Doe #1 John Vs Millburn High School

Case Number: 21STCV26161 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, A.L. filed this action against Doe 1 for damages arising out of childhood sexual abuse. Plaintiff added LBUSD as a doe defendant. The Court consolidated 21STCV26161 with 22LBCV00364, Huggins v. LBUSD, which arises out of similar misconduct. LBUSD filed this motion to stay in the personal injury hub court, which then transferred the matter to this independent calendar court for all future proceedings. The matter was fully briefed prior to transfer. 2. Motion to Stay Proceedings a. Legal Standard Any party may file a motion for an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 404.5 staying the proceedings in any action being considered for, or affecting an action being considered for, coordination, or the court may stay the proceedings on its own motion. The motion for a stay may be included with a petition for coordination or may be served and submitted to the Chair of the Judicial Council and the coordination motion judge by any party at any time prior to the determination of the petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.515.) b. Request for Judicial Notice Pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 451, 452, subds. (d) and (h), 453, Defendants request for judicial notice is granted as to Request Nos. 1 to 12. Plaintiffs request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-35 is also granted. c. Analysis Defendant moves to stay the trial because (1) there are two pending writs before two different appellate courts to decide the constitutionality of California Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218) and (2) Defendant wants to be able to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations without fear that its relevant Board will violate the law to authorize payments for any settlement agreement. To elaborate, AB 218 authorized a three-year window beginning in January 1, 2020 that allowed claims of childhood sexual assault to be brought regardless of how long the abuse allegedly occurred. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1, subd. (q).) AB 218 amended Government Code § 905 to retroactively strip statutory governmental immunities for public entities which violates Article XVI section 6 of the Constitution and its prohibition of gifts of public funds. Defendant states the first pending writ, West Contra Costa U.S.D. v. Superior Court (First Appellate District Case No. A16934), wherein the parties are awaiting the requested oral arguments and have submitted their respective briefs. (See RJN Nos. 1-8, Exhs. B,C.) In the second pending writ, Roe # 2 v. Superior Court (Second Appellate District, Div. 6, Case No. B334707), the court requested an informal response to the filed writ, granting the school district until May 17, 2024 to file an informal reply to the response. (See RJN Nos. 9-12, Exh. G.) In exercising its discretion [regarding stay] . . . the court should consider the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party, and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other jurisdictions . . . [and] whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced. (Farmland Irr. Co. v. Dopplmaier (1957) 48 Cal.2d 208, 215.) First, Defendant argues that like Caiafa Prof. Law Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 800, 807-808 wherein a stay of a state court action involving the obligation to pay attorneys fees was justified because a broad action involving RICO was pending in federal court that would govern that case and other cases involving such fee obligations, here this case should be set aside because one or both of the two pending appellate writ proceedings could resolve the issue as to AB 218s unconstitutionality. Defendant further explains that staying this case is the only way to ensure the case will not conflict with the decisions reached in the two pending Appellate Court cases. Next, Defendant also asserts staying the action will not prejudice Plaintiffs rights because Plaintiff waited 17 years to file the lawsuit and any stay would toll the time within which Plaintiff is required to bring the case to trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 583.340.) In opposition, Plaintiff responds that (1) no legal support exists to mandate a stay in similar contexts and (2) staying the action would prejudice Plaintiff. Plaintiff notes that the Second District has summarily denied similar writ petitions. Plaintiff notes that, in the event the different courts of appeal split, this case will be in the same procedural posture it is in now. Plaintiff also notes that the issue will likely go to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the courts of appeal split, and this could take years. Plaintiff also argues the factors, set forth in Nken v. Holder (2009) 556 U.S. 418, 426, do not support a stay. Those factors are: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. (Id., at p. 434.) Once an applicant satisfies the first two factors, the traditional stay inquiry calls for assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Granting the instant motion would prejudice Plaintiff. There is no guarantee that the decisions made by the Court of Appeals in the pending writs would create a definitive ruling on the issue as it could always be further appealed to the Supreme Court, potentially taking years to resolve. The Court notes that the vast majority of trial courts have held against the District on this argument, and this trial court has consistently held against the District on this issue. The motion is therefore denied. Defendant is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

