Michael Diaz V. City Of New York, New York City Administration For Children'S Services F/K/A Bureau Of Child Welfare, Spofford Juvenile Detention Center A/K/A Bridges Juvenile Center

Case Number: 23STCV10042 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 39 HEARING DATE July 11, 2024 CASE NUMBER 23STCV10042 MOTIONS Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings MOVING PARTY Defendant Pitzer College OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiff Brendan Schultz MOTION Defendant Pitzer College (Defendant) moves for judgment on the pleadings. In his complaint, Plaintiff Brendan Schultz (Plaintiff) alleges he is a former student who reported Defendant for discriminating against Plaintiff based on Plaintiffs race or ethnicity. (Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 7, 15-16.) Plaintiff further alleges, in retaliation, Defendant failed to endorse Plaintiffs application for a grant as an alumnus of Defendant. ( Id. , ¶¶ 17-18, 20.) Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff opposes the motion. ANALYSIS A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but may be made after the time to demur has expired. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f).) Like a demurrer, the grounds for the motion [for judgment on the pleadings] must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. ( Civic Partners Stockton, LLC v. Youssefi (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1013.) In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, [a]ll allegations in the complaint and matters upon which judicial notice may be taken are assumed to be true. ( Rippon v. Bowen (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1313.) Plaintiffs first cause of action is under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act). To state a cause of action under the Unruh Act, Plaintiff must allege Defendant is a business establishment that intentionally denied Plaintiff full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services based on Plaintiffs sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation. (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is a non-profit college. (Complaint, ¶¶ 5, 7.) A non-profit educational establishment is not a business establishment for purposes of the Unruh Act unless it has some significant resemblance to an ordinary for-profit business. ( Doe v. California Lutheran High School Assn. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 828, 839.) Plaintiff does not allege Defendant operates in a manner akin to a for-profit business. As such, Plaintiff fails to allege Defendant is liable under the Unruh Act. Further, as the basis for his cause of action under the Unruh Act, Plaintiff cites the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA. To state a cause of action under the ADA, Plaintiff must allege he is a disabled person who suffered adverse actions because of his disabilities. ( Bagatti v. Dept. of Rehabilitation (2007) 97 Cal.App.4th 344, 360.) A violation of the ADA is also a violation of the Unruh Act. ( Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co . (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1446.) However, Plaintiff does not allege facts to show he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Instead, Plaintiff alleges Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because of his racial or ethnic identity. Plaintiff mentions a disability without alleging any supporting facts. (Complaint, ¶ 14.) While discrimination based on racial or ethnic identity violates the Unruh Act, it does not violate the ADA. The court grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first cause of action, and Plaintiff is granted leave to amend. Plaintiffs second cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. The defendant must have engaged in conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result. ( Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co . (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant depriv[ed] [Plaintiff] of a professional opportunity . . . . (Complaint, ¶ 35.) That is not extreme and outrageous conduct. Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus, the motion is granted as to that cause of action with leave to amend. Plaintiffs third cause of action is for negligent infliction of emotional distress, or NIED. NIED is a tort in negligence, and the plaintiff must establish the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. [A] right to recover for emotional distress as a direct victim arises from the breach of a duty that is assumed by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of the defendant's preexisting relationship with the plaintiff. ( Moon v. Guardian Postacute Services, Inc . (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1009, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant was negligent in retaliating against [Plaintiff] by depriving [Plaintiff] of a professional opportunity for asserting his civil rights after facing discrimination by initiating an internal civil rights grievance procedure through Pitzer College and an external civil rights grievance procedure through the US Department of Education Office of Civil Rights. (Complaint, ¶ 45.) Plaintiff does not allege what duty Defendant owed to Plaintiff, and how Defendant breached that duty. Plaintiff fails to allege a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. For the same reason, Plaintiffs twelfth cause of action for negligence fails, and the motion is granted as to those causes of action with leave to amend. Plaintiffs fourth cause of action is for breach of contract. Plaintiff is entitled to plead breach of contract in general terms. ( Ochs v. PacifiCare of Cal. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 782, 795.) Plaintiff, nonetheless, must allege defendant offered to enter into an agreement with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff accepted that offer. (See Donovan v. RRL Corp . (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261, 270-271 [An essential element of any contract is the consent of the parties, or mutual assent . . . [which] usually is manifested by an offer communicated to the offeree and an acceptance communicated to the offeror].) Plaintiff alleges Defendant published policies and procedures on its website and then breached those policies. ( Complaint, ¶¶ 49-54.) Plaintiff fails to allege facts to suggest Defendant intended these policies to constitute contractual offers to Plaintiff. Plaintiffs allegations suggest Defendants policies are open offers for Defendant to contract with anyone who visits Defendants website, which is irrational. As such, Plaintiff fails to allege Defendant breached a contract with Plaintiff. For the same reason, Plaintiffs fifth cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails. (See Smith v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 38, 49 [The prerequisite for any action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties, since the covenant is an implied term in the contract].) Thus, the motion as to these cause of actions is granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs sixth and eighth causes of action are for fraud. Plaintiff must allege fraud with particularity. This means: (1) general pleading of the legal conclusion of fraud is insufficient; and (2) every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in full, factually and specifically, and the policy of liberal construction of pleading will not usually be invoked to sustain a pleading that is defective in any material respect. ( Wilhelm v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1331.) To state a claim for promissory fraud, Plaintiff must allege specific factual circumstances beyond contract breach, which reflect Defendants contemporaneous intent not to perform. ( Hills Transportation Co. v. Southwest Forest Ind., Inc . (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 702, 707.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant represented it would not retaliate against complaints of discrimination, nonetheless Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff after Plaintiff reported discrimination. ( Complaint, ¶¶ 71-73, 94-98.) Plaintiff fails to allege specific facts to show Defendant did not intend to abide by its representation at the time it made the representation. Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support the causes of action for fraud, and the motion as to those causes of action is granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs seventh cause of action is for negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiff alleges Defendant represented to Plaintiff that Defendant would not retaliate against persons who make complaints of discrimination, but Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff after Plaintiff reported discrimination. ( Complaint, ¶¶ 82-84.) There is no cause of action for a negligent false promise. ( Tarmann v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 159.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim for negligent misrepresentation fails as a matter of law. The motion as to that cause of action is granted without leave to amend. Plaintiffs ninth cause of action is for willful misconduct; the tenth is for reckless misconduct; and the eleventh is for gross negligence. These are not causes of action but rather principles of liability. (See Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 526 [willful misconduct is not a separate tort, but simply, an aggravated form of negligence]; see also Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 729-730 [noting willful or wanton behavior is separate and distinct from negligence in that they involve different principles of liability and different defenses].) The Court grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to these causes of action without leave to amend. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs complaint is granted without leave to amend as to the seventh, ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action. The motion is otherwise granted with leave to amend. Plaintiff is to file an amended complaint within 10 days of notice of this order. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this order and to file proof of service thereof.

Case Number: 22STCV28389 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 55 NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS : Motion Of Defendant Southern California Conference Of Seventh-Day Adventists For Order Compelling Plaintiff John Doe To Comply With Demand For Physical Examination, And Imposing Monetary Sanctions. Motion Thereof For Mental Examination (C.C.P. §§2032.310-2032.320). The Court had continued these matters from 4/25/24 after instructing the parties to meet and confer on the issues raised in the motion and, if necessary, holding an IDC with the Court. The Court requests an update on any progress made towards resolving the motions.

