect [¶] Breaking civil Pandemic Mandates on Disabled and Senior/Disabled (Continuous). (Id. at p. 5.) On a form attachment for exemplary damages, Plaintiff pleads that the facts supporting [her] claim are Filed and served no fault eviction day before Thanksgiving under Pandemic Mandate. Served false Breach of Contract Notice in front of many neighbors. With email to Horizons and their Attorney, notified, we would like to remain on lease through end of Pandemic Mandate and through end of Mandates, still changed to Mo to Mo and raised rent. Refused directions to place work order for repairs. Called names and frightened me with noise in garage and other odd behavior. Interfered with me off property. Continually targets me. Discrimination of Disability. There is more need lawyer. (Id. at p. 4.) Thus, while the Complaint lists a number of intentional torts on the form attachment for intentional tort, it is unclear which intentional tort or how many intentional torts Plaintiff pleads in the Complaint. Further, it is unclear when each tort or act is alleged to have occurred and against which of the Defendants each claim is brought. Therefore, we find that the nature, source, and extent of the claims being brought against Defendants are so unclear from the Complaint to be understood. Further, in order to state a cause of action for any of the torts listed on the Complaint, Plaintiff must state facts alleging each of the elements of the cause of action for the tort. There are, however, few facts alleged in the Complaint and those that are alleged are so vague and unclear that the nature, source, and extent of the claims being brought against Defendants cannot be understood. Accordingly, this court SUSTAINS the Demurrer. The Motion to Strike Defendants move to strike punitive damages from the Complaint. However, because we sustain the Demurrer, no causes of action remain in the Complaint to support punitive damages. Accordingly, this court DENIES the Motion AS MOOT. Dated: July 15, 2024 _______­­­­­­­­­­___________________________ Hon. Eric Harmon Judge of the Superior Court