23CV01051 BAKER v. HAVEN INVESTMENT CORP. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendant Haven Investment Corp. dba Garden Haven Nursery’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Summary judgment is appropriate since plaintiff failed to dispute any material facts and failed to produce evidence that the Privette doctrine either does not apply or that an exception to it applies. No triable issues of material fact are presented by any party. This is an action for damages related to injuries plaintiff sustained on a jobsite following a propane tank explosion. Plaintiff’s independent plumbing contracting company was hired by defendant to install a gas stove, new faucets, and a new water heater on defendant’s property. He alleges defendant’s employees negligently turned on a gas line he had shut off to install the stove resulting in an explosion and his severe burn injuries. This case turns exclusively on the legal issue of whether the Privette doctrine applies. Plaintiff’s form complaint, filed 5/8/23, seeks personal injury damages for one count of negligence. I. DEFENDANT’S MOTION Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that as a hirer, it is not liable for the industrial injury of a contractor. (Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (“Privette”).) The facts it presents, which are not disputed, are that plaintiff, a licensed plumbing contractor operating his own business since 2008, was hired by defendant to install a gas stove, new faucets, and a new water heater in a building owned by defendant. Plaintiff’s company was hired based on a verbal bid of $2,400, and defendant’s owner was out of state at the time he was to perform the work. (Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“UDF”) 1-4.) The new stove required connection to a propane tank on site and defendant told him to discuss the gas line with its employee Mario Cervantes. (UDF 5-6.) Plaintiff understands basic safety practices and procedures related to gas lines, including verifying that they are turned off before and during the work. When plaintiff shut off the gas line from the propane tank, he saw a Hispanic male whom he presumed was working on site, but it was not Mr. Cervantes. Plaintiff spoke to him in Spanish and advised him not to turn the gas line Page 1 of 9 on and to make sure others did not. He understood that the man responded affirmatively to those instructions. (UDF 7-15.) Plaintiff then closed the propane tank valve before commencing work, confirmed it was shut off, and while connecting the stove, realized that he needed an additional part (a flared fitting for the stub-out in order to attach the proper length flex line). (UDF 16-23.) Plaintiff then left the job site to retrieve the parts at his storage unit, which was 25 minutes away. Before he left, he replaced the cap with a plug to close the stub-out, which was a safety precaution to close the gas line and prevent gas from coming out in the event someone turned the gas line back on. (UDF 24-26.) Plaintiff drove to and from his storage unit, returned to the job site, and did not see any other persons in the immediate vicinity of the site. He did not visually check or otherwise verify that the gas line valve remained off, he did not smell gas, removed the plug closing the stub-out, heard hissing and realized the gas line was live. He tried unsuccessfully to put the plug back in but the gas escaped, ignited within a second and severely burned him. (UDF 27-34.) Plaintiff opposes the motion on the grounds that two exceptions to the Privette doctrine apply and that his case may proceed to trial. He claims there were at least four employees of defendant on site that day and that one of defendant’s agents reactivated the gas line during his brief absence from the job site. (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement, fact no. 11.)1 He contends that someone reactivated the gas line while he was away and that amounts to either retained control which affirmatively contributed to the injuries or a concealed hazard, negating the presumption of no liability under Privette. Defendant argues on reply that neither of the Privette exceptions are applicable here. Plaintiff was an independent contractor with extensive experience, it retained no control over any part of his work, that plaintiff failed to speak to the person defendant told him was in charge of the site, that plaintiff failed to take basic safety measures when returning to the site, and the hazards were known, readily apparent and not concealed. Plaintiff failed to oppose defendant’s Separate Statement and responded “undisputed” to all 35 facts.2 Similarly, defendant failed to oppose any of plaintiff’s separate undisputed facts, instead relying on the legal framework of the Privette doctrine. 1 As evidence of his own separate fact no. 11, plaintiff only offers his complaint, ¶ GN-1. Parties cannot rely upon their own pleadings to support separate statements. (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (Crowell) (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 720; CCP § 437c(p)(2).) 2 The single fact “disputed” by plaintiff fails to offer any supporting evidence (UDF 12). “Without a separate statement with references to supporting evidence … it is impossible … to demonstrate the Page 2 of 9 II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD In a summary judgment motion, the court must determine from the evidence presented that “there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law…” (CCP §437c(c).) In making this determination, the court may rely on “affidavits, declarations… and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken.” (CCP §437c(b).) “The court’s sole function on a motion for summary judgment is issue-finding, not issue determination. The judge must simply determine whether there is a triable issue as to any material fact… To be material, the fact must relate to some claim or defense in issue under the pleadings and be in some way essential to the judgment; if proved, it could change the outcome of the case. There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof…If there is a single such issue, the motion must be denied. (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) §§10:270-271.) "A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (CCP § 437c(a)(l).) "[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) "That is because of the general principle that a party who seeks a court's action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon." (Ibid.) Further, "the