Sidelines Bar & Gril L, Llc Vs Underwriters At L

PROCEDURAL/FACTUAL BACKGROUND Currently before the Court is a Motion to Compel related to lemon law litigation. As alleged, in March 2019, Plaintiff Salvador Monroy-Bautista (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”) purchased a 2019 Honda Civic (hereinafter, “Subject Vehicle”) that was covered by Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s (hereinafter, “Defendant” or “Honda”) warranties. (Compl. ¶¶9-10.) Plaintiff alleges the Subject Vehicle was delivered defective and, after its purchase, showed defects in its electrical and transmission systems. (Id. at ¶11.) On July 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Honda and co-defendant Ontario Automotive LLC d/b/a Penske Honda Ontario (“Penske Honda Ontario,” and collectively, with Honda, “Defendants”). The Complaint pleads four causes of action: (1) Violation of the Song— Beverly Act — Breach of Express Warranty (against Honda); (2) Violation of the Song—Beverly Act — Breach of Implied Warranty (against Honda); (3) Violation of the Song—Beverly Act section 1793.2, subdivision (b) (against Honda); and (4) Negligent Repair (against Penske Honda Ontario). Defendant answered on August 14, 2023. 2 On October 11, 2023, the parties entered into a protective order governing discovery. 1 On November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One, which was noticed for February 14, 2024. On January 12, this Court held a Trial Setting Conference, in which it set an Informal Discovery Conference for March 8 and continued the hearing for the motion to compel until March 27. (Jan. 12, 2024 Min. Order.) Honda did not appear at the March 8 discovery conference, and the Court set another one for May 17, continuing the hearing on the motion to compel to May 30. (Mar. 8, 2024 Min. Order.) On March 29, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel, seeking further responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set Two. Plaintiffs’ motion seeks to compel further responses to their requests for production (hereinafter, “RFPs”) 10, 14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, and 47. In support of their motion, Plaintiff also filed a proposed order, declaration of counsel, and separate statement. On May 17, the parties met for an informal discovery conference, and the Court vacated the hearing date for May 30, which was set to rule on Plaintiff’s first motion to compel. In the minute order, the Court stated: Parties agree that the only Request for productions that remain at issue are No.’s 10, 14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, and 47. The only document in contention is the Honda “Quality Improvement Sheet(s)”, otherwise, all documents responsive to these request[s] for production[] have been produced. Honda’s opposition to the motion will focus on its refusal to produce the Quality Improvement Sheet(s). (May 17, 2024 Min. Order.) The RFPs referenced above correspond to the RFPs at issue in the current motion to compel, however, despite what is written in the May 17 Minute Order, Honda’s 1 This protective order was filed with the Court on October 17, 2023, but based on a review of Odyssey, it does not appear to be signed by the Court. 3 opposition does not just “focus on its refusal to produce the Quality Improvement Sheet(s).” (Ibid.) It, instead, addresses all of Plaintiff’s motion. On July 8, Plaintiff filed his reply. This motion is currently scheduled to be heard Monday, July 15, 2024. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard. a. The Parameters of Discovery. Under California’s Civil Discovery Act, “parties may conduct discovery ‘regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action … if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’” (Perlan Therapeutics, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1351, fn.12 (citing Code Civ. Proc., §2017.010).) “Thus, for discovery purposes, information is relevant to the ‘subject matter’ of an action if the information might reasonably assist a party in evaluating a case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.” (Jessen v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 711-712.) With respect to whether a request will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, “[i]nformation is relevant if its discovery will tend to promote settlement or assist in preparation for trial” and the party seeking discovery is entitled to substantial leeway, with doubts resolved in favor of allowing discovery. (Norton v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1760-1761.) Although trial courts have “wide discretion” to allow or prohibit discovery, “trial courts issuing discovery orders and appellate courts reviewing those orders should do so with the pro- discovery policies of the statutory scheme firmly in mind. A trial court must be mindful of the Legislature’s preference for discovery over trial by surprise, must construe the facts before it liberally in favor of discovery, may not use its discretion to extend the limits on discovery beyond 4 those authorized by the Legislature, and should prefer partial to outright denials of discovery.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540.) b. Motions to Compel. A party who deems a statement of compliance with a document demand as incomplete, or the representation of inability to comply as inadequate, incomplete, or evasion, or an objection to a document demand as without merit or too general can move to compel further responses. (Code Civ. Proc., §2031.310, subd. (a).) In ruling on the motion, courts may consider the relationship of the information sought to the issues framed in the pleadings; the likelihood that disclosure will be of practical benefit to the party seeking discovery; and the burden or expense likely to be encountered by the responding party in furnishing the information sought. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide (TRG 2013), Civil Procedure Before Trial, §8:1180-8:1181.) The motion to compel must be noticed within 45 days of receipt of the responses (plus the additional time if not personally served). (Code Civ. Proc., §2031.310, subd. (c).) The motion to compel must be accompanied by a declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve informally the issues presented by the motion before filing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., §§2031.310, subd. (b)(2), 2016.040.) Additionally, the moving party must set forth facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., §2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) Motions to compel must also be accompanied by a separate statement containing the requests and the responses, verbatim, as well as reasons why a further response is warranted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a).) The separate statement must be complete in itself; no extrinsic materials may be incorporated by reference. (Id., rule 3.1345(c).) A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, 5 evasive or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).) A motion to compel further responses “shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(b)(1).) Unverified discovery responses are tantamount to no response at all, and are subject to a motion to compel responses (rather than a motion to compel further responses). (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d 632, 635-36.) However, objections to interrogatories and demands for production are not required to be verified because “objections are legal conclusions interposed by counsel, not factual assertions by a party.” (Blue Ridge Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 339, 345.) The standard of review for discovery orders in general is abuse of discretion. (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733.) The determination whether a privilege applies likewise is subject to the abuse of discretion standard. (Kirchmeyer v. Phillips (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402.) II. Analysis. In Plaintiff’s motion he seeks further responses to eight specific RFPs (10, 14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, and 47), all of which seek documents, including emails, relating to “field technical reports”. Each of the eight RFPs relate to slightly different topics, and are analyzed below. a. Meet and Confer Requirement Procedurally, Plaintiff is required to file “a meet and confer declaration,” that states “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented,” along with its motion to compel. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040; 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) Along with his motion, Plaintiff filed the declaration of counsel Chris Grigoryan, which stated that counsel sent two separate meet and confer letters, in good faith, prior to filing this motion. (C. 6 Grigoryan ¶¶19-20.) Although Honda argues that Plaintiff did not attempt to meet and confer after the May discovery conference as was requested by the Court, the meet and confer requirement has technically been met. As such, the Court will rule on the merits to avoid further delays. b. RFP 10: Structural Defects Plaintiffs seek further responses to RFP 10, which seeks “field technical reports … with information relating to warranty parts replacement trends relating to the STRUCTURAL DEFECTS in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle.” (Pl.’s Sep. Statement at 16 (emphasis in original).) To this request, Honda objects, but then also states that it “has made a diligent search and reasonable inquiry in an effort to comply with this request and has no field technical reports directed to warranty parts replacement trends and no responsive documents have ever existed.” (Id. at 17.) Defendant’s response that it made a diligent search, reasonable inquiry and no document exists is code-compliant and the Court cannot order Honda to produce records it states do not exist. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) To the extent Honda is interpreting the request too narrowly and responsive documents do exist, Honda is correct that the documents sought by RFP 10 are irrelevant and beyond the scope of discovery in this case. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges problems with electrical and transmission defects, but RFP 10 seeks documents related to “structural defects.” In his motion, Plaintiff goes through the repair history of the Subject Vehicle (Mem. at 3), and none of those repairs deal with the Subject Vehicle’s structure. As such, RFP 10 is beyond the scope of discovery. The Court denies the motion to compel as to RFP 10. c. RFPs relating to Transmission and Electrical Defects (14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, 47). 7 Plaintiff seeks further responses to seven RFPs that seek “field technical reports” related to “common parts failures,” (RFPs 14, 37) “commonly observed problems,” (RFP 23), “repeat repair failures,” (RFP 24, 47), warranty parts replacements (RFP 33), and “suggested repair procedures” (RFP 46) relating to electrical or transmission defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. To these requests, Honda objects but then also states that it “has made a diligent search and reasonable inquiry in an effort to comply with this request and has no field technical reports…and no responsive documents have ever existed.” (Pl.’s Sep. Statement at 19-27.) Defendant’s response that it made a diligent search, reasonable inquiry and no document exists is code-compliant and the Court cannot order Honda to produce records it states do not exist. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) As Honda has noted, Plaintiff did not define “field technical reports,” in its RFPs, and if Honda has no documents under this title, it cannot be expected to produce anything responsive to these requests. It may be, however, that at the informal discovery conference, the parties came to an understanding that these RFPs are actually seeking “Quality Improvement Sheet(s),” related to the specific topics. (May 17, 2024 Min. Order.) To the extent the parties do have an understanding that these RFPs seek “Quality Improvement Sheet(s)” and these documents do exist, they are relevant to the litigation and should be produced. Discovery is relevant if it is admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., §2017.010.) “In the context of discovery, evidence is ‘relevant’ if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. (Glenfed Dev. Corp. v. Superior Court (National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA) (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; Norton v. Superior Court (Ein) (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 8 1750, 1760.) Case law allows the discovery of other vehicles having the same defects as the at- issue vehicle. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 973-74 (the court allowed the discovery of all warranty complaints received on vehicles of the same make, model, and year as the plaintiff’s vehicle); Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 152-532 (the Court of Appeal recognized that submitted evidence concerning the same make and model vehicle that showed the same non-conformities, as the subject vehicle, was evidence the expert properly relied upon to show the defendant failed to conform the subject vehicle to its warranty).) Plaintiff cites several cases to illustrate that it is common practice to allow production of internal emails, bulletins, and database searches related to similarly situated vehicles of the involved in litigation. For example, in Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 340- 347, the Court of Appeal noted that internal e-mails demonstrated that Chrysler was aware of the problem with the Totally Integrated Power Module, which affected the plaintiff’s vehicle, and this ultimately led the Santana Court to conclude the jury could infer from the emails that the manufacturer intentionally chose not to fully honor the express warranty, which was sufficient to support a civil penalty under section 1794, subdivision (c). Honda argues these RFPs are entirely too broad, and, even if narrowed, do not seek information allowed pursuant to the case law cited by Plaintiff. Defendant essentially argues this action is for one vehicle hence these requests exceed the scope of relevant discovery. For support to limit the discovery, Defendant relies on Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (Thiem Industries, Inc.) (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224-225 (Calcor Space Facility) and distinguishes 2 In Velasco v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (C.D.Cal. 2019) 2019 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 222387, at *3, the Central District Court of Appeal indicates Donlen is superseded by statute. But the Velasco court is referring to revisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Ibid.) This Court relies on California law, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the holding of Velasco is irrelevant. 9 Plaintiff’s relied on cases Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967 (Doppes) and Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138 (Donlen). In Calcor Space Facility (cited by Defendant), the Court of Appeal, Fourth District vacated a trial court order compelling discovery, where it found Plaintiff had been allowed to proceed with a “fishing expedition,” because the plaintiff’s requests failed to “bear any relationship to the manner in which [defendant] Calcor maintains its records. The burden is sought to be imposed on Calcor to search its extensive files, at many locations, to see what it can find to fit [plaintiff’s] definitions, instructions and categories.” (Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 222.) Plaintiff’s RFPs, however, do bear a relationship to the claims at issue and given that they are tailored to issues named in the complaint and related to the same make and model of the Subject Vehicle, they seem sufficiently narrowly tailored. While neither Doppes nor Donlen is directly on point, they do establish a consensus that discovery associated with complaints and defects in similar vehicles can be relevant under the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, particularly, in assisting on whether Honda was aware of the defects. Also, Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (c), provides that if a buyer establishes the defendant willfully failed to comply with its obligation, he is entitled to recover a civil penalty. However, if the manufacturer’s failure to repurchase or replace was based on good faith and reasonable belief the statutory obligation did not exist, then willfulness cannot be found. (Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051; Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104.) Nevertheless, “[a] decision made without the use of reasonably available information germane to that decision is not a reasonable, good faith decision.” (Lukather v. General Motors, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1051.) 10 Applying this here, these RFPs seek documents discussing common part failures, observed problems, warranty parts replacements, suggested repair procedures, and repeat repair failures relating to electrical and transmission defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. They thus go to Honda’s knowledge of the issues and/or ability to fix/repair the defects present in the Subject Vehicle that were specifically plead in the Plaintiff’s complaint. These RFPs also relate to the issue of Honda’s duty to replace or repurchase under the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. As such, if Plaintiff’s RFPs 14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, and 47 are seeking “Quality Improvement Sheet(s),” a document familiar to Honda, and related to electrical and transmission defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle, the Court grants the motion to compel. But if the parties do not have an understanding as to what specific documents these requests are seeking, Plaintiff is given leave to amend the requests. CONCLUSIONS Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court Grants, in part, and Denies, in part, Plaintiff s Motion to Compel Further Responses: (1) Denies the Motion as to RFP 10; and (2) Grants the Motion to Compel and orders Defendant to further respond to RFPs 14, 23, 24, 33, 37, 46, and 47 if the parties have an understanding as to what title or category of documents Plaintiff is seeking, given that repair reports related of vehicles of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle relating to electric or transmission defects are relevant. If the parties do not have an understanding of the specific type of document Plaintiff is seeking, Plaintiff is given leave to amend the requests to define “field technical reports”. Plaintiff’s counsel is ordered to provide notice. 11 12

Case Number: 24TRCV00488 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: P Application for Default Judgment The court considered the application for default judgment. RULING The application for default judgment is DENIED without prejudice. DISCUSSION Plaintiff Guy Edwards seeks to enter default judgment against defendants JAF Investments Inc. and John Fowler in the total amount of $545,195.14 consisting of: (1) $336,878 in principal; (2) $25,500 in loan fees; (3) $33,687.80 in late fees; (4) $141,174.29 in prejudgment interest; (5) $7,262.40 in attorney fees; and (6) $692.65 in costs. Upon review of the application as submitted, it is noted that it contains several deficiencies. First, the judgment amount identified in the CIV-100 compared with what is listed in the proposed judgment are not identical. Second, the CIV-100 fails to include the total demand of the complaint, and instead, it refers to the combined loan principal of $336,878 and int, costs, fees. Third, the proposed judgment only lists defendant John Fowler as whom judgment would be entered against. Fourth, the application fails to substantiate that the total amount of money loaned to defendants. Based on the checks and cashier checks issued to the defendants, plaintiff has only substantiated $208,500 of the $336,878 of the total loan principal. Thus, additional evidence is needed. Accordingly, plaintiffs application for default judgment filed on April 3, 2024 is DENIED without prejudice.

Case Number: 23AHCV00560 Hearing Date: August 7, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT EBF HOLDINGS, LLC dba EVEREST BUSINESS FUNDING , Plaintiff(s), vs. CORINTHIAN HOSPICE, INC., et al. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23AHCV00560 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR AN ORDER THAT THE GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS AND THE TRUTH OF MATTERS SPECIFIED IN REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION BE DEEMED ADMITTED, AND FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT CORINTHIAN HOSPICE, INC. Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 8, 2024 Plaintiff EBF Holdings, LLC dba Everest Business Funding (Plaintiff) moves for an order deeming admitted the genuineness of documents and truth of matters specified in its First Set of Requests for Admission served on defendant Corinthian Hospice, Inc. (Defendant) on October 16, 2023. The motion is unopposed. Where a party fails to timely respond to a request for admission, the propounding party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) The court shall grant a motion to deem admitted requests for admissions, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Where a party fails to provide a timely response to requests for admission, [i]t is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) The motion is unopposed and there is no dispute that Defendant failed to serve responses to Plaintiffs discovery requests. It also does not appear that Defendant has served substantially compliant proposed responses. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. Sanctions are imposed against Defendant in the reduced amount of $385, consisting of .5 hours at Plaintiffs counsels hourly rate and a $60 filing fee, payable within 20 days of the date of this Order. Moving party to give notice. Dated this 9th day of July 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Case Number: 23STCV14015 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 39 HEARING DATE : July 11, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV14015 MOTION : Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Isamar Cervantes and Yolanda Rodriguez OPPOSING PARTY: Defendant Kia America, Inc. MOTION Plaintiffs Isamar Cervantes and Yolanda Rodriguez (Plaintiffs) move to compel Defendant Kia America, Inc. (Defendant) to further respond to Requests for Production of Documents, set one (RPD), Nos. 1-3, 7, 18, 20, 22, 24, 30, 35, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 48, 54-56, 65, 73, 75-77, and 85-86. ANALYSIS If the propounding party deems responses to requests for production of documents unsatisfactory, the propounding party may move to compel further responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310.) Plaintiffs allege their 2020 Kia Sorrento vehicle had defects Defendant was unable to repair within a reasonable number of attempts. Plaintiffs, therefore, contend Defendant is liable under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act). Plaintiffs demanded Defendant produce documents about Plaintiffs vehicle and concerning the same make and model of the vehicle. To date, Defendant has produced its sales file, repair orders, and CARFAX history report for Plaintiffs vehicle, copies of a recall and a technical service bulletin that applied to Plaintiffs vehicle, the warranty claim records for Plaintiffs vehicle, communications between Plaintiffs and Defendant, and relevant portions of Defendants service policies and procedures. (See Declaration of Sharon L. Stewart, Exhibits B, D.) Defendant refuses to produce documents about other 2020 Kia Sorrento vehicles. (See Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses, p. 1.) Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery regarding the alleged defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model as Plaintiffs vehicle. Likewise, Plaintiffs are entitled to evidence of Defendants conduct towards other purchasers of defective vehicles, which is pertinent to a finding the manufacturer willfully violated the Song-Beverly Act by failing to adequately repair a vehicle. ( Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 1191, 1204.) The court grants the motion to compel further responses. Defendant essentially contends the information Plaintiffs seek about defects in vehicles of the same make and model as Plaintiffs vehicle is irrelevant. In the context of discovery, evidence is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence. ( Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) As set forth above, information about the same make and model as Plaintiffs vehicle is pertinent to this case. Defendant claims Plaintiffs definition of electrical defect(s) in the RPD is improper. Plaintiffs defined electrical defect(s) as one or more defect(s) within the electrical architecture of the Kia Sorento vehicles equipped with the same electrical architecture as the SUBJECT VEHICLE that can result in (1) loss of power, (2) battery draining, (3) lights dimming or flickering, (4) power windows, doors or locks not working, (5) failure to start, (6) malfunctioning of the instrument cluster, (7) malfunction or failure of the auto start-stop feature (8) malfunction or failure of the engine stop-start (ESS) feature (9) malfunctioning or failure of the fuses, modules, and/or relays; as well as, any other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE. (See Plaintiffs Separate Statement, p. 7.) This definition is reasonably particularized, as required: it specifies information about issues with the electrical architecture in Kia Sorrento vehicles. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.030, subd. (c)(1).) Further, even if Defendant objects to this definition, Defendant must, at minimum, identify documents responsive to the RPD that incorporate the definition as Defendant understands it. ( Standon Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 901, fn. 3.) The court declines to impose sanctions. The court notes, on February 7, 2024, Defendant responded to Plaintiffs letter regarding Defendants responses to the RPD. (Declaration of Sharon L. Stewart, Exhibit C.) Instead of further engaging with Defendant, Plaintiffs declared the parties at an impasse and filed this motion. Further efforts to informally resolve this dispute may have avoided the need for judicial intervention or, at the very least, may have narrowed the issues before the court, particularly as Defendant did produce some of the documents Plaintiffs seek in this motion, including the documents regarding Defendants policies and procedures. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) Accordingly, a sanctions award would be unjust under the circumstances. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).) CONCLUSION AND ORDER Plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to the RPD is granted. Defendant is to produce responsive documents that pertain to vehicles of the same year, make, and model of Plaintiffs vehicle. Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of this order and to file proof of service of same.

S-CV-0052433 Singh, Gurwinder vs. FCA US, LLC ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged NOTE: No party has paid advance jury fees pursuant to CCP § 631. Trial Date & Length: 12/08/25 4 day Jury Trial (Please contact Master Calendar (916) 408-6061 on the business day prior to the scheduled trial date to find courtroom availability.) Civil Trial Conference: 11/21/25 (heard at 8:30 am in Dept. 3) Mandatory Settlement Conference: 11/14/25 (heard at 8:30am; report to Jury Services) NO APPEARANCE REQUIRED UNLESS REQUESTED BY PARTY BY 3PM ON THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO HEARING DATE. REQUESTS FOR APPEARANCE MUST BE FAXED TO THE CIVIL DEPARTMENT, ATTN: CMC CLERK AT (916) 408-6275, AND TO ALL OPPOSING ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES WITHOUT ATTORNEYS BY 3:00 PM THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT DATE. SEE LOCAL RULE 20.1.7.

S-CV-0052425 Euerle, Duane Allen vs. FCA US LLC ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged NOTE: Defendant has not paid advance jury fees pursuant to CCP § 631. Trial Date & Length: 12/08/25 6 day Jury Trial (Please contact Master Calendar (916) 408-6061 on the business day prior to the scheduled trial date to find courtroom availability.) Civil Trial Conference: 11/21/25 (heard at 8:30 am in Dept. 3) Mandatory Settlement Conference: 11/14/25 (heard at 8:30am; report to Jury Services) NO APPEARANCE REQUIRED UNLESS REQUESTED BY PARTY BY 3PM ON THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO HEARING DATE. REQUESTS FOR APPEARANCE MUST BE FAXED TO THE CIVIL DEPARTMENT, ATTN: CMC CLERK AT (916) 408-6275, AND TO ALL OPPOSING ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES WITHOUT ATTORNEYS BY 3:00 PM THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT DATE. SEE LOCAL RULE 20.1.7.

Case Number: 18STCV06807 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 brian weiner, et al. , Plaintiffs, vs. onyx tower group, llc , et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 18STCV06807 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Hearing Time: 2:00 p.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ONYX TOWER GROUP, LLC FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FURTHER RESPONSES, AND SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $55,260 AGAINST DEFENDANTS ONYX TOWER, LLC, ONYX TOWER GROUP, LLC, ONYX TOWER HOLDINGS, LLC, AND ONYX TOWER MANAGEMENT, LLC AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS P. WILSON, AND DENNIS P. WILSON; MOTION TO COMPEL ONYX TOWER HOLDINGS, LLC FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FURTHER RESPONSES, AND SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $55,260 AGAINST DEFENDANTS ONYX TOWER, LLC, ONYX TOWER GROUP, LLC, ONYX TOWER HOLDINGS, LLC, AND ONYX TOWER MANAGEMENT, LLC AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS P. WILSON, AND DENNIS P. WILSON; MOTION TO COMPEL ONYX TOWER MANAGEMENT, LLC FOR FPRODUCTION [sic] OF DOCUMENTS AND FURTHER RESPONSES, AND SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $55,260 AGAINST DEFENDANTS ONYX TOWER, LLC, ONYX TOWER GROUP, LLC, ONYX TOWER HOLDINGS, LLC, AND ONYX TOWER MANAGEMENT, LLC AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS P. WILSON, AND DENNIS P. WILSON; MOTION TO COMPEL ONYX TOWER, LLC FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND FURTHER RESPONSES, AND SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $55,260 AGAINST DEFENDANTS ONYX TOWER, LLC, ONYX TOWER GROUP, LLC, ONYX TOWER HOLDINGS, LLC, AND ONYX TOWER MANAGEMENT, LLC AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD LAW OFFICES OF DENNIS P. WILSON, AND DENNIS P. WILSON AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS Background Plaintiff Brian Weiner, individually and derivatively on behalf of Onyx Tower Management, LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action on November 30, 2018, against a number of defendants. The operative Third Amended Complaint was filed on October 22, 2020, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, constructive trust, accounting, declaratory relief, constructive fraud, fraud, and appointment of receiver. On March 6, 2020, defendant Michael Hakim filed a Cross-Complaint against a number of cross-defendants, including Onyx Tower Management, LLC. On April 12, 2023, Michael Hakim filed a Cross-Complaint to the Third Amended Complaint. In addition, on January 19, 2021, a number of defendants filed a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff. Plaintiff now moves for an order compelling the production of documents within Onyx Tower Group, LLCs, Onyx Tower Holdings, LLCs, Onyx Tower Management, LLCs, and Onyx Tower, LLCs possession, custody, and control; and for further responses. Plaintiff also seeks sanctions in connection with each of the motions. Onyx Tower Holdings opposes each of the motions. [1] Evidentiary Objections The Court rules on Plaintiffs evidentiary objections as follows: [2] Objection No. 1, p. 1: sustained as to [t]he Documents that were identified, overruled as to the remainder. Objection No. 2, p. 2: overruled Objection No. 3, p. 2: sustained Objection No. 2, pp. 2-3: sustained Objection No. 3, p. 3: overruled Objection No. 4: overruled Objection No. 5: overruled Objection No. 6: sustained Objection No. 7: sustained as to provided testimony to the best of his recollection, overruled as to the remainder. Objection No. 8: overruled Objection No. 9: overruled Objection No. 10: overruled Objection No. 11: overruled Objection No. 12: overruled Objection No. 13: overruled Objection No. 14: overruled Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (a) provides that [o]n receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1)¿A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. (2)¿A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. (3)¿An objection in the response is without merit or too general. A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection must set forth specific facts showing good cause for the discovery sought and must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b) .)¿ Discussion The Court refers to Onyx Tower Group, LLC, Onyx Tower Holdings, LLC, Onyx Tower Management, LLC, and Onyx Tower, LLC collectively herein as the Onyx Entities. In his declaration in support of the instant motions, Plaintiffs counsel states that on April 28, 2023, Plaintiff properly served requests for production of documents upon the Onyx Defendants seeking documents related to the Subject Property. Attached to the Appendix of Exhibits as Exhibit 1 are true and correct copies of Plaintiffs first set of requests for production of documents upon the Onyx Entities. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 8, Exs. 1.) Plaintiffs counsel states that [o]n May 28, 2023, Defendants served objections to Plaintiffs document requests only on the basis that written discovery is cut off pursuant to the Minute Orders dated February 17, 2022 and October 4, 2022. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 10, Exs. 3.) Thereafter, the parties met and conferred regarding this matter. (Saltz Decls., ¶¶ 11, 13.) Plaintiff notes that on September 27, 2023, an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) was held in this action. The Courts September 27, 2023 minute order provides, inter alia , [t]he Informal Discovery Conference is held. According to the agreement by Counsel Dennis P. Wilson, Responses will be provided by October 30, 2023. (September 27, 2023 Minute Order at p. 8 .) Plaintiffs counsel asserts that the Onyx Entities production&was served two days late on November 1, 2023, and responses were served three days late on November 2, 2023, in violation of the Courts September 27, 2023 Minute Order& (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20.) Plaintiffs counsel states that [a]ttached to the Appendix of Exhibits as Exhibit 5 are true and correct copies of Defendants responses to Plaintiffs first set of requests for production of documents upon the Onyx Entities. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20, Exs. 5.) Plaintiffs counsel asserts that [s]ubstantively, the Onyx Defendants responses were not compliant with the Code of Civil Procedure&By way of example, and not limitation, the Onyx Defendants provided the same response to each of the 23 requests in the 4 sets of document requests making it impossible for Plaintiff to know whether the Onyx Defendants are complying in whole or in part with any of the requests contained across the 4 sets, or whether the Onyx Defendants even conducted a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry to comply& (Saltz Decls., ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs counsel contends that [t]his singular response referencing the Onyx Defendants data dump of over four thousand pages of documents also renders it impossible to determine which documents are responsive to which request. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs counsel notes that on November 3, 2023, another IDC was held. The Courts November 3, 2023 minute order provides, inter alia , [t]he Court suggests for the parties to meet and confer in order to be in compliance with prior court order(s) before the next hearing. After the meet and confer, the parties are to file a response statement 2-court days prior to the next hearing. On the Courts own motion, the Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) scheduled for 11/03/2023 is continued to 12/01/2023& Plaintiffs counsel states that on November 10, 2023, Plaintiffs Counsel sent a detailed letter asking the Onyx Defendants to supplement their responses, correct their production of documents, and to schedule a meet and confer by November 14, 2023. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 28, Exs. 7.) Plaintiffs counsel asserts that [o]n November 27, 2023, Mr. Wilson sent Plaintiffs Counsel a letter attempting to add untimely, improper, and previously waived objections to the Onyx Defendants responses&In said letter, the Onyx Defendants stood by their position of refusing to modify responses in any way, and thereby making any further attempt to meet and confer futile. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 30, Exs. 8.) On December 1, 2023, another IDC was held. The Courts December 1, 2023 minute order provides, inter alia , that [i]n open court, the Informal Discovery Conference is held. The Court finds that further Informal Discovery Conferences will be unproductive. The Court permits plaintiff to file their Motions to Compel. In the motions, Plaintiff sates that Plaintiff moves to compel further responses from [the Onyx Entities] to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set One and a full and complete production of documents because: (i) [the Onyx Entities] purported statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (ii) [the Onyx Entities] purported representation of its inability to comply because Plaintiff is allegedly in possession of most documents is inadequate, incomplete, and evasive, and (iii) [the Onyx Entities] attempt to preserve objections in its responses are without merit. (Mots. at p. 7:10-17.) As set forth above, the Onyx Entities served further responses to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set One, on November 2, 2023. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20, Exs. 5.) It appears that the Onyx Entities further responses to each of Plaintiffs 23 requests for production all provide as follows: Subject to and without waiving Preliminary Statement above, Defendant assumes that the request seeks the production of documents related to this litigation, and - to the extent that any exist - will produce all non-privileged documents in Defendants possession custody and control responsive to this request that Defendant does not believe Plaintiffs already have in their possession, custody and control. Indeed, Plaintiffs have the vast majority of said documents currently in its possession, custody and control as they have the contracts, emails, invoices and cancelled checks in their own possession, custody and control, either through their own means or the accompanying document production bates stamped WTG00000l through WTG004371. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20, Exs. 5.) Plaintiff argues that [t]his singular, impermissibly confusing response by each of the Onyx Defendants does not comport with any of the prescribed responses according to the Discovery Act. (Mots. at p. 8:5-8.) Indeed, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210, subdivision (a) , [t]he party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following: (1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities. (2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item. (3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling. In the oppositions, Onyx Tower Holdings asserts that Defendants obviously cannot do so, but attempted to provide ALL DOCUMENTS and ALL COMMUNICATIONS in response to each request in the best attempt to comply. Defendant not only provided said documents in the order that they were kept, but specifically bates stamped each and every document page for ease of reference . (Oppns at p. 6:10-14, emphasis omitted.) However, the Court does not find that the Onyx Entities further responses clearly indicate whether they will comply with the particular demand for inspection, or whether they lack[] the ability to comply with the demand for inspection& ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subds . (a)(1)-(2).) Rather, as set forth above, the Onyx Entities further responses to the subject requests each appear to provide, inter alia , that &Defendant assumes that the request seeks the production of documents related to this litigation, and - to the extent that any exist - will produce all non-privileged documents in Defendants possession custody and control responsive to this request that Defendant does not believe Plaintiffs already have in their possession, custody and control . (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20, Exs. 5, emphasis added.) Onyx Tower Holdings does not appear to cite legal authority demonstrating that such a response is adequate. Thus, the Court finds that the statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, and that the purported representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive . ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a) .) Plaintiff also cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280, subdivision (a) , which provides that [a]ny documents or category of documents produced in response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall be identified with the specific request number to which the documents respond. As set forth above, the Onyx Entities further responses to the subject requests each appear to reference the accompanying document production bates stamped WTG00000l through WTG004371. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 20, Exs. 5.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants singular response referencing the same document bates range - WTG000001 through WTG004371 cannot possibly refer or apply to each Onyx entity, contain responsive documents to each request, or consist of the entire universe of documents within Defendants possession, custody, or control. (Mots. at p. 8:14-19.) Onyx Tower Holdings does not appear to specifically address this point. Plaintiffs counsel also asserts that Tanya Hakim&[testified] that there are at least 10,000 pages of documents in their possession, custody, or control relating to the Subject Property&Thus, significantly more documents exist than what the Onyx Defendants produced& (Saltz Decls., ¶ 26, Exs. 2.) Onyx Tower Holdings also does not appear to respond to this assertion. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for the Court to compel the Onyx Entities to provide further responses to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set One to the Onyx Entities. Request for Sanctions Plaintiff also asserts that terminating, issue, and/or monetary sanctions are appropriate against Defendant and its counsel. (Mots. at p. 12:15-19.) As an initial matter, Plaintiff states that he incorporates by reference Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions previously filed against Defendants&on September 21, 2023, and hereby supplements that request as a request for sanctions may properly be included in a motion to compel discovery. (Mots. at p. 12:16-22.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs attempt to incorporate by reference another motion is improper as it violates page limit rules. Pursuant to ¿ Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113, subd ¿ . (d) ¿ [e]xcept in a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages. ¿ Plaintiffs instant motions are each 15 pages. Consequently, the Court declines to consider any arguments made outside of the moving papers filed by Plaintiff in connection with the instant motions. Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: & (g) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (g) .) There are a broad range of sanctions available against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030 .) The court may impose a terminating sanction by one of the following orders: (1) ¿An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process. (2) ¿An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed. (3) ¿An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party. (4) ¿An order rendering a judgment by default against that party. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d) .) In addition, [t]he court may impose an issue sanction ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (b) .) In the motions, Plaintiff asserts that terminating sanctions are warranted given Defendants and its Counsels intentional, repeated, and willful refusal to produce responsive documents or code compliant responses over the course of more than six months in violation of this Courts numerous orders. (Mots. at pp. 14:25-15:2.) More specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant and its Counsel still violated this Courts September 27, 2023 and November 3, 2023 orders by producing documents and responses late and in&non-compliance with the Discovery Act& (Mots. at p. 14:14-19.) As an initial matter, the Court notes that the November 3, 2023 minute order does not indicate that the Onyx Entities were ordered to produce documents. As set forth above, the November 3, 2023 minute order provides, inter alia , that [t]he Court suggests for the parties to meet and confer in order to be in compliance with prior court order(s) before the next hearing. After the meet and confer, the parties are to file a response statement 2-court days prior to the next hearing. In addition, Plaintiffs argument that Defendant and its Counsel&violated this Courts September 27, 2023&order[] by producing documents and responses late (Mots. at p. 14:14-19) acknowledges that responses and documents were produced. Thus, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has demonstrated that terminating or issue sanctions are warranted at this time. The Court notes that in Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604 , cited by Plaintiff, the Court of Appeal noted that the courts have long recognized that the terminating sanction is a drastic penalty and should be used sparingly. A trial court must be cautious when imposing a terminating sanction because the sanction eliminates a partys fundamental right to a trial, thus implicating due process rights. (Internal citation omitted.) The discovery statutes&evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. Although in extreme cases a court has the authority to order a terminating sanction as a first measure, a terminating sanction should generally not be imposed until the court has attempted less severe alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful and/or the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective. ( Id. at pp. 604-605 [internal quotations, citations, and emphasis omitted.] .) Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions against the Onyx Entities and their counsel. Plaintiff cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h) , which provides that [e]xcept as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010 ) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. As set forth above, on November 10, 2023, Plaintiffs Counsel sent a meet and confer Letter to the Onyx Entities counsel concerning Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 28, Exs. 7.) The November 10, 2023 meet and confer letter provides, inter alia , that this singular response referencing the same sequence of over four thousand pages of documents renders it basically impossible for Plaintiff to determine which documents are responsive to which request. This is a data dump in violation of Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.280(a), which requires that any documents produced be identified in conjunction with the specific request number to which the documents respond. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 28, Exs. 7, p. 2.) In addition, in the motions, Plaintiff asserts that Code of Civil Procedure Section 2031.280(a) requires that any documents produced be identified in conjunction with the specific request number to which the documents respond. Defendants singular response referencing the same document bates range - WTG000001 through WTG004371 cannot possibly refer or apply to each Onyx entity, contain responsive documents to each request, or consist of the entire universe of documents within Defendants possession, custody, or control. (Mots. at p. 8:12-19.) In the oppositions, Onyx Tower Holdings contends that [t]here is no requirement in the Code of Civil Procedure that a responding party identify in its response (with particularity or otherwise) the specific documents or things it intends to produce in response to a particular demand if it provides a statement of compliance. If the responding party does not object to the requests in their entirety, the responding party then must make the requested documents, things, or property available for inspection. Any documents produced in response to an inspection demand shall either be produced as they are kept in the usual course of business or be organized and labeled to correspond with the categories in the demand. (Oppns at p. 5:19-27, citing 2031.280, subd. (a).) In the replies, Plaintiff notes that he cited the correct Code section in the motion, and asserts that Onyx Tower Holdings improperly urges the Court to rely upon outdated law because the Code section language quoted and cited by Defendant is no longer accurate authority. (Replies at p. 3:17-18.) Indeed, as discussed, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280, subdivision (a) provides that [a]ny documents or category of documents produced in response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall be identified with the specific request number to which the documents respond. In light of the fact that Plaintiff cited to the current version of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280, subdivision (a) in the motion and in meet and confer correspondence (Saltz Decls., ¶ 28, Exs. 7), the Court finds that Onyx Tower Holdingss reliance on an outdated version of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.280 in the oppositions is without substantial justification. Thus, the Court finds that monetary sanctions are warranted under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h). Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions against each of the Onyx Entities and their counsel, Law Office of Dennis Wilson and Dennis Wilson, in the amount of $55,260.00 (Mots. at p. 2:23-24.) Plaintiffs counsel Michael Saltz states that he spent a total of 17.5 hours&addressing Defendants discovery abuses or refusals to cooperate with Plaintiffs requests for production of documents following the September through December 2023 IDCs, seeking to meet and confer, and preparing the&Motion[s], that he anticipate[s] spending 1.5 hours reading and opposing papers to be filed by Defendants, and preparing a Reply, and that he anticipate[s] spending 2 hours preparing for and attending a hearing on [the] motion[s]. (Saltz Decls., ¶ 32.) For each motion, the total amount of Mr. Saltzs requested time is 21 hours at a requested $800 per hour, for a total of $16,800.00 (Saltz Decls., ¶ 33.) In addition, Plaintiffs counsel Simone E. Poyourow states that she spent a total of 116.2&hours addressing Defendants discovery abuses or refusals to cooperate with Plaintiffs requests for production of documents following the September through December 2023 IDCs, seeking to meet and confer, and preparing the&Motion[s], that she anticipate[s] spending 10 hours reading Defendants opposing papers, and preparing a Reply, and anticipate[s] spending 2 hours preparing for and attending a hearing on [the] motion[s]. (Poyourow Decls., ¶¶ 5-6.) For each motion, the total amount of Ms. Poyourows requested time is 128.2 hours at a requested $300 per hour, for a total of $38,460.00 (Poyourow Decls., ¶ 7.) The Court does not find that these requested amounts are reasonable. The Court finds that it is reasonable to award sanctions to Plaintiff for the four motios in the total amount of $12,400.00. This amount was calculated by awarding sanctions for 11 hours at Mr. Saltzs hourly rate of $800/hr for a total of $8,800; and 12 hours at Ms. Poyourows hourly rate of $300/hr for a total of $3,600.00. Lastly, the Court denies Onyx Tower Holdingss request for sanctions against Plaintiff. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motions for orders compelling the production of documents and further responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents, Set One to the Onyx Entities are granted. The Court orders the Onyx Entities to provide further verified responses and to produce documents responsive to Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, Set One , within 30 days of the date of this Order.¿¿¿¿ Plaintiffs motions for terminating and issue sanctions are denied. Plaintiffs motions for monetary sanctions are granted in part. As to each of the four motions, the Onyx Entities and their counsel, Law Office of Dennis Wilson and Dennis Wilson are ordered to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $12,400.00 to Plaintiff within 30 days of the date of this Order. Onyx Tower Holdingss requests for monetary sanctions are denied. Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice of this Order. DATED: July 12, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court [1] The Court notes that on June 18, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed and served via electronic mail untimely supplemental declarations in support of the motions. The Court notes that [u]nless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b) .) Sixteen court days before the July 3, 2024 hearing is June 10, 2024. In addition, [a]ny period of notice, or any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days & ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B) .) Plaintiff does not appear to show that he was authorized to file the supplemental declarations.¿Thus, the Court declines to consider the untimely supplemental declarations. [2] The Court notes that Plaintiffs evidentiary objections are misnumbered.

Case Number: 19STCV40314 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 17 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 17 TENTATIVE RULING CODY HARDCASTLE, et al. vs. SIDE BAR AT OH CRAB, et al. Case No.: 19STCV40314 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Plaintiffs motion for a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Gonzales based on the terms of the Stipulation for Entry of Judgment between the parties is GRANTED. On 11/8/2019, Plaintiffs Cody and Natalie Hardcastle (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against Side Bar at Oh Crab, A-1 Expedite, Inc., M&B Holdings, Inc., John Gonzalez, and Michele Gonzales, alleging: (1) breach of written and oral contract; (2) breach of written contract; (3) breach of oral contract; (4) fraudulent concealment; (5) negligent misrepresentation; (6) appointment of a receiver; (7) money had and received; (8) money lent; and (9) preliminary injunction. On 5/22/2024, Plaintiffs moved for a judgment in favor of them and against Defendant John Gonzales (Gonzales), based on the terms of a Stipulation for Entry of Judgment between the parties. The motion is unopposed. Discussion On 10/27/2021, Plaintiffs and Gonzales settled this matter by way of a Stipulation to Enter Judgment (SEJ). The SEJ required Gonzales to make sixty (60) consecutive monthly payments of $1,295.30 beginning on December 1, 2021 and continuing on the first of each month until November 1, 2026 when a total of $77,718 was paid. ( Id ., ¶ 3.) Hardcastle would provide a Notice of Default and allow Gonzales ten (10) days to cure any missed payment. ( Id .) A failure to cure a default entitles Hardcastle to a judgment against Gonzales in the sum of $ 77,718 less any payments already made. ( Id .) Repeated Notices of Default have been sent to Gonzales via his attorney. ( Id , ¶ 4.) Through February 1, 2024, Gonzales typically cured the default. However, since then, Gonzales has failed to remit the monthly payment despite a Notice of Default being provided March 1, 2024 (for the February 1, 2024 payment) and April 1, 2024 (for the March payment). ( Id .) More than ten days have passed with Gonzales failing to cure the default. Gonzales has paid a total of $38,811.80 to Hardcastle. ( Id ., ¶ 9.) A balance of $38,906.20 is due and outstanding ($77,718 - $38,811.80). Per the SEJ, Hardcastle is also entitled to 10% on any default amount. Therefore, the total judgment amount should be $42,796.82. After review of the SEJ and Plaintiffs documentation showing default, the Court finds that the relief sought should be granted. ( See Motion, Exh. A; Stafford Decl.) The Court takes Gonzales failure to oppose as a concession to Plaintiffs motion on the merits. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion for a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Gonzales based on the terms of the Stipulation for Entry of Judgment between the parties is granted. It is so ordered. Dated: July , 2024 Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.