Case Number: 22STCV34586 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 10, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 22STCV34586 MOTIONS : Motion for Terminating Sanctions MOVING PARTY: Defendants Rachel Carter and Andre Carter OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Defendants Rachel Carter and Andre Carter (Defendants) move for terminating sanctions against Plaintiff Angelica Rodriguez (Plaintiff) for failure to comply with the Courts May 3, 2024 discovery order. No opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose&sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc. section 2023.030.) The court may impose a terminating sanction for misuse of the discovery process by any of the following: (1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process; (2) An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed; (3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party; (4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030(d).) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery, or disobeying a court order to provide discovery, constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d), (g).) The trial court may order a terminating sanction for discovery abuse after considering the totality of the circumstances: [the] conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful; the detriment to the propounding party; and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain the discovery. (Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 377, 390, quoting Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal. App. 4th 1225, 1246.) Generally, [a] decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. (Los Defensores, supra, 223 Cal. App. 4th at p. 390 [citation omitted].) Under this standard, trial courts have properly imposed terminating sanctions when parties have willfully disobeyed one or more discovery orders. (Los Defensores, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 citing Lang, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1244-1246 [discussing cases]; see, e.g., Collisson & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622 [terminating sanctions imposed (by striking the defendants Answer and subsequently granting default judgment) after defendants failed to comply with one court order to produce discovery]; Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 481, 491, disapproved on other grounds in Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 478, n. 4 [terminating sanctions imposed against the plaintiff for failing to comply with a discovery order and for violating various discovery statutes].) DISCUSSION On October 30, 2023, Defendants served Demand for Production of Documents, Set One, Specially Prepared Interrogatories, Set One, and Form Interrogatories, Set One, on Plaintiff. (Kothary Decl. ¶ 2.) On May 3, 2024, the Court granted Defendants unopposed motions to compel Plaintiffs written discovery responses. Counsel for Plaintiff did not appear at the hearing. The Court ordered Plaintiff to serve verified responses, without objections, within 20 days. The Court further granted monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $718.50. The monetary sanctions were due within 30 days. On May 8, 2024, Defendants served electronic notice of the order on Plaintiffs counsel. Defendants filed the instant motion on June 10, 2024, arguing that Plaintiff has not complied with the Courts order by serving the discovery or paying the sanctions. (Kothary Decl. ¶ 5.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has not complied with the May 3, 2024 order. Plaintiff also has failed to respond to discovery that was served in October 2023, over eight months ago. Plaintiff does not oppose this motion and therefore fails to set forth reasons for the discovery abuse. Additionally, it does not appear that lesser sanctions would induce compliance. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion. CONCLUSION Therefore, Defendants motion for terminating sanctions is GRANTED. The complaint as to Defendants Rachel Carter and Andre Carter is dismissed without prejudice. As the only remaining defendants are unnamed Doe defendants, the Court dismisses the entirety of the complaint. All dates are advanced and vacated. Defendants shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file a proof of service of such.

Case Number: 22AHCV01061 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT MARIO GARCIA, et al. , Plaintiff(s), vs. JOANNA ESQUIVEL, et al. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 22AHCV01061 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT MENTAL EXAMINATION Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 11 , 2024 ) Defendants Joanna Esquivel, Juan Molina, and Maria De Jesus Meza Hernandez (Defendants) seek leave to conduct a mental examination of plaintiff Mario Garcia (Plaintiff) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.310, et seq. A mental examination shall be performed only by a licensed physician, or by a licensed clinical psychologist who holds a doctoral degree in psychology and has had at least five years of postgraduate experience in the diagnosis of emotional and mental disorders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.020, subd. (c)(1).) The only statutorily authorized justification for ordering a mental examination is that the mental condition of the examinee is in controversy. ( Doyle v. Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1878, 1886.) In the absence of an allegation that plaintiff has any current mental injury as a result of defendants alleged conduct, her present mental condition is not directly relevant. ( Ibid .) Here, Defendants wish to have Dr. Emer Gharibian, a clinical psychologist, examine Plaintiff and determine the nature and extent of Plaintiffs alleged injuries. Plaintiff stated in response to form interrogatories that he suffers from depression, stress, suicidal thoughts, pain, difficulty sleeping, and a walking disability. Therefore, it appears that his mental condition is at issue. However, [a]n order granting a physical or mental examination shall specify the person or persons who may perform the examination, as well as the time, place, manner, diagnostic tests and procedures, conditions, scope, and nature of the examination. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.320, subd. (d).) The way to describe these diagnostic tests and procedures fully and in detail is to list them by name. ( Carpenter v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 249, 260 Neither Defendants motion nor their proposed order list any test and procedures by name. Instead, Defendants notice of motion and proposed order broadly state that diagnostic testing and procedures which are deemed necessary will be performed and will include the same types of tests, questions, and procedures conducted by Plaintiffs treating physicians. This general categorization of potential exams does not allow the Court to craft an order which comports with the statutory requirements governing mental examinations. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED without prejudice. Dated this 11th day of July , 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Case Number: 20STCV30564 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT JANE DOE L.P., Plaintiff, vs. DOWNEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 20STCV30564 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 11, 2024 On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff Jane Doe L.P. served a Notice of Taking Deposition of Defendant Downey Unified School Districts Person Most Knowledgeable and Fact Witness Principal Tom Houts and Request for Production of Documents (RFPs) on Defendant Downey Unified School District. On February 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to RFP No. 4. At the March 19, 2024, hearing, the Court found that some information about K.G., such as that related to Defendants knowledge of his prior similar misconduct and need for supervision, may be relevant. However, the Court found that RFP No. 4 was overbroad. The Court also noted that the request infringed on K.G.s privacy rights without giving him notice before the disclosure. Accordingly, the Court continued the hearing, ordered the parties to meet and confer about the scope of RFP No. 4, and ordered Defendant to provide K.G.s guardians last known address and phone number to Plaintiff so that Plaintiff could provide notice of the motion and the continued hearing date. On May 3, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed a supplemental declaration. Plaintiff has served K.G.s guardian with notice of the motion via U.S. mail and email. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. 13.) Since the last hearing, Plaintiff and Defendant have been discussing the scope of RFP No. 4. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 6-10.) However, from April 18, 2024 through May 1, 2024, Defendants counsel stopped responding to Plaintiffs counsel. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 11.) At the June 4, 2024 hearing, the Court ordered supplemental briefing and continued the hearing. Defendant timely filed a supplemental brief with exhibits. One of these exhibits is an email from K.Gs guardian in response to a conversation with Defendants counsel, which states, I do not Authorize Downey Unified School District to release [K.G.s] school records. And also [K.G.] will be pleading the Fifth Amendment. (Evenstad Decl., Ex. D.) As propounded, RFP No. 4 requests Any and all SCHOOL RECORDS in YOUR possession, custody or control for K.G. SCHOOL RECORDS is defined as any and all written notes, memos, reports, or other writings regarding a student including but not limited to report cards, progress reports, letters, notes, nurses notes, attendance records, health records, incident reports, IEP reports, correspondence, class schedules, or any other written material having anything whatsoever to do with the student in YOUR possession, custody or control. Defendants last specific offer (March 26, 2024) was for K.G.s student profile, enrollment history, attendance history, entry into the special education program dates, and the September 2019 IEP outlining the supervision/services that his IEP called for at the time of the incident. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 7.) On April 23, 2024, Defendants counsel communicated that she think[s] the production should be limited to the IEP in place at the time of the incident, which is really the only thing that would meet the directly relevant standard. (Evenstad Supple Decl., Ex. C.) Plaintiffs last request (April 25, 2024) was for K.G.s student profile, enrollment history, class schedule for the 2019-2020 school year, entry into the special education program dates, IEP/504 Triennial Plans for the time period of August 1, 2012 - December 6, 2019, behavioral and psychosocial reports up until December 6, 2019, Disciplinary Records from August 1, 2012 - December 6, 2019, if any, which shall include written/recording verbal warnings, written warnings, incident reports, suspensions, detentions, complaints regarding behavioral issues and incidents, reprimands, and any similar admonishments of inappropriate behavior demonstrated by K.G. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. 