Kone Sidi Vs Spann Tatiyanah

Case Number: 23SMCV03139 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 TARA STEUDEMANN, et al., Plaintiff s , v. ISMAEL ISRAEL SANCHEZ, et al., Defendant s . Case No.: 2 3 SMC V 0 3139 Hearing Date: July 11 , 2024 [ TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF RONALD MING BACKGROUND This case arises from a car-pedestrian accident . On March 16, 2021, Defendant Ismael Israel Sanchez was driving a commercial van when entering the crosswalk where Plaintiff Tara Steudemann was walking . Plaintiff claims Sanchez hit and ran over her body twice . Plaintiff claims she suffered severe injuries including patellar fracture, multiple ankle fractures, and severe fracture blisters . At the time of the collision, Defendant Geraldine Tapia was the registered owner of the van operated by Sanchez . Plaintiff claims Tapia negligently entrusted the car to Sanchez who she knew or should have known was unfit to operate a commercial vehicle . Plaintiff s husband, Valentin Steudemann , has also filed a loss of consortium claim . At her deposition, Plaintiff testified she was a member of a gym called FulHaus . She trained at FulH a us with Ronald Ming who she testified is a physical therapist, personal trainer and the owner of FulH a us . Defendants noticed the deposition of Ming , to obtain a more thorough understanding of Plaintiffs current condition . Ming did not object to the subpoena, but he failed to appear for the deposition . This hearing is on Defendants motion to compel the deposition of Ronald Ming . Defendants also seek sanctions in the amount of $1,337.50 against Ming . There was no opposition filed as of the posting of this tentative ruling . LEGAL STANDARD Personal service of a¿deposition subpoena obligates any resident of California to appear, testify and produce whatever documents or things are specified in the subpoena; and to appear in any proceedings to enforce discovery. ( Code Civ. Proc. § 2020.220(c) .) A¿ deposition subpoena may command either: (1) only the attendance and testimony of the deponent, (2) only the production of business records for copying, or (3) the attendance and testimony of the deponent, as well as the production of business records, other documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things . ( Code Civ. Proc. § 2020.020 .) A¿ subpoena for a¿ deposition of a non-party is enforceable by a¿ motion to compel compliance brought pursuant to ¿ Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1 . This section provides that [ i ]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness &the court, upon motion reasonably made & or upon the court s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order & directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. ( C ode C iv. P roc. § 1987.1 .) A¿ motion to compel compliance with a¿ deposition subpoena must be made within 60 days after completion of the deposition record, the date objections are served, or the date specified for production, and be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. ( Code Civ. Proc., §2025.480, subd., (b) ;¿ Board of Registered Nursing v. Sup.Ct. (2021) 59 CA5th 1011, 1032-1033 .) A written notice and all moving papers supporting a¿ motion to compel an answer to a deposition question or to compel production of a document or tangible thing from a nonparty deponent must be personally served on the nonparty deponent unless the nonparty deponent agrees to accept service by mail or electronic service at an address or electronic service address specified on the deposition record. ( Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1346 .) Further,¿ Code Civ . Proc . section 1987.2(a) ¿provides, in relevant part, that, in making an order on a motion to order compliance with a¿ deposition subpoena , the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification . & ( C ode C iv. P roc. § 1987.2(a) .) A nonparty deponent may be subject to monetary sanctions for disobeying a court order ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (k) ) or for flouting the discovery process by suppressing or destroying evidence . ( Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 464, 476 ). A nonparty may also be punished by contempt ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.240 ) or payment of $500.00 ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1992 ). TIMELINESS Defendant s motion is timely . Ming failed to appear for his noticed deposition on May 21, 2024 . Sixty days from May 21, 2024 is July 20 , 2024 . Defendants filed their motion on June 7, 2024 , well within the 60 day deadline . MEET AND CONFER Defendants motion is not supported by a meet and confer declaration . Defense counsel attests he spoke with Mr. Ming a day prior to his deposition . When told he had to appear at the deposition, Mr. Ming said he would not appear . ( Bell Dec. ¶ 8.) There is no indication Defendants told Mr. Ming they intended to file a motion to compel and a request for sanctions or they met and conferred with Mr. Ming on the grounds for their motion . Notwithstanding, the Court will consider the motion on its merits, but cautions counsel to comply with the statutory requirements . ANALYSIS Defendants were required to personally serve their motion to compel on Mr. Ming . (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1346.) The proof of service to the motion to compel indicates it was served electronically on counsel for Plaintiffs . There is no indication that Mr. Ming was served with the motion, much less that service was done personally . Accordingly , the Court denies the motion to compel . CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants motion to compel the deposition of Ronald Ming . DATED: July 11, 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23CHCV01244 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: F51 JULY 8, 2024 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23CHCV01244 Motion Filed: 4/17/24 JURY TRIAL: 8/5/24 MOVING PARTY: Defendants Christopher Johnson; and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (collectively, Defendants) RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Maryam Haidari (Plaintiff) NOTICE: OK RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on Plaintiffs complaint. TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied. BACKGROUND This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff alleges that on 5/29/22, while riding her bicycle, she was injured in a collision with Defendant Johnsons vehicle at the intersection of Oso Avenue and Saticoy Street, Los Angeles, California. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that Johnson was acting within the scope of his employment with Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. at the time of the subject collision. ( Id. at ¶¶ 78.) On 4/28/23, Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendants, alleging a sole cause of action for Negligence. On 6/27/23, Defendants filed their answers. On 4/17/24, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On 6/25/24, Plaintiff filed her opposition. On 7/3/23, Defendants filed their reply. ANALYSIS The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp . (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings. ( Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 65, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381382.) As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 15191520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. ( Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. ( Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. ¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) A. Evidentiary Objections The court has reviewed the evidentiary objections submitted by the parties. While all objections have been considered, due to their extensive nature, the Court will not address each objection individually in this tentative ruling. Instead, the Court's analysis will focus on the substance of the objections raised and their relevance to the determination of the motion at hand. B. Negligence Plaintiffs sole cause of action against Defendants is Negligence. To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) the existence of a legal duty of care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate cause resulting in an injury. ( McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Here, Defendants argue that they are not liable to Plaintiff under a Motor Vehicle Negligence theory because it is Plaintiff who caused the incident as a matter of law by running a red light and driving on the wrong side of the roadway, and Defendant Johnson, in stark contrast, drove through the intersection pursuant to a green light after looking both ways, exercising due care. (MSJ 8:1417.) Defendants contend that Johnson, exercising due care in driving through the intersection, was legally stopped at his red stoplight, and when the light turned green, saw that the intersection was clear to proceed through, and only first saw Plaintiff at the moment just before impact. ( Id. at 4:1216, 5:69.) 1. Plaintiffs Comparative Negligence Defendants argue that Plaintiff ran a red light, on the wrong side of the roadway, as corroborated by four independent third party witnesses and the police report. (MSJ 10:611:14.) Defendants therefore contend that Plaintiffs act of running a red light caused the impact, which caused Plaintiffs physical injuries. Had Plaintiff not run a red light, she would not have been in the roadway with oncoming traffic coming towards her, and no impact or injury would have occurred. ( Id. at 11:1619.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that in comparative negligence cases (such as this one), a plaintiffs purported negligence cannot, as a matter of law, obliviate Defendants own negligence. (Pl.s Opp. 1:89.) Plaintiff further asserts that this case presents material factual disputes that must necessarily be decided by a jury to appropriately apportion liability: (1) whether Defendant Johnson was negligent in failing to observe Plaintiff in the crosswalk and (2) whether Plaintiff had the right of way under Vehicle Code § 21451. ( Id. at 6:47.) Courts are very reluctant to uphold a summary judgment in comparative negligence cases. & Ordinarily, issues of negligence are jury questions and the court may rarely decide comparative negligence questions without submitting them to the jury. & In short, negligence is a question of fact if different conclusions can be rationally drawn from the evidence. ( Maxwell v. Colburn (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 180, 186 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Plaintiff argues that whether or not a vehicle with a green light [has the right of way] depends upon whether another vehicle or pedestrian was lawfully in the intersection previously. (Pl.s Opp. 7:2426, citing Veh. Code § 21451, subd. (a); People v. Hahn (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d Supp. 841, 843844; Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 453, 459.) Here, Plaintiff proffers her own deposition testimony, and an expert declaration (albeit lacking foundation in many areas) and surveillance camera footage purporting to show that Plaintiff began crossing the intersection during her green light, while Defendant was stopped at his red light, turned around to retrieve a sweater she had dropped, before again proceeding to cross the intersection while her light was still green. (Ex. 1 to Decl. of Colleen M. Mullen, 52:2056:9; Exs. 410 to Decl. of Jon B. Landerville, MSME, P.E.) Plaintiff therefore contends that here, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff, who lawfully entered the intersection with a green light, had the right of way pursuant to Vehicle Code § 21451(a). (Pl.s Opp. 8:45.) The Court agrees and finds that Plaintiff has met her responsive evidentiary burden to show that a triable issue of fact exists as to Plaintiffs own potential comparative negligence, as different conclusions as to whether Plaintiff ran a red light can be rationally drawn from the evidence. 2. Defendants Breach of the Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care The general duty to take ordinary care in the conduct of ones activities & indisputably applies to the operation of a motor vehicle. ( Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 774, citing Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) Here, Defendants argue that Johnson exercised reasonable care at all relevant times as he drove through the intersection. (MSJ 12:1619.) Defendants support their contentions with Johnsons deposition testimony, third-party witness declarations, and LAPD Officer Solis deposition testimony. In opposition, Plaintiff maintains that it is for the jury to decide whether the reliance upon anothers due care is reasonable. (Pl.s Opp. 6:2324, citing Hendricks v. Pappas (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 774, 778.) Plaintiff argues that here, there is a material dispute of fact as to whether Defendant Johnson was negligent in failing to observe and account for Plaintiff crossing the intersection when he had a green light. ( Id. at 6:2728.) Plaintiff asserts that there was nothing obstructing Defendants field of vision, and thus his view of the intersection, through which Plaintiff was crossing prior to the collision. ( Id. at 7:13.) In support of this contention, Plaintiff proffers the deposition testimony of both Johnson and LAPD Officer Solis, and her experts declaration. Plaintiff argues that under these circumstances, a jury may find that Defendant Johnsons negligence in failing to observe Plaintiff for over ten seconds in the crosswalk directly in front of him rather than Plaintiffs purported negligence in continuing to cross an intersection she lawfully entered caused Plaintiffs injuries. ( Id. at 9:2225.) The Court agrees. While Defendants dispute the credibility of Plaintiffs expert declaration, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met her responsive evidentiary burden to show that a triable issue exists as to whether Johnson breached his duty of reasonable care, and likewise whether his conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs injuries. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied. C. Vicarious Liability An employer is vicariously liable for the torts of employees committed within the course or scope of their employment. ( Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School District (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 133, 138139.) As the Court finds that triable issues exist as to the nature and degree of each partys comparative negligence, and the parties have not raised any issues regarding whether Johnsons conduct was committed within the scope of his employment, it finds that a triable issue remains as to whether JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is vicariously liable for Johnsons conduct. CONCLUSION The motion is denied.

Case Number: 22STCV07864 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Wednesday, July 10, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 14 PROCEEDINGS Gina Solis, et al. v. Estate of John Russell Calvert, et al. 22STCV07864 1. Nicholas J. Ajellos Application to Appear as Counsel Pro Hac Vice TENTATIVE RULING Nicholas J. Ajellos Application to Appear as Counsel Pro Hac Vice is granted. Background Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on March 3, 2022. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint was filed on March 9, 2022. Plaintiffs allege the following facts. Plaintiffs decedent was killed in aircraft crash on March 13, 2020. Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 9.40 states, in relevant part: (d) The application must state: (1) The applicant's residence and office address; (2) The courts to which the applicant has been admitted to practice and the dates of admission; (3) That the applicant is a licensee in good standing in those courts; (4) That the applicant is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (5) The title of each court and cause in which the applicant has filed an application to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this state in the preceding two years, the date of each application, and whether or not it was granted; and (6) The name, address, and telephone number of the active licensee of the State Bar of California who is attorney of record. (e) An applicant for permission to appear as counsel pro hac vice under this rule must pay a reasonable fee not exceeding $50 to the State Bar of California with the copy of the application and the notice of hearing that is served on the State Bar. The applicant has met all the requirements mandated in Rule 9.40. The Application to be admitted as counsel pro hac vice is therefore granted. Nicholas J. Ajello is admitted as counsel pro hac vice in the pending matter. Defendant Rapco, Inc. is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 23TRCV04159 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B CARLOS LEON, et al., Plaintiffs, Case No.: 23TRCV04159 vs. [Tentative] RULING CITY OF HAWTHORNE, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendant City of Hawthorne Responding Party: Plaintiffs Carlos Leon, et al. (1) Demurrer to First Amended Complaint (2) Motion to Strike Portions of FAC The Court considered the moving and opposition papers. RULING The demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action in the FAC is SUSTAINED WITH TWENTY DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. The motion to strike is GRANTED WITH TWENTY DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. BACKGROUND On December 14, 2023, plaintiffs Carlos Leon, Eva Leon, and T.L., a minor by and through her guardian ad litem, Eva Leon, filed a complaint against City of Hawthorne and County of Los Angeles for (1) negligence dangerous condition of public property, (2) public employee and agent liability, and (3) wrongful death. On April 10, 2024, plaintiffs filed a FAC. This case is related to 23TRCV00302 (against the driver of the vehicle). LEGAL AUTHORITY Demurrer When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228. A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747. Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal. App. 2d 636, 643-44. Strike The court may, upon a motion . . ., or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP §436(b). CCP §431.10 states: (a) A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense. (b) An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following: (1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense. (2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense. (3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint. (c) An immaterial allegation means irrelevant matter as that term is used in Section 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP §437. DISCUSSION Demurrer Defendant City of Hawthorne demurs to the first, second, and third causes of action in the FAC on the grounds that the allegations are insufficient to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain. The FAC alleges that plaintiffs decedent Michael Leon was born on August 20, 2009, and died on January 8, 2023. FAC, ¶¶1-2. This lawsuit stems from a high-speed automobile versus pedestrian crash that resulted in the death of decedent Michael and personal injuries to plaintiffs Carlos Leon and T.L. Id., ¶19. On January 8, 2023, in the evening hours, a speeding vehicle fatally struck plaintiffs decedent who was attempting to cross and/or was crossing El Segundo Blvd. Id., ¶20. At about the time the subject incident occurred, the subject vehicle was engaging in an exhibition of speed and/or high-speed street race and/or high-speed reckless driving on westbound El Segundo Blvd. at or near Truro Ave., in the City of Hawthorne, in the County of Los Angeles. Id., ¶21. At the time of the subject incident, the subject vehicle was traveling at a speed grossly in excess of the posted speed limit on El Segundo Blvd., which is 40 miles per hour. Id., ¶22. The FAC further alleges that the dangerous and illegal street racing and/or reckless high-speed activity of the subject crash was one of a plethora of similar incidents which occurred on El Segundo Blvd. and for which El Segundo Blvd. was known. Id., ¶23. Hawthorne and the County had prior notice of the numerous dangerous high-speed and/or reckless activities which occurred on El Segundo Blvd., as well as numerous other busy streets, throughout Hawthorne and the County. Id., ¶24. Despite having this knowledge, these pertinent government agencies did not do anything to deter or prevent dangerous and reckless high-speed activities from occurring, or to minimize the risk that such activities could result in crashes with pedestrians or other vehicles, despite having the means and ability to do so. Id., ¶25. The FAC further alleges that the dangerous condition was one that created a substantial risk of injury when pedestrians used El Segundo Blvd. with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used. The nature of the dangerous condition changed during the COVID-19 pandemic and continuing through the time of the incident as dangerous driving increased in the subject area significantly and after the pertinent light signal phasing plans, pedestrian warnings, and related safety design measures were approved by defendants. The dangerous conditions included light signal phasing plans and other actions or decisions that increased the risk of negligent or criminal conduct on the roadway, including dangerously high speed street racing and other dangerous, life threatening conduct by operators of motor vehicles; failure to install pedestrian-crossing warnings; failure to install no pedestrian crossing signs; and to take other measures to alleviate the dangerous condition, or to minimize the risk of injury or death arising from the dangerous condition, that existed at the time of the accident. Id., ¶25. First cause of action for dangerous condition of public property The elements of a cause of action for a dangerous condition on public property are: (1) a dangerous condition existed on the public property at the time of the injury; (2) the condition proximately caused the injury; (3) the condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained; and (4) the municipality had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the property in sufficient time to have taken measures to protect against it. Gov. Code §835. [A] claim alleging a dangerous condition may not rely on generalized allegations [citation] but must specify in what manner the condition constituted a dangerous condition. Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal. App. 4th 434, 439. A dangerous condition is defined as a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. Gov. Code §830(a). [A]claim alleging a dangerous condition may not rely on generalized allegations but must specify in what manner the condition constituted a dangerous condition. A plaintiff's allegations, and ultimately the evidence, must establish a physical deficiency in the property itself. A dangerous condition exists when public property is physically damaged, deteriorated, or defective in such a way as to foreseeably endanger those using the property itself, or possesses physical characteristics in its design, location, features or relationship to its surroundings that endanger users. Cerna v. City of Oakland (2009) 161 Cal. App. 4th 1340, 1347-38 (citations omitted). A public entity may be liable for a dangerous condition of public property even where the immediate cause of a plaintiff's injury is a third party's negligent or illegal act (like . . . grossly negligent driving) if some physical characteristic of the property exposes its users to increased danger from third party negligence or criminality. But it is insufficient to show only harmful third party conduct, like the conduct of a motorist. [T]hird party conduct by itself, unrelated to the condition of the property, does not constitute a dangerous condition for which a public entity may be held liable. There must be a defect in the physical condition of the property and that defect must have some causal relationship to the third party conduct that injures the plaintiff. [P]ublic liability lies under [Government Code] section 835 only when a feature of the public property has increased or intensified the danger to users from third party conduct. Id. at 1348 (citations omitted). The FAC allege that the subject area whether the incident occurred on El Segundo Blvd., at or near Truro Ave., in the City of Hawthorne, including the roadway, intersection, crosswalk, traffic signals, sequencing of the traffic signals, speed limit warnings, street lights, and traffic control devices (Dangerous Condition) is and was owned, controlled, designed, operated, evaluated, built, constructed, maintained, managed, inspected, patrolled, overseen, and/or repaired by defendants. FAC, ¶27. Defendant argues that plaintiffs have not pled with the requisite particularity. Further, defendant contends, plaintiffs make generalized and conclusory allegations that the subject intersection was dangerous but fail to allege any facts specifying the nature of the dangerous condition, why the condition is dangerous, or how the condition contributed to the incident. Rather, the FAC merely identifies features of the intersection in the abstract without specifying how the features or the lack thereof rendered it a dangerous condition. Defendant further argues that plaintiffs fail to allege a causal relationship between a physical condition and the conduct of a third party. Defendant cites to Campbell v. City of Santa Monica (1942) 51 Cal. App. 2d 626, 629 (Liability of the city may not be created by . . . a motorist who disregards the law or negligently operates his car to the detriment of other. And, [t]he fact that the city may reasonably foresee that some motorists and pedestrians will use them in a negligent manner to the injury of others does not make it a joint tort-feasor.). Further, defendant cites, a public entity is only required to provide roads that are safe for reasonably foreseeable, careful use. Fuller v. State of California (1975) 51 Cal. App. 3d 926, 940. Defendant further argues that the allegations do not show that the City had actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition at the subject intersection. Moreover, the City argues, it is immune from liability for injuries caused by the failure to provide adequate regulatory traffic controls, signals, or markings at an intersection. See, e.g. , Paz v. State (2000) 22 Cal. 4 th 550, 561 (no affirmative duty to install traffic control signals); Gov. Code §830.8. In opposition, plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently pled dangerous condition of public property, causation, and notice. Plaintiffs assert that although they are not required to allege the specific actions the City should have taken, the Citys signal phasing plans essentially created a tunnel of green lights for vehicles to speed freely. Further, plaintiffs contend, the City has refused to produce its police report of the subject incident by claiming that it cannot because of the ongoing related criminal action. As for immunity, plaintiffs contend, they sufficiently pled the failure to warn exception to the Citys claimed immunity under Gov. Code §830.8 because lack of pedestrian warning signs contributed to the dangers condition that was not apparent to pedestrians crossing the road with due care, which was that El Segundo Blvd., was effectively used as a raceway by dangerous and reckless drivers at certain times. The Court finds that the allegations are insufficient to meet the elements and are too generalized. Plaintiffs have not alleged any feature of the public property that has increased or intensified the danger to users from third party conduct. Plaintiffs have not alleged a defect in the physical condition of the property that has a causal relationship to the third-party conduct, which is alleged to be street racing and/or excessive speed. See Cerna , supra. Further, it appears that Gov. Code §830.8 provides immunity to the City for failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings or devices described in the Vehicle Code and plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled the exception under that section. The allegations are also conclusory as to actual and/or constructive notice. The demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Second cause of action for negligence - public employee and agent liability The FAC alleges that defendants carelessly and negligently designed, constructed, owned, operated, maintained, inspected, and/or controlled the Subject Area; carelessly and negligently supervised, managed, instructed, performed work and selected, hired, engaged and permitted others to perform work on the Subject Area, resulting in a dangerous, defective, and unsafe condition. These dangerous conditions and these acts and omissions of defendants and their employees proximately caused Decedents death and Plaintiffs damages herein. FAC, ¶40. Defendants are liable for the injuries and damages to decedent and plaintiffs under the Government Code, including sections 815.2(a), 815.4, 815.6, and 820(a). Id., ¶43. Defendant argues that this cause of action fails to allege a valid statutory basis for imposing liability against the City and that plaintiffs reliance on Gov. Code §§815.2(a), 815.4, and 820 are misplaced because they do not create a cause of action, as they are general rules of vicarious liability and a general rule that a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission. Rather, the sole statutory basis for a claim imposing liability on a public entity based on the condition of the public entitys property is Gov. Code §835. Defendant also argues that the claim fails because it is predicated on the breach of mandatory duty as the FAC fails to identify the purported enactment that imposed a mandatory duty. In opposition, plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently pled a negligence cause of action in the event it is discovered that one of its independent contractors caused Plaintiffs injuries. The Court finds that the allegations are insufficient for the reasons argued by defendant, including that Gov. Code §835 is the sole statute for imposing liability against a public entity based on dangerous condition of public property and that the other Government Code sections do not apply. Also, plaintiffs have not identified any enactments imposing a mandatory duty on defendant. Government Code §815.6 (a) provides, where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty. To construe a statute as imposing a mandatory duty on a public entity, the mandatory nature of the duty must be phrased in explicit and forceful language. In re Groundwater Cases (2007) 154 Cal. App. 4th 659, 689 (citation omitted). The demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Third cause of action wrongful death Defendant argues that the FAC fails to state a cause of action for the underlying cause of action for dangerous condition of public property, thus this claim also fails. In any action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the complaint must contain allegations as to all the elements of actionable negligence. Novak v. Continental Tire North America (2018) 22 Cal. App. 5 th 189, 195. In opposition, plaintiffs argue that because they sufficiently alleged a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property, the wrongful death cause of action is supported. As the Court ruled above, the allegations are insufficient to constitute a cause of action for dangerous condition, upon which this cause of action is based. The demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Motion to Strike Defendant City of Hawthorne requests that the Court strike paras. 25, 27, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 44, 47, 48. Defendant argues that the allegations are immaterial and improper because the City is immune. In light of the ruling on the demurrer, the motion to strike is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. ORDER The demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action in the FAC is SUSTAINED WITH TWENTY DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. The motion to strike is GRANTED WITH TWENTY DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. Defendant City is ordered to give notice of ruling.

Case Number: 24NWCV01039 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: F 24NWCV01039 Motion for Trial Preference Plaintiffs move for trial preference. Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (a) provides, as follows: A party to a civil action who is over 70 years of age may petition the court for a preference, which the court shall grant if the court makes both of the following findings: (1) the party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole; and (2) the health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the partys interest in the litigation. Code of Civil Procedure section 36.5 provides that An affidavit submitted in support of a motion for preference under [C.C.P. §36(a)] may be signed by the attorney for the party seeking preference based upon information and belief as to the medical diagnosis and prognosis of any party. The affidavit is not admissible for any purpose other than a motion for preference under [C.C.P. §36(a)]. Seventy-five-year-old Claude Mashburn has established he has a substantial interest in the action because he is the Plaintiff in this action. In addition, Plaintiffs counsel has submitted an affidavit stating his medical diagnosis and prognosis: diabetes mellitus, hypertension, dyslipidemia, anemia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, chronic kidney disease stage 3, cardiomyopathy, acute on chronic systolic heart failure, mitral valve insufficiency, atherosclerosis of aorta, secondary hypercoagulable state, secondary hyperaldosteronism, permanent atrial fibrillation, a history of stroke and open-heart surgery, and a compression fracture of the T12 thoracic vertebra. (Decl. Pinkney, ¶¶ 6, 7.) Based on the above, the Court grants trial preference.

Case Number: 23CHCV02085 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/11/24 TRIAL DATE: 6/30/25 Case #23CHCV02085 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES (Request for Production, Set 1) Motion filed on 1/16/24. MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Edward Sandstrom RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant East Valley Towing, Inc. NOTICE: ok RELIEF REQUESTED : An order compelling Defendant East Valley Towing, Inc. to provide further responses to Plaintiff Edward Sandstroms Request for Production, Set 1, Nos. 7, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37 and 38. Additionally, Plaintiff requests sanctions against East Valley and its counsel, Wood Smith Henning & Berman LLP, in the amount of $2,161.65. RULING : The motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part, as set forth below. SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 5/24/22 between Plaintiff Edward Sandstrom (Plaintiff) and Defendant William Peterson (Peterson), an employee of Defendant East Valley Towing, Inc. (East Valley), while Peterson was driving East Valleys tow truck. Plaintiff claims to have suffered extensive injuries as a result of the accident. In this action, among other things, Plaintiff has included a claim for loss of income and loss of future earning capacity. On 7/14/23, Plaintiff filed this action against Peterson and East Valley alleging causes of action for: (1) Negligence against all defendants, (2) Negligent Entrustment against East Valley and Does 1-50 and (3) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention against East Valley and Does 1-50. On 8/2/23, Plaintiff served East Valley with Requests for Production, Set 1. (Chichyan Decl. ¶3, Ex.A). After granting several extensions of time to respond, East Valley served responses to the requests on 11/17/23. ( Id . ¶5, Ex.B). Plaintiff found East Valleys responses to certain of the requests to be deficient. Id . During the meet and confer process, Plaintiffs counsel extended the deadline for East Valley to provide further responses to 1/10/24 and the deadline to file a motion to compel further responses was extended to 2/9/24. ( Id . ¶¶6-7, Ex.C, D; Herme Decl. ¶6). East Valley failed to serve further responses by the 1/10/24 deadline due to a calendaring mistake. (Herme Decl. ¶6). As a result, on 1/16/24, Plaintiff filed (served on 1/15/24) the instant motion seeking an order compelling East Valley to provide further responses to Plaintiffs Request for Production, Set 1, Nos. 7, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37 and 38. ( Id . ¶¶6-7, Ex.C-D). Additionally, Plaintiff requests sanctions against East Valley and its counsel, Wood Smith Henning & Berman LLP, in the amount of $2,161.65. East Valley has opposed the motion and Plaintiff has filed a reply to the opposition. ANALYSIS The opposition indicates that on 1/22/24, East Valley served further responses to all of the requests at issue except number 33. ( See Herme Decl. ¶7, Ex.D; Reply, generally). The opposition also indicates that after the service of the further responses, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter regarding claimed deficiencies in the responses/further responses to requests 23, 33 and 38. (Herme Decl. ¶8, Ex.E). Therefore, East Valley believed that the responses to those three requests were the only responses which remained at issue. (Herme Decl. ¶9). The reply does not dispute that East Valley served further responses to all but one of the requests (no.33) at issue in the motion. However, the reply indicates that Plaintiff is still dissatisfied with the responses/further responses to the all of the requests at issue in the motion, specifically, requests: 7, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, and 38. ( See Reply, p.2:22-28, p.6:4-6). Plaintiff seems to believe that because the further responses were served after the motion was filed, Plaintiff need not establish the deficiencies in the further responses. ( See Reply, p.2:22-28). The Court does not agree with Plaintiffs position. CCP 2031.310(c) provides: Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response , or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand. (emphasis added) CRC 3.1345(c) provides, in relevant part: A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue. The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Material must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference. The separate statement must include--for each discovery request (e.g., each interrogatory, request for admission, deposition question, or inspection demand) to which a further response, answer, or production is requested--the following: (1) The text of the request, interrogatory, question, or inspection demand; (2) The text of each response, answer, or objection, and any further responses or answers . . . (emphasis added) As such, once East Valley served further responses to most of the requests at issue, Plaintiff was required to file a new motion addressing the deficiencies in those responses, after making a good faith effort to informally resolve the remaining discovery issues. Plaintiff also fails to explain how East Valley could know that Plaintiff was still dissatisfied with the responses to any of the requests at issue other than requests 23, 33 and 38 as those are the only requests addressed in Plaintiffs meet and confer letter served after the further responses were served. ( See Opposition, Ex.E). In the reply, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to further responses because the information could support a claim for punitive damages against East Valley. However, the complaint does not include a claim for punitive damages nor did Plaintiff indicate in its meet and confer efforts or the moving papers that he was seeking information to support such a claim. As such, East Valley did not have an opportunity to respond to this argument. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish why the further responses to Requests 7, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 34, 37 and 38 provided by East Valley after the motion was filed are deficient. See CCP 2031.310(c); CRC 3.1345(c)(2). The Court further finds that sanctions are not warranted. Pursuant to the parties meet and confer efforts, Plaintiff had until 2/9/24 to file a motion to compel further responses. (Chichyan Decl. ¶7, Ex.D). Plaintiffs counsel gives no indication that he contacted East Valleys counsel after further responses were not received by the 1/10/24 agreed upon deadline and filing the instant motion 3 court days later on 1/16/24, three and a half weeks before the agreed upon deadline to do so. The Court finds that a further response to Request 33, to which East Valley provided no further response, is warranted. ( See Herme Decl., Ex.D). East Valleys first objection to the phrase contractual or legal agreements being vague, ambiguous, overly broad and undefined does not even apply as that phrase is not contained in request 33. East Valley has also failed to justify any of the other objections asserted in response to this request. Further, if any documents are being withheld on the basis of privilege, a privilege log must be provided. CCP 2031.240(c). CONCLUSION The motion is granted as to Request 33. A further response is due within 20 days. The motion is denied as to Requests 7, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 34, 37 and 38. Sanctions are denied. The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to electronically bookmark the exhibits attached to the motion as required by CRC 3.1110(f)(4). Counsel for the parties are warned that failure to comply with this rule in the future may result in matters being continued so that papers can be resubmitted in compliance, papers not being considered and/or the imposition of sanctions.

23CV02997 HOOVER v. SHEPHERD (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF HOOVER’S MOTION TO BE RELIEVED The unopposed motion to be relieved is granted. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 1 of 1

Case Number: 23VECV04520 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: W E.P. HANDY vs WANQING XIONG, et al. APPLICATION FOR pro hac vice Date of Hearing: July 11, 2024 Trial Date: N/A Department: W Case No.: 23VECV04520 Moving Party: Plaintiff E.P. Handy Responding Party: None. BACKGROUND On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff E.P. Handy filed a complaint against Defendants Brothers Take Out Corporation, Brother Logistics Group Inc., and Wanqing Xiong for Negligence, Negligence Per Se, and Negligence Hiring, Training, Entrustment, Supervision and Retention. Plaintiff alleges on November 15, 2021, Defendant Xiong, an employee of Defendant Brothers, was negligently driving a 2017 Freightliner Cascadia, semi-truck with trailer, when Defendant Xiong negligently changed lanes into the right lane, struck Plaintiffs vehicle on the drivers side rear quarter panel causing it to rotate counterclockwise and collide with the front of the Defendants Freightliner. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Xiong pushed Plaintiffs vehicle approximately 45 feet before Plaintiffs vehicle rotated off of the front of the semi-truck to the North and slammed into the inside concrete retaining wall. [Tentative] Ruling: GRANT Michael E. Carr, Esq. and Blake D. Beeler submit an application for admission pro hac vice as counsel for Plaintiff Handy alongside Carrie Rognlien, Esq. Mr. Carr is a member of the Oklahoma and Arkansas State Bar as well as the United States of Eastern District of Oklahoma, United States of Western District of Oklahoma, United States of Northern District of Oklahoma, and United States of Eastern District of Arkansas. Mr. Beeler is a member of the Oklahoma State Bar as well as U.S. District Court Western District of Oklahoma, U.S. District Court Northern District of Oklahoma, U.S. District Court Eastern District of Oklahoma, U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, Date of Admission is April 2004, and U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Pursuant to California Rules of Court 9.40, an application for appearance pro hac vice must be served on all parties who have appeared in the case and on the State Bar of California at its San Francisco Office. Additionally, the application must state: (1) The applicant's residence and office address; (2) The courts to which the applicant has been admitted to practice and the dates of admission; (3) That the applicant is a member in good standing in those courts; (4) That the applicant is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (5) The title of court and cause in which the applicant has filed an application to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this state in the preceding two years, the date of each application, and whether or not it was granted; and (6) The name, address, and telephone number of the active member of the State Bar of California who is attorney of record. Mr. Hall has fulfilled these requirements. The declaration of Nathan Shaffer in support of the motion states he has sent a copy of the motion to the California State Bar with the fee of $50.00. (Shaffer Decl. ¶3, Exh. A.) The motion is GRANTED, contingent on proof the State Bar has received the $50.00 fee.