party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact." (Ibid.) "[T]he opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact." (Ibid.) "There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." (Ibid.) Each material fact must have a citation to supporting evidence. (CCP 437c(b)(1).) “If a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts contained in the separate statement, the motion may be denied.” (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, at §10:95.1, citing Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.) Opposition declarations are to be liberally existence of disputed facts.” (CCP §437c(b)(3); Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 115 (disapproved on other grounds by Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 41-42; Blackman v. Burrows (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 889, 895.) Page 3 of 9 construed while the moving party’s evidence is strictly scrutinized. (Id. at §10:124.7.) The court need only rule on material objections, i.e., those that the Court relies on in making its determination. Evidentiary objections not ruled on are presumed overruled and preserved for appellate review. (Id. at §9:63.1.) III. PRIVETTE DOCTRINE Generally, a non-negligent party cannot be liable for tort to its independent contractor's employees. (Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 702.) Privette “renders the hirer of an independent contractor immune from liability to the independent contractor's employee even when the basis for liability was that the hirer failed to provide in the contract that the contractor must take special precautions to avert the risks of work. [Citation.] Privette also bars liability when the injured employee's theory is that the hirer negligently hired the independent contractor. [Citation.] Finally, Privette applies when the injured employee's cause of action against the hirer of the independent contractor is based on the hirer's failure to comply with statutory or regulatory workplace safety requirements. [Citation.]” (Johnson v. Raytheon Company, Inc. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 617, 628.) “By hiring an independent contractor, the hirer implicitly delegates to the contractor any tort duty it owes to the contractor's employees to ensure the safety of the specific workplace that is the subject of the contract. That implicit delegation includes any tort law duty the hirer owes to the contractor’s employees to comply with applicable statutory or regulatory requirements.” (SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590, 594.) The California Supreme Court has held that the duty to ensure a safe workplace may be delegated, based largely on the policy rationale that because workers’ compensation limits the liability of an independent contractor to its employees, “it would be unfair to permit the injured employee to obtain full tort damages from the hirer of the independent contractor—damages that would be unavailable to employees who did not happen to work for a hired contractor. This inequity would be even greater when, as is true here, the independent contractor had sole control over the means of performing the work.” (Id. at 603.) There are two exceptions to the Privette general rule of nonliability. The first is where a hirer of an independent contractor retained control over safety conditions and the exercise of retained control affirmatively contributed to the employee's injuries. (Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 202.) “Affirmative contribution” to the plaintiff's injuries sufficient to support liability against the hirer encompasses a situation where a hirer promises to undertake a particular safety measure but negligently fails to do so if that failure affirmatively contributed to an employee's injury. (Id. at 212.) An “affirmative contribution” may also take the form of actively directing a contractor or an employee about the manner or performance of the Page 4 of 9 work, and that direction causes injury. (Tverberg v. Fillner Constr. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1446.) The second is where a landowner knew, or should have known, of a latent or concealed preexisting hazardous condition on its property, the contractor did not know and could not have reasonably discovered this hazardous condition, and the landowner failed to warn the contractor about this condition (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 664; Gonzalez v. Mathis (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 257, 267 ["In subsequent cases, the Court established two exceptions to the “Privette doctrine”].) But even where the defendant's property lacked certain safety guards as required by applicable regulations, courts have held that it was the responsibility of the independent contractor to identify the absence of the safety guards and to take reasonable steps to address the hazard. (SeaBright Ins. Co., supra, 52 Cal.4th at 594.) On summary judgment where defendant can establish it hired plaintiff to perform work and that plaintiff was injured while performing that work, defendant is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of nonliability. (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Servs. LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 664.) IV. MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE AND NO EXCEPTION TO PRIVETTE IS ESTABLISHED As stated, the facts presented establish that plaintiff, a very experienced plumbing contractor, failed to take adequate safety measures when he returned from retrieving parts by failing to ensure the gas line was off. Notably, plaintiff left the job site for nearly an hour and when he returned, failed to visibly confirm the gas remained off. Based upon defendant’s undisputed facts, it is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the Privette doctrine applies and it is not liable. Defendant has offered uncontroverted evidence that it hired plaintiff, a licensed plumbing contractor, to perform work and plaintiff was injured while doing that work. Plaintiff argues both exceptions to Privette apply here – that defendant retained control over the gas line, that circumstantial evidence suggests that one of the four employees of defendant on site turned the gas line back on, and that the reactivated gas line constitutes a known but concealed hazard. However, plaintiff offers no evidence to support either exception. All he offers in his own Separate Statement, fact nos. 7-11, that he turned off the gas line, that there were four other defendant’s employees on site, that he informed a person he was working on the gas line, that no one was to touch it, and that person acknowledged his instructions. This undisputed evidence does not support either retained control or a concealed hazard. First, defendant delegated to plaintiff the entirety of the job – to install the gas stove – and did Page 5 of 9 not direct or offer any of its employees to assist or control aspects of plaintiff’s work. (UDF 3-6, 28.) Defendant neither promised to undertake a particular safety measure and negligently failed to do so, or actively directed plaintiff about the manner or performance of the work, resulting in injury. (Hooker v. Department of Transportation, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 212; Tverberg v. Fillner Constr., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 1446.) Second, the hazard posed by an active gas line is not concealed and could have easily been discovered had plaintiff used basic safety measures upon his return to the site. (UDF 1, 7, 16-18, 21-22, 26, 29, 33, 35.) (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., supra, 37 Cal.4th at 664; SeaBright Ins. Co., supra, 52 Cal.4th at 594.) Since Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of producing evidence to support either exception to the Privette doctrine, summary judgment is appropriate. No triable issues of material fact are presented and defendant is presumed not liable. V. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of defendant’s Answer in this action is denied. The court need not take judicial notice of its own records in the action. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

Case Number: 23LBCV00172 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: S27 Defendants propounded RFAs, set one and FROGs, set two on Plaintiff on 4/04/24. Defendants propounded FROGs, set three, SROGs, set two, and RFAs, set three on Plaintiff on 4/10/24. On 5/15/24 and 5/16/24, Defendants filed motions to compel responses to the above interrogatories and to deem the above RFAs admitted, setting them for hearing on various dates. On 6/03/24, the Court rescheduled the hearing on all of the motions to 7/18/24. Defendants gave notice of the ruling the same day. To date, Plaintiff has not served responses to any of the propounded discovery. Defendants therefore seek an order compelling Plaintiff to respond, without objections, to the outstanding discovery, deeming the RFAs admitted, and requiring Plaintiff to pay sanctions. Defendants motions to compel are granted. Plaintiff is ordered to serve verified responses to the above-detailed interrogatories, without objections, within five days. The Court notes that time is of the essence, as the case is scheduled for trial on 8/06/24. CCP §§2030.290(a),(b). Defendants motions to deem RFAs, sets two and three, admitted are also granted. CCP §2033.280(a), (b). Sanctions are mandatory. §§2030.290(c), 2033.280(c). Defendants seek sanctions in the varying amounts in connection with each motion. Counsel bills at the rate of $210/hour. The Court awards one hour of time to prepare each of these form discovery motions. No opposition was filed and therefore no reply was necessary. The Court awards one hour to appear at the hearing on the motions, as the Court strongly encourages remote appearance. The Court therefore awards a total of six hours of attorney time at the requested rate $210/hour, or $1320 in attorneys fees. The Court also awards five filing fees of $60 each, or $300 in costs. Sanctions are sought against and imposed against Plaintiff, in pro per; he is ordered to pay sanctions to Defendants, by and through their attorney of record, in the amount of $1620, within twenty days. Defendants are ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Case Number: 21STCV44649 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: T Motion to Reclassify to Limited Jurisdiction Moving Party: Richard Cartier (Defendant) Responding Party: N/A Tentative Ruling: Deny BACKGROUND Plaintiff Bayron Enriquez Vazquez (Plaintiff) filed this action on December 8, 2021, for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident on July 28, 2020, alleging negligence. Plaintiff seeks special damages for the medical treatment he received as a result, amounting to a $8,525.00, in addition to $3,500 in damages his vehicle sustained. Plaintiff also estimates he will incur between $1,500 to $3,000 in medical costs for future treatment. (Motion to Reclassify, Exh. A Response to Interrogatory Form 1.1.) MOVING PARTY POSITION Defendant Richard Cartier (Defendant) filed this motion to reclassify the action as a limited jurisdiction action, arguing that Plaintiff does not seek relief for costs above the $35,000.00 threshold for unlimited jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to this motion. ANALYSIS I. Defects As a preliminary matter, the court notes Defendants notice was untimely. Defendants notice (p. 7) to Plaintiff reflects that service was provided to Plaintiff via email on June 2516 court days before the July 18 hearing. Because service made via email extends the notice period by 2 court days, Defendant was untimely. ( (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6(a)(3)(B).) II. Motion to Reclassify this Action as a Limited Jurisdiction Action CCP § 403.040 governs reclassification of civil cases. The court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification, regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been classified in an incorrect jurisdictional classification. (Code Civ. Proc.,, § 403.040(a).) A case should only be reclassified from unlimited to limited if the jurisdictional amount necessarily cannot be reached. (See Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 270-71.) This is a high standard that amounts to a legal certainty. ( Id. at 270) The court may believe it highly unlikely that plaintiff will recover the amount demanded, but this is not enough to defeat jurisdiction, unless it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount which he has demanded. ( Id. ) CCP § 86(a)(1) classifies civil cases as limited when the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to thirty-five thousand ($35,000) or less. A. Amount in controversy The court initially notes the jurisdictional amount increased to $35,000 at the beginning of this year, but it does not appear the new statute is retroactive. ( See Civ. Code §§ 85-86.) Thus, the central issue to determine whether to reclassify this action as limited jurisdiction is whether it is a legal certainty that Plaintiff cannot recover over $25,000.00 from this case. ( Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 270.) Whether the new jurisdictional amount is retroactive and applicable to this case is immaterial, as Defendant still would not meet their burden for the reasons discussed below. Defendant points to Plaintiffs responses to form 1.1 interrogatories to assert that the total relief sought does not reach the jurisdictional amount required. Namely, Defendant indicates that Plaintiff incurred $12,025.00 in medical expenses and vehicle damage so far, and estimates up to $3,000.00 in additional costs for future medical expenses. (Motion to Reclassify, Exh. A Response to Interrogatory Form 1.1.) Defendant argues that because these total costsamounting to $15,025.00fall below the minimum requirement for unlimited jurisdiction, this action should be reclassified. ( Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Reclassification p. 3.) Here, it is not a legal certainty that Plaintiff will not recover over the jurisdictional minimum. Plaintiffs response to interrogatory no. 6.7 indicates that a healthcare provider advised Plaintiff that they will have between $1,500 to $3,000 in future medical costs attributable to Defendant, it does not speak directly to the issue of damages Plaintiff is seeking in this action. More specifically, Plaintiffs response to interrogatory no. 9.1 lists that he requests recovery for general damages, pain and suffering, and future medical expenses, all of which in the amount to be determined. Defendant has not addressed the potential for Plaintiff to recover for pain and suffering, nor the possibility that Plaintiffs future medical expenses will exceed the estimate his healthcare provider provided. Because of the especially uncertain nature of personal injury cases, failing to address all of Plaintiffs bases for recovery is especially problematicas Defendant did not conclusively show Plaintiff cannot receive above threshold required for unlimited jurisdiction. In turn, Defendant has not met the burden of showing the legal certainty required to reclassify the case to limited jurisdiction. RULING Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Reclassify is denied.

Case Number: 23SMCV00072 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Panduro v. Carson CASE NO.: 23SMCV00072 MOTION: Motion for Terminating Sanctions; Monetary Sanctions HEARING DATE: 7/17/2024 Legal Standard If a party fails to obey a court order compelling it to provide a discovery response, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction . . . In lieu of or in addition to this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction . . .. (CCP §§ 2030.290(c), 2030.300(e), 2031.300(c), 2031.320(c).) Misuse of the discovery process, which includes disobeying a court order to provide discovery, is conduct subject to sanctions. (CCP § 2023.010(g).) Possible sanctions are: (a) [A] monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct&. (b) [A]n issue sanction ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses. (c) [A]n evidence sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence. (d) [A] terminating sanction by one of the following orders: (1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process. (2) An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed. (3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party. (4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party. (e) [A] contempt sanction by an order treating the misuse of the discovery process as a contempt of court. (CCP § 2023.030.) The party seeking to impose sanctions need only show the failure to obey earlier discovery orders. ( Puritan Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 877, 884 [interpreting former statute dealing with refusal to comply].) However, numerous cases hold that severe sanctions (i.e., terminating or evidentiary sanctions) for failure to comply with a court order are allowed only where the failure was willful. ( R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 495; Vallbona v. Springer (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1545; Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.) The burden of proof then shifts to the party seeking to avoid sanctions to establish a satisfactory excuse for his or her conduct. ( Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 201.) Analysis Defendant Marcie Marie Carson moves for terminating and monetary sanctions against Plaintiff Yamilet Panduro for their failure to obey this courts order of November 28, 2023, to pay monetary sanctions to Defendant in the amount of $660.00. Defendant also requests monetary sanctions of $1,060.00 against Plaintiff and counsel of record, Hesam Yazdanpanah, for costs and fees associated with having to bring this motion. Defendant does not cite any authority suggesting that a party and/or counsels failure to pay monetary sanctions would justify terminating sanctions absent other violations. The Court is also disinclined to grant sanctions-on-sanctions. Monetary sanctions are enforceable as judgments under the typical procedures available to such orders. (See CCP §680 et seq. [enforcement of money judgments].) Accordingly, Defendants motion is DENIED.

Case Number: 22STCV40016 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 32 HEARING DATE July 15, 2024 CASE NUMBER 22STCV40016 MOTION (1) Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint as to the Third Alleged Cause of Action (2) Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Complaint Regarding the Prayer for Punitive Damages MOVING PARTY Defendant Enedino Espinoza OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiff Joseph Buddenberg MOTION On December 23, 2022, Plaintiff Joseph Buddenberg (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Target Corporation, Allied Universal, John Doe, and Does 1 to 50 for various causes of action including, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges that on October 18, 2022, he was exiting the premises at 735 S. Figueroa St. Los Angeles, when John Doe, a security guard, physically attacked and assaulted him. (Complaint ¶ 8.) On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint, substituting Enedino Espinoza as John Doe. Defendant Enedino Espinoza (Defendant) now demurs to the third cause of action in the complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress arguing it is uncertain and fails to state a cause of action. Defendant also separately moves to strike Plaintiffs punitive damages claim in the first and second causes of action. Plaintiff opposes and Defendant replies. LEGAL STANDARD A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. ( Donabedian , 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.) The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. ( Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action. ( Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) On demurrer, a trial court has an independent duty to determine whether or not the & complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. ( Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged but must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained. ( Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the pleading is so bad that the responding party cannot reasonably respond, i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him or her. ( Khoury v. Malys of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Where a demurrer is made upon the ground of uncertainty, the demurrer must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears by reference to page and line numbers. (See Fenton v. Groveland Comm. Services Dist . (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.) Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, [i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. ( Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245). MEET AND CONFER Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 requires that [b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(3).) According to the Declaration of Loni K. Harada-Orosz, Defendants counsel met by telephone with Plaintiffs counsel and sent a meet and confer letter in April 2024 regarding this demurrer. (Harada-Orosz Decl. ¶ 56.) Therefore, the meet and confer requirement is met. ANALYSIS As an initial matter, upon reviewing the complaint, the Court finds that the pleadings are not so uncertain that Defendant cannot reasonably respond. Therefore, the Court will address the argument that the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action does not state sufficient facts. The elements for a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiffs suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) an actual and proximate causal link between the tortious conduct and the emotional distress.¿ ( Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)¿ ¿ The tort calls for intentional, or at least reckless conductconduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result. ( Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 210.) It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware. ( Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) A defendants conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. ( Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 234, 257 (internal citations and quotations omitted).) Mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. ( Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist . (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 597 (internal citations and quotations omitted).) Rather, the requirements for satisfying the element of extreme and outrageous conduct are rigorous and difficult to satisfy. ( Okorie , supra , 14 Cal.App.5th at 597.) On the spectrum of offensive conduct, outrageous conduct is that which is the most extremely offensive. ( Id. ) (quoting Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1129).) Depending on the idiosyncrasies of the plaintiff, offensive conduct which falls along the remainder of the spectrum may be irritating, insulting or even distressing but it is not actionable and must simply be endured without resort to legal redress. ( Ibid. ) In order to avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with great[ ] specificity the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. ( Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) Here, the complaint alleges the following: As Plaintiff was exiting the subject premises and using his cellphone, he was approached and questioned by Defendant JOHN DOE. Defendant JOHN DOE, suddenly and without warning, physically attacked and assaulted Plaintiff with such force that Plaintiff suffered injuries and damages. The force of Defendant JOHN DOE'S assault to Plaintiff's body caused Plaintiff to suffer physical injuries and damages. (Complaint ¶¶ 89.) Plaintiff also describes the incident as the following: Defendant JOHN DOE aggressively approached the Plaintiff, leaning forward and getting within inches of his person, and in a loud bellicose manner threatened to touch and/or grab Plaintiff in a harmful manner such that it reasonably appeared that Defendant JOHN DOE was about to carry out the threat. ( Id. ¶ 15.) The complaint further alleges: Defendant JOHN DOE acted with the intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress when Defendant JOHN DOE, suddenly and without warning, physically attacked and assaulted Plaintiff with such force that plaintiff suffered injuries and damages. Defendant JOHN DOE'S conduct as set forth above was so outrageous as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community. As a result of Defendant JOHN DOE's socially unacceptable conduct set forth above the Plaintiff has suffered severe and extreme emotional distress including, but not limited to, highly unpleasant mental suffering and anguish that entails such intense, enduring and nontrivial emotional distress that no reasonable person in a civilized society would be expected to endure. (Complaint ¶¶ 2729.) The complaint alleges a physical attack of such force that it caused physical injury. The complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer. Motion to Strike California law authorizes a partys motion to strike matter from an opposing partys pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435; 436(a).) Motions may also target pleadings or parts of pleadings which are not filed or drawn in conformity with applicable laws, rules or orders. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).) A motion to strike is used to address defects that appear on the face of a pleading or from judicially noticed matter but that are not grounds for a demurrer. ( Pierson v Sharp Memorial Hospital (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342.) Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) Malice is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiffs rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate. [Citation.] (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.) As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, malice requires more than a willful and conscious disregard of the plaintiffs interests. The additional component of despicable conduct must be found. ( College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) (emphasis added.) The statutes reference to despicable conduct represents a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards. (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime. ( Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) Further, [t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiffs interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences. ( Flyers Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.) A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. ( Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award for punitive damages. ( Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.) Moreover, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. ( Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Lastly, [t]he mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. ( Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) The complaint alleges a physical attack of such force that it caused physical injury. The complaint states a prima facie claim for punitive damages. The motion to strike is denied. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court overrules Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court denies Defendants motion to strike with leave to amend. Defendant shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file a proof of service of such.

22CV02834 JOHN ROE 1 et al. v. MOUNTAIN VIEW WHISMAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. SANTA CRUZ CITY SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR STAY, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO CONTINUE TRIAL SANTA CRUZ CITY SCHOOL’S MOTION TO COMPEL MENTAL EXAMINATION AND TESTING OF PLAINTIFF ROE 3 AND PLAINTIFF ROE 4 The motion to continue trial is denied. The motion to compel is granted. Motion to continue trial While Dr. Scott has another trial appearance slated for early October 2024, the parties and trial court can fashion a witness schedule to accommodate his other trial and conference commitments. Motion to compel mental exam and testing of plaintiffs Page 1 of 4 The parties are unable to reach an agreement as to the length of time which should be permitted for evaluation by psychiatrist Dr. Charles Scott. Plaintiffs assert a total of 8 hours per plaintiff is sufficient for examinations by both Drs. Hooker and Scott. Defendant contends Dr. Scott requires up to 8 hours of testing and Dr. Hooker requires up to 4 hours of testing. In support of this position, Dr. Scott provided a declaration explaining why up to 8 hours is required. Having reviewed his declaration, the court finds it sufficient to establish good cause to compel examination and testing of Roes 3 and 4 with Dr. Scott for up to 8 hours and for up to 4 hours with Dr. Hooker. That is, a total of 12 hours for each plaintiff. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2032.320, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs also assert they do not want to sign the document titled “Informational/Agreement For Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation” from UC Davis Health, School of Medicine before Dr. Scott’s evaluation, because it “may cause them to waive certain fundamental rights.” (Opp at pg. 7.) A copy of the form is attached to Dr. Scott’s declaration as exhibit C-2. The court reviewed the form and did not find it contained any waivers except the doctor-patient relationship and the duty of confidentiality that accompanies the relationship, which is expected given the context of the evaluation. Plaintiffs did raise any specific issues with the form, so the court is unable to further address their concerns regarding this form. Defendant SCCS’s Request for Judicial Notice: Defendants request for the court take judicial notice of the first amended complaint and certificates of merit for Defendant Does 1 and 2 are denied since the court need not take judicial notice of records in its own file. Defendants SCCC’s Second Request for Judicial Notice 1. Court order in Doe v. Familiesfirst Inc. 2018 Cal.Super. LEXIS 36211. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 2. Court order in Jaber v. Cal. Envtl. Sys., 2018 Cal.Super. LEXIS 61456. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 3. Court order in Aguilar v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles 2021 Cal.Super. LEXIS 42435. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 4. Order on defendants SCCS’s Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Alternative, to Continue Trial Date, dated May 15, 2025. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of its own court records. Page 2 of 4 5. Oral Argument Notice from Court of Appeal First Appellate District dated June 25, 2024, appellate case no. A169314. Granted. 6. Temporary Stay Order from Court of Appeal Second Appellate District filed June 26, 2024, appellate case no. B334707. Granted. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

HOLDING COMPANY, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0201274 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. This is a breach of contract case arising out of maintenance and repair work that Plaintiff alleges it hired Defendants to perform on a bulldozer in 2020. Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings, on the grounds that the First Amended Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants Peterson Holding Company and Peterson Tractor Company. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Meet and Confer: Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, moving party's counsel must meet and confer, in person or by telephone, with counsel for the party who filed the pleading subject to the judgment on the pleadings motion “for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” CCP § 439(a). Here, the Declaration of Paul Meidus attaches as Exhibit A a “Meet and Confer” email he sent to Plaintiff’s counsel midday on May 21, 2024. Mr. Meidus’s Declaration states that as of the date of the filing, he had not received a response from counsel. The instant Motion was filed May 22, 2024. The Court’s Order dated June 17, 2024, noted that this was not a good faith effort to meet and confer, and ordered Defendant to file a supplemental declaration regarding additional efforts to determine if an agreement could be reached, no later than July 9, 2024. No such declaration has been filed. Defendant has not adequately met and conferred as required by CCP § 439(a). Defendant was also ordered to file proper proof of service of the motion, as none had been previously filed. Defendant did not do so. Timeliness of Motion: CCP 438(e): No motion may be made pursuant to this section if a pretrial conference order has been entered pursuant to Section 575, or within 30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise permits. Here, it appears no pretrial conference order has been entered. However, the date the action was initially set for trial was November 28, 2023. That date has long passed, and the parties have sought and received two continuances of the trial date since then. The parties have participated in a mandatory settlement conference, and have engaged in motion practice including on discovery issues. As Defendants argue, the motion is untimely under CCP 438(e). Despite the time limitation imposed by CCP 438(e), which was codified in 1994, Courts have since held that a nonstatutory motion for judgment on the pleadings survives without the time limitation. “A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself.” Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 CA4th 644, 650. Request for Judicial Notice: Pursuant to Evid. Code §§ 452 and 453, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the Complaint and First Amended Complaint. Merits: A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by CCP § 438, the rules governing demurrers apply. Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 CA4th 995, 999; Templo v. State of Calif. (2018) 24 CA5th 730, 735 (motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer). The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or be based on facts the court may judicially notice. CCP § 438(d); Tung v. Chicago Title Co. (2021) 63 CA5th 734, 758-759. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed October 26, 2023, is the operative pleading. Defendants named in the caption include Peterson Holding Company, Brian Adams, and Peterson Tractor Co. The parties stipulated to the amendment of the FAC, which changed Plaintiff’s name to Black Knight Enterprises (it was formerly Black Knight Fire Support, Inc.). The order on that stipulation was entered on October 23, 2023. The FAC alleges: Peterson Holding Company and Peterson Tractor Company (“Peterson”) operate several lines of business, including Peterson- CAT. (FAC ¶4.) Peterson, as Peterson-CAT, sells Caterpillar brand earthmoving and construction equipment, and provides maintenance and repair services for such equipment. (FAC ¶4.) Peterson operates at several locations, including a facility in Redding, County of Shasta, California, which was where Peterson’s obligations which are the subject of this complaint were to be performed. (FAC ¶4.) Peterson’s service manager Brian Adams provided a quote for maintenance work which Plaintiff accepted on December 2, 2020. (FAC ¶ 10.) The FAC contains numerous further allegations against Peterson. The Court only looks to the face of the pleadings and matters subject to judicial notice on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. This is a well-pleaded complaint making allegations that Peterson Holding Company and Peterson Tractor Company entered into a contract with Plaintiff in 2020 for maintenance work that was performed. The identity of the correct business entity which is directly liable to Plaintiff may be Peterson Holding, Peterson Tractor, or Peterson-CAT – but that information is in the control of the Defendants. The Court notes that on June 24, 2024, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Discovery Responses, which had not been provided as required by the CCP, despite several reasonable extensions granted by Plaintiff. The responses presumably will permit Plaintiff to amend to add Peterson-CAT as a named defendant if necessary. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as on a demurrer, the court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” Hood v. Hacienda La Puente Unified School District (1998) 65 Cal. App. 4th 435, 438. No matter how unlikely, a plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on a demurrer. Del. E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 604. A plaintiff must plead ultimate facts that acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of plaintiff’s causes of action. Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 542, 550. Here, Defendants are clearly aware of the allegations in this matter and the events which gave rise to them. Defendants are arguing corporate form shields two of the defendants from liability. Notably, Defendants’ pleading is conspicuously silent as to what the actual corporate relationship is here, even though that information is within its custody and control. The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED. No proposed order has been lodged as required by Local Rule 5.17(D). Defendant shall prepare the order.