11.) In its supplemental opposition, Defendant now asks the Court to limit the production to K.G.s student profile with his demographic information and enrollment history and special education program information, which includes the special education programs and dates from 2011 through the time of the incident; K.G.s September 2019 IEP; and K.G.s discipline history from the start of summer school 2019 until the incident, which is the only time that plaintiff and K.G. attended Downey High School. (Suppl. Opposition at p. 4.) Defendant contends that it cannot offer more or less supervision of a student where it is not called for in an IEP and agreed to by the parent, and a school cannot implement any special education program or provide services to a child if the parent doesnt agree to them. (Suppl. Opposition at pp. 6-7.) However, Defendant focuses only on the IEPs requirement of parental consent to the provision of special education and related services, not Defendants general duty to supervise and protect against foreseeable harms for all students. (See id. at pp. 6-8 [citing Education Code sections 56340, 56341, 56341.1, 56345].) California courts have long recognized that a student may recover for injuries proximately caused by a breach of [a schools] duty to supervise. ( M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 518.) The existence of a duty of care of a school district toward a student depends, in part, on whether the particular harm to the student is reasonably foreseeable. ( Ibid. ) The harm may be foreseeable when the alleged perpetrator was repeatedly disciplined for grave acts of defiance and inappropriate and violent behavior. ( Id. at p. 520.) Plaintiff alleges that on December 6, 2019, her one-on-one aide abandoned her, resulting in Plaintiff being assaulted by K.G. (Complaint ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant negligently failed to carry out its duties to properly and adequately supervise Plaintiff L.P. and failed to discipline, investigate, warn, appropriately supervise, or suspend [K.G.] despite having actual or constructive knowledge that he had engaged in inappropriate conduct with other minor student. (Complaint ¶¶ 23, 46.) Accordingly, Defendants limitation to K.Gs student profile, September 2019 IEP, and discipline history from summer 2019 is too narrow. The limitation for K.G.s discipline history for the only time that plaintiff and K.G. attended Downey High School is particularly too narrow if Defendant had additional knowledge of K.G.s behavior from prior attendance at other schools in Defendants district. The motion to compel further is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant is ordered to respond to RFP No. 4 by producing the following documents to Plaintiff within 30 days: K.G.s student profile; enrollment history; class schedule for the 2019-2020 school year; dates of entry into the special education program; IEP/504 Triennial Plans for the time period of August 1, 2012 to December 6, 2019; behavioral and psychosocial reports up until December 6, 2019; and Disciplinary Records from August 1, 2012 to December 6, 2019, if any, including written/recording verbal warnings, written warnings, incident reports, suspensions, detentions, complaints regarding behavioral issues and incidents, reprimands, and any similar admonishments of inappropriate behavior demonstrated by K.G. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 11th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23LBCV01593 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: S25 Procedural Background On August 23, 2023, Plaintiff Martin and Graciela Ruiz filed a complaint against Defendants Frank Colaruotolo Consulting, Inc. (FCC), Pacific Crane Maintenance Company, LLC (PCMC), and Does 1-10. On April 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (FAC), alleging two causes of action: (1) Negligence against Defendants FCC, Frank Colaruotolo, and Does 2 through 10; and (2) Negligence against Defendants PCMC and Does 2 through 10. On June 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (SAC), adding CSI Services as a Defendant. Plaintiffs Martin Ruiz and Graciela Ruiz are the surviving biological father and mother of the decedent, respectively. (SAC ¶¶ 1, 2.) Plaintiffs are suing for the loss of their adult son, decedent Edgar Ruiz. Decedent was killed during a forklift incident on January 18, 2022. (See SAC ¶¶ 16-23.) Since the filing of Plaintiffs original complaint, Nico Ruiz filed a separate action against Defendants FCC and CSI Services, Inc., LASC No. 24LBCV00081. LASC Case No. 23LBCV01593 and LASC Case No. 24LBCV00081 (hereinafter collectively referred to as Related Cases) were deemed related by this Court. (See March 14, 2024 Notice of Ruling Re: Related Cases and Upcoming Hearing Dates in Case No. 24LBCV00081; Forouzan Decl., ¶ 6.) On May 7, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to consolidate the Related Cases. Legal Standard CCP § 1048 provides: (a) When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. (b) The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid unnecessary costs or delay, avoid duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both actions, and avoid inconsistent results by hearing and deciding common issues together. (See Estate of Baker (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 471, 484-485.) Further, the granting or denial of a motion to consolidate rests in the trial court's sound discretion and will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. (Feliner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 509, 511.) Ruling The Court agrees the two related matters should be consolidated for the following reasons: (1) both involve the same incident and (2) include nearly identical Defendants, (3) involve identical questions of law and fact, (4) identical burdens of proof, and (5) similar if not identical witnesses. However, there appears no record of Plaintiffs filing a notice of motion to consolidate in LASC Case No. 24LBCV00081 (the Nico Ruiz case) as required by Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.350(1)(C). If the parties in 24LBCV00081 waive the requirement of a noticed motion, the Court will grant the Motion to Consolidate. If there is no waiver, the Motion to Consolidate is denied without prejudice for Plaintiffs to correct the procedural defects.

S-CV-0052422 Privalov, Sergey vs. Bennett Engineering Services Inc. No appearance required. CMC is continued to 10/14/24 at 2pm in Dept. 6. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Bennett Engineering Services Inc.; Michel, Brandon Robert Additionally, no proof of service has been filed as to Defendant(s): Bennett Engineering Services Inc.; Michel, Brandon Robert

LOPEZ vs CORONA POST Petition to Compel Arbitration by CVRI2401992 ACUTE, LLC CORONA POST ACUTE, LLC